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Abstract 
Accompanying the world-wide growth of multinational national enterprises (MNEs) 
has been an increasing interest in the broad issues of international human resource 
management (IHRM) and the management of people in MNEs. The uniqueness of 
managing human resources in an MINE is the need for the organisation to operate in 
more than one national context, possibly with three different categories of employees 
— host country, parent country, and third country nationals. Taking into account the 
unique elements of the external environment in each country of operation presents 
particular challenges for the design of human resources policies and practices, 
including compensation (remuneration) systems. 
This thesis focuses on the compensation systems of MINE subsidiaries, and uses the 
guiding question: 'How does the external environment of an MNE subsidiary 
influence the design of its compensation system?' Adopting a case study 
methodology, the thesis examines the compensation systems of five MNEs (over the 
period 1992-95) by studying pairs of subsidiaries and companies based in Australia 
and Singapore. Two of the MNEs were European owned, and three Australian 
owned. The Summary Profile of Experiential and Algorithmic Compensation Patterns 
of Gomez-Mejia and Balkin (1992) is applied to each pay system, and the similarities 
and differences analysed. Possible key external environmental differences and some 
internal characteristics that might have caused those similarities and differences in 
compensation design are then suggested for each MINE. In addition, the roles of the 
corporate and national head offices in the compensation design of their subsidiaries 
are explored. While not usually included as an external influence on human resource 
management of MNEs, the MINE head office does form part of the integrated 
organisational network within which MNEs operate. 
The external factors receiving specific attention for their impact on subsidiary 
compensation design are employment legislation, industrial relations systems, 
economy and incomes policies, and national culture. While the thesis analyses these 
attributes separately for simplicity, it is recognised that they are largely interdependent 
(Jackson & Schuler, 1995), and that it is impossible to rigorously determine the 
impact of each variable and its interaction with others. The main outcome of the 
thesis is, therefore, a discussion leading to an explanatory framework on the influence 
of the external environment and the MINE head office on MINE subsidiary 
compensation systems, together with some propositions grounded in the existing 
literature and case study findings. The thesis concludes with a consideration of the 
implications of the findings for strategic THR.M theory and practice, and further 
research. 
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Glossary of Terms 
Accord 
Annual statements of accord between the Australian Labor Party (ALP) and the 
Australian Council of Trade Unions covering a range of economic, industrial and 
social objectives during the period of office of the ALP Government. 
Australian Workplace Agreement 
In the Australian context, a new type of non-union agreement which can be 
individually or collectively negotiated. 
Award 
A legally binding pronouncement by an industrial tribunal on the rates and conditions 
of employment for an industry, company, workplace or occupation. 
Annual Wage Supplement 
A bonus used in the Singapore context. Is also referred to as the '13th month' bonus. 
Bargainable Employees 
A term used to denote those employees who can be legally be represented by a union 
for the purposes of negotiating a collective agreement. 
Collective agreement 
A term used in Singapore to represent an agreement negotiated by a company with a 
union and ratified by the Industrial Arbitration Court. 
Check-off 
An arrangement by a union with an employer whereby union subscriptions are 
deducted at source from wages and salaries of union members. 
Central Provident Fund 
The compulsory fund in Singapore into which employers and employees pay a fixed 
percentage of salary. This acts as the main source of pension funds for employees. 
Industrial Employee 
Usually used in Australia to mean shop—floor or blue collar staff 
Minimum Rates Award 
An award in Australia which sets out the legal minimum pay which has to be paid to 
an employee for a particular job classification. 
National Wage Case 
Used in the Australian context to describe the principal national wage review 
conducted periodically by the Australian Industrial Relations Commission, usually in 
the form of a test case by national unions, employers and the federal government 
representatives. It may result in the Commission setting the principles for 
compensation systems nationally and/or the awarding of pay rates for certain sectors 
of the economy. 
X X V 
National Wages Council 
In the Singaporean context, is the tripartite committee which meets annually (usually 
in May) in Singapore to make recommendations to Government on what criteria 
compensation systems in Singapore should follow in the year 1 July to 30 June. 
Over-award Payment/Rate 
A rate of pay in an Australian workplace which exceeds the award rate allocated to a 
job classification by an industrial tribunal. It may only be given when the award is a 
minimum rates award. 
Paid Rates Award 
An award in an Australian workplace which specifies the actual pay rate which a 
person must be paid for a job classification and which must not be supplemented by 
over-award payments. This is compared to a minimum rates award which can be 
augmented at the workplace level by an employer. 
Pay As You Earn 
In the Australian context, normally refers to direct tax deducted from 
weekly/fortnightly/monthly salary. 
Preference Clause 
A clause in an Australian award which gives preference for employment to union 
members before non-union members. 
Salary Sacrifice 
The structuring of a compensation package for employees in an Australian workplace 
to maximise their disposal income without increasing the cost to the employer. It is 
usually involves making deductions from gross salary prior to the deduction of income 
tax. 
Superannuation 
Term used in Australia to mean pension scheme. It may be a bulk sum or annual 
pension. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
The Research Question and its Rationale 
Australian industry is showing increased interest in international markets, especially in 
Asia (Kabanoff, 1996). While there are growing numbers of Australian off-shore 
international businesses, the Business Council of Australia (BCA) (1993:154) has 
exhorted management to 'dramatically increase the number of Australian companies 
that are global players' to generate an 'outward orientation' for the economy. Major 
Australian organisations such as Telstra. BHP and Lend Lease are now responding to 
this challenge (Stace, 1996a;1996b;1996c). The reluctance to locate off-shore has 
sometimes been due to the ease of selling in home markets or the perception that an 
international division was either an 'attractive side-bet' or a 'distractive nuisance' 
(Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1991:5). Australian business has often perceived that investing 
in Asia might be more risky or less lucrative than investing in the United States or 
Europe — perhaps understandably in the light of the recent Asian economic crisis 
(Economist, 6 December, 1997). While the Asian region now absorbs about 60 per 
cent of Australia's total exports — about twice the level of 30 years ago (Edwards, 
O'Reilly & Schuwalow, 1997) — much of this growth is due to export sales rather 
than off-shore investment into Asia (p.82). 
Australia's change in international focus and the continuing growth and strategies of 
MNEs have led some researchers to describe the world as a 'global village' (Doktor, 
Tung & Von Glinow, 1991:259). Unfortunately, academic research has not always 
accompanied the growth of international business at the same rate, as international 
studies are often perceived as 'specialized' and 'esoteric' (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1991). 
However, two-thirds of the world's chief executives expect employment and revenue 
to be increasingly created outside their company's home country (Adler & 
Bartholomew, 1992a); if they are correct, there is a real need to ensure that 
international human resource management (IHRM) research does not lag behind the 
needs of existing and potential multinational enterprises (MNEs). Because they 
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recognise that FIRM strategies can constrain the implementation of global strategies, 
top mangers recognise how 'critical' effective human resource management is to 
'global success' (Adler & Bartholomew, 1992a:551). Indeed, human resource 
management (HRM) is increasingly being recognised as a 'strategic lever' with a 
marked effect on a firm's economic performance (Becker & Gerhart, 1996). 
However, it is likely that the knowledge of what to do in managing IHRM is greater 
than how to do it. This situation is pertinent in that Adler and Bartholomew 
(1992b:53) emphasised: 'transnational firms also need a transnational human resource 
system and transnationally competent managers'. Any attempt to set up a business 
overseas thus creates unique challenges for management, not the least of which are to 
formulate BRM policies to support internationally competitive business strategies 
(Dowling & Welch, 1991), and to train managers in international management skills 
(Yetton & Craig, 1995; Edwards, O'Reilly & Schuwalow, 1997). 
This research study is about MNE compensation or 'remuneration', the latter term 
being more commonly used in Australia. Since the former term is more commonly 
used in the literature, it will be used in the thesis. The central guiding question for the 
study is: 
How does the external environment of an MNE subsidiary influence the design of 
its compensation system? 
The objective of the research is to explain the relative influence of elements of the 
external environment on subsidiary compensation design with a view to generating an 
explanatory framework and set of propositions based on case study findings and 
existing literature. 
The external environment has always been acknowledged as being a significant 
influence on BERM strategies and practices (Cascio, 1992; Fisher, Schoenfeldt & 
Shaw, 1990; Devanna, Fombrum & Tichy, 1984; Carrell, Kuzmits & Elbert, 1989; 
Hall & Goodale, 1986; Whitfied, Marginson & Brown, 1994), and the variety of 
national external environments faced by the MINE is one key difference in managing 
an MINE compared with a domestic organisation (Schuler, Dowling & De Cieri, 
1993). The importance of external factors in an IFIRM context has even led some 
writers to recommend that they should be 'part of the HRM model rather than 
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external influences on it' (Brewster, 1995:13). The FIRM literature usually asserts 
that the elements for consideration should include the economy/market, 
demographics, social values, laws, and national and international competitors, labour 
market conditions, technological changes, government influences, unions, industry 
characteristics, and national culture (Schuler et al., 1992; Jackson & Schuler, 1995; 
Milkovich & Boudreau, 1997). A set of internal factors will also have an effect on the 
performance of the MNE (Schuler, Dowling & De Cieri, 1993). These may include 
the technology, structure of international operations, head office international 
orientation, size, life cycle stages, international business strategy, and experience in 
managing internationally (Schuler, Dowling and De Cieri, 1993; Jackson & Schuler, 
1995). The internal and external characteristics are likely to be interlinked— a point 
acknowledged in the integrative framework of IHRM of Schuler, Dowling and De 
Cieri (1993). 
It is recognised that the 'search for determining environmental factors and their 
systemization has been a matter of controversy ever since comparative management 
research was established in the sixties' (Pieper, 1990a:20). Listing the factors to 
establish national differences in HRM, Pieper (1990a:20) argues, 'only has a heuristic 
character and is by no means systematic'. Researchers tend to list what they believe is 
important in explaining the national FIRM without any theoretical underpinning — 
'the overall problem of comparative management research' (p.20), and may assert that 
culture is at the heart of national differences with the argument that 'since nations 
have different cultures, they consequently have different legal, political and industrial 
relations systems' (p.21). A general social theory of some kind is therefore needed to 
overcome some of the problems of the lack of theory of existing comparative studies. 
This will require 'a new level of cooperation between the disciplines' (p.22). This 
study is not intended to generate 'a new social theory'. It therefore conforms with 
recent attempts to analyse national differences without an over-riding theory of 
comparative HRM or IHRM. Precedents are provided in the nine country studies 
edited by Pieper (1990b). 
While thus acknowledging that classifying and separating elements of the external 
environment is arbitrary and a simplification, four research questions (based on 
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important elements suggested by the literature) guide the data collection and 
development of the explanatory framework and propositions. They are: 
Research Question 1 
How does employment legislation affect the compensation design of an MNE 
subsidiary? 
Research Question 2 
How does the economy affect the compensation design of an MNE subsidiary? 
Research Question 3 
How does national culture affect the compensation design of an MITE subsidiary? 
Research Question 4 
How does the industrial relations system affect the compensation design of an 
II1NE subsidiary? 
While the role of the head office of the MINE is not usually on the list of external 
environment elements, it is included in this study because the 'relevant' environment 
for an MINE affiliate not only includes the external environment but also 'elements of 
the corporate network as well' (Birkinshaw & Morrison, 1995:731). In addition, the 
international orientation of the head office of the MINE is also likely to have an effect 
on the choice of compensation design in the subsidiary and the management of the 
external environment (Schuler, Dowling & De Cieri, 1993). This orientation thus 
forms the basis for the fifth research question. 
Research Question 5 
How does the MNE head office international orientation affect the choice of 
compensation design in a subsidiary? 
Like Adler and Boyacigiller (1996) and Teagarden and her 13 joint authors (1995), a 
qualitative and case study research methodology is used in this study (Wright, 1996; 
Yin, 1989). There is support for such an approach in international management 
studies at their current state of development (Mendenhall, Beaty & Oddou, 1993), 
and for more descriptive research on national differences in international 
compensation (Gerhart & Milkovich, 1992). The compensation practices of five pairs 
of MINE subsidiaries and companies which operate in Australia and Singapore are 
analysed, and the similarities and differences are utilised to generate some 
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propositions about the effect of the external environment on MINE subsidiaries 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967). 
Apart from the greater Australian business involvement in Asia, there are strong 
reasons for choosing MINE compensation as a research subject. They relate to (1) the 
sheer scale of MINE activity, (2) the need for more research on reward systems, (3) 
the shortage of research on international compensation, especially outside the United 
States, Japan and Europe, (4) the state of IHRM generally, and (5) the paucity (with 
some notable exceptions) of THRM studies in Australia. 
Taking MNEs first, the management of the global workforce is on such a scale that it 
hardly requires justification for study, although the exact statistics on MNEs seem 
open to debate. Feltes, Robinson and Fink (1992) record that in 1988 2,000 US 
MNEs had 21,000 foreign subsidiaries in 121 countries, and the US Government 
estimated that there were 2.2M US citizens living abroad in that year. Arvey, Bhagat 
and Sales (1991) stated that the US expatriate workforce, spread over 130 nations, 
was more than 80,000. Emmott (1993) speaks of the world economy accommodating 
around 35,000 MNEs operating with more than 170,000 affiliates, while Ahrens 
(1996) posits that there were at least 50,000 MNEs in 1996; however, 80 per cent of 
production was concentrated in about 500 of them (Enderwick, 1989). Of course, 
MINE investment is not just one-way; foreign direct investment in the United States, 
for example, is said to be worth 300,000 new jobs each year to the economy 
(Hoffman, 1988). 
Of general compensation work, in 1985 Kerr stated that 'surprisingly little research 
has investigated the design of reward systems' (p.155). The literature concentrated 
on reinforcement, behaviour modification and motivation theory, but 'little theoretical 
or empirical work' existed which could assist in designing compensation systems 
which were 'aligned with organisational strategy and structure' (p.155). Von Glinow 
(1985:193) echoed this, indicating that 'virtually no research' had examined the 
'structural and procedural aspects of reward system practices' and that with the 
exception of Kerr (1985), 'no work has been done on the strategic implications of 
designing reward systems'. The lack of research on a contingency theory tying the 
compensation systems to operating objectives and strategies is surprising, since 
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'labour costs comprise more than half the costs in most organisations' and because 
pay systems were 'pivotal in terms of motivation, attraction, and retention of human 
resources' (Balkin & Gomez-Mejia, 1987a:169). Existing work had stressed the 
techniques of pay systems rather than their purposes. 
Milkovich (1987:277) agrees with Balkin and Gomez-Mejia (1987a) that 'pitifully 
little is known about the pay-offs of specific pay policies and practices under varying 
conditions'. There was a need to study the compensation in both successful and 
unsuccessful companies and the various roles which pay played in BRM. According 
to A.W.J. Thomson's Foreword in Pay Systems and Productivity, the British text by 
Bowey, Thorpe and Hellier (1986:vii), payment systems were a 'much maligned and 
underestimated subject of analysis'. This was due to their lack of appeal and to their 
complexity. This is perhaps manifested in a 'lack of documentation' on the impact of 
external and economic factors on the compensation system (Butler, Ferris & Napier, 
1991:122). Despite the wide attention that executive pay has attracted across many 
disciplines, little is known about 'how the internal and external firm contexts affect 
both the level and design features' of executive compensation (Gomez-Mejia, 
1994:206). While a number of theories seek to explain why firms choose a particular 
pay policy and what the implications of this might be, Ehrenberg (1990:3-S) believes 
'there is very little empirical evidence on whether compensation policies have their 
intended incentive effects at either the individual or corporate level'. 
Gerhart and Milkovich (1990:663) continue along the same lines in that 'little is 
known ... about the extent, nature, determinants, and performance implications of 
differences in compensation system designs'. It would be interesting to know whether 
particular pay strategies were linked to chosen selection and development systems, 
and 'which combinations work best under different conditions' (p.687). We should 
examine why compensation decisions change, and whether other HRM decisions 
typically accompany them (p.687). Do we know why compensation strategies remain 
constant in some cases even when the external environment makes it advisable to 
change them? Is the reluctance to change because organisations give greater weight 
to internal consistency than to environmental change? Indeed, Milkovich (1988:284) 
stresses that 'more attention needs to be devoted to the effect of environmental jolts 
on compensation strategies'. It could be that an organisation will only reorientate its 
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strategies after major changes in the environment. Much comPensation research 
'simply did not refer to the possibility of environmental effects' (p.281). 
In addition, it appears that empirical work is 'greatly needed' on the long-term 
success of firms that modify their compensation systems in response to environmental 
change compared with those that do not (Gerhart & Nfilkovich, 1992:532). To an 
extent this exhortation is being heeded. Gomez-Mejia and Balkin (1992:5) observe 
that some industrial psychologists perceived a major trend for the 1990s to be the 
incorporation of 'contextual factors' when analysing the impact of HRM practices 
such as 'business strategies, organisation's history, firm size and structure, economics 
and legal conditions, and host country'. Within this context, 'compensation offered 
the greatest potential from a strategic perspective in terms of theoretical development, 
empirical research, and application' (p.5). In summary, then, one might start with the 
two significant questions posed by Rajagopalan and Finkelstein (1992:127) in their 
study of the environment and rewards: 'How do firms with different strategies adjust 
their compensation systems in response to environmental change?' and 'How does the 
environment affect compensation systems directly?' 
Transferring the focus to the need for international compensation research, Arvey, 
Bhagat and Sales (1991) could find 'very little comparative literature' on 
compensation (p.369) and on comparative employee (fringe) benefits packages 
(p.39'7). Moreover, Gomez-Mejia and Balkin (1992:106) agreed that most work on 
reward strategy had concentrated on domestic economies and that 'very little is 
known about how international forces affect pay strategies and their effectiveness'. 
Although there have been many studies on national culture and management since the 
1980s, the link with compensation had been mainly neglected. The implications for 
the practitioner were that 'those responsible for formulating and implementing 
transnational compensation strategies must rely on clinical judgement, gut feeling, 
heuristics, and perceptual data' (Gomez-Mejia & Welbourne, 1991:41). This 
deficiency had earlier been perceived by Milkovich and Newman (1984), who 
suggested that the trend towards using more expatriates in MNEs would require a 
more strategic approach towards international compensation. 'The apparent 
"firefighting" and non-systematic practices .. [then] .. in vogue .. [were] .. particularly 
dismaying' (p.492). As late as 1999, the same authors were still lamenting that 
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international compensation in MNEs was not being sufficiently linked to competitive 
advantage and performance concerns (p.523). 
Townsend, Scott and Markham (1990) summarised the benefits of a greater 
understanding of international pay practices as being the better meeting of employee 
expectations and an optimisation of the compensation budget. They noted the 'dearth 
of both theory and empirical research on cross-national compensation practices' 
(p.667). Pay studies, whether by local or foreign authors, had focused on a single 
country, but there was a need for 'true cross-national research with compensation 
practices as the foci of interest' (p.668) — a call repeated by Permings (1993) in 
relation to comparative executive reward systems (p.277). Indeed, the amount of 
research on 'the interaction between compensation strategy and national culture and 
level of economic development of an economy was practically nil' (Harvey, 
1993b:785). This deficiency is being rectified by recent work from Newman and 
Nollen (1996), and, to a greater extent, by Schuler and Rogovsky (1998). While the 
IFIRM practitioner literature is replete with advice on expatriate pay, development of 
'global compensation systems' for expatriates, foreign nationals and third country 
foreign nationals has been seen as 'one of the most important issues' facing IHRM 
(Harvey, 1993:56). 
The particular justification for studying compensation in MNEs is that decisions of 
affiliates on HRM issues such as selection, compensation and training and 
development are 'particularly important' for MNEs (Martinez & Ricks, 1989:466). 
Yet 'few studies have examined the extent to which multinational parent companies 
actually influence these human resource decisions' (p.466). Furthermore, there is a 
paucity of HRM studies from the subsidiary's viewpoint (Erden, 1988), an area which 
is now being researched (see, for example, Roth & O'Donnell, 1996). The head 
office perspective is more common. There is little research in strategic international 
HRM 'on the major linkages between the corporate office and foreign subsidiaries' 
(Milliman, Von Glinow & Nathan, 1991:321). Going deeper into the infrastructure, 
Roth, Schweiger and Morrison (1991:370) detect the need to include 'management 
systems, communication processes, and managerial philosophies rather than only 
formal macro-organizational structures' in MNE studies. 
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On a more general IHRM level, Rosenzweig and Singh (1991:340) asserted that 
'consideration of the international dimension of organizational environments' 
remained 'relatively unexamined', with Kochan, Batt and Dyer (1992:310) agreeing 
that the current research in 1HRM 'defines the field too narrowly' and suggesting that 
explanations of varying HRM practices across nations had to combine micro and 
macro levels of analysis (p.311). Adler and Bartholomew (1992a:552) asked whether 
global HRM research was 'leading or lagging the needs of business', Adler having 
advocated in the previous year (with Boyacigiller 1991:283) that international studies 
should not be relegated to being 'a subsidiary of domestic research'. This obviously 
has implications at practitioner level where there is concern that executives pick up 
global perspectives and skills (Brandt, 1991; Overman, 1989; Ronen & Shenkar, 
1988). Practitioners have not been helped by a literature on international FIRM that 
was 'still rather sparse' and by the disciplines of international and comparative 
management which were 'not well developed' as at 1988 (Dowling, 1988:1-232/3). 
Consequently, Enderwick and Barber (1992:278), in a review of IHRM in the 1990s, 
saw a 'pressing' need for research of HRM strategies in MNEs and 'a strong case' for 
more research on HRM policies in new international business firms — a view which 
gets support from Jackson and Schuler (1995:257), who recommend that future work 
on HRM should reflect 'the reality of rapid globalization' and 'international context of 
large organisations'. IHRM has been judged now as a 'field of scientific inquiry' that 
is arguably no longer 'in its infancy' reflecting the development of 1HRM issues, 
studies of HRM in MNEs, and accompanying theories in the last decade (Dowling, 
Welch & Schuler, 1999:iv). 
The final reason for choosing a topic on MNEs operating in Australia and Singapore 
is that 1HRM research in Australia is a reasonably new discipline. In this area, 
Dowling has been the leading contributor (see for example, Dowling, 1988), followed 
by Welch (see, for example, Dowling, Welch & Schuler, 1999) and, more recently, De 
Cieri (see, for example, Schuler, Dowling & De Cieri, 1993). Others are now 
entering the field (for example, Fish [with Wood], 1996, Hutchings, 1996 and Zhu, 
1997). By comparison, the study of comparative industrial relations in Australia has 
been regularly offered in university industrial relations departments and has resulted in 
more academic writing, although the research is mainly focused at national levels 
rather than at foreign subsidiary and workplace levels (see, for example, Decry & 
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Mitchell, 1993; Frenkel, 1993a). However, recent work by Frenkel (1994) on MNEs 
is more workplace focused. With American THRM research now being almost 
matched by the output from European writers, a need has been noted for more IHRM 
studies of organisations in Japan. Australia and the Pacific Rim (Brewster & Scullion, 
1997). 
The Concepts Used in the Study 
This study concentrates on one aspect of THRM and aims to fulfil its objective by 
providing: 
• a description of the compensation systems of five MNEs by studying 
pairs of selected subsidiaries and companies based in Australia and 
Singapore; 
• an analysis of the similarities and differences in those compensation 
systems; 
• an identification of the key external HRM environmental differences in 
Australia and Singapore that might cause those similarities and 
differences; 
• an indication of the role of corporate head office in the design of the 
MNE compensation systems in the five MNEs; 
• a discussion of the findings in order to generate a framework and 
propositions for further research 
Throughout the thesis, a number of key concepts will be used which it would be 
appropriate to define in brief at this stage. They are 'MINE', 'compensation', 
'employee benefits', and `MNE head office'. Other concepts (e.g. 'national culture' 
and 'collective agreements') will be explained as the study progresses. 
Academics have not reached an agreed definition of MNEs, mainly because there is a 
vast range of organisations with international connections encompassing differing 
degrees of overseas investments, partnership and ownership (Fatehi, 1997). Terms in 
international management include 'global, world, transnational, international, 
supernational, and supranational' (Czinkota, Ronkainen & Moffett, 1994:356). In 
this thesis, the terms 'international, multinational, global and transnational' will be 
used interchangeably. There are precedents for this approach (see Phatak, 1992). 
Some authors use the term multinational corporation (MNC) (see Asheghian & 
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Ebrahimi, 1990), but 'multinational enterprise' (MNE) will be used here to cover all 
businesses that produce and distribute 'products or services globally without regard to 
political boundaries' (Taoka & Beeman, 1991:628). Thus 'MINE' incorporates 
multinational 'corporations', 'firms' and 'companies'. The operational definition of 
an MNE preferred in this project is that of Sundaram and Black (1992:733) because it 
tries to incorporate a range of past attempts and includes the influence of external and 
internal organisation. It is: 
An MNE is any enterprise that carries out transactions in or between two sovereign entities, 
operating under a system of decision making that permits influence over resources and 
capabilities, where the transactions are subject to influence by factors exogenous to the home 
country environment of the enterprise (Sundaram & Black, 1992:733). 
The term 'subsidiary' and 'affiliate' will be used synonymously to mean an 
incorporated businesses in a foreign country in which the parent MINE holds an 
ownership position. It is accepted that the term 'subsidiary' is also complex in that it 
may be no more than a 'legal shell' (Birkinshaw & Morrison, 1995:750). Its role may 
vary by strategy, structure, autonomy, dependence on the parent MINE and inter-
subsidiary contact, and be defined either by the parent MNE, the affiliate itself, or a 
combination of the two (Taggart, 1996). The term 'subsidiary' or 'affiliate' is also 
used to describe the business units located in Australia of two of the three Australian 
MNEs that were selected for comparison with Singaporean units, as explained in 
Chapter 4. 
Reference will be made to the 'home country' — the location of the parent MINE, 
which is Australia in three of the five pairs of cases in this study. The fourth and fifth 
pairs are either European owned major oil and food companies, with separate 
subsidiaries in both Australia and Singapore. The 'home country' and corporate head 
offices for the oil and food MNEs are in Europe. The 'host country' is the foreign 
country in which the MINE has made an investment — taken as Singapore in the three 
Australian owned MINE cases in this thesis, and Australia and Singapore in the two 
MNEs of European origin. 
Because of this study's reliance on American literature, the term 'compensation' as 
defined by Milkovich and Newman (1996:5) is preferred. This refers to 'all forms of 
financial returns and tangible services and benefits employees receive as part of an 
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employment relationship'. While 'remuneration' is used frequently in the Australian 
literature, 'compensation' is used interchangeably in some recent Australian 
publications (see, for example, O'Neill, 1990a; Schuler et al, 1992). The term 'pay' is 
occasionally employed in the thesis for variety, but usually to reflect 'compensation' 
as defined by Milkovich and Newman (1996:5) rather than to mean financial return 
only. An alternative term that might have been considered for general use is 'reward', 
which British writers Armstrong and Murlis (1988) claimed was more appropriate 
than 'salary' because it reflected the direction in which the development and 
management of compensation was going. The concept 'compensation system' is 
utilised to encompass all compensation decisions whereas compensation 'structures' 
are defined as 'pay relationships among different jobs in a single organisation' 
(Milkovich & Boudreau, 1997:474). 
It has been usual compensation practice to sub-divide 'total compensation' into 
intrinsic and extrinsic rewards (Schuler et al., 1992). This project will exclude 
intrinsic rewards (job factors), concentrating on extrinsic rewards, which can be 
separated into wages, salaries or benefits (Schuler et al., 1992) or, synonymously, 
direct and indirect compensation (Milkovich & Newman, 1984). The direct aspect 
will include wages, salaries, base pay, award pay, performance related pay, and non-
recurring rewards such as prizes and profit-sharing. Indirect compensation (benefits), 
for operational purposes, will mean pay for time not worked or off-the-job (such as 
various types of approved leave — holiday [vacation], compassionate, maternity, 
educational), protection (medical care, life insurance and superannuation [pension]) 
and some employee services and allowances (such as free uniforms, meal allowances, 
employee share schemes, long service awards, loans, cars, travel allowances, mobile 
telephones and social/recreational club memberships). A number of employee 
services and allowances have been excluded to restrict the project to an appropriate 
size for analysis. These exclusions include annual leave loading (in Australia), 
provision of car parking facilities, journal subscriptions, spouse travel, drug and 
financial counselling, subsidised canteens, income splitting, relocation and transfer 
assistance, library, holiday homes, child minding, language classes and various 
physical facilities such as sporting venues, and music at work. Unique benefits 
because of expatriate status, such as paid air fares for home leave, and children's 
educational expenses, are also excluded. 
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The provision of benefits varies in Singapore and Australia, possibly reflecting the 
adaptation to the different social and legal frameworks; comment will be made on the 
general trends in each country. The research will apply to full-time employees only in 
the five MNEs. It will usually exclude the compensation arrangements for contractors 
in Australia and Singapore, and 'foreign workers' in Singapore who are paid on 
different criteria, except where information was made available. 
There are some problems operationally and conceptually in distinguishing between 
compensation strategies, philosophies, programs, policies, processes and practices, 
although Schuler (1992:20) argues that all these concepts comprise 'strategic [HRMII 
activities'. The emphasis in the project will be on compensation practices. Less 
attention will be given to policy alternatives and 'system architecture' (Becker & 
Gerhart, 1996), although 'compensation system' will be mentioned frequently as a 
generic term to cover policies and practices. In the thesis, the term 'strategic 
compensation' will not be used unless it is the subject of an author under review. 
Milkovich (1988), in a seminal work, suggested that strategic compensation rested on 
three tenets: (1) the fact that compensation practices varied across organisations and 
employee types, (2) that managers and employees had a choice of system, and (3) a 
supposition that if compensation systems 'fitted' the organisation and environment, 
the organisation would be more effective (p.263-4). However, there is some 
difficulty in defining 'strategic compensation'. Not all compensation decisions (such 
as choice of job evaluation system) are strategic. Milkovich (1988) therefore defined 
strategic compensation decisions as those 'that are critical to the performance of the 
organization' (p.265). He pointed out that these critical policy choices might vary 
according to employee group. The significant ones were the level of pay, 'internal 
versus external orientation, hierarchy ..., and the basis for the pay structure, reward 
mix, and the basis of rewards' (p.267). Later, Milkovich and Newman (1996:13) 
stated that 'compensation strategy' was a combination of an organisation's policies on 
internal consistency, external competitiveness, employee contribution, and 
administration of pay. While some of the internal issues are addressed in this project, 
its main concentration is on the external environment, so no assumption is made about 
whether compensation systems 'fit' business strategies. 
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For the comparison of the external environments of Australia and Singapore in 
relation to compensation, the following elements in Chapters 5 and 6 (some of which 
will be defined later in the thesis) will be analysed: 
• physical geography and history 
• demography 
• economy 
• system of government 
• labour force 
• national culture/social features 
• employment law 
• industrial relations institutions 
• unions 
• national incomes policies. 
As mentioned above, the thesis analyses the external environmental features 
independently for simplicity, and it is recognised that they are largely interdependent 
(Jackson & Schuler, 1995). Moreover, the MINE is an Interorganizational network' 
of head offices and sets of subsidiaries 'embedded in an external network' (Hannon, 
Ing-Chung, & Bih-Shiaw, 1995:532). Indeed, De Cieri and Dowling (1995:135) are 
of the view that in cross-cultural organisational behaviour research, an integration of 
macro and micro approaches (a `meso paradigm') is more suitable for reflecting the 
'integrative capacities' in MNEs. It is also accepted that where there are a large 
number of variables relative to the number of case studies, it is 'impossible to 
rigorously determine the impact of each variable and its interaction with others' 
(Frenkel, 1993b:8). Nevertheless, the selection of these elements not only conforms 
with the HRM literature already quoted, but also with the typologies of external 
characteristics receiving treatment in the current international and comparative 
management literature (see, for example, Tayeb, 1996, and Mockler & Dologite, 
1997). Another example is Phatak (1992:8) who sees the 'international environment' 
as the 'total world environment' and 'the sum total of the environments of every 
nation in which the company has its foreign affiliates'. These could be examined by 
considering the legal, cultural, and economic environments and the political system. 
Critical environmental constraints in some of the early comparative management 
literature were variously categorised as either educational-cultural, sociological-
cultural, political and legal, and economic variables (Farmer & Richman, 1965) or 
socio-economic, educational, political, and legal and cultural (Negandi & Prasad, 
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1971). Farmer and Richman (1965:6) considered that in international management 
the external environment had received 'inadequate attention'. Comparisons of 
management in different countries would 'prove rather useless' unless the external 
environment was also included (p.6). In this thesis, the Farmer and Richman practice 
of synonymously using the terms 'environmental' or 'external factors', 
'characteristics', 'variables', and 'constraints' is followed (p.26). Furthermore, the 
'constraint' may signify that an environmental feature is constraining managerial 
effectiveness in a particular country to varying degrees, or may be seen in a positive 
light in that the external factors may produce 'dominant patterns of managerial and 
firm behavior' which may not necessarily have an adverse effect on managerial 
effectiveness (p.27). The same argument could be made in relation to compensation 
in MNEs. 
As the orientation of the MNE head office forms the basis for a research question, 
'head office' is in need of definition. Despite the term 'NINE head office' initially 
appearing to be unambiguous, the type and structure of the MINE usually determines 
the role and location of its head office (Nohria & Ghoshal, 1997). In these case 
studies, the term 'corporate head office' will mean the world head office for the entire 
MINE. As mentioned before, in two of the case studies, these are situated in Europe. 
One of these MNEs (Oilco) has separate subsidiary companies registered in Australia 
and Singapore which are quite large in their own right. In the second major MINE 
(Foodco), the Australian subsidiary in turn possesses a wholly owned affiliate in 
Singapore. In this instance, reference will be made to the separate Australian head 
office. Some of the MNEs that were founded in Australia have their world head 
office located in Australia, but also have regional offices in Singapore with some 
influence over the Singaporean subsidiaries as well. The complexity of another case 
studied (Metalco) was the owning of the Singaporean affiliate by an Asian based 
holding company which was, in turn, owned by a major Australian MINE at the 
project cut-off date. These issues will be clarified and revisited in the case study 
discussions, but their existence demonstrates that MNEs rarely conform to the 'pure' 
structures of the textbook. 
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The Study in the International Human Resource Management Context 
At this stage, the research is now placed in the context of international management, 
or more particularly, against a background of international HRM (IHRM). Dowling, 
Welch and Schuler (1999:4-5) distinguish EHRM from domestic HRM by six 
additional factors: 
• more HR activities 
• need for a broader perspective 
• more involvement in employees' personal lives 
• changes in emphasis as the workforce mix of PCNs and HCNs varies 
• risk exposure 
• more external influences. 
These additional activities cover taxation, relocation and translation services in 
particular (Dowling, 1988). The more complex external influences included dealing 
with host country governments, economies, business practices, labour relations, 
taxation and health and safety (p.1-241). Ricks, Toyne and Martinez (1990:220) 
noted that [FIRM research had other unique features compared with domestic BRM, 
and that these were 'the interaction of differing cultural-based norms and value 
systems within single organisations, the cross-national transfer of management and 
management skills, and ways of learning and responding to stimuli because of socio-
cultural differences'. Thus the challenge for IHRM was to research BRM issues that 
spread across different nations to help organisations to achieve objectives in both the 
home and host countries. While IFIRM has been observed as a 'slowly emerging ... 
field of inquiry within ... FIRM' (Dowling, 1989:66) and a 'field in its infancy' 
(Laurent, 1986:92), in recent years a considerable 1HRM literature has emerged, 
although there may not yet be 'clear answers ... to managing human resources in the 
context of the global organization' (Schein, 1986:169). There is even debate about 
the term `IHRM' as De Cieri and Dowling (1999) suggest that recent IFIRM research 
and theory development 'make it more useful and accurate' to refer to 'strategic 
BRM in MNEs' than 'strategic EHRM' in order to highlight the FIRM differences 
between domestic and international organisations (p.307). 
Ricks and colleagues (1990:221) classify existing IHRM research under four main 
headings: 
• management of host-country human resources 
• cross-national transfer and management of human resources 
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• cross-national interaction of human resources 
• comparative FIRM. 
The study of the management of host-country HRM may mean the analysis of 
domestic issues in a single international setting with more emphasis on 'cultural, 
economic, legal and sociological factors' (p.221). Although the results cannot be 
generalised to other nations, they can be useful to MNEs located in or considering 
locating in those countries. Examples of this type of research are the Brewster and 
Bournois (1991) study of HR.M in Europe; Teagarden, Butler and Von Glinow's 
(1992) analysis of strategic HRM in Mexico; Holton's (1990) work on HRM in 
China; and Pucik's (1984) article on white collar HRM in large Japanese 
manufacturing firms. 
Host country studies are few in number compared to the literature on cross-national 
transfer and management of human resources. Ricks, Toyne and Martinez (1990:221) 
refer to 'traditional and non-traditional lines of inquiry' in this area. The traditional 
study of expatriates has included their recruitment and selection (Scullion, 1992; 
Baliga & Baker, 1985; Hays, 1974), the adjustment and influence of the expatriate's 
spouse (Black & Gregersen, 1991; Black & Stephens, 1989), expatriate socialisation 
(Black, 1992), compensation (Young, 1973; Hodgetts & Luthans, 1993a; Bishko, 
1990), productivity (Bird & Dunbar, 1991), loyalty to the MNE (Banal & Reisel, 
1993), expatriate reduction (Kobrin, 1988), and utilisation of expatriates in 
environments of differing complexity (Boyacigiller, 1990). The non-traditional 
research in cross-national transfer and HRM has, according to Ricks, Toyne and 
Martinez (1990:221-2), focused on the HEIM of international joint ventures (LIVs) 
and foreign subsidiaries, HR planning and 'the integration of HRM into the overall 
effort to match strategy and structure'. Examples can be quoted such as Miller, 
Beechler, Bhatt and Nath's (1986) research on global strategic planning and HRM, 
the problem of strategic variety and strategic control in MNEs (Doz & Prahalad, 
1986), the impact of parent firm characteristics on personnel patterns in LTVs (Zeira & 
Shenkar, 1990), strategic management of HRM in an LTV (Gerlinger & Frayne, 1990) 
and organisational life cycles and strategic [FIRM in MNEs (Milliman, Von Glinow & 
Nathan, 1991). 
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The study of cross-national interaction of human resources can be facilitated through 
the analysis of IJVs and MNEs (Ricks, Toyne & Martinez, 1990). The two parents of 
the IN of various nationalities and the diversity of the MINE provide the opportunity 
to research 'the interaction of socio-culturally influenced management processes and 
practices' (p.222). The authors believe that this area of IHRM has 'considerable 
promise' for greater comprehension of the way BRM can affect the behaviour and 
strategy of MNEs and IJVs (p.222). Literature that might be mentioned in this 
context includes Dunning and Morgan's (1980) work on employee compensation in 
US MNEs and indigenous firms, JaM's (1990) inquiry into the HRM of Japanese 
firms, their foreign subsidiaries and their locally owned counterparts, and Von Glinow 
and Teagarden's (1988) examination of the issues involved in transferring HRIVI 
technology in Sino-US cooperative ventures. 
The final classification of IHRM research suggested by Ricks and colleagues (1990) 
was comparative HRM. They emphasise that this is 'clearly distinct' from [FIRM and 
is essential to the development of [FIRM theory building and testing (p.223). The 
essence of comparative FIRM is to investigate how BRM differs in each country as a 
result of different 'cultural, social, economic and legal reasons' (p.223). If one argues 
that industrial relations and HRM are inextricably linked, there is a growing interest in 
comparative industrial relations, which can assist in IHRM theory (for example, 
Locke, Kochan & Piore,1995; and the Australian texts by Bamber & Lansbury, 1998, 
and Deery & Mitchell, 1993) as well as recent comparative HR.M texts such as Pieper 
(1990b), Hollinshead and Leat (1995), Moore and Jennings (1995) and Harzing and 
Van Russeveldt (1995), and smaller comparative studies on issues such as pay 
structures (Brown, Hayles, Hughes & Rowe, 1980), managerial values (At-Twaijri, 
1989), and wage structures in developing African countries (Iwuji, 1980). 
In terms of Ricks, Toyne and Martinez's (1990) four categories, this project could be 
classified as one of cross-national interaction of human resources, in that it studies the 
compensation practices of MNEs in the context of different socio-cultural 
environments. It could also be suggested that it investigates one aspect of strategic 
[FIRM, a concept defined by Schuler, Dowling and De Cieri (1993:720) as: 
human resource issues, functions, and policies and practices that result from the strategic 
activities of multinational enterprises and that impact the international concerns and goals of 
those enterprises. 
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Finally, in placing this study into some kind of typology, we observe that Adler (1983) 
listed six types of cross-cultural research: (1) parochial, (2) ethnocentric, (3) 
polycentric, (4) comparative, (5) geocentric, and (6) synergistic research. Parochial 
studies are 'designed and conducted in one culture by researchers from that culture' 
(p.32). Ethnocentric studies are designed in one culture and then repeated in a second 
culture (p.33). Polycentric research is usually 'individual domestic studies conducted 
in various countries around the world' (p.34). The aim is to explain management 
practices against a particular cultural background. The comparative study tries to 
highlight the similarities and differences across two or more cultures with the focus on 
culturally specific or universal behaviours and practices. Geocentric research 
examines the management of MNEs and 'tends to be a search for similarity across 
cultures' (p.42). Synergistic studies address the issues of cross-cultural interaction in 
MNEs. One difference between synergistic and other studies is the focus in 
synergistic studies on 'understanding and generating the best balance between 
culturally specific (pluralistic) and universal (culture general) patterns of management 
and organization' (p.43). 
In concentrating on MNE compensation systems only, this study could perhaps be 
classified as having ethnocentric, polycentric, comparative research and geocentric 
aspects. It is ethnocentric in the sense that Western compensation concepts such as 
internal consistency and external competitiveness are assumed to be issues of concern 
in Singapore as well as Australia (Milkovich & Newman, 1996). It is polycentric in 
that it tries to explain the design of compensation systems within specific cultures — 
the Australian and Singaporean national cultures. It is comparative in that it will 
show how the two cultures differ and how compensation practices are similar or 
country-specific, or even diverging or converging. It is geocentric in that it addresses 
a small fraction of the primary question 'How do multinational organizations 
function?' (Adler, 1983:31). It looks for similarities of compensation systems and 
philosophies of the MNEs across the two countries. 
In a more recent piece, Adler and Bartholomew (1992a) used a typology for 
classifying publishing trends in international organisational behaviour (OB) and FIRM. 
They divided them into (1) foreign national articles that focus on OB and HRM in one 
foreign country, (2) comparative international articles that compare OB or HRM 
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issues in two or more countries, and (3) international interaction articles that focus 
'on the interaction among organisation members from two or more countries' (p.553). 
This project falls into the second category. In addition, it would perhaps be further 
assessed by Adler and Bartholomew (1992a) as 'cultural', as national culture is 
expressed explicitly in the research. Whether it makes any difference is another issue 
(p.554). The research should also be categorised as a cross-national study, as 
opposed to a cross-cultural study, because of its sole concentration on Australia and 
Singapore. Although for the sake of analysis each country is assumed to culturally 
homogeneous, it is accepted that this may not be the case in either Singapore or 
Australia (Nasif, Al-Daeaj, Ebrahimi & Thibodeaux, 1991). The terms 'culture' and 
'nation' are also used synonymously (Adler & Doktor, 1991 [1986]). Finally, it 
should not be concluded that there is only one possible approach to comparative 
HRM (Arvey, Bhagat & Sales, 1991), but it can be agreed that the area lacks a strong 
theoretical foundation (Pieper, 1990b; Boxall, 1995). 
Structure of the Thesis 
The first chapter has provided an overview of the topic and the broad rationale for the 
study. It has argued that the growing number of MNEs and the pressure on countries 
to develop overseas interests has created a need for IHRM research to help businesses 
formulate appropriate strategies, policies and practices. Research on compensation 
systems is very limited in the area of international environments and the way those 
environments affect MNE pay systems at micro subsidiary level. The main question 
chosen for this thesis is therefore about how the external environment influences 
compensation systems of affiliates. The objective of the project was outlined in the 
context of international human resource management typologies, and the main 
definitions provided. 
Chapter 2 is the first of two chapters on literature relevant to the topic. It is devoted 
to domestic compensation and the external environment. The second literature 
chapter (Chapter 3) then considers the unique compensation issues of MNEs, and the 
main research underpinning the _thesis, namely — the effect of the external 
environment on MINE compensation design. It concludes with a summary of the 
research on MINE head office control of FIRM in subsidiaries. 
Chapter 4 puts the case for using comparative case studies as the main methodology 
in this study, places the MNE case studies examined in context, provides detail on the 
semi-structured interview approach and outlines some of the problems involved and 
the shortcomings of the research. 
Chapters 5 and 6 discuss Singaporean and Australian compensation in their local 
contexts. The environmental contexts include description of the demography, 
government, labour force, social factors and industrial relations institutions and 
structures. These chapters conclude with a discussion of the significance of the 
external environment for compensation design of an MINE subsidiary based in 
Singapore and Australia. As the case data collection cut-off date was 31 August 
1995, only the environment up to 1995 is described, the assumption being that events 
beyond these dates would not have directly affected management's decisions on 1995 
compensation arrangements'. However, where national Singaporean data were 
available only for 1996, these are provided as well.. This material is unreservedly 
descriptive in nature and intended to be a 'thick description' of the MNEs' contexts to 
supplement the cultural description (Boyacigiller & Adler, 1995:27). It is necessary 
to highlight the main differences between Australia and Singapore. 
Chapters 7-11 record the findings of the case study fieldwork, and the following 
chapter (12) returns to the research questions, combines the findings, and compares 
the Australian and Singaporean compensation systems in general terms. Chapter 13 
concludes the thesis with further discussion of the literature and cases leading to the 
development of a subsidiary compensation systems design framework, some 
suggested propositions on the effects of the external environment on MINE subsidiary 
compensation design, a discussion of the implications of the study for SIHRM theory 
and practice, and recommended issues for further study. 
As would have been expected, the has been a change in the Singaporean economy since 1995, and the Asian recession 
dramatically slowed the economic growth rates and increased the levels of unemployment and retrendmients in the country in 
1998. The growth rate was 6.9 per cent in 1996 but increased to 7.8 per cent in 1997, unemployment being measured at 1.8 
per cent. In contrast, the economic growth rate for 1998 was only 1.5 per cent (Foo Siang Luen & Kwth Toi Chi, 1999). 
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CHAPTER TWO 
DOMESTIC COMPENSATION AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
Internal Influences on Domestic Compensation 
This research is about the effect of the external environment on the compensation 
systems of MNE subsidiaries and so takes as a given that an organisation is an open 
system that constantly interacts with the environment of which it forms a part 
(Mullins, 1993). An understanding of organisations is thus impossible without 
consideration of the impact of environmental forces (Katz & Kahn, 1966) and their 
role as one of the main determinants of organisational functioning (Aharoni, Maiman 
& Segev, 1981). To provide a foundation for the understanding of the interaction of 
the external environment on MNE compensation in Chapter 3, some literature on 
domestic compensation is reviewed first. 
Corporate Strategy and Compensation 
At the beginning of this thesis, compensation was defined as 'all forms of financial 
returns and tangible services and benefits employees receive as part of an employment 
relationship' (Milkovich & Newman, 1996: 5). It had been a 'prominent research 
subject' in the scientific management days (1900-30) (Lawler, 1971:7), but (as of the 
1970s at least) compensation practices were not research-based, and tended to be 
'faddish and assumptive' (p.6). They often seemed to have developed by chance or to 
have been copied from other organisations. Gomez-Mejia (1988b), in an editorial for 
the Human Resource Planning journal, stated that traditional studies of compensation 
had been dominated by tools and techniques towards an objective of attracting, 
retaining and motivating. This had been superseded by the 'compensation strategy 
movement' which advocated a linking of reward systems to other functions in the 
organisation and held that 'innovative pay strategies should be used to reinforce 
corporate and business unit strategies' (page unnumbered). Concepts such as 'equity' 
and 'time-based pay' were being replaced by newer approaches, but in general, the 
literature on compensation decisions has arguably been limited to 'one or two 
theoretical vantage points' (Bartol & Martin, 1988:361). This deficiency is being 
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rectified to some extent by the more recent work of researchers such as Gomez-Mejia 
and Balkin (1992), and Gerhart (with Minkoff & Olsen, 1995, and with Trevor & 
Graham, 1996). 
Not everyone agrees, of course, on how important compensation systems are in an 
institution, nor that compensation is at 'the heart' of the employment relationship 
(Gerhart, Minkoff & Olsen, 1995). Beer, Spector and Lawrence (1984:115) posit 
that compensation has only 'limited potential for developing commitment and 
competence', that it 'should be used far less frequently as a leading policy area' in 
FIRM, and that it should be considered as a support for other areas of FIRM such as 
'employee influence, human resource flow, and work systems' (p.147). Against that, 
Gomez-Mejia (1988a:496) sees the compensation system as a 'crucial' HRM system 
that emits powerful signals, shapes organisational climate or culture, reinforces 
institutional structures and encourages employees to behave in a way 'they perceive 
leads to rewards they value'. Milkovich and Broderick (1991:25) also assess 
compensation as a 'critical piece of human resource strategy', which, because of its 
visibility and importance, can help to identify and encourage achievement of corporate 
goals. Facilitating organisational objectives and reinforcing structure are now seen as 
significant objectives for a compensation system in addition to the normal 'attract, 
retain and motivate' goals (Schuler et al., 1992:256-7). Other compensation 
objectives may include complying with the law, influencing behaviour, maintaining 
efficiency, and controlling labour costs — illustrating that there may be as many lists 
of pay objectives as there are employers, and a different set for each business unit 
(Milkovich & Newman, 1996:13). 
Up to 1987, little research had been done on tying the compensation systems to an 
organisation's objectives, strategies and environment via a contingency model (Balkin 
& Gomez-Mejia, 1987). The earliest (if conflicting) US literature on organisational 
strategies and compensation systems concentrated on executive salaries (Gomez-
Mejia & Wiseman, 1997). The integration of HRM strategy (including compensation) 
into corporate strategy is a more recent idea. Success in achieving intended strategies 
depended on a 'match' or 'fit' between strategy, organisation and environment 
(p.171). Doing this via a contingency framework might assist in understanding the 
24 
effect of macro-organisational issues on compensation• strategies (Gomez-Mejia & 
Wiseman, 1997). 
In an earlier piece, Gomez-Mejia (with Bandit, 1992) asserts that the strategic 
approach to compensation is based on two assumptions. The first is that pay systems 
must be analysed in the context of internal and external factors. The other is that an 
organisation has a vast range of compensation policies and practices from which to 
choose and each of them may have strategic implications (pp.34-5). The emphasis on 
'may' here is important as not every compensation decision is 'strategic'. Others have 
developed this point (see Gerhart & Milkovich, 1990). 
Strategic decisions involve top management, demand allocation of many company 
resources, 'have major consequences for multiple businesses or fillictions, are fitture 
orientated', need external environmental analysis and 'affect the long-term 
performance of an organisation' (Gerhart & Milkovich, 1990:668). Decisions on pay 
level and pay mix are likely to be strategic, whereas 'narrow tactical questions' such 
as choice of job evaluation systems are not. Milkovich and Broderick (1991:25) 
propose that the following five decisions 'are considered strategic by those who 
manage compensation systems': (1) compensation's role in total HRM strategy, (2) 
the level and mix of the pay, (3) the internal structures, (4) the criteria for and 
frequency of pay increases, and (5) the administration of the schemes. The four steps 
for developing compensation strategy were therefore (1) analysing compensation 
implications of business strategy, the external environment and the internal HRM 
conditions, (2) developing a strategic compensation position, (3) determining any gap 
between desired strategic position and current position and putting the compensation 
system into practice, and (4) implementing strategies (p.30-1). 
The external environment is thus just one of a number of variables which might 
determine a particular compensation strategy. In Milkovich's (1988:274) view, the 
three main clusters of determinants are (1) organisation strategies (corporate, business 
unit and human resources), (2) internal environment (organisation types, internal 
labour markets, size, profitability and labour costs/total costs), and (3) external 
environment (legislative changes, labour unions, and product and labour market 
pressures). However, our understanding of compensation strategy 'is incomplete at 
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best' (Gomez-Mejia & Welboume, 1988:185). The research is sparse on the 
connection between organisational strategy and the appropriate compensation system. 
Most commentary is prescriptive in nature (p.185). A large company may have a 
mixture of pay policies, but 'each firm has its own unique history and tradition, 
cultural norms, and socio-technical and environmental forces that shape the 
framework within which the compensation system must operate' (p. 186). Hufnagel 
(1987:93) also argues that while strong links between corporate and compensation 
strategies are advocated, many of the recommended frameworks use 'borrowed 
typologies' of strategic types. There is no unified view of strategy and strategic 
planning approaches. 
Despite the deficiency of the evidence, Butler, Ferris and Napier (199 1 :124) advocate 
linking the compensation system to the strategic business plan because 'corporate 
performance and effectiveness will increase'. It may also force managers to 'think 
more long—term'. A 'well-designed' compensation system should thus 'be developed 
from the business strategy' (p.125). However, research on how the various 
components of strategy could be integrated was limited as, thus far, it had centred on 
organisation life cycles and diversification (p.127). One difficulty in all this, of course, 
is at what stage compensation should be linked to strategy. For example, Schuler and 
MacMillan (1984/1986) suggest HRM issues such as compensation practices should 
be considered at the corporate strategy formulation stage rather than at the 
implementation stage. The overall strategy should be formulated, the HRM strategy 
agreed and then the appropriate practices developed. Practices such as staffing and 
compensation created the competitive edge for the company. Although this is fine in 
theory, in practice managers might not follow the compensation policies which are 
linked to business objectives (Kramar, 1992). 
Nevertheless, according to Gomez-Mejia and Balkin (1992:147), there are three 
propositions that have 'strong empirical support': 
• The greater the fit between compensation strategies, overall corporate strategies, 
and SBU strategies. the greater the contribution of the pay system to firm 
performance. 
• Firm performance improves as the congruency among the pay system, 
organizational characteristics, and environmental forces increases. 
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• 	The more pay strategies deviate from the 'ideal' compensation strategies 
appropriate for various organizational strategies, the lower their contribution to 
firm performance. 
These propositions are based on contingency theory, which has already been applied 
to organisation theory and FIRM policies and practices. In getting a suitable internal 
and external match, it is obvious that there is no universally ideal compensation 
system, as corporate strategies and contexts change over time and require different 
systems, and so should be flexible and able to adjust as circumstances change 
(Gomez-Mejia & Balldn, 1992). The corporate and SBU strategies can operate an 
'independent as well as a combined influence on various pay strategies', but the closer 
the fit between pay strategies, organisational features and the environment, the better 
the firm's performance (p.119). The concept and testing of fit in compensation, 
however, is problematic. Gomez-Mejia and Welbourne (1988:187), for example, in 
discussing the concept of fit between corporate, business unit and FIRM strategy state 
that because research is limited, 'we cannot be certain that fit is actually optimal for 
corporate success'. It may not be desirable to have a static fit. The reality may be 
more like 'shooting a moving target' (p.187). Compensation strategies may soon 
become obsolete as conditions change, one of these being the position in the life cycle. 
Life Cycles and Compensation 
Another contingency framework in the compensation literature is the linking of pay 
systems to organisational or product life cycles (Gerhart & Milkovich, 1992). Balldn 
and Gomez-Mejia (1987) saw the organisational life cycle as a helpful concept in the 
linking of business strategy and compensation systems. They suggested different pay 
strategies at the stages of start up, growth, maturity and decline, and concluded that 
'the choice of specific pay incentives is constrained by the stage of the organisation 
life cycle' (p.245). Their study of the high-technology industry showed that most risk 
was assumed in the early stages, so stock or cash bonuses and stock options would be 
appropriate short- and long-term incentives. 
According to Kochan and Barocci (1985:245), 'compensation policies evolve in 
response to changes in the external environment and in the needs of the organisation'. 
They argue that when an organisation or business unit is young, compensation levels 
and policies tend to be ad hoc and driven by the external labour market. As the 
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organisation matures, more formality occurs and, once established, fundamental 
changes in the system are difficult to make. Newman (1988:200) suggests that in a 
declining product market, organisations should attempt to motivate 'special groups' 
with boundary-spanning functions linking external and internal environments. 
Compensation should 'reward behaviours that support those key interactions with the 
environment' (p.203). Most boundary—spanning roles, such as sales, are usually 
excluded from job evaluation and may be paid on incentives. Scientists may also be 
excluded from job evaluation and be 'more closely associated with external market 
rates' (p.203). In the same way that a compensation strategy should suit declining 
product markets, Balldn (1988:207) advocates the design of compensation policies to 
'reinforce employee behaviours associated with rapid growth such as risk—taking, 
innovation and teamwork'. Basing his views on existing literature, he suggests in a 
normative way that incentives are more important in total compensation for fast-
growing firms than in mature companies (p.210). Base salary and benefits have to be 
at a competitive level. Job evaluation may be used, but may be less useful for fast-
growing firms. Profit-sharing and employee stock ownership are recommended for a 
rapidly growing firm, as are short-term pay incentives to encourage risk-taking and 
innovation. The key contributors such as successful sales people or research scientists 
should be rewarded with stock options. 
In a study of 33 'high-tech' and 72 'traditional' (non high-tech) firms and business 
units, Balldn and Gomez-Mejia (1987) proposed initially that the product life cycle 
was likely to be 'the key determinant of compensation strategies and their 
effectiveness in achieving organisational goals' (p.171). A 'high-tech' firm was 
defined as a company with an annual budget for research and development of five per 
cent or more of its sales revenue. The results of the study (p.180) supported strongly 
the hypotheses that incentives will form a greater proportion of the compensation 
package and be more effective at the growth stage of the product life cycle. High-
tech firms, in particular, had a higher incidence of incentive use at their growth stages, 
compared with non-tech firms. 
Milkovich (1988) analysed the literature on life cycles and compensation and found 
that applications of life cycles commenced with executive pay and then extended to all 
levels (p.277). As a generalisation, for the start-up phase, compensation writers 
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usually recommended 'an external market emphasis, low base/high incentive mix,, low 
benefits, and an administrative style that emphasises decentralization and informality' 
(p.277). However, the cycle/compensation strategy approach can be criticised on a 
number of fronts (Milkovich, 1988; Butler, Ferris & Napier, 1991). It is very 
deterministic. There may be more than one compensation system suitable for a given 
cycle, and firms may have several products at different stages of life. Moreover, the 
literature often fails to distinguish between product, market, industry, and company 
life cycle. There may also be the research operational problem of knowing what cycle 
an organisation is in and when it has moved from one stage to another. 
Diversification and Compensation 
The other main theme of compensation research using a contingency approach has 
been on diversified organisations — an area more closely aligned to this thesis. Meals 
and Rogers (1986:89) state that academic compensation literature and company 
reward programs have focused on principles applying across the whole firm and have 
not attended to different strategies required for the business units. Miles and Snow 
(1984/1988) agree that the HRM system has to be tailored to the demands of business 
strategy and that in a multi-business organisation, the BRM department may have to 
'offer services to a wide variety of strategic business units' (p.42). In reality, HRIVI 
systems have lagged behind structure and strategy, possibly because HRM 
departments were preoccupied with techniques or not involved in the design of 
organisations and the formulation of business strategies (p.51). 
Milkovich (1988:275) is of the view that with diversification, 'organizations are 
classified as to whether they exhibit a single, dominant, related, or unrelated product 
diversification strategy'. The diversification appears to be 'an outcome' of a 
corporate strategy which encourages operation in a number of product markets. 
Because of the need to integrate the various businesses, compensation can serve as a 
'key integration and control mechanism' (p.275). In this regard, Gomez-Mejia and 
Welbourne (1988) state that compensation decisions can be controlled by corporate 
headquarters or delegated to various plants, divisions or business units. Centralised 
pay might work best when corporate expertise is required and 'when internal equity is 
emphasised' (p.180). Decentralised compensation systems are preferable 'when local 
innovation is beneficial' and when business units have different life cycles or operate 
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in different markets. Economies of scale or ease of administering legal requirements 
may also result in centralisation. Norbum and Miller (1981) recommend that top 
management compensation systems be linked to the 'characteristics of the strategic 
manager whose job it is to achieve that performance' (p.23). The characteristics 
needed in a particular strategic situation should be reinforced by the compensation 
system. In a diversified company that has a number of different business unit 
strategies, the use of a unified job evaluation system (such as a Hay system) is 
inappropriate — a conclusion which would be worth testing. 
Two oft-quoted research findings on diversification and compensation are those of 
Kerr (1985) and Napier and Smith (1987). Kerr (1985:157) reviewed previous 
research, which suggested that as firms become more diversified, managerial 
performance tended to be judged exclusively on financial grounds and on the SBU 
rather than on overall corporate performance, and that more autonomy was given to 
the SBUs. This, in turn, affected the compensation systems. Napier and Smith 
(1987) found little support for the hypothesis that more highly diversified companies 
used more objective (as opposed to subjective) performance criteria for corporate 
managers. But they did find that the proportion of corporate managers' pay received 
as bonuses increased as a firm diversified. In more highly diversified companies, the 
bonuses were not necessarily based on objective criteria as might have been expected. 
They might have been more at the discretion of top management to encourage 
'executive compliance with top management's expectations of performance' (p.200). 
Two larger-scale projects were undertaken by Balkin and Gomez-Mejia (1990:162) 
and Gomez-Mejia (1992). In the first study, Balkin and Gomez-Mejia (1990:162) 
concluded that both corporate and SBU strategies were 'determinants of several SBU 
pay strategy dimensions'. The 1990 study found that as a company changes from a 
growth to a maintenance strategy, 'there is a change in pay mix', with a smaller 
incentive proportion of the package, but with higher benefits (p.163). Finally, 
Gomez-Mejia's 1992 research gave support for a hypothesis that single-product firms 
would be more effective if they adopted a more Experiential compensation. 
Algorithmic compensation seemed to be more successful among dominant–product 
firms, among related–product firms and among steady state firms (i.e. those that grow 
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internally). 	Experiential compensation made a 'greater contribution to firm 
performance among evolutionary firms' (p.385). 
In summary, the research suggests that there are links between different corporate and 
SBU strategies and various compensation systems. However, some caution is needed 
in generalising from the results because in most cases, the findings are based on 
survey or interview data, are limited to managerial and professional staff, and are 
usually based on the perceptions of HR/compensation managers (Milkovich, 1988). 
Furthermore, we cannot say that the corporate and SBU strategies are the sole 
determinants shaping compensation strategies, so the concept of management 'choice' 
in compensation is evident. 
Management Choice and Compensation 
Compensation strategy has been defined as: 
the repertoire of pay choices available to management that may, under some conditions, have 
an impact on the organisation's performance and the effective use of its human resources 
(Gomez-Mejia & Welbourne, 1988:174) 
The success of the choice 'depends on those contingencies facing the organisation at 
any given time' (p.174). Watson (1986: 75) argues that the concept of strategic 
choice, which was highlighted by Child (1972), goes beyond the 'deterministic 
implications of contingency thinking'. It emphasises the freedom of choice which 
'key decision-makers are said to have'. Decision-makers are members of the 
dominant coalition who accept that there are constraints in factors such as size, 
technology and environment, but who believe that these factors can be changed or 
manipulated. Milkovich and .Broderick (1991) posit that the major issue arising from 
environmental impact is the amount of choice available to managers. While legislation 
reduced the 'viable choices', organisations do develop various options within 
environmental constraints which may develop competitive advantage (p.31), with the 
choices manifesting themselves in compensation policies. 
Several writers have discussed the various options in compensation choices and have 
listed them as a set of continua. Examples are Schuler et al.'s (1992:274) eight pairs 
of continua and Gomez-Mejia and Balkin's (1992:61) Algorithmic and Experiential 
Profile. For instance, Schuler et al. suggest that the level of base pay may be 
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influenced by the choice between internal and external equity (i.e. internal relative 
worth or external market rates). Lawler, in a 1986 paper, went further and focused 
on nine strategic issues on pay which required 'strategic choices' (p.217). They 
included the process issues (communication and participation) as opposed to the 
mechanics; paying the job as opposed to paying the person; seeing compensation as an 
end in itself rather than a means towards organisation effectiveness; internal as 
opposed to external equity; a centralised as opposed to a decentralised system; the 
role of performance in compensation; and the compensation mix. However, Gomez-
Mejia (1992:392) is right in suggesting that firms are not faced with a set of 'bipolar 
choices', but rather a set of interrelated compensation decisions about, say, the degree 
of Algorithmic or Experiential dimension they wish to pursue. Nevertheless, 
managements do not have unlimited choice and so may not optimise their situation. 
The degree of choice may vary across SBUs according to the technology, nature of 
the work and workforce, and rate of change of the environment. 
From the empirical research on compensation choice, two studies can be highlighted. 
First, Weber and Rynes (1991) studied the way compensation managers used 
information on job pay rates, market survey rates and job evaluation results in making 
job decisions, and whether 'differences in compensation strategies and organisational 
demographics such as size and industry influenced job pay decisions' (p.88). They 
found that job evaluation and market information figured significantly in job pay 
decisions by compensation managers, but 'increases in market rates produced larger 
increments in pay assignments than did equivalent increases in job evaluation points' 
(p.103). Managers did not 'appear to attach as much importance to job evaluation as 
they [did] to market surveys', but this may depend on whether the managers are 
internally or externally orientated; internally focused ones place almost as much 
weight on job evaluation results as they do on market surveys (p.103). Furthermore, 
organisational demographic factors such as size and industry seemed to be less 
significant in job pay decisions than 'current pay market rates, internal job structure, 
and pay strategies like market position and orientation' (p.104). 
Second, in a study of longitudinal data on about 14,000 top and middle level 
managers and 200 organisations, Gerhart and Milkovich (1990) argued that 'theories 
focusing only on individual, job, and environmental factors [were] not sufficient for 
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explaining organisational differences in compensation practices' (p.683). They found 
that 'organisational differences in pay mix were not only larger than those for base 
pay but also less well explained by industry, size, and financial performance' (p.685). 
The pay mix also seemed to be related to subsequent financial performance, whereas 
base pay level was not (p.685). One explanation is that organisations have less 
discretion in altering pay levels because these might lead to product price increases, 
while the pay mix can be adjusted without major cost implications. The pay mix 
relationship to financial performance could be explained by pay levels being 
insufficient to affect performance whereas a risk element in the pay might do so. The 
authors advise some caution in interpreting their results because many factors 
determine a return on assets (p.686). 
Despite the internal constraints, it could be argued that compensation can more easily 
be 'manipulated and directly controlled by management' than most other HRM 
variables (Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992:6). In addition, 'most organisations have 
considerable discretion' in decisions on pay allocation, principles and administration 
(p.13). The deterministic models of pay design based on equity, labour markets, job 
evaluation and salary surveys overlook the unique pay issues facing each firm, the 
environmental and business context and the likelihood of different pay systems in 
different parts of the organisation (p.13). Most assumptions of traditional 
compensation systems are inappropriate for managerial, executive, research and 
professional ranks (p.13); the systems are inflexible, accused of gender bias and 
subject to error (e.g. salary surveys) (pp.14-15). The success of the choice of 
compensation system depends on how well the choice allows the . firm to 'cope better 
with contingencies' and is integrated with the firm's corporate strategy (p.35). 
In place of the traditional approach to compensation, Gomez-Mejia and Ballcin 
(1992:18) advocate a strategic approach in which the reward system is customised 'to 
withstand jolts coming from the rapid shifts within and outside the firm' and which is 
used flexibly to achieve business objectives. Compensation must be an 'integral part 
of strategy formulation', play a major part in strategic decision making, reflect the 
wishes of the firm's major constituencies and stakeholders (p.19) and be assessed 
against the firm's performance (p.20). Contingency theory, strategic choice, industrial 
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economics, transaction cost, and strategic employee group models might serve as 
useful foundations to examine this. 
Summing up, the message is that there is no ideal compensation system for all 
organisations at all times. The exhortation is to choose the compensation strategies 
that will give a company competitive advantage. The difficulty is knowing which 
choices from the menu to make. Each organisation is likely to have a unique 
compensation system, but is unlikely to optimise its choices because of internal and 
external influences beyond its control. Yet compensation decisions might be more 
firmly under the control of management than the other HRM choices. From the 
limited research undertaken, ensuring a fit between compensation and corporate and 
SBU strategies and the features of the internal and external environment is more likely 
to result in higher performance. But the practical difficulties of achieving this are 
somewhat daunting. 
Other Organisational Influences on Compensation 
While corporate and business unit strategies are very significant influences in 
compensation design, the effect of other internal and external features should not be 
under-emphasised. It has been accepted that pay decisions are affected by external 
influences such as the economy, product and labour markets, government regulations, 
and unions (Ivfilkovich & Boudreau, 1997). The internal influences are the other 
systems in the organisation (including HRM) and the characteristics of its employees 
— this latter factor being 'too easily and too often overlooked in designing pay 
systems' (p.458). There is also evidence that human resources strategy will have an 
impact on compensation policies (Milkovich, 1988). 
Milkovich (1988:279) quotes two empirical studies in which HR strategies were 
shown to affect compensation policies. Wils and Dyer (1984) (quoted in Milkovich, 
1988) examined the link between 22 business unit strategies and HER strategies and 
concluded that compensation systems were perceived to vary in importance by line 
managers within the context of HR strategies according to the business strategies 
being pursued, such as growth, profit or stabilisation. 'Compensation was not seen as 
among the most important activities in either profit or stabilized units' (p.279) 
although it was in the growth units. De Bejar and Milkovich (1986) (quoted in 
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Milkovich, 1988:279) surveyed 129 business units across various industries and found 
that 'the nature of incentive compensation emerged as a critical dimension'. Not so 
critical were other aspects of the compensation system. Both studies should be 
treated with reservations, as they were confined to managerial compensation, and are 
of limited general application. 
Research on direct links between compensation systems and an organisation's culture 
is limited (Milkovich & Boudreau, 1991). The relationship of pay and organisational 
culture was alluded to by Lawler (1971:276), who suggested that the pay system 
'must fit the human relations climate of the organisation'. Pay secrecy, for example, 
might be related to how authoritarian or participative an organisation was. Piece-
work does not have to be accompanied by an authoritarian climate, but 'it is difficult 
to convince people they can be democratically administered' (p.277). The technology 
and structure of the organisation may also affect pay systems (p.278), so the 
compensation system has therefore to be tailor-made to fit the characteristics of the 
organisation to be effective (p.281). 
Von Glinow (1985) provided a typology for the design of compensation systems for 
professionals within four cultural contexts — the apathetic, caring, exacting and 
integrative cultures — arguing that there was a 'close interdependence between an 
organisation's reward system and the culture in which it is embedded' (p.192). The 
compensation could be 'symbolic of the culture' on some occasions, although the 
culture could also be perceived as the reward by professionals. The core values of the 
organisation are reflected in the way compensation is selected and distributed. The 
culture may also affect the criteria for reward distribution and the way the system is 
administered (p.194). However, compensation may affect culture through its 
influence on 'motivation, satisfaction and membership' (p.195). According to 
Muczyk (1988:225), 'the US has become an "instrumental" culture'. Employees will 
therefore only be effective when they are convinced of a link between effort and 
performance, and between performance and rewards. This could be compared with 
Japan's 'normative' culture, where workers work hard because of their values to 
'embrace loyalty and postpone gratification' (p.226). 
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The mention of employee values raises the issue of motivation and incentives 
(performance-linked pay) — the variable component of the compensation system. In 
the context of this study, the important question is whether and why similar incentives 
are used internationally, and with what effect. The assumptions of management about 
factors that might enhance motivation are also interesting. Bolle de Bal (1990) notes 
a re-emergence of wage incentives throughout the industrialised world, especially 
those wage incentives which are linked to corporate profits. This has been due to the 
trend towards flexibility, deregulation and the increasing autonomy of employees. 
Similar trends are occurring in centrally planned economies. This led Bolle de Bal to 
suggest that 'there signs of a gradual convergence between the capitalist and socialist 
socio-economic systems, as evidenced by the evolution of performance-linked 
remuneration' (p.51). Pay-for-performance may be used by employers to generate a 
new attitude in employees to link their effort to performance and ultimately to profits 
and thus 'eschew unreasonable demands' (p.52). 
After even a cursory reading of the numerous available articles on incentives, it is 
evident that most ignore external factors which might affect the operation and design 
of a scheme and that the adjective 'strategic' is very rare. The exceptions include 
Salter (1973) who advocated the 'tailoring' of incentives to strategy, as 'incentive 
compensation policy' was 'intimately related to corporate strategy' (p.101), and 
'strategic impact merit pay', which is a type of variable compensation. It 'ties the 
duration of raises to the strategic impact of employees' work' (Newman & Fisher, 
1992:39). But a review of research on merit pay by Heneman (1990:253) concluded 
that there was 'very little research' on the relationship between environmental 
characteristics and merit increases (p.236). Yet the environment arguably has a 
significant impact at times. There is evidence that employees in demand in a tight 
labour market might receive larger merit pay (p.254). The profitability of a firm may 
determine the size and manner of pay–outs, and the nature of the product market's 
volatility 'may have an influence on the type of incentive plan that is used' (p.254). 
The size of merit awards for non-unionised staff has also been used as a benchmark in 
negotiations by US unions for unionised employees (p.255). The major research on 
incentives in Britain by Bowey, Thorpe and Hellier (1986) discovered that 
government incomes policies in the 1970s renewed an interest in productivity 
incentive schemes. 
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Finally, there has been a range of research on the unique issues of technology and 
compensation, namely high-technology companies and R and D personnel. For 
example, Hannon, Milkovich, Gerhart and Friedrich (1990) studied more than 200 
firms over the period 1981-85 and found high-technology firms had higher base pay 
and greater bonuses, and made greater use of longer-term incentives. This applied 
across various industries and led to the notion that compensation decisions exhibited 
'strategic-like properties' which might be 'more aligned with organisation 
characteristics (e.g. R and D strategy) rather than industry patterns' (p.283). 
Appelbaum (1991: 27) also noted differences in compensation in US high-technology 
companies, concluding that they were different from other industries in that they 
offered four principal rewards: (1) a high incentive components, (2) stock ownership 
for all employees, (3) special incentives for key contributors, and (4) dual career paths 
to enable technical employees to parallel a managerial compensation progression. 
This does not altogether support Gomez-Mejia and Balkin's (1989) findings that 
individual-based compensation such as merit pay or individual bonuses were 
'perceived as less effective than aggregate incentive strategies for R & D workers' 
(p.431). Aggregate incentives were more likely to prevent R & D staff from 
resigning, gave them more pay satisfaction and were more motivating, but team-based 
bonuses were 'perceived as the most effective rewards in an R & D setting' (p.431). 
What has been summarised in this section is some selected general literature on 
compensation. The intention was to show the research on the range of internal 
variables which affect the design of compensation systems. Each of these may have 
some influence on the pay polices of an MNE subsidiary. We have noted that 
management has considerable choice of design, but this might be affected by the need 
to link compensation to corporate or SBU strategy, the stage in the organisation's life 
cycle, its diversified nature, the culture of the firm, the type of industry, the 
sophistication of its technology, or the kind of employee employed. The stage of 
empirical support for many of the propositions of this research has been described as 
'tentative' (Gerhart, Minkoff & Olsen, 1995:535). 
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External Influences on Domestic Compensation 
Any thorough explanation of compensation systems must include consideration of the 
external environment, but much research on rewards 'simply [does] not refer to the 
possibility of environmental effects' (Milkovich, 1988:281). The conceptual 
difficulties involve deciding which elements specifically influence a compensation 
system, classifying the dimensions, and identifying which aspects of compensation are 
affected by external changes. 
The External Environment and Compensation 
As Anthony, Perrewe and Kacmar (1996:385) point out, 'while many external 
environmental factors impact an organization, only a few have a direct effect on an 
organization's reward system'. There is a large literature on the effects of unions and 
broad industry characteristics on compensation, but there is little coverage of whether 
organisations facing similar industry and external environments have different reward 
systems (Milkovich, 1988). Milkovich's analysis (1988) is limited to unions and 
legislation, but his text written with Boudreau (1991), includes product and labour 
markets as well (p.446). Anthony and colleagues (1996) also confine their discussion 
to the product and labour market and government regulations. Schuler et al.'s (1992) 
text refers to the labour market only (p.261). 
There is little empirical work on environmental dimensions that might affect 
compensation of the business unit. Gomez-Mejia and Balkin (1992:74) list these as 
the degree of uncertainty, volatility, the magnitude of changes, and the complexity of 
the environment, but they are not further developed in the text. The issue of concern 
is whether environmental constraints 'allow any room for managers to adopt different 
compensation policies in support of their business strategies' (Milkovich & Broderick, 
1991:31). Legislation restricts choice, but companies take different options in 
responding to changes in legislation, society and technology. It is perhaps easier to 
perceive reactions at a macro level in the practitioner literature rather than at micro 
level. The move towards 'new pay' in the United States has been attributed mainly to 
the major changes in the external environment (Schuster & Zingheim, 1992). The 
'new pay' is supposed to reflect 'an understanding of organisational goals, values, and 
culture and the challenges of a more competitive global economy' (p.xi). It has been 
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driven by factors 'initiated from outside the organisation' (p.24). Kanter (1987:12) 
also posits that the move from 'status' to 'contribution' as the basis for compensation 
was due to a large number of 'economic, social and organisational changes'. In 
another 1987 piece, she attacked the traditional US pay schemes, saying 'these old 
arrangements' were no longer appropriate because of economic, social and 
organisational changes. The changes in compensation systems across Europe, 
particularly the `decollectivisation of pay' have also been attributed to the pressures of 
the external environment in the form of demographic and structural change, economic 
uncertainty and unemployment, and the weakening of the unions (Filella & 
Hegewisch, 1994). 
Other specialist compensation writers have recognised the influence of the external 
factor on compensation systems over a much longer time span. Belcher (1974: 365— 
6) notes that compensation changes have been due to economic changes through 
'continued industrialization', changes in the mode of living, 'the social determination 
of the way in which compensation is distributed', and collective decisions of 
government, management and labour. The government, in particular, through income 
tax legislation and incomes policies, has had considerable influence (as have unions) 
on the growth of employee benefits (p.36'7). Other constraints include culture, the 
economy, other organisations, and 'the size, structure, technology and climate of the 
organization' (p.448). Mahoney (1989/1992) compares traditional and non-
traditional compensation designs against environmental change. He argues that job-
based compensation 'emerged with industrialisation', the factory system and mass 
production (p.338). Lawler in Pay and Organization Development (1981:222) 
reported that in the 1970s the three most critical social trends for compensation were 
the rise in international competition, 'the enormous growth' in the regulation of 
private business, and the likely lower economic growth and higher inflation in the 
1980s. To demonstrate the relationship, he attempted a matrix (p.226) listing social 
changes in the workforce, organisation, and the environment on one axis and pay 
practices (divided into the four dimensions of individualised pay, open and defensible 
decision processes, performance-based pay and more egalitarian systems) on the 
other. 
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One of the few empirical studies on compensation and the general industrial 
environment, by Rajagopalan and Finkelstein (1990), analysed the effects of the 
environment on the senior management compensation systems of 50 large US investor 
owned electric utilities. The electricity industry was deregulated after 1978 and the 
authors investigated the way in which this changed the degree of managerial 
discretion on policy options. The hypothesis was that the amount and type of 
compensation would vary with discretion (p.32). The results were that 'the greater 
the level of managerial discretion, the greater the amount of compensation paid to 
chief executive officers, the more common the utilization of performance-contingent 
incentive mechanisms, and the greater the proportion of incentive pay' (p.36). They 
also suggested that firms do change many aspects of senior management 
compensation in response to major changes in the environment and 'that changes in 
amount, type, and mix all tend to be consistent with the strategic orientation of the 
firm' (p.36). This supported the notion that when an organisation adapts to the 
changing environment, it adjusts its structural mechanisms as well as its corporate 
strategies. 
The conclusion from this discussion is that the general external environment does play 
a big part in compensation design, but at this stage the empirical studies, as opposed 
to the practitioner literature, are not numerous. More work has been done on specific 
elements of the environment. 
The Social Environment and Compensation 
Moving from the general environment to the specific, and starting with the social 
element, BRM texts have traditionally included comment on changes in the social 
environment as it affects FIRM. This usually includes demographic trends, labour 
force, racial composition, and family and worker value changes. The shifting family 
situation impinges on benefits such as child-care and parental leave, the ageing 
workforce on retirement schemes, and the changing nature of work and skill 
requirements on career ladders and compensation systems. 'The dramatic increase of 
women and minorities' in the US workforce meant that organisations had to 're-
examine policies, practices and values' (Fisher, Schoenfeldt & Shaw, 1990:22). 
Furthermore, `worklife is changing' (Carrell, Kuzmits & Elbert, 1989:27). Employees 
were not only just required to give 'a fair day's work', but also 'quality, innovation 
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and excellence'. In exchange, employees wanted participation in decision making, 
flexibility of hours and benefits such as 'child-care, EAPs and a healthy work 
environment' (p.27). 
Kochan and Barocci (1985) saw the shortage of jobs and career prospects in the 
1980s as putting pressure on compensation and career policies. There was much 
misinformation about whether worker values, attitudes and expectations had changed 
over time in the United States, and there was a lack of data 'tracking the history of 
worker views on a broad range of employment issues over substantial amounts of 
time' (p.49). There was no support for the view that the work ethic had declined in 
the United States, but workers did appear to have changed their expectations about 
work and careers (p.51). Survey data suggested that pay and benefits were still given 
high priority by employees in the United States, although control over the work 
environment and career prospects were also rated highly (p.52). However, empirical 
work on the work ethic was still proceeding. 
In the Australian context, Kramar, McGraw and Schuler (1997:70) emphasised three 
shifts in Australian social structure as the 'most significant' for the management of 
organisations in the future. They were: (1) the growth in flexible work arrangements, 
(2) the increase in the numbers of women in management, and (3) the rising levels of 
education in the workforce. The compensation implications in Australia were a 
decrease in penalty pay rates (for abnormal working hours), conflict over relative 
compensation for sub-contractors and permanent staff, and (like Carrell, Kuzmits & 
Elbert, 1989) a desire for more employee involvement in decision making. 
On the same theme, Schiemann (1990:124), a practitioner, believed that greater 
education of the workforce has created 'more sophisticated consumers of benefits and 
compensation policies' and that they required participation in compensation decisions 
and more choices of incentives and benefit options. Risher (1992), also a practitioner, 
was of the opinion that pay-for-performance would increase in the United States in 
the next few years (i.e. 1992 onwards), that the recognition of, and reward, for good 
performance was 'consistent with North American culture' and that the importance of 
individual effort and recognition of the value to society was crucial. 'This cultural 
value system affects the mind-set of workers at all levels' (p.3). Contrary to this, 
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Lawler (1990) propounds that industrial incentive schemes have lost their popularity 
because of societal changes as well as their complexity and inefficiencies (p.63). The 
expansion of employee rights and legal redress in the United States had made 
incentive systems more open to challenge (p.65). However, in addition to incentives. 
Milkovich and Newman (1996) suggest that societal factors have historically affected 
the internal equity of compensation systems. Approaches over the years used to 
justify compensation arrangements have included the 'just wage doctrine', 'societal 
norms, custom and tradition' (p.54), and comparable worth (England, 1992). 
A number of the HRM issues so far mentioned are part of the challenge of managing 
diversity, and Barber and Daly (1996) provide a useful discussion of the way 'new 
pay' systems might relate to diversity in the United States. In summarising the 
research on racioethnic and gender diversity, they conclude that (1) the differences in 
compensation preferences between blacks and whites in the United States can only be 
partly explained by socioeconomic factors (p.198), (2) while some research reveals 
that women place a higher value on `nonmonetary job attributes' than do men (p.198), 
recent evidence showing no observable differences between the sexes in the 
preference for high pay may be a sign of less role and occupational segregation, and 
(3) men and women differ in what they consider as fair in the allocation of 
compensation. The obvious implications for the MNE are that as well as diversity 
across cultures, the preferences for compensation systems may vary within a 
workgroup. 
This section has shown that empirical work on social trends and compensation is not 
copious on a general level, but that separate facets of the effects of social change and 
diversity on specific aspects of compensation (such as the connection between 
changing workforce composition and child-care demands) are evident. 
The Economic Environment and Compensation 
Moving now to the way the economic environment may impinge on compensation 
systems, the analysis could include macroeconomic and microeconomic forces, 
particularly the product and labour markets of the organisation. Kochan and Barocci 
(1985:36) see the 'particularly important' macroeconomic policies of a government to 
be its fiscal or spending policy, monetary policies of a central bank, formal or informal 
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incomes policies and industrial policies that influence domestic and international trade 
and investment. These policies would affect inflation, unemployment and economic 
growth rates. These in turn could affect HRM/1R policies, including compensation, 
by shaping employee expectations about wage and salary increases, the bargaining 
power of unions and workers, the discretion of management and unions under an 
incomes policy, and the future of specific industrial sectors (pp.36-7). Decisions of 
unions and management can, of course, affect government monetary policy by the 
scale of negotiated settlements. In the product market, the degree of competition 
facing a firm may affect its ability to offer pay rises and its discretion to be innovative 
in compensation (p.42). In times of high product demand, it may be easier to pass on 
higher prices. The ability of the employer to pay higher wages may also be dependent 
on the productivity and profitability of the company (Ivancevich, 1992:363). By 
contrast, determining public sector compensation levels may be part of a 
government's economic strategy to control earnings across both private and public 
sectors (Wise, 1988). 
In the labour market, the level of unemployment might influence the level of earnings 
necessary to attract and retain staff. However, the labour market 'is not influenced or 
controlled by any single force' and its unpredictability adds 'an element of frustration' 
when forming HRM policies (Carrell, Kunnits & Elbert, 1989:26). Moreover, 
Milkovich and Newman (1996) argue that the concept of one 'homogeneous' labour 
market does not reflect reality, as firms operate in a number of labour markets (p.230) 
and 'very little research' had been done to assist organisations in making 'pay level 
decisions' (p.241). Linking the economic environment to internal compensation 
structure is also problematical, but it may influence the internal equity of a structure as 
skills in demand may be paid more highly, and the differentials may then become 
entrenched and accepted over time (lVfilkovich & Newman, 1996). Perhaps Cascio 
(1991:421) sums up the issue best by stating that what national monetary or fiscal 
economic policies actually 'affect wage levels and to what degree' is a mystery. 
Indeed, some organisations try to `insolate themselves from the vagaries of the labor 
market' by restricting their hiring to junior-entry level employees only and then relying 
on strong internal promotion systems (p.421). 
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Governments and Compensation 
Management of the macro economy can include national incomes policies and 
legislation that reflect the role of government in compensation at business unit level. 
Milkovich and Boudreau (1997) suggest that governments influence compensation 
systems through laws and regulations and, more indirectly, by socioeconomic policies 
(p.458). Indirect government influence on compensation can occur through wage 
laws, fiscal and monetary policy and social welfare law (Milkovich & Newman, 1996). 
Governments may also impose incomes policies on employers and regulate wage 
rates, hours of work and employee benefits (through tax legislation). Wage and price 
controls can be implemented to maintain low inflation and employment. The 
intervention of governments can vary — examples being freezing wages at a certain 
level, linking wage rises to productivity increases, providing formulae for compliance 
to a standard of wage increase, and allowing a wage increase in line with some price 
change (Milkovich & Newman, 1996). The danger is that any external control 
implemented at an arbitrary point will inevitably cause inequities for an employer or 
employee (p.498). Ivancevich (1992) agrees that the introduction of regulations by 
government means employers must change their policies, irrespective of their view on 
the ultimate effectiveness of those policies. The government's interest in 
compensation could be to ensure that 'the distribution of financial compensation 
supports the social and economic interests of the broader society' (Scarpello & 
Ledvinka, 1988:361). It does this by legislating to provide a basic level of 'security 
from poverty' and to maintain and improve the social and economic environment. For 
example, the mandated practices in the United States can be grouped under fair 
exchange for the price of labour, income continuity (unemployment or disability), and 
retirement security protection. 
According to Kochan and Barocci (1985:57), a government can also act as a 
'mediator' between the 'multiple interests present in the employment relationships'. 
This might mean setting minimum standards, and determining 'how much autonomy 
to delegate to private management at the work place', as governments attempt to 
operate in the public interest. The researchers argue that in the United States (until 
1985 at least) there has been a long-term trend for governments to become more 
interventionist in shaping terms of employment and the processes by which these were 
determined. However, US Governments have not 'assumed an active role in strategic 
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business decision making that affects human resource management within a firm' 
(p.49'7). Business had frequently not directly interacted with government over 
economic policy and US unions have not sought join on corporate boards. At a 
functional (middle) level, Kochan and Barocci also compare the industry and 
enterprise-level industrial relations structures of Europe and the United States, where 
the government role differs, where there is more uniformity of structure (compared 
with diversity of the United States) and where employee protection and benefits 
legislation is greater (p.498)(see also Brewster, 1995 at p.5). 
The preferred degree of government intervention into organisational compensation 
depends on one's ideology. Lawler (1990:273) discusses the role of government in a 
normative way, arguing that 'laws can be used to mediate or prohibit certain pay 
practices as well as to encourage or discourage them'. He favours minimal 
government interference in that 'most organisations are in the best position to decide 
which pay system is best for them'. Lawler does not therefore support legislation (in 
the United States) to encourage pay-for-performance, profit-sharing schemes, gain-
sharing or comparable worth. However, were legislation to be passed on comparable 
worth, he holds the view that both job-based and skill-based pay systems should be 
permitted (p.279). It is therefore interesting to compare the British experience where 
Smith (1992:170) records that successive post-war UK Conservative and Labour 
Governments have had incomes policies starting with restraint policies in the 1940s, 
'official and unofficial policies' in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s and Profit-related Pay 
introduced in 1987 and refined in the 1991 Budget. It appears British Governments 
believed that intervening in micro-policies would lead to enhanced corporate 
performance. Nevertheless, in analysing the effects of incomes policies in the Nordic 
countries, Elvander (1990:21) argues that to be successful, these instruments must be 
'accompanied by a centralised bargaining system upheld by a few strong central 
organisations'. 
Obviously the role of the state in compensation is much more complex than can be 
adequately covered here. Adams (1992:517) sees governments as 'dominant actors' 
in the industrial relations system, and so we should examine their motives, and no 
longer accept that they always act in the public interest. At the same time, we should 
not assume that employers take a neutral stance — they obviously attempt to 
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influence governments through lobbying and arguing compensation legal cases 
(Milkovich & Newman, 1996). 
Unions and Compensation 
We turn now to selected literature on the effect of the union presence on 
compensation systems and long-enduring issues such as managerial prerogative. 
While Storey (1983:98) argues that there had been no 'full-length British academic 
study of the phenomenon' until his work, US comment goes back well before that. 
Myers (1976:26) asserts that since the 1790s in the United States, unions have put 
'increasing pressure and control' over the level and practice of compensation. Not 
surprisingly then, Milkovich (1988:281) states that the impact of unions on 'the 
various aspects of compensation strategy (level, mix, hierarchy, basis for increases, 
administrative procedure) has a substantial research base'. 
Balkin (1989) reviewed the US research on the way unions influence pay policy in 
organisations, and suggested that while plenty of research existed on the way unions 
affect pay levels, fewer studies had considered the impact on the form and 
administration of pay and the use of pay incentives. Ballcin argues that unions have 
had 'a broad impact on the determination of pay policy' (p.299), pay policy here being 
defined as (1) average pay level, (2) pay form (i.e. proportion of salary, benefits and 
incentives), (3) pay structure (hierarchy of pay rates/levels), and (4) the systems for 
administration of rises. His view is that when unions are not present, management 
uses the local labour market rates for industrial employees via surveys and then 
chooses what to pay in relation to the market. By contrast, pay policies in unionised 
settings have been incorporated in bilateral agreements. Unions also indirectly affect 
non-union firms by threats of unionisation (p.301). There is much evidence of union 
impact in forcing wage levels and employee benefits above the levels of non-union 
firms (p.301). American evidence suggests that in union firms, a bigger percentage of 
total compensation will be devoted to employee benefits (p.302). Unions also seek 
uniform pay rates across establishments and single rates for each job class; may prefer 
seniority-based pay and smaller differentials between job classes in an organisation; 
oppose merit reviews and individual incentive plans; and attempt to obtain promotion 
by seniority. American unions have taken different positions on group incentives and 
gain-sharing schemes. Balkin's general conclusion is that through collective 
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bargaining, unions have been able to achieve pay levels, forms and structures that are 
more 'in line with average workers' preferences' (p.304). These conclusions for the 
United States were supported by Milkovich and Newman (1996), but union interest in 
cost of living clauses has decreased in recent years. In addition, unions were 
grappling with two-tier agreements. 
The influence of unions on compensation systems 'has recently begun to be integrated 
into models of strategic human resource management' (Butler, Ferris & Napier, 
1991:123). Unions are, of course, in turn affected by external conditions. The 
presence of unions in a plant constrains the employer because the conditions of 
employment have to be negotiated with a third party. Milkovich and Boudreau 
(1991) comment that the union impact on pay strategies go beyond the unionised 
firm; non-organisations may attempt to remain union-free and adjust rates accordingly 
or even relocate plants (p.46). Employers may also have a definite FIRM strategy to 
minimise, if not eliminate, the union role. 'The threat of unions may force employers 
to improve compensation and benefits (p.447). 
Earlier, Henderson (1979) argued that over the years, various American unions have 
been significant in obtaining improvements in wages, time off with pay, income 
security and a better quality of work life (p.105). He noted (p.117) that historically, 
unions have been suspicious of job evaluation schemes and incentive productivity-
oriented pay schemes, but that a 'bonus contingent on productivity' may be becoming 
more acceptable (pp.123-4). There are some differences in the literature, however, as 
to what the impact on compensation levels might be. Gomez-Mejia and Balkin (1992) 
believe unions in the United States can generate wage levels between 10 and 20 per 
cent higher than non-union organisations (somewhat higher than the 8.9-12.4 per cent 
estimated by Jarrell & Stanley [1990]), a higher rate being apparent in recessionary 
times (p.325). Furthermore, the union effect is not even across the economy: results 
are higher in the truck driving and skilled construction trades (Gomez-Mejia & Balkin 
1992). American unions have been particularly responsive to the needs of the older 
and less mobile employee. Defined benefit retirement plans are more likely than the 
defined contribution plans of non-union companies. Retirement benefits are inclined 
to be higher and health insurance more frequent and generous, in union firms (Gomez-
Mejia & Balkin, 1992:327). For the wage structure, American unions prefer pay 
47 
uniformity across establishments and industries, single rates for a job class, automatic 
pay progression and a 'flatter' hierarchy of rates (p.328). They usually oppose merit 
pay and individual wage incentive plans because they rely on supervisors' subjective 
judgements and can be divisive among work teams. More recently, unions have been 
more sympathetic towards group-based, gain-sharing and profit-sharing plans (p.329). 
Nevertheless, Bolle de Bal (1990:346) argues that the flexibility of wages (linking pay 
and performance) is usually disliked by unions in Western countries and 'erstwhile 
socialist countries'. This is because flexible schemes may undermine 'income security, 
equality of treatment, occupational equity and job security'. 
Recent empirical research on unions and compensation has addressed a wide range of 
issues. For illustration, Belman and Voos (1993) (who list 30 articles on the 
relationship between union wages and union coverage) concluded that wages were 
positively correlated with the extent of unionisation in a local market industry such as 
supermarkets, but not in a national market industry such as aerospace. Ashraf 
(1990:446) tracked union/non-union differentials over a 15-year period in the United 
States and found that 'nonwhites, blue-collar workers, and less-educated workers gain 
relatively more from unions than those who are white, white-collar, and better 
educated'. However, Flanagan (1990:301) is of the opinion that although union wage 
effects are one of the most frequently researched areas of economics, 'very rarely is 
there a discussion of why these measurements are of interest from the perspective of 
human resource management'. It Would be helpful, for example, to know why a 
union in one sector produces a higher relative effect in one sector than in another 
(p.302). Not that these are easy figures to calculate; Jacoby and Mitchell (1988:215) 
emphasise that the economic impact of unions is better measured by the proportion of 
union wages in the total payrolls (or total compensation covered by collective 
bargains) rather than by the percentage of unionised employees in the workforce. 
A recent study by Ng and Maki (1994) examined the influence of unions on 37 HRM 
practices in 356 US manufacturing firms. Their conclusion was that there was no 
difference in the use of the classification method or the points system between union 
and non-union firms. But non-union firms are more likely to use subjective ranking 
methods, individual incentive schemes, and profit-sharing plans. Unions were less 
opposed to group pay incentive schemes and gain-sharing. The results suggested that 
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unions were not opposed to pay-for-performance per se, but only when it created 
'rivalry and increased pay differentials among individual employees' (p.134). 
As Cascio (1991:419) indicates, it is difficult to get a definitive measurement on 
unions' impact on compensation systems without comparing identical organisations 
with and without unions. 'Any wage differences then could be attributed to 
unionization'. Unfortunately, this scenario is unlikely. It is also not valid to compare 
two companies in the same industry with varying rates of unionisation and then argue 
that compensation differences are due to the degree of unionisation. The reasons are, 
first, that where the union density is low in an industry, it may lack the power to shut 
down the whole industry compared with one with higher membership levels. 
Secondly, non-union firms may actually grant concessions to avoid unionisation. In 
that case, the influence of the union is underestimated (p.419). Jackson and Schuler 
(1995) also agree that it is too simplistic to compare union and non-union firms. One 
has also to analyse whether union-management relations are 'adversarial or 
cooperative' (p.249). The added difficulty of research assessing the effect over time 
of unions on compensation is that unions and industrial relations systems are subject 
to a changing environment. Kochan and Barocci's (1985:496) view is that 'industrial 
systems are relatively slow to adapt to changing environments and often continue to 
follow policies and practices long after environment changes render them obsolete'. 
While one can agree that union presence does have an effect on compensation 
systems, its influence and outcomes may be complicated to assess. Union 
involvement may be evident in job classification, employee benefits and incentive plan 
committees as well as regular wage negotiating committees or at industrial tribunals 
(Hills, Bergmann & Scarpello, 1994). But union presence and recognition for 
bargaining purposes may, of course, depend in the first place on national legislation 
(Brewster, 1995), which may also affect 'almost all aspects of HRM' (Jackson & 
Schuler, 1995:248). 
Legislation and Compensation 
One final external factor which is subject to constant change is the legislation affecting 
compensation systems. The legal—political context has often been taken as a given in 
FIRM research, and organisations are assumed to adjust their compensation systems 
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to conform with laws and regulations (Masters, 1987:358). However, Masters (1987) 
believes this is an unfortunate view because it probably does not conform to the 
reality. First, organisations often devote 'substantial resources' to influencing the 
shape of laws and regulations affecting them (p.358). Second, because laws 
impacting on employment may be federal, state or local, employers may be subject to 
a range of laws, regulations and court decisions which are inconsistent and ambiguous 
(p.361). 
Fisher, Schoenfeldt and Shaw (1990:486) state that the increase in American 
Government regulations 'has made legal constraints a major factor in planning and 
administering a compensation system' and Milkovich and Newman (1996) advocate 
that compensation techniques and their outcomes must all be designed to comply with 
the law. Laws and regulations can serve as both constraints and objectives and the 
MNE will face different legislation in each country in which it operates. Some 
legislation allows an organisation 'to interpret the changes', whereas for others, the 
law is mandatory and requires implementation (Butler, Ferris & Napier, 1991:123). 
Tax changes may be in the former category, whereas minimum wage laws are clean-
cut. Tax changes may affect the attractiveness of any compensation packages, 
especially at executive levels. 
Taxes can affect three areas of compensation strategy: (1) income, (2) benefits, and 
(3) capital gains (Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992:334). Levels of income tax may 
affect employees' preferences for current or deferred salary. As will be discussed in 
the next section, tax may affect the design of benefits such as health and life insurance 
and retirement schemes. For example, Dessler (1991:344) states that the US Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 had the effect of increasing the employee benefits of rank and file 
employees while 'reducing tax-favoured benefits' of the highly paid_ Taxes may also 
influence the attraction of using stock ownership as an incentive for various levels of 
staff. 
Legislation constrains the actions of employers by imposing financial penalties for 
non-compliance. World-wide codes discourage policies such as pay discrimination, 
requiring instead the standard of 'equal pay for equal work' and 'equal pay for work 
of comparable worth'. Both of these standards have been open to interpretation in 
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the courts, particularly in the United States. A number of countries have comparable 
worth (or pay equity) legislation to ensure that jobs of similar skill levels, 
responsibility and working conditions are paid at a similar level, normally determined 
by job evaluation (Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992). 
Despite the 'increasing array of legal issues' facing HRM (Galbraith & Lawler, 
1993:235), Beer et al. (1984) commented that many European countries had more 
sweeping laws affecting HRM than those of the United States, although many areas 
subject to legislation in Europe were incorporated in collective bargaining in the 
United States (p.44-5). However, the impact of the law on compensation systems 
may depend on the extent to which it is enforced. For example, Strauss (1992:29) 
posits that the Reagan administration 'was marked by a considerable slackening in the 
rigour' with which the executive branch enforced employment legislation. 
Nevertheless, this did not lead to a decrease in legislation — quite the reverse. 
What this selection of textbook literature does not show is how the interpretation of 
new regulations and laws really affects compensation strategy at business unit level. 
Neither do we know what impact new employment legislation has on the overall 
performance of a firm. Most of the discussion is at a macro level. While national 
legislation can set socially desirable minimum standards, practitioners analyse the 
labour market in terms of freedom and external interference. For example, McIlwee 
(1986:228) refers to the way 'efficient labour markets' are 'impaired' by the 
employment legislation in the UK, which has prevented employers shedding labour 
quickly, increased the cost of termination and redundancy, and increased the cost of 
pensions. 
In the context of this thesis, what emerges is evidence and convincing argument that 
all aspects of the external environment discussed do have some impact on 
compensation design. The various changes in compensation systems over the years 
appear to have been part responses to environmental pressures. As mentioned earlier, 
we know little about the way the processing of this information occurs in the 
organisation. Moreover, it would be difficult to quantify and prioritise the effect of 
each element. The main constraint would be seem to be the law, in that the employer 
does not have, in theory, the choice whether to observe it or not. The reality is that 
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employers will breach regulations and laws at times because of ignorance, ambiguity 
or lack of executive enforcement. The main conceptual problems, as noted earlier, 
are isolating the elements in the environment which influence compensation, 
classifying the environment, and identifying which parts of the compensation system 
are most affected. There is an impression of a large research need here. 
Employee Benefits and the External Environment 
The discussion so far in this chapter has been on the external influences on 
compensation in general. This section focuses specifically on employee benefits and 
the external environment. Employee benefits have been defined as: 
that part of the total compensation package other than pay for the time worked, provided to 
employees in whole or in part by employee payments, e.g. life insurance, pension, workers' 
compensation, vacation' (Milkovich & Newman, 1984:363). 
They can be categorised as those which are 'legally required social insurance 
programmes', 'private insurance and retirement plans', 'payments for time not 
worked', 'extra cash payments', and 'employee services and perquisites' (Broderick 
& Gerhart, 1997:147). 
The standard texts on HRM tend to concentrate on the growth of benefits, their 
purpose in the compensation system, their components, and their planning, design and 
administration. Unfortunately, the empirical research on benefits has not matched 
their growth internationally. In fact, some authors suggest that benefits are probably 
the least-researched area of compensation (Milkovich & Newman, 1996). Complete 
answers are awaited on how employee benefits are linked to organisational strategy 
and performance, and the effect of benefits on employee attraction, motivation and 
retention. However, there have been recent attempts to rectify this situation (see, for 
example, Broderick & Gerhart, 1997). Research on the effect of the general external 
environment on employee benefits design is not plentiful although separate elements 
of the environment such as the influence of unions on benefits have received attention 
(see, for example, Freeman, 1981). 
Taking government and legislation first, there is clearly an interaction between 
government philosophy and legislation that may affect the extent to which benefits are 
mandatory or optional, and the allocation of the benefits' cost among government, 
employer and employee. In the United States, for example, employers are required to 
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contribute to the mandatory programmes of Social Security, unemployment 
compensation and workers' compensation (Bergmann, Scarpello & Hills, 1998). By 
comparison, while Australian employers have to pay premiums for workers' 
compensation (insurance) under state legislation, the Australian Federal Government 
pays unemployment allowances, and pensions for age, invalidity, deserted wives, 
supporting parents and widowhood; in addition, under federal law, superannuation 
(pension) costs are compulsorily imposed on employers and employees as a fixed 
percentage of pay (Kramar, McGraw & Schuler, 1997). Interestingly, no 
unemployment benefit is payable in Singapore. Apart from these basic minimum 
requirements, governments may also legislate for leave for particular purposes such as 
the US Family Leave (Milkovich & Boudreau, 1997), long service leave in some 
states in Australia, and sick leave (under the Employment Act in Singapore) (Chew 
Soon Beng & Lim Siew Ngoh, 1996). Paid time off for jury service may be offered 
where a country has juries as part of the legal system; similarly, a period of national 
military service requiring leave may be compulsory during a working life (Bergmann, 
Scarpello & Frills, 1998). 
Government economic policy has been cited as a cause for growth in employee 
benefits. Incomes and price controls during the second World War and the Korean 
War led to an increase in the level and range of benefits in the United States to satisfy 
employee needs (Milkovich & Newman, 1996). Alpert (1987:12) analysed employee 
benefits using time-series data and economic modelling and concluded that income, 
economies of scale of group purchase, worker education, worker health, the structure 
of the economy and wage and price controls 'have all had positive and often 
statistically significant effects on fringe benefit expenditures'. Further, he recorded 
that benefits acted in accord with business cycles, 'falling relative to wages in down 
cycles and rising relative to wages in upswings' (p.12). As employers might be 
reluctant to reduce wages in a depressed economy, firms appear to reduce benefits 
instead, generating possible union pressure. Along with running the economy, 
government's role in taxation has affected benefit provision. Some benefits have been 
designed to avoid federal and state personal income taxes, although legislation may 
impose taxes on benefits either on the employee or the employer, causing a change in 
benefit strategy (Milkovich & Newman, 1996). There is evidence, for example, that 
the Fringe Benefits Tax introduced in Australia in 1986 had a significant effect on 
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executive compensation packages as it was imposed on the employer rather than the 
employee (O'Neill & Clark, 1990). 
Gomez-Mejia and Balldn, (1992:326) assert that through their collective bargaining 
unions have been seen as being at the 'cutting edge' of employee benefits in the 
United States. They cite empirical evidence to show that unionised employers are 
more likely to provide better retirement benefits, health insurance, life and accident 
insurance, and vacation and holiday pay (Freeman, 1981; Sohick, 1978: Allen & 
Clark, 1986; Fosu, 1983; Rossiter & Taylor, 1982). 
The changing nature of society and developed economies is another major external 
influence on employee benefits. The world of contingency and portfolio workers 
(Handy, 1995) 'poses a new set of questions for benefits administrators' (Milkovich & 
Newman, 1996:476). The ageing societies of the industrialised countries may have an 
impact on health and pension costs; future employment growth, mainly through small 
business (which traditionally has a narrower range of benefits), may influence the 
relationship between employer attraction and benefits (Broderick & Gerhart, 1997). 
The increased participation of women in the labour force has led to increased child-
care assistance, flexitime policies (Kossek, 1987) and spouse relocation assistance 
(Moore, 1981). 
It is self-evident that national cultural differences will have an impact on employee 
benefits. A basic example is the designation by governments of different religious 
public holidays. Empirically, however, a recent study by Schuler and Rogovsky 
(1998) is one of the few attempts to link national culture to the provision of employee 
benefits. Using secondary data, they found that the frequency of flexible benefit plans, 
workplace child-care, and maternity leave programmes was associated with the 
Masculinity and Femininity dimensions of national culture as denoted by Hofstede 
(1980). Although this is an important study, it is unfortunate that secondary data for 
other Asian countries, in addition to those given for Japan and Korea, were not 
available. 
One interesting question for this project is why employee benefits in industrialised 
countries originated as they did, and how they change over time. One determinant 
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appears to be government philosophy, which reflects how much of employees' social 
and economic need fulfilment is provided by government infrastructure, and how 
much by the employer. One might question whether developing nations follow the 
lead of more advanced ones in the provision of services and if so, why? Are there any 
cultural factors that should be addressed? For example, are employee benefits 
perceived in different national cultures in the same way? And do they have a different 
impact on employee behaviour? 
The conclusion from this short review is that the literature suggests that social, 
demographic, economic, government philosophy, unions and collective bargaining, 
and particularly legal factors are likely to have a marked effect on employee benefit 
design, and that while in the past benefits were given in a rather piecemeal fashion, the 
relative expense of benefits in developed countries is possibly causing more careful 
planning where they are concerned. As with compensation generally, the MINE will 
find different external factors affecting benefits in each location of operation. The 
choice then will not just be what benefits to pay, but also which benefits should be 
paid on a company-wide basis and which tailored to each country's subsidiaries for all 
levels of employee. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have selected the literature that considers the main internal and 
external influences on domestic compensation design. The importance of the external 
environment is acknowledged in all basic HRM texts, but environmental changes may 
not necessarily be reflected in HRM policy changes. The external environment is a 
complex, interrelated and dynamic phenomenon, affects organisations in different 
ways and might, in turn, be affected by the organisation. The control of domestic 
subsidiaries and divisions has similar properties to those in the management of an 
MNE. 
The prescriptive literature advocates the linking of strategic FIRM to corporate 
objectives while acknowledging the complicated reality of the process of formulation 
and implementation of corporate strategy. With the constraints of the external 
environment perhaps under-estimated, recent work has advocated the principle of 
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'choice' for FIRM strategies, policies and practices. 	The choice results in 
organisations using different practices at various levels of the company, different 
practices perhaps operating in divisions or plants because of varying life cycles or 
corporate diversification strategies. The external environment sets the context for the 
choice as it is not unlimited. 
As we have shown, the linking of HR.M strategy to corporate strategy flows through 
to the compensation strategy literature as well, although views differ as to how 
important the compensation system is in this. The vast number of compensation 
choices is influenced by internal and external environments. Taking the contingency 
approach, however, there is a belief that the better the fit between the corporate and 
business unit strategies and the compensation system, the greater the contribution of 
the system to organisational performance. This has been specifically examined in the 
context of the organisational and product life cycle, where the composition of 
compensation can be adapted to support different strategies. 
The various compensation systems likely to be operating in SBUs in a diversified 
company have not received much attention, particularly how the distinction between 
corporate and SBU performance bonuses is made. Recent research based on limited 
data suggests that if compensation strategies support diversification strategies, greater 
performance results. The options for choice in linking compensation to corporate 
strategy have been well documented, but this does not necessarily mean corporate 
strategy causes a particular compensation system. The reality is that compensation 
may be a pattern of elements rather than individual elements, and the system may not 
be related to corporate strategy because of directors' preferences, or (as institutional 
theory posits), because of copying of the strategies of other organisations, or 
conforming with laws and regulations (Jackson & Schuler, 1995). Furthermore, 
corporate strategies may not be clear in any case. The additional complication is that 
compensation decisions are affected by internal strategies such as HRM strategies, 
organisational size, structure, technology, culture, assumptions about motivation and 
incentives, organisational performance, and the type of employees involved. External 
influences particularly affecting compensation, according to the literature, include the 
volatility of the environment, legislation, government regulations, union presence, 
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product and labour markets, competition, social values, the economy, and incomes 
policies. 
We noted that the research on the external environment and compensation had 
concentrated on specific elements of the environment, and that one cannot ignore the 
sub—divisions of these elements — such as the introduction of a national incomes 
policy by a government, as well as its legislative, taxation and minimum standards 
role. We also found that societal features were believed to affect internal equity, 
whereas the economy not only affected levels of pay but, in turn, employee 
expectations and wage demands of unions. These two illustrations show how many 
elements of the external environment interrelate, making their research rather 
complicated. From the literature, it is evident that we are still some way from 'a 
grand theory of compensation' that would explain how each environmental element 
affects each feature of a compensation system, especially over time (Gerhart, Minkoff 
& Olsen, 1995:530). 
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CHAPTER THREE 
COMPENSATION AND THE MULTENATIONAL ENTERPRISE 
MNE Compensation Strategy 
The more complex nature of the external environment facing the MNE was 
acknowledged in the early literature. In the 1960s, Farmer and Richman (1965) 
suggested the MNE faced three sets of environmental constraints: (1) local 
constraints, as a result of which home country operations may still significantly affect 
an overseas company, (2) the environment of the host country, and (3) international 
constraints, which may differ between host and home country. These sets may, of 
course, change at various rates. More recently, Phatak (1992:8) writes of 'the 
international environment' being 'the total world environment' and 'the sum total of 
environments of every nation in which the company has its foreign affiliates'. But 
despite the uniqueness of the domestic and foreign environments, 'similar factors can 
be used in their assessment' (Asheghian & Ebrahimi, 1990:205). The international 
environment 'is created from the interaction between the domestic and the foreign 
environments' (p.205) and comprises of 'a set of diverse economic, legal, and political 
forces'. Ball and McCulloch (1990:16) support the classifications of Asheghian and 
Ebrahimi (1990), but assert that foreign environment forces operate differently from 
domestic ones in that elements may be of a different force value (e.g. degree of 
political force), incur changes which are more difficult to assess, and experience 
different 'types and degrees of interaction' of the elements. Moreover, there are 
varying 'density of linkages' between 'suppliers, producers, regulators, and customers 
and others' which an MINE faces from country to country (Nohria & Ghoshal, 1997: 
199); the greater the complexity of each local environment, the greater the managerial 
choices for affiliate autonomy, integration and formalisation (pp.97-101). 
In comparison with the compensation strategy of the domestic firm, the MINE has 
some distinctive characteristics (Dunning, 1993). These particularly centre on the 
'innovating capacity' of MNEs in free market economies, with a resulting effect on 
local skills and employment (p.350). The effects are not always positive, especially 
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when capital-intensive MINE production methods replace local labour-intensive 
industry. The MINE production system may also be 'more locationally footloose than 
uninational activity' (p.351). As nations like Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South 
Korea have become advanced. MNEs have resited labour intensive operations to less 
developed nations. The MINE also functions in international labour markets for 
managerial, professional and technical staff. These people may be recruited from 
within or outside the MINE. Furthermore, some MNEs transport unskilled labour 
(such as construction workers) between nations to work on projects, thus 'performing 
an arbitrage function which the international labour market is unable to do' (p.351). 
Dunning continues by noting that MNEs have greater experience and knowledge of 
employee compensation and conditions across the world and so can implement 'best' 
HRM practices to improve productivity (p.351). The MINE is likely to have greater 
bargaining power with unions than the local firm, as local union officials will lack 
knowledge of the 'economic strengths' of the subsidiary or whole corporation 
(p.352). Finally, the interaction between an MNE affiliate and the host government 
may be different from that of a local firm, in that the MINE has more options to resite 
facilities should laws, political or union environment no longer appear attractive to the 
MINE. 
For the individual MINE, at a more macro level, the basic compensation strategy 
questions are to what extent compensation systems must be adapted to cope with 
'diverse cultural contingencies', and whether the effectiveness of different 
compensation systems varies from nation to nation (Gomez-Mejia & Welbourne, 
1991:29). There seems to be a convergence of pay systems across the world, perhaps 
through imitation or use of consultants. However, if we accept that compensation 
systems should be designed to facilitate the corporate objectives of the MINE, then 
one would expect the systems to be adjusted to suit different cultures (p.30). The 
other complication is that compensation in the subsidiary has to be congruent with 
other BRM practices in the affiliate and at corporate level, and with the business unit 
life cycle as well as the cross-national external environment (Milliman, Von Glinow & 
Nathan, 1991). In providing a useful list of the 'domestic' and 'foreign' organisation 
environments (both internal and external) that influence international compensation, 
Harvey (1993a:58) similarly speaks of the 'fit' and 'flexibility' of global compensation 
issues associated with MNEs. 'Flexibility' for him is the ability of the compensation 
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system to accommodate a variety of expatriate and third country national (TCN) 
managerial candidates, and different economic and cultural contexts. The 
'consistency' of global compensation for expatriates and TCNs should be within the 
MINE and between affiliates, as managers have to be treated equitably (p.59). He 
acknowledges that while internal organisational issues are important, the variation in 
external environments is usually the most significant determinant (p.59). 
The distinction between formulating and implementing compensation strategy at 
corporate and business unit levels has been made by Miller, Beechler, Bhatt and Nath, 
(1986), but is not often recognised in the MINE compensation literature. Lei, Slocum 
and Slater (1990) used a quadrant of global/multi-domestic strategy and 
hierarchy/performance reward systems to show the relationship between strategy and 
rewards in MNEs, and identified MNEs which appeared to have the 'best fit' (p.33). 
On the same strategy/compensation theme, a study of 126 firms based in Japan, UK 
and United States by Roth and Ricks (1994:107) found that there was support for a 
hypothesis that for companies competing in a global industry, a 'dispersed goal 
configuration' (the scope or breadth of the goals of the organisation) was 'positively 
associated with multiple criteria for top management rewards/compensation'. Apart 
from these studies, much of the international HRM discussion of compensation (with 
exceptions such as Welch, 1994, and Bonache & Fernandez, 1997) ignores the 
corporate strategic element. 
From our consideration so far, we can initially agree with ICressler's (1971-72:398) 
proposition that it is difficult to set up 'a standardized world-wide compensation 
policy'. The reasons for this include: 
Obtaining reliable local national compensation data; extending stock purchase arrangements 
to employees outside the... [home nation]; off-shore/split compensation payments to local 
national executives; taxation, benefits/TCN pensions; local legislation changes in employment 
and benefit laws (Dowling, 1989:68). 
These issues require HRM practitioners to have 'global skills' (Brandt, 1991) because 
although some professionals see ILO standards as having an increasing influence, the 
different legal, political and tax situations in each country will necessitate tailor-made 
compensation and benefits (Overman, 1989). 
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Unfortunately, much of the research on MNE compensation systems focuses on the 
managerial expatriate level and ignores the administrative, clerical and industrial (blue 
collar) skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled occupations — perhaps because these are 
mainly determined locally, are more subject to local institutions (Ferner, 1997), are 
located in the host nation only, and are therefore of less interest to head office. They 
are also cheaper, and usually linked to local labour markets rather than to world-wide 
corporation rates. Generalisations are difficult, however, because the degree of local 
regulation may vary. According to Ferner (1997:22), the literature suggests that 
wage determination and hours of work are more likely to reflect the local 
environment, whereas payment systems are 'less likely to be regulated by the local 
systems' and are therefore more inclined to reflect the parent MNE preferences. With 
that reservation in mind, Dowling, Welch and Schuler (1999:182) argue that 
international compensation should have four objectives: (1) consistency with 'the 
overall strategy, structure, and business needs' of the MINE, (2) attraction and 
retention of employees in key MINE areas, (3) facilitation of the 'transfer of 
international employees in the most cost-effective manner', and (4) 'equity and ease of 
administration'. Their main advice for the MNE (from an earlier edition of their text) 
was to 'match compensation policies with [its] staffing policies and general HRM 
philosophies' (Dowling, Schuler & Welch, 1994:169). An ethnocentric staffing policy 
may therefore need an appropriate compensation response. 
Discussion of MINE rewards is also confined to the expatriate and monetary 
compensation in Phatak (1992) and Cascio (1992), whereas Pucik (1992) argues that 
MNEs should not only consider the short-term monetary reward but also the 'global 
career opportunities' of local host nation staff (p.72). 
The Employment Effects of the MNE 
The compensation strategy of a major MINE with a large workforce in a host country 
will clearly have implications for the local economy and labour market. Dunning 
(1993) records that by the end of 1990, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
had published 49 reports of the employment effects of MNEs on host nations, in 
addition to books and monographs on a wide range of HRM practices. We will select 
only a very small sample of this work for illustration of the main issues. 
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The initial problem with any analysis of MINE employment effects is methodological: 
comparing the level of compensation across jobs, sectors and countries, and 
establishing the exchange rate (Dunning, 1993). As a . generalisation, there is 
'considerable evidence' that MINE subsidiaries pay more than locally owned 
competitors, although the difference is not as great as often supposed (p.375). The 
reason may be that the MNE is more capital-intensive, and thus achieves higher 
productivity. The affiliate may also be larger than local establishments, and feel 
obligated to provide above-average compensation to attract new recruits. There is 
some evidence that, relative to their competitors, MNEs pay more in technology-
intensive sectors and in sectors producing 'consumer goods with a high income 
elasticity of demand' (p.375). Likewise, compensation for skilled professionals and 
managerial staffs has usually been higher than that of local companies. 
To take some individual country ILO studies, Stopford (1979:47) asserts that MNEs 
located in the UK are likely to be seen as compensation pace—setters because of their 
high profile, and so 'will be treated as such'. In the 1960s, of the first 13 major 
productivity bargaining agreements negotiated, 8 were by MNEs. One view was that 
productivity bargains and good fringe benefits would prevent unionisation of the 
workforce (p.48). MNEs tended to prefer independence of operation and were less 
likely to join employer associations for that reason. Iyanda and Bello (1979) found 
that in Nigeria employees felt more secure in MNEs than they did in indigenous firms, 
the latter being small, owner-managed operations. Nevertheless, host country 
managers felt excluded from the secrets of the MINE 'expatriate clique' (p.12). The 
MNEs and local companies provided different ranges of fringe benefits, with MINE 
expatriate managers enjoying better housing and related benefits than those of 
Nigerian MNE managers. The conclusion of Iyanda and Bello was that MNEs in 
Nigeria employed people with higher skill levels than did local firms, paid higher 
wages and fringe benefits, trained more, and offered greater job security than the local 
companies. The situation in the Philippines in the 1970s was not so clear—cut. 
Tanchoco-Subido (1979) found that MNEs paid higher wages in 14 industries but 
lower rates in 6 others. In the manufacturing industry, the MNEs were generally 
providing greater compensation were than Philippino companies. However, 
Tanchoco-Subido (1979) did find evidence of firms with foreign equity paying below 
the minimum wage for industrial and agricultural workers (p.70). 
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Gunter's (1982) overview for the ILO of MINE social policy confirms previous 
studies, which found that MNEs give better compensation in general than local firms; 
he suggests, however, that the practice of some MNEs of transferring home—country 
practices into host nations has created problems. Examples are wage systems new to 
the host country and demands by local staff for specific employee benefits that are 
foreign to the MNE (p.24). A 1976 ILO study of wages and working conditions in 
MNEs mentions that whether an MNE pays higher wages may depend on how 
extensive collective bargaining is in local companies and MNE affiliates (p.3). If both 
local and MINE companies are subject to collective agreements, 'the pressures for 
parity in wage levels may be strong' (p.3). This is particularly so if there are national 
agreements that impact on conditions at a local level. There is evidence that MNEs 
do have to adjust to the local industrial scene for staff lower in the hierarchy. In a 
1973 paper, Gunter stated that MNEs tend to adjust to local conditions when there is 
local labour legislation, local industrial relations patterns and local wage levels that are 
in the interests of the MINE (p.7). 
The differences in conditions between MINE and local firms are still attracting current 
interest. In a study of 261 Irish, US and other internationally owned companies 
operating in the Republic of Ireland, Turner, D'Art and Gunnigle (1997) concluded 
that there was no statistical difference between Irish and US companies on IR issues 
such as union recognition, union density, union influence and the presence of works 
councils (p.97). However, while the study has no data on pay levels, it did note that 
the incidence of performance-related pay in US companies was 'twice the mean 
average of Irish companies' (p.98). Differences were also recorded between 109 local 
Taiwanese and 32 US MNEs located in Taiwan in research by Lin (1997). She found 
partial support for a hypothesis that compensation would be 'significantly different', 
noting differences in the composition of compensation packages and more explicit pay 
policies in the US MNEs (p.62). 
According to Dunning (1993), it is difficult to attribute the better conditions provided 
by MNEs to their multinationality per se, but it must be part of the reason (p.376). 
Some working practices will be part of the culture of the MNE head office. However, 
it is not usually in the interests of the MINE to markedly exceed local rates. 
Ownership may also play a part in compensation systems; Dunning emphasises that 
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Japanese affiliates may concentrate on 'employee-related determinants', whereas 
Western firms rely more on lob-related determinants' (p.376). The composition of 
employee benefits may also be reflected in national origin — the Americans preferring 
'monetary inducements' and profit-sharing, the Japanese favouring 'non-pecuniary 
incentives' (p.376). In a sense, the MINE cannot win whatever it does. Some argue 
that if the production systems are similar in home and host nations, then the workers 
should be paid the same wage. If the MINE pays less than local rates, it could be 
accused of exploitation. If, on the other hand, it does pay high local compensation, it 
can be accused of inflationary settlements or using pay levels as a method of 'buying 
good industrial relations' (p.3'76) as well as putting wage pressure on locally owned 
companies. These contradictions are neatly summarised by Frenkel and Royal 
(1996b) as the 'worker repression' (rates favourable to the MINE), 'worker 
incorporation' (relatively high pay) and 'mutual gains' (high pay and job satisfaction) 
hypotheses (pp.5-6). 
Expatriate Compensation and the MNE 
Bonache and Fernandez (1997) state, surprisingly, that expatriate compensation is the 
aspect of expatriate management receiving least attention in the literature (presumably 
meaning the academic as opposed to the vast practitioner literature); and they are 
correct in noting that writings on expatriate compensation have generally tended to 
under-emphasise links with the strategic goals of the MINE. 
A large MINE subsidiary is likely to employ both host country (HCNs) and expatriate 
(PCNs) managers working together, possibly with third country nationals (TCNs). 
The MNEs themselves take many structural forms, and the length of expatriate 
assignments may vary enormously. The complexity is not just in setting up systems to 
achieve international compensation objectives, but also in accommodating the three 
categories of employees and 'territorial differences ... in a manageable company-wide 
policy' (Young, 1973:118). Expatriates are expensive and compensation has to be 
tailored 'cross-culturally' to 'meet the specific needs of ... managers in MNEs' 
overseas operations' (Hodgetts & Luthans, 1993a:58). This is complicated because 
'salary levels for the same job differ among countries in which an MNC operates' 
64 
(Cascio, 1992:642) and because of external environmental changes such as national 
taxation policies and exchanges rates (Dowling & Welch, 1988). 
There are at least three possible policy options for MNE PCN and TCN compensation 
(Dowling, Schuler & Welch, 1994). The first — the home-based policy — 'links the 
base salary for expatriates and TCNs to the salary structure of the relevant home 
country' (p.150). This keeps PCN and TCN rewards on a par with the home nation 
staff; and enables PCNs and TCNs to be repatriated to the home country without 
salary complications. Against these advantages must be weighed the inequity of 
PCNs and TCNs doing the same job as HCNs but being paid differently. A second 
approach is the host-based policy, where 'the base salary for international transfer is 
linked to the salary structure in the host country', but with a number of supplements 
based on the home nation compensation system (pp.150-1). This may still result in 
different packages for PCNs and TCNs. A third approach is the 'region-based policy' 
under which expatriates are paid at lower levels of compensation if they are working 
in regions near their home country than they would be paid in far-flung regions 
(p.151). The advantage for the MNE is that it could save money if the home country 
is a high-paying one. 
The home-based plan for predefined and temporary expatriate assignments can be 
advocated where international employees will eventually go home, where 'the number 
of different nationalities in any one host location is relatively low', and where 
expatriates are numerous 'in higher-level host location jobs' (Anderson, 1990:29). 
Host-based compensation plans would be more appropriate where for the converse 
applies. To the home and host nation plans, Payne (1990) adds the 'modified balance 
sheet' and the 'international' approaches, the former being developed because the 
'balance sheet' was found to be too rigid, and the latter applying to all expatriates 
regardless of nationality and location (p.68-9). Other terminology and variations are 
the 'headquarters scale plus MNC's affiliation differential', and the 'citizenship' and 
'global' compensation scales of Fatehi (1997). 
By the third edition of their text, Dowling, Welch & Schuler (1999:187) suggest that 
the two main options for expatriate compensation are the 'going rate' or 'market rate 
approach', and the 'balance sheet' approach — the latter being the most frequently 
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adopted method of payment. The 'going rate' approach is an alternative term for the 
host-country approach where the expatriate's compensation is linked to the salary 
structures of the host country. There is a choice of the compensation of HCNs, 
'expatriates of the same nationality', or 'expatriates of all nationalities' as the 
reference point (p.187). By comparison, as mentioned earlier, the 'balance sheet' 
approach uses the salary structure of the home country as the standard together with 
allowances to ensure that there is no diminution in purchasing power while on 
overseas assignments (p.190). Other advice on expatriate and managerial 
compensation comes from Rayman and Twinn (1983), who caution MNEs on using 
the same job evaluation scheme throughout the world because of different cultural 
values. In developing nations, Western systems might result in a 'distorted pattern of 
relativities' in those countries (p.210). Handling of differentials between steps in the 
hierarchy and attitude towards seniority and merit are also likely to vary (p.211). 
Bishko (1990) refers to the exporting of executive compensation incentive schemes in 
US MNEs that is occurring in some financial services companies. The objective for 
PCNs and TCNs is to make the incentive plan 'as US—tax effective to the employee as 
possible' (p.38). With the HCN, the thrust is to 'deliver as much as possible to the 
local national, bottom line, at no increased employer cost' (p.38). 
There have been two recent studies of Australian expatriate compensation. Welch 
(1994), in four Melbourne-based company case studies, found all four used the 
Balance Sheet approach for their international assignments. Stone (1995) surveyed 
20 Australian, American and British owned MNEs that administered their expatriates 
from Australia, and found that about three—quarters of the MNEs tied their expatriate 
base salaries to an Australian structure for simplicity and to facilitate re-entry to 
Australia. Eighteen per cent of the respondents used the host nation salary structure, 
and none reported organising a separate international structure. Problems of inequity, 
cost, and inadequate market knowledge were offered as reasons for this (p.365). 
Finally, we are likely to agree with Butler, Ferris and Napier (1991:187) that 'there is 
little research' on a number of these issues, although the literature is replete with 
practical advice from practitioners on international compensation (e.g. Reynolds, 
1992). This deficiency is echoed in the lack of work done on MNE HCN 
compensation systems. 
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Compensation of MNE Host Country Employees 
In an American Compensation Association article, local compensation for HCNs in 
US MNEs was said to have been 'generally ignored' by MINE head offices until the 
mid-1980s (Reynolds, 1992:74). While budgets for local nationals may have been 
controlled or reviewed, few attempts were made to develop 'global compensation 
strategies' or manage HCN compensation structures. Most local compensation 
systems reflected their local cultures. Phatak (1992) suggests that US MNEs do not 
pay local nationals on the same level as PCNs or TCNs. Their package is usually 
linked to local conditions, including 'cultural variables', legislation and tax structures 
(p.199). Historically, Reynolds argues that US MNEs delegated HCNs' 
compensation to local management, but with some nations now paying more than US 
rates, head office interest has increased. 
The literature on the rationale for particular MINE subsidiary HCN compensation 
policies is scarce, as most interest has been in the extent of 'transferability' of 
compensation principles from other cultures and comparative HRM pieces using 
survey techniques. However, for the purposes of this thesis, there are a number of 
useful ILO reports on MNE compensation of HCNs, even if they are somewhat dated 
and lacking in theoretical underpinning. 
An early one of these was an ILO (1977b) report on the labour practices of six US-
based MNEs in the metal trades; the report noted that the general policy on 
compensation in the host country was to provide compensation that was 'as good or 
better' than that given by organisations in comparable industries (p.57). Caterpillar's 
policies were designed to 'attract and retain the best qualified employees' (p.57). The 
essence was to compensate local people fairly according to their contribution and 'the 
framework of existing practices'. General Motors had a goal of being 'in the 
forefront' in compensation, and it therefore monitored the practices of industrial 
leaders. Ford Motors similarly had a policy of offering 'competitive' conditions in its 
localities (p.57). 
There were three main determinants of compensation packages in the affiliates of the 
MNEs: collective bargaining, the legal environment and 'prevailing local practice' 
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(p.57). For example, International Harvester quoted the influence of the local wage 
rates and conditions on the collective bargaining process and government regulations 
as being the major determining factors in its packages (p.58). International metal 
worker unions also argued that the high levels of unionisation in the home as well as 
the host nation affected the outcome. However, metal unions surveyed in various 
countries 'were nearly all unanimous' that the compensation practices of the NENE 
subsidiaries did not differ from local conditions as a result of the multinational 
character of those companies (p.67). For example, Australian unions saw no 
differences in compensation in MNEs, and believed that what variations there were, 
could have been due to 'historical practices, arbitration awards and legislation' (p.68). 
In 1991, multinational banks reported to the ILO that the main influences on 
compensation in host countries were (1) the policies of other banks operating in the 
same nation, (2) any legislated minimum levels, (3) the provisions of collective 
agreements which may have been negotiated at national level for the banking industry, 
(4) sectoral, company or local collective agreements, and (5) any custom or practice 
related to banking (ILO, 1991a:93). The general HR policy of many of the large 
banks was determined by their head offices, which recommended overseas 
compensation systems and levels to attract and retain good local staff. However, 
inevitably the overseas branches and subsidiaries had to relate to the local 
environment and 'the large banks generally allow considerable latitude to managers of 
overseas offices' to design compensation systems that conformed to the local 
environment (p.93). For example, the UK owned Midland Bank had a policy of 
comparing its locally paid compensation with 'seven designated foreign banks and 
two leading local banks', and then establishing job grades and salary scales. It 
attempted to be in the upper quartile compared with competitors (p.94). The Union 
Bank of Switzerland adopted similar policies, with all staff salaries being reviewed 
annually. In India, multinational banks compared themselves with local publicly 
owned banks whose rates were set by the government after consultation with staff. In 
other nations such as Argentina, Finland, Indonesia, Norway, and Switzerland, the 
MINE bank had normally to follow national agreements for the banking sector, but 
there were examples of MNEs deciding to remain outside these national agreements. 
In Austria, Greece and France, the banking national agreement specified the grades 
and salary scales to be observed. The ILO (1991) also recorded that some 
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multinational banks operating in Canada used the Hay system for evaluating clerical 
jobs, but a job evaluation system used by a Canadian affiliate in Japan had to be 
adapted to local conditions (p.96). 
An earlier study of labour practices of MNEs in the textile, clothing, and footwear 
industries found surveyed MNEs giving similar answers to those of the banks (ILO, 
1984). The companies had to follow any national agreement or legislation of the host 
nation, although in some MNEs, 'certain wage categories were determined at 
headquarters,' while others followed 'a totally independent wage policy' (p.93). For 
instance, the Rhone-Poulenc Textile company is quoted as having no 'homogeneous 
wage policy' for the whole MNE, preferring to operate separate policies for each 
affiliate according to its financial capability (p.94). The composition of the 
compensation systems usually included a basic wage, allowances, benefits and 
additional payments. 
MNEs in the petroleum industry also designed compensation to conform with host 
nation legislation, collective agreements and other local conditions (IL0,1977a:58). 
Exxon's policy was quoted as following the pay levels of the oil industry in the host 
nation. Where there was no other oil operation, the company would follow the scale 
of wages and benefits of large industry in the country. If there were no patterns to 
emulate, then the company would initiate one. Levels of pay and benefits were local 
labour market driven, although the Exxon Corporation encouraged 'consistency 
amongst affiliates as to salary systems especially for professional and management 
personnel' (p.58). Shell International replied that their international operations were 
conducted 'within national frameworks' which influenced general policies on 
compensation. However, with international and expatriate staff; head office tried to 
establish 'a degree of parity between expatriates working in different countries', with 
general conditions of service that took into account separation from the home nation 
(p.58). The report went on to give examples of these principles. For example, Shell 
UK determined its compensation according to the local employment market, and 
would follow local practices in countries such as France, where there was a national 
oil industry agreement based on qualifications with special increments for efficiency 
(p.63). 
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While these ILO reports mainly describe the compensation position without 
attempting to place the results in a conceptual framework, they do highlight the 
flexibility of MNEs in designing their compensation in the various countries in which 
they operate. They are clearly bound by any legislation, collective agreements and 
other local features. There is some evidence of head offices in large MNEs 
attempting to achieve some parity among managerial staff and a tighter control over 
international and expatriate employees, whereas the local affiliate appears to have 
considerable autonomy. In some instances, such as banking MNEs, the subsidiary 
may only award merit increases in line with company practice. What the ILO reports 
do not highlight are the differences in tightness of the respective national labour 
markets. In a buyer's market, Fatehi (1997:320) argues that using the local 
compensation standard works well for the MINE, but in a seller's market, local pay 
standards are 'more problematic', needing justification from the MNE for 
discriminating on pay levels between countries for the same job. He refers to the 
practice of promoting more competent local staff to international status and scales or 
to home country scales as two ways around this problem. 
Finally, one of the few empirical studies on HCN pay at subsidiary level is by Roth 
and O'Donnell (1996). Their investigation of senior executive and lower level 
compensation in 100 foreign subsidiaries in two industries in the United States (40 
affiliates), UK (22), Canada (14), Japan (12) and Germany (12) was based on a mail 
questionnaire. Agency theory was used as a theoretical context. Hypotheses focused 
on (1) the cultural distance between market characteristics of the parent MINE and 
affiliate, (2) the strategic role of the subsidiary, and (3) the affiliate managers' 
commitment to the MNE. The mix and market position of HCN employee 
compensation were examined. Part of their findings were: 
• The percentage of senior management's incentive-based compensation increases when a 
subsidiary has a lateral centralization form and its senior manager has a higher level of 
commitment to headquarters.[Tateral centralization form' is where the foreign subsidiary 
has worldwide responsibility for a specific product or product line{p.681 }1 
• The percentage of total incentive-based compensation paid by the subsidiary increases with 
the foreign subsidiary's cultural distance (Roth & O'Donnell, 1996:697) 
They elaborated: the MNE affiliate might have to adapt to the host country 
environment in setting certain incentives for all local staff, as cultural distance was 
associated with pay mix. One explanation why 'lateral centralization' might have a 
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different effect on the pay mix of senior management is that it is 'subsidiary specific'. 
For example, a corporate MNE policy of giving equity stocks to senior management 
in the subsidiaries could have more to do with some 'firm specific' reason than with 
the local national culture (p.698). 
Researching pay mix and level is, of course, only one part of the compensation 
package. The handling of employee benefits in the NINE is another. 
Employee Benefits and the MNE 
The provision of employee benefits in the MNE raises some unique problems for the 
HRM function. Schemes such as pension plans, medical coverage and social security 
are difficult to administer in an MINE because of cultural and transportability 
differences (Dowling, Schuler & Welch, 1994). There are questions as to whether 
PCNs should continue in home country programs or transfer into host nation 
programs (p.162). There is also the impact of local legislation on expatriate 
termination benefits, which social security system to choose, 'whether benefits should 
be maintained on a home-country or host-country basis', and the exportability of 
home nation programs to the affiliates (p.163). Thus, as Robock and Simmonds 
(1989:587) put it, the 'types and levels of benefits that are customary' can vary 
significantly from country to country. Individual benefits may differ, as might the 
proportion of the compensation bill devoted to benefits. In addition, some benefits, 
may be imposed by legislation. An MINE may decide to take an international 
responsibility for items such as insurance, which would make transfer between 
countries easier. The expatriate workforce might also receive a different set of 
benefits from those of HCNs; these usually take the form of extra leave or air fares for 
partners and families (Hodgetts & Luthans, 1993a). Cascio (1992:644) suggests that 
MNEs usually administer their employee benefits on the 'best of both worlds' 
principle, with the expatriate receiving home country benefits where possible. Where 
a benefit such as disability insurance is not available, the expatriate might be 
incorporated into a host nation program. 
The practitioner literature outlines the practical problems of MNE benefit 
administration. For example, Hait (1992:27) refers to the US rules on -the coverage 
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and taxation of retirement benefits for US expatriates and 'reverse expatriates' as 
being 'complex, confusing and, in some cases, illogical'. Woolsey (1990:55) reports 
the difficulty of US compensation specialists in keeping up with legal changes in the 
area of pensions and social security across the world, while Payne (1990:76) argues 
that Australian executive salaries are 'relatively low' by world standards, but offset by 
'fairly high' benefits. These differences have to be factored into packages; 
superannuation and motor vehicles are particularly sensitive. 
Again, the reports of the ILO are the main sources of data on employee benefit 
payment by MNEs in host nations, and mostly concentrate on the number of benefits 
paid by an MINE compared with those offered by local firms in a host country. For 
example, a 1976 ILO report on wages and conditions in MNEs quotes a 1973 survey 
of US owned and other MNEs operating in Spain compared with locally owned 
companies. This survey of 57 US MNEs, 56 other MNEs and 45 large local firms 
found that although the MNEs provided greater numbers of employee benefits than 
the local firms, the differences 'were not pronounced', as different packages of 
benefits were offered (p.41). Spanish companies granted disability and medical 
expenses more frequently than did MNEs, but the converse was the case for death 
benefits and accident insurance. The conclusion was that the benefits of the MNEs in 
Spain were, on the whole, on a par with the better Spanish employers. 
Some US-based MNEs in the metal trades assessed their subsidiaries' benefits to be at 
least 'comparable' or 'competitive' or even better than those of locally owned 
companies in the host nation (ILO, 1977b: 71). This applied to MNEs such as 
Caterpillar, Ford, General Motors and International Harvester. All of the MNEs and 
their subsidiaries replied to the ILO that their employee benefits exceeded the legal 
minima laid down by legislation (p.'76). These extra provisions included insurance, 
vacation and bonus pay, shorter working hours and other extra allowances. The 
reasons given for paying in excess of the legal requirement were collective bargains, 
local management decisions or as result of competition. 
The extent of any provision of welfare facilities by MNEs in host nations will depend 
the level of infrastructure already there. An ILO (1977a) report on petroleum MNEs 
stated, for example, that Exxon's affiliate managers were given considerable 
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autonomy and had often supplied health and medical facilities not only for their 
employees, but also to the local community (p.68). In the textile, clothing and 
footwear industries, the welfare and recreation facilities of MNEs in host countries 
were generally 'better developed' than those of local industry (IL0,1984:103). These 
could range from canteens and sports facilities to club houses, summer camps and 
company owned hospitals. The influences on social security provision in the industry 
were, in order of importance, (1) national legislation, (2) collective agreements 
(industrial, regional, national or company), and (3) MINE-specific social security plans 
not covered by (1) and (2) (p.103). 
According to a 1985 ILO analysis, women working in MNEs in developing nations 
were likely to receive at least the minimum statutory benefits, but were unlikely to 
receive more than the minimum maternity, sick and compassionate leave (p.44). The 
point was made that benefits were provided to attract and retain staff without having 
to put up wages, and not every employee used the benefits offered — e.g. company 
housing or recreational facilities. Medical facilities could be granted to ensure a 
healthy workforce, but up to 1985, child-care in Asia was very rare, even for MNEs 
with a workforce of 4,000 women (p.46). The reputation of MNEs as exceeding 
local conditions, however, was again emphasised in a 1991 ILO study of banking 
MNEs, where the large banks offered 'an impressive package of fringe benefits' to 
attract quality staff (p.100). Some benefits were reserved for high-level or expatriate 
employees, and others were adapted to local conditions. The UK Midland Bank, for 
example, would provide a benefit if more than half of its competitors granted it in a 
specific locality. The social security benefits seemed to be the 'most wide-spread and 
important' ones offered by the MNE banks; the benefits were usually universal and 
amended to suit local conditions. They might also supplement government schemes in 
well-developed nations. Life and accident insurance followed the same principle. 
Maternity leave was granted according to any collective agreements or legal 
requirements. Expatriate staff; however, were normally treated in a special way, with 
benefits designed 'to maintain a high standard of living abroad' (p.105). 
The provision of financial privileges for local banking staff could reduce turnover, and 
many of the large banks allowed participation in share-purchase schemes. By 
comparison, working hours, time off with pay and annual vacations were mainly 
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influenced by local factors such as legislation, collective agreements and custom and 
practice, rather than by headquarters policy (p.106). Annual leave appeared to be the 
preference of head office to attract staff. Sometimes this was geared to length of 
service. The generosity of the MINE banks was not without problems. Selection and 
career management could 'lead to favouritism and injustice' (p.116), and significant 
differences between expatriate and local staff packages could also result in 
perceptions of inequity. 
In summary, the expatriate benefit packages seem, on the whole, to be arranged 
centrally in the major MNEs. The local staff provisions may depend on legislation, 
collective agreements or unilateral decisions of the MINE, with or without head office 
involvement. While benefits such as annual leave may be 'coloured' by head office 
policy, the variety of legislation across the globe inevitably means that major areas 
such as pensions and social security have to be adapted locally. In the case of 
legislated minimum standards, the MNE usually has no choice but to meet them or 
exceed them. The choice for cultural aspects of NINE compensation may not be so 
clear. 
Host Country Culture and MNE Compensation 
Gomez-Mejia and Welbourne (1991:29) emphasise that MNEs are creating a world of 
'stateless corporations', with staff from various cultural backgrounds, 'trying to 
become local companies in many countries'. The issues arising from this are: 
• To what degree must compensation systems be tailored to 'cope with diverse cultural 
contingencies?' (p.29) 
• Does the 'effectiveness of particular compensation strategies [vary] from one country to 
another?' (p.29) 
• How can one design compensation strategies 'that are most appropriate for specific 
cultural conditions?' (p.29) 
Their main argument is that MNEs will achieve greater success when national culture 
is considered in compensation design (p.29). Yet pay systems are tending to 
converge with similar pay-for-performance schemes being introduced around the 
world. The reasons suggested for this are the perception that other people's systems 
are more successful, greater exposure to various management practices, the growth of 
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consultancies and the emphasis on 'prescriptive, universal practices' by academics 
(p.30). 
Little is known, however, about how 'exported' compensation practices work in other 
countries and how culture affects their effectiveness. There may be some strategies 
that work better than others in particular environments (p.30). Rather than merely 
transferring more home-country reward systems to host nations, more attention 
should be given to local cultural norms, local compensation schemes and their effect 
on employee and corporate performance. This, of course, may result in some 
interesting ethnocentric advice for MNE managers. For instance, Puffer and 
Shekshnia (1996), in a piece on Russian culture and compensation, recommend that 
Western firms setting up in Russia design compensation so that the Russian 
collectivism and group solidarity are reinforced, and that pay systems should try to 
'reduce the influence of other [Russian] cultural dimensions such as high uncertainty 
avoidance and risk aversion' (p.235). They go on to advise recruiters to select well-
educated Russians under forty who have little experience of 'the old Soviet work 
ethic' and are thus adaptable to Western management practices, concluding that 
'designing a fit between Western compensation and Russian culture is a major 
component of a successful compensation strategy' (p.238). In the light of this advice, 
it is of some significance that the Trompenaars' (1994) data on Russian managers 
shows them to be high on Individualism (see pp. 52 and 57). 
While national culture can be significant in compensation system evolution and 
effectiveness, some writers contend that one should not be obsessed with this, 
because of the variables involved (Gomez-Mejia & Welbourne, 1991). Pay system 
failures may not necessarily be due to cultural differences (p.40). This point is 
expressed strongly by Milkovich and Bloom (1998), who accuse MNEs of letting the 
practice of aligning compensation to national culture dominate, particularly as there 
may be variations in sub-cultures. Their study of two companies in the United States 
and two in Slovenia suggested that local political, economic, institutional and other 
forces (rather than national culture) could explain 'a significant amount of variation' 
in employee values (p.19). Within national cultures, there still might be 'sufficient 
discretion' for MNEs to design reward systems that encourage corporate 'global mind 
sets' and achieve 'strategic priorities', linked with a 'customized' set of compensation 
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elements in particular business units or regions to fit the local markets. There was a 
menu of compensation choices from which individuals can choose according to their 
national cultural values (pp. 20-3). The strength of the Milkovich and Bloom (1998) 
model is its attempt to integrate 'local versus global' MINE compensation designs and 
re-emphasise the linking of pay to corporate goals. 
Operationalising the concepts of compensation and culture to lead to specific 
prescriptive policies is, of course, another matter. Hodgetts and Luthans (1993b) 
examined some cross-cultural aspects of compensation to advocate a particular 
reward strategy for local MINE managers by using the Hofstede (1980) dimensions to 
represent culture. For example, in high Power Distance cultures, they suggest that 
MNEs should follow 'a hierarchical compensation strategy for local managers', and 
have 'a relatively large gap between the lowest and highest members of the 
organization' (p.43). For a lower Power Distance culture, the range between top and 
bottom should be more compressed and 'participatory gain-sharing and profit-sharing' 
should be considered. On the dimension of Individualism, an emphasis on extrinsic 
and performance-based rewards is more appropriate for high Individualism cultures. 
Group compensation plans and inclusion of seniority and family factors would be 
more suitable for low Individualism cultures. Societies with high Masculinity values 
require compensation that recognises 'aggression and dominance', while a low 
Masculinity score would suggest a system that focuses on 'social benefits, quality of 
work life and equity' (p.44). In a high Uncertainty Avoidance culture, the local staff 
should have a highly structured and bureaucratic compensation system, with few 
variable components and an emphasis on equity. The opposite would be the case for 
a low Uncertainty Avoidance culture, where compensation should be linked to 
performance, have an element of risk, and be highly competitive relative to the market 
(p.45). 
Hofstede's work, of course, has been subject to a number of criticisms, which he has 
attempted to answer (see Harzing & Hofstede, 1996). Criticism of his research has 
included the basing of his theories on the 'structural functionalist paradigm', his 
concept of 'collective programming', equating culture with nation, the construction of 
his four dimensions, sampling techniques, 'the related ecological—individual 
confusion' (Westwood & Everett, 1987:187-202), the age of the data, generalising 
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the data from MNE subsidiary employees to national culture (Harzing & Hofstede, 
1996), and his 'disembodied treatment' of culture away from institutions such as 
political and legislative frameworks (Femer, 1994:91). Nevertheless, an examination 
of 61 replication studies after modifications, 'by and large' confirmed Hofstede's 
findings (Sondergaard, 1994:452). In countering the criticism of insufficient 
dimensions, Hofstede and Bond (1988) added a fifth dimension (long- and short-term 
orientation). While the Hofstede dimensions provide a quantitative difference 
between his samples, Jackson and Schuler (1995:252) observe that 'empirical studies 
seldom include direct measures of both culture and HRM' — not that there is any 
agreement on a 'definitive value scale' for measuring national cultural differences 
(Sparrow & Hiltrop, 1994:64). 
A major more recent attempt than Hofstede's to represent national culture by 
dimensions is the work of Trompenaars (1994)(& Hampden-Turner, 1997) based on a 
database of responses from 30,000 managers from MNEs in 55 countries. 
Trompenaars used five people–relationship orientations based on the work of Parsons 
(1951) (Universalism versus Particularism; Individualism versus Communitarianism; 
Neutral versus Emotional; Specific versus Diffuse; and Achievement versus 
Ascription) plus a nation's attitudes to time and the environment. In his 1994 and 
revised 1997 texts, Trompenaars produces an ordinal nation ranking for each of his 
dimensions based on country averages (p.246). Whether this more recent data attains 
the usage of Hofstede's in international research remains to be seen. But Luthans, 
Marsnik and Luthans (1997) indicate that while some of Hofstede's (1980) findings 
are supported by Trompenaars's research, the latter's additional dimension., 'Specific 
versus Diffuse', showing the range of preferred involvement in the multiple areas of 
one's life, was more useful in explaining current work–family relationships. 
Furthermore, the later data of Trompenaars covers Russia and other East European 
nations, whereas Hofstede's does not. Interestingly, Luthans, Marsnik and Luthans 
(1997) noted that Hofstede's low Individualism ranking for Mexico (i.e. showing a 
more collectivist orientated society) was the opposite of what Trompenaars found. 
They attributed the move towards individualism to increased democracy and 
economic growth in Mexico. However, comparing the two sets of findings is fraught 
with problems because of different definitions, dimensions and sampling practice. 
Although it is more modern, the Trompenaars work can still be criticised for equating 
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culture with national boundaries, representing culture by seven dimensions, providing 
average cultural scores only and generalising data from surveys of MINE managers to 
a national culture. 
Hodgetts and Luthans (1993b) then proceeded to classify clusters of countries stating 
that the Pacific Rim nations have two common cultural dimensions: high Power 
Distance and low Individualism. They advocate high salaries for the top managers 
and group-based incentives (p.46). While the Hodgetts and Luthans argument has a 
logical attraction, their recommendations really only have the status of propositions 
or, in their words, 'general guidelines' (p.48). They have progressed these ideas to 
the development of a four country provisional IERM contingency matrix for five 
areas of HRM (Luthans, Marsnik & Luthans, 1997), but the 1993 recommendations 
are used in the discussion of compensation for Singapore and Australia in this thesis in 
the case study analyses. 
Other propositions concerning cultural influences on the design of incentive systems 
in East Asia have been suggested by Huo and Steers (1993). They propound that 
culture can affect an incentive scheme because 'it determines what is considered to be 
important or valuable by the workers' and 'predisposes organisational members to 
perceive problems in a certain way' (p.73). Moreover, culture can restrict the choice 
of options available to management. But unlike Hodgetts and Luthans (1993b), Huo 
and Steers (1993) do not see culture as the main determinant for the type of incentive 
scheme to be used. They are of the view that other boundary conditions such as the 
nature of the technology and work environment and compatibility with other systems 
should be considered 'before one adapts the incentive scheme to the cultural 
environment' (p.82). However, because of cultural characteristics, the effectiveness 
of any incentive scheme was likely to vary across the world. The texts of Hofstede 
(1980) and Trompenaars (1994) have also suggested the appropriateness of certain 
compensation systems for particular cultures, and a recent paper by Schuler and 
Rogovsky (1998) used large-scale secondary data to support propositions that: 
• seniority-based and skill-based compensation is more likely in higher Uncertainty 
Avoidance nations, and 
• individually-based performance, individual bonus/conunission, performance pay and 
employee share options/stock ownership plans are more frequent in higher Individualism 
countries (pp. 159-77). 
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Of interest in the Schuler and Rogovsky article is the authors' assumption that in a 
high Masculinity culture, compensation practices would be less likely to take 
employees' personal and social needs and non-work lives into account. Their 
research found that workplace child-care and maternity leave was less prevalent in 
countries with higher levels of Masculinity. Compare this with Gomez-Mejia and 
Welbourne's (1991) suggestions for high Masculinity cultures on the Hofstede 
dimensions which are based on their assumption that high Masculinity denotes a 
perception of women as 'the weaker sex' needing special benefits such as paid 
maternity leave, day care and restricted hours of work — an opposite viewpoint. This 
illustrates one danger in extrapolating from cultural dimensions to a recommended set 
of compensation systems. 
Looking at other research on the acceptability of compensation in particular cultures, 
Schneider (1988) cites an MNE's Danish subsidiary whose proposed incentive scheme 
for sales people was rejected by employees because it contravened the egalitarian 
spirit of the affiliate (p.238). She argues that the 'relative importance of status, 
money, or vacation time varies across countries' and will influence the potential 
motivation of a compensation system. Utroska (1993:74), a practitioner, propounds 
that 'certain US management practices like pay for performance and commission 
salaries do not go over well in Europe'. Koopman (1991) also states that the Western 
principle of rewarding only individual performance is foreign to South Africans, who 
dislike being singled out for their achievements (p.43). Ferner's (1994) research on a 
British engineering MINE found that French managers resisted the implementation of a 
standard company-wide Hay/MSL job evaluation scheme (p.93). Chilton (1993) 
writes of Lincoln Electric's 'longer than expected' transfer of its incentive programs 
into its foreign operations. The consultants, Hewitt Associates (1991), refer to the 
US MINE whose proposed pay-for-performance system was opposed in Italy and 
Germany for different cultural reasons in each case. The cultural problems faced by 
MNEs seeking to transfer compensation systems are thus very evident. 
Beechler and Yang (1994) have been critical of a number of the theories explaining 
the transfer or non-transfer of FIRM practices overseas, especially in relation to 
Japanese HRM. Their argument is that although one can recognise national cultural 
differences as affecting the ability of Japanese MNEs to transfer their FIRM overseas, 
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emphasis on culture alone ignores the 'evolution' of Japanese HRM as 'rational 
responses' to its social and economic development (p.471). Furthermore, the 
question needs to be asked why a Japanese MNE would want to transfer its HRM 
systems overseas in any case (p.471). 
Apart from the Schuler and Rogovslcy (1998) article already referred to, other recent 
empirical works relevant to MNE compensation and culture start to overcome 'the 
dearth of both theory and empirical research on cross-national compensation 
practices' (Townsend, Scott & Markham, 1990:667). First, Beatty, McCune and 
Beatty (1988) explored the bases on which Japanese and US managers made 
compensation decisions to highlight the problems Japanese MNEs may have in 
practising in the US environment. A survey of 41 Japanese and 63 US managers was 
undertaken and the authors found that Japanese managers gave less emphasis to 
performance in salary increase decisions. While performance was given some 
emphasis, the Japanese managers also considered job worth 'and, to a lesser extent 
need for achievement, organizational commitment, and years with the organization' 
(p.472). Beatty and colleagues concluded that unless Japanese MNEs were aware of 
the values and managerial practices in the United States, conflict with US staff could 
arise. 
The interest in Japanese management has, of course, led to studies of whether 
Japanese MNE compensation practices can be transferred completely into Japanese 
subsidiaries, the assumption being that cultural differences may affect the degree of 
transition. This has been against a debate about how firmly entrenched the Japanese 
'treasures' of life-time employment, enterprise unions and seniority systems of pay 
and promotion actually are in the Japanese economy, their original links with Japanese 
culture, and whether they are changing anyway (Morris & Wilkinson, 1995). For 
example, Wood (1996) compared the HRM of some Japanese manufacturing plants in 
the UK with those in non-Japanese UK sites and concluded that while the Japanese 
MNE subsidiaries practised 'high-commitment management' more frequently than the 
non-Japanese firms, the probability of compensation practices of pay for seniority and 
age were no more likely in the Japanese affiliates than they were in the non-Japanese 
companies (p.522). His conclusion was that there was no evidence of a 'wholesale 
"Japanization" of British industry' (p.511). 
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This appeared to confirm the results of a study by Pang and Oliver (1988), who found 
that only one of the eleven Japanese manufacturing MNEs studied operating in the 
UK used a seniority-based pay scheme; only two practised life-time employment; but 
all eleven had single-status facilities and conditions. They concluded that the question 
was not whether Japanese practices had been transferred to the UK, but whether the 
HRM strategies fitted in with the manufacturing, marketing and overall business 
strategies of the subsidiaries (pp.20-1). A similar finding was made by Dedoussis 
(1995), who undertook case studies on nine Japanese MNEs located in Australia. He 
found that seniority only played a 'marginal role' in compensation (p.740). An 
elementary bonus scheme existed in only two MNEs, and pay rates and allowances 
were in line with award rates rather than exceeding them. Fringe benefits were 
directly related to the size of the firm. The Dedoussis conclusion was that this 
absence of Japanese practices in the Australian affiliates was not because they would 
not 'fit' into the socio-cultural fabric of Australia, but was more likely a conscious 
decision to minimise blue and white collar labour costs and to 'marginalise' the local 
workforce (p.734). By contrast, Morris and Wilkinson (1995:728) conclude that the 
more 'basic tenets of JIT/TQC production' tend to be introduced in Japanese affiliates 
around the world, and that the 'successful transfer' has more to do with managerial 
prerogatives than with 'amenable societal culture'. 
Returning back to global studies, Townsend, Scott and Markham. (1990) sought to 
identify differences in compensation practices between countries and cultures and 'to 
determine if the cultural cluster model described by Ronen and Shenkar [1985] [was] 
predictive when applied to compensation practices' (p.668). The assumption was that 
value differences were more likely to be reflected in the form of compensation used 
(i.e. the relative proportion of the components of wages, incentives and benefits). 
Twenty countries were placed into five clusters — Anglo, Oriental, Germanic, Latin 
European and Nordic. Townsend, Scott and Markham concluded that culture has a 
significant effect upon pay practices (p.674). The ratio of the components was 
affected by cultural affiliation. This is significant because 'it suggests that phenomena 
beyond strictly local and national customs may impact upon how employees are paid' 
(p.674) and the findings do not support Negandhi's (1975) assertion that culture has 
only a marginal effect on employment practices. The Townsend, Scott and Markham 
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(1990) study, however, has some limitations. Pay data aggregated by industry within 
nations were used. No compensation data by company or type of incentive or benefit 
were available. Moreover, no distinction could be made between MNEs and locally 
owned companies, and this might have affected the results (p.677). 
This suggestion of cultural compensation differences between nations was also 
observed by Pennings (1993). He interviewed executives in US, French and Dutch 
enterprises. Using the Hofstede (1980) dimensions as a framework, he found that 
only the US firms used long-term executive plans and that the French and Dutch 
bonuses were small by US standards, ranging from 0 to 10 per cent (p.270). The US 
firms put more reliance on pay as a motivator. Permings' main conclusion was that 
executive compensation differences were 'arguably a function of culture' (p.276). 
Finally, Newman and Nollen (1996) undertook an impressive study of a large US 
MNE's 176 sales, service and support work units in 18 different countries in Asia and 
Europe. Their thesis was that MNEs 'need to adapt their management practices to 
the national cultures in which they operate in order to achieve high business 
performance' (p.754). Using data from the firm's regular employee attitude survey to 
measure management practices against the five Hofstede (1980; 1991) cultural 
dimensions, they found that work units in more Masculine cultures performed better if 
they 'made more use of merit-based rewards for pay and promotion' (p.766). Work 
units in more Feminine cultures were more effective if they made 'less use of merit-
based rewards' (p.766). Performance was measured by the return on assets, return on 
sales and the work unit's manager's performance bonus. They concluded that MNEs 
should take national culture as a 'given' and design their managerial practices 
accordingly (p.774). The major contribution of this study is its link to performance of 
the affiliate, although the authors admit that they used 'less-than-perfect' measures of 
independent variables and that their focus on only one company made the findings less 
amenable to generalisation (pp.775-6). 
Summing up, what we have tried to show here is that the MINE must consider the 
additional variable of culture in the compensation design process in their subsidiaries. 
Our knowledge of this area is at present limited and the initial questions of Gomez-
Mejia and Welbourne (1991) remain largely unanswered. There is evidence to 
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suggest that some compensation practices will not transfer well internationally, but we 
do not know at this stage (with the exception of Newman & Nollen, 1996) which 
cultures are more amenable to certain compensation practices at all levels of the 
workplace than others, and whether a pay system/cultural 'fit' will result in higher 
productivity. Nor do we know to what extent culture, as opposed to local 
institutional factors, plays in explaining compensation design. Empirical evidence is 
emerging that culture may be a significant factor in individual country compensation 
design, but some writers caution MINE managements not to over-emphasise this in 
relation to other, more critical, institutional factors that may allow some discretion in 
design. 
Host Country Government and MNE Compensation 
An MNE subsidiary in a host country is likely to be subject to the same government 
rules on compensation design as applies to locally owned firms. Some evidence for 
this view can again be gained from ILO reports. 
A 1985 ILO report stated that MINE agricultural enterprises in developing nations 
were subject to the same labour and safety legislation as applied to locally owned 
firms, and were more likely to observe those restrictions, especially in the rural sector 
(p.22). In manufacturing, the report submits that next to labour market forces, 
'government legislation and regulation are the most important determinant of wages 
and benefits' given by MNEs to women workers (p.47). For the nations studied, 
some governments did this by setting minimum wages or decreeing cost-of-living or 
other increases. Not every nation has minimum wage regulation, and even those that 
do may not enforce it rigorously. Other conditions of service such as social security 
payments on behalf of the employee, leave (including maternity leave) provisions, 
hours of work and occupational health regulations may also affect the NINE. 
The ILO (1977b) report on MNEs in the metal industry outlined the relationship 
between host governments and MNEs at that time. In general, MNEs were accepted 
as a normal part of the industrial sector and were treated in the main as if they were 
local concerns. However, some nations did apply restrictions, especially on the 
permitted level of equity in the host country. In Canada, Hong Kong, Australia, UK 
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and the then Federal Republic of Germany, the general policy was to treat MNEs like 
local companies, with the 'same rights and obligations in the labour market' (p.18). 
India had more limiting legislation, in that majority investments were only permitted in 
exceptional circumstances. MNEs in India operated as subsidiaries or branches, and 
subsidiaries that were incorporated in India were subject to different parts of Indian 
company law from those applying to MNE branches. 
None of the countries in the 1977 study had unique legislation on working conditions 
and labour relations for MNEs, so the companies were subject to local laws. 
Nevertheless, elaboration of some local legislation has been necessary to clarify 
unique MINE elements. For example, the UK labour relations legislation at the time 
had to accommodate trade disputes over conditions which might have occurred 
overseas but affected UK employees. Germany specified that MINE subsidiaries had 
to observe the same employee participation criteria as those applying to German 
companies. In Australia, MNEs were (and still are) subject to local employment laws 
and any industrial tribunal requirements. 
A similar conclusion emerged from the ILO (1977a) study of oil MNEs. In a survey 
of eight nations, the Australian Government replied that it had no special legislation 
on wages and conditions that applied to oil MINE subsidiaries. Companies were 
bound by any relevant state and federal laws and any action of industrial tribunals. 
Similarly, there were no special provisions in France and Germany, although there 
was some mention at that time of the possibility of transnational collective bargains 
based on conditions across the EEC. In Indonesia, regulations were based on the 
premise that 'all mineral oil and natural gas are state owned and controlled' (p.7), 
although external contractors could be appointed to run the operations. The 
government could change employment conditions by stipulating a bonus or profit-
sharing arrangement. There were no special laws in Italy for oil MINE affiliates, 
although national collective agreements might set minimum compensation. Similarly, 
in Nigeria and the UK, the governments had no unique rules for the MNEs. 
Although only brief and somewhat dated evidence has been presented here, the 
common theme is that an MINE subsidiary is likely to be subject to the same 
government rules on compensation design as apply to locally owned firms. 
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Host Country Industrial Relations and the MNE 
The MINE is thought to have a specific way of impacting upon trade unions and 
worker interests (Bean, 1994). This belief arises from the 'perceived strength' of the 
MINE, which can mobilise and transfer resources between countries and which has to 
operate in a number of different national industrial relations systems (p.190). The 
head office of the MINE may impose its decisions on affiliates — decisions which 
might include the corporate view on bargaining or union recognition. Bean adds that 
these policies may not be appropriate for the host nation and may lead to conflict. 
Three common views of MNEs are that they can create unemployment in the home 
country by exporting jobs to cheaper labour nations, can weaken union bargaining 
power because of their vast resources, and can have decisions made away from the 
site of local managers and negotiations (pp. 191-2). Moreover, local unions have 
difficulty in accessing financial data on the subsidiary. 
Bean (1994) examines each of these arguments in turn. His view is that the question 
of exporting jobs to cheaper nations is a complex one (p.192). While there are 
examples of MNEs transferring production, 'the evidence suggests that the possible 
job displacement which could occur from large-scale production switching to a more 
favoured location is limited' (p.193). One also cannot generalise about head office 
control of industrial relations. Whether head office intervenes in a subsidiary's 
industrial relations may depend on 'technological and organisational considerations', 
whether the affiliate is a key one, the age and national origin of the subsidiary, and the 
difference in cultures between host and home nations (pp.194-200). There are 
examples of MNE subsidiaries following the headquarters' line in opposing union 
recognition and employer association membership, but Bean (1994) cites the example 
of Singapore, where unions have sometimes found it easier to gain recognition with 
the MNEs than with local firms, possibly because the MNEs have more experience in 
handling unions (p.199). The union response to MNEs can take the form of 
exchanging information across affiliates, providing international assistance for a 
subsidiary in dispute, and attempting multiple negotiations with several subsidiary 
managements at the same time. There are examples of 'trans-national coordinated 
bargaining on a significant scale' (p.204). 
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Unions also try to establish international federations and pressure national and 
international bodies such as the ILO to get some control over the MNE and to ensure 
that MNEs at least conform to local industrial relations statutes (Briscoe, Rothman, & 
Nacamulli, 1992). The progress towards transnational bargaining is slow, however, 
because of the complexity of different laws and cultures, employer opposition, and the 
reluctance of local national unions and employees to allow decision making to move 
away from the host nation (pp.7-8) (see also Levison & Maddox, 1982). 
Nevertheless, the European Commission in Brussels was planning for European 
Works Councils that would affect MNEs and operate in at least two of the member 
states (Furlonger, 1992). 
The issue of MINE and control dominates much of the industrial relations literature 
(see, for example, Hellman, 1977; Morgan & Blainpain, 1977). Frenkel (1993a) asks 
whether MNEs have the reputation for being anti-union because host governments 
might support this approach, or because MNEs might resist unions and influence 
governments at the same time (p.327). He concludes that the available evidence does 
not support 'union marginalization through the direct role of MNCs' (p.328). Some 
governments have sought to reduce the unions' role, but it is not clear whether MNEs 
are behind this. In any event, there is recent US evidence that there is not much 
difference between the difficulty of organising MINE subsidiaries in the United States 
and the difficulty of organising locally owned US firms (Sanyal & Neves, 1992). 
The advice given by international business texts to management on how to run MINE 
subsidiary industrial relations contains a number of options. Taoka and Beeman 
(1991:534) see the main issue as the degree of decentralisation. They recommend 
that when the subsidiary management is 'new and inexperienced' in industrial relations 
or if one affiliate's negotiated settlement might affect another, then industrial relations 
should be more centralised. On the other hand, more autonomy in negotiations may 
raise the credibility of the local manager. Hodgetts and Luthans (1991:304) consider 
the 'strategic management' of industrial relations to be a major challenge for MNEs 
because of the numerous approaches possible. Three industrial relations approaches 
are advocated by the authors: the ethnocentric, polycentric and geocentric. The 
ethnocentric is said to be 'generally not effective and can have even disastrous results' 
(p.305). MNEs may abandon this approach as they expand internationally. With the 
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polycentric, the MNE's industrial relations strategy is a series of different approaches 
adapted to the unique external environment of each nation. The geocentric model 
tries to link different locations together in a unifying and 'composite industrial 
relations approach' (p .305). 
The empirical literature on MNEs and industrial relations goes back thirty years — 
Kujawa (1979) acknowledging Shearer's (1967) Industrial Relations of American 
Corporations Abroad as the first work on the problems of MNEs and labour — so 
only a representative selection is discussed here. Roberts and May (1974) surveyed 
32 British MNE head offices and found that 63 per cent of these gave policy advice 
on industrial relations to subsidiaries, with just over a third stating that no advice was 
ever proffered. Bomers and Peterson (1977) assessed the industrial relations of 23 
MNEs (8 US and 15 European) with subsidiaries in West Germany and the 
Netherlands. They had no evidence that MNEs frequently referred industrial 
decisions to higher levels to avoid an issue, and found no concern among unions 
about some industrial relations practices transported by US MNEs (p.52). Kujawa 
(1979:11) scrutinised existing research on MINE industrial relations at the time and 
concluded that empirical evidence did not sustain the argument that US MNEs 
attempted to 'despoil the local social and cultural integrity' of local host nation 
environments as they related to industrial relations. 
Enderwick and Buckley (1983, amended 1984) used the results of a 1980 British 
Workplace Industrial Relations Survey to obtain data on 63 foreign and 485 locally 
owned MNEs operating in Britain. They found that foreign owned MNEs were less 
unionised, more likely to engage in decentralised plant level bargaining, and tended to 
tie industrial (manual) worker increases to rises in the cost of living (rather than on 
the British companies' capacity to pay). Non-unionised foreign MNEs tended to pitch 
salary levels for non-manual employees to comparable rates outside (p.323). 
Compared with the British, foreign firms avoided payments by results incentive 
schemes and appeared to utilise labour more effectively (p.329). By comparison, 
Henley (1983) investigated the industrial relations of MINE manufacturing subsidiaries 
in Malaysia and Kenya to show the impact of environment on labour policies. Henley 
argued that industrial relations and HRM policies of the MNEs were particularly 
affected by government control of unions, especially at central organisation level. 
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Governments were willing to 'subordinate the interest of labour to national economic 
priorities' by minimising restrictions on employers' prerogatives (p.117). Company 
unionism was encouraged, but political activity was prohibited. Nevertheless, Henley 
concludes that while government policies were similar, MNE policies and practices 
differed greatly. This may have been due to the age of the company, the role of 
expatriate managers, the 'general level of economic activity' or the 'specific social 
structure and political system' of the country (pp. 129-30). 
Apart from the research already summarised, the main data on individual MNEs is 
contained in ILO surveys. A 1977(b) report on six US-based MNEs in the metal 
trades summarised replies from Caterpillar, John Deere, Ford Motors, General 
Motors, International Harvester and Otis Elevators. Each MNE responded differently 
to the notion of a general international industrial relations policy (p.82). Caterpillar 
had a Code of Conduct which gave recognition to unions if the employees so desired. 
Ford and Otis had a policy that encouraged each subsidiary to work out its own 
industrial relations in the context of the local laws and practices. Local legislation 
was significant in the degree of recognition given to unions. Legislation and general 
customs of host nations were also important in relation to the degree of influence 
unions had on decision-making at various levels, apart from any collective agreement 
negotiated. All MNEs preferred to handle industrial relations matters locally or at a 
level as low as possible, and there was little transfer of labour relations practices from 
the home nation. Any international transfer of practices that did occur, tended to 
occur through training in industrial relations at head offices or because local managers 
requested them. 
The industrial relations practices of the MINE oil companies were also reported on by 
the ILO (1977a). Replies were obtained from 21 petroleum companies, both from 
headquarters and subsidiaries, but with less detail than the metals study. Industrial 
relations policies again varied from nation to nation. For example, Esso Australia 
observed in its reply that trade union recognition was an 'integral part' of the 
compulsory arbitration system in Australia (p.82). Shell Germany likewise stated that 
Federal Republic legislation gave sole bargaining rights to a single union that 
negotiated with the company at national level. 
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A 1984 survey of 8 textile, clothing and footwear MNEs and 11 subsidiaries carried 
the same theme as previous MINE sectoral studies — namely that the degree of 
unionisation in the MINE subsidiaries appeared to be on a level similar to the national 
situation in which the affiliate was located ( e.g. high in Australia and low in countries 
where unions were attempting to get established), and that responsibility for industrial 
relations was very decentralised in most of the MNEs (ILO, 1984). MINE parent 
headquarters seemed only to have an advisory role, and became involved only 
exceptionally, over problem cases (p.120). There was evidence of some transferring 
of home nation practices. For example, Kanebo of Japan had a subsidiary in Brazil 
(Kanebo do Brasil) that had adopted many practices of the parent company within the 
local legal framework. The Brazilian affiliate believed this gave it industrial relations 
that were superior to those of local firms (p.122). 
One final data source on MNEs and industrial relations is the ILO report on social and 
labour practices of MINE banks (1991a). As might be expected, the density of union 
membership and recognition in bank MNEs varied according to country, depending 
on the industrial relations system, the labour legislation and the strength of the union 
movement. The level of unionisation in MINE banks was generally lower than in local 
banks (p.123) because of the banks' reluctance to unionise, the individual nature of 
the work, the good conditions, and prospects for careers (p.137). Collective 
bargaining practices varied greatly among banks and countries, but the local 
legislation had to be observed. In some situations, the MNEs would transfer internal 
salary administration and personnel policy from the home country, but where these 
practices conflicted with local law, the latter would prevail (p.126). MINE banks 
tended to supplement local conditions, but because of competition, the large MINE 
banks did not diverge very much from each other in industrial relations. 
Generalisations about host country industrial relations and MNEs are thus difficult to 
make. The discretion given to a subsidiary in IR policy is dependent on many factors. 
While MINE headquarters may intervene in the industrial relations policies and 
practices of an affiliate, and there may be some transferring of home country 
practices, the extent to which this occurs will depend on a number of factors, 
including the subsidiary role and product (Frenkel, 1993b). The reputation of MNEs 
for minimising trade union recognition is not easy to substantiate on current evidence. 
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Some MINE are advocates of decentralisation, which leaves the subsidiary to develop 
its own industrial relations strategies. Consequently, each MNE is likely to have 
different policies for each affiliate for each country as it adapts to that country's 
unique legislation, custom and practice and union movement. Legislation, in 
particular, will probably guide the choices of the subsidiary on matters such as trade 
union recognition and collective negotiations. 
Host Country Law, International Codes and Compensation 
The importance of the local legislation to MNE FIRM has already been noted, but 
according to Florkowski and Nath (1993:306), 'there is a dearth of research' on the 
way MNEs adapt their BRM practices to local legal systems. Despite this, the host 
country legislation and regulations are usually included in international HRM models 
and frameworks (see, for example, Schuler, Dowling & De Cieri, 1993). In fact, 
legislation and regulations may be the strongest external factor shaping the structures 
and procedures of MINE subsidiaries because of the possible penalties involved in non-
compliance (Flokowski & Nath, 1993). The difficulty for the MNE is that private 
international law is part of national law, and so will vary from nation to nation 
(Morgenstern, 1984). In many countries, the international law is changing to 
accommodate the increasing number of MNEs and higher government intervention in 
labour matters (p.2). Attitudes to litigation may also vary by culture, some cultures 
using it as a very last resort (Robbock & Simmonds, 1989). 
Four possible sources of law confront the MINE: (1) the indigenous law of the home 
country of the MINE, (2) the indigenous law of the host country, (3) the indigenous 
law of the home country of the employee, and (4) transnational law (Florkowski & 
Nath, 1993). Local staff working at the MINE parent head office are subject to home-
country law. Expatriates working overseas may also be subject to home law. 
Employees at the host nation subsidiary will be subject to host country legislation, but 
the position of third country nationals 'is less clear' (p.308). The authors go on to 
divide the MINE legal environment into five dimensions — regulatory heterogeneity, 
complexity, stability, predictability and relevancy. The latter term (the extent to 
which employment legislation will be enforced) was considered to be the 'most critical 
dimension to consider' (p.311). 
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Local legislation can affect the amount of compensation given (Morgenstern, 1984). 
There might be a legal minimum wage and certain mandatory bonuses such as the 
'thirteenth month' in some nations (p.73). There might be equal pay laws, or 
legislation covering the form and periodicity of payments (p.74). Yet MNEs can 
adopt a strategy to minimise the effect of host nation laws. They may avoid countries 
where they perceive the legislation to be unfavourable. They can negotiate with a 
host government to modify the constraint, or enter into a joint venture to get around 
some restriction (Florkowski & Nath, 1993). It is possible that one factor in an 
MNE's choice of location of country is the compensation legislation and rules facing 
it, but the research in this area is limited. - 
More work has been done on the impact of international codes on MNE operations. 
Because of pressure from unions and governments, in 1976 the countries of the 
OECD adopted a voluntary code for labour issues in MNEs. Where no comparable 
organisations exist, the MNE has to provide the best possible compensation within 
government policies and at a level to meet the basic needs of the employees and their 
families (para.34). This was followed by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social 
Policy that exhorts MNEs to provide wages and conditions which are 'not less 
favourable' than those for other host nation companies (1L0 1977c; 1991b:Section 
33). Under the OECD Guidelines (1976:16), the standards of employment and 
industrial relations 'must not be less favourable than those observed by comparable 
employers in the host country' (p.16). The UNCTC Code of Conduct for 
Transnational Corporations (quoted in Dunning, 1993:588-596) incorporating the 
Tripartite Declaration, is more ambitious and is intended to be legally binding on 
signatory countries. Policy decisions of the EU have also enhanced union rights in 
dealing with MNEs (Robbock & Simmonds, 1989). 
The thrust of the ILO and OECD guidelines is to seek greater acceptance by MNEs of 
employees' rights to join unions and to extend collective agreements (Robbock & 
Simmonds, 1989). Other ILO conventions on 'basic worker rights' relate to forced 
labour, child labour and discrimination and equality of compensation (Coulthard, 
1997). While the codes are not legally enforceable, they are agreed by the member 
nations and accepted by major MNEs (Robbock & Simmonds, 1989). Because of 
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their sensitivity to criticism, MNEs often welcome the codes, provided they are 
'consistent with international law' and do not discriminate against MNEs in favour of 
local industry (Blanplthn, 1987:136). Following the codes raises their conduct above 
criticism. 
When a country ratifies an ILO convention, it precludes the nation from changing a 
law 'in a way to render it incompatible with the convention' (Landau, 1990:35). The 
conventions of the ILO may be incorporated into the legislation of a host nation and 
be supplemented with local administrative regulations. Some evidence on whether the 
ILO Declaration had any impact on MNE practices is given in two ILO reports on the 
MNE textile, clothing and footwear industries (1984), and the NINE banking industry 
(1991a). The replies from parties in the textile industry were supportive of the 
principles, but in some quarters the guidelines were not well known. The 
Confederation of Australian Industry acknowledged that MNEs in Australia were 
conducting business in line with the requirements (p.140), and a similar situation 
existed in Germany. The Malaysian Employers' Federation reported that no union 
complaints had been received (p.141). Although the MNEs and most unions surveyed 
had not experienced any problems, the British Trade Union Congress was concerned 
that some MNEs had shown an 'unwillingness to observe the spirit, let alone the 
letter, of the Declaration' (p.142). 
The ILO banking report (1991) perhaps sums up well the sketchy evidence we have 
on the impact of the various international codes on MINE compensation policies and 
practices, namely, 'there is no evidence of either whole-hearted observance or 
complete disregard' (p.137). The reaction to local legislation is firmer in that the 
MINE has to observe it, but even there, the ILO has evidence of MNEs negotiating 
with governments to waive certain conditions. Further, on a more general level, the 
ratification of ILO conventions varies enormously across countries and they only have 
legal force if backed by local law (Frenkel & Royal, 1996a). The average ratification 
rate of all ILO conventions is 'quite low', and their relevance in a globalised economy 
• is being questioned (Coulthard, 1997:55). There is no consensus on whether 
increasing competition and globalisation will lead to decreasing labour standards 
across economies of the world, but there is evidence of mandatory benefits being 
offset by lower wages, thus holding wage costs constant (Lee, 1997). 
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The MNE Head Office Relationship with its Subsidiaries 
Although the headquarters and subsidiary relationship has been discussed briefly in 
industrial relations and other contexts, it is appropriate to conclude this chapter with 
two sections on the research on head office involvement in compensation decisions in 
MINE subsidiaries. We initially consider the head office–subsidiary relationship in 
general terms, then focus on compensation alone. In relation to this thesis, it could be 
argued that the amount of influence the external environment has on subsidiary 
compensation at certain occupational levels will be contingent on the MNE's structure 
of international operations and the international orientation of parent MINE 
headquarters (Schuler, Dowling & De Cieri, 1993). 
Sundaram and Black (1992) argue that MNEs are not just extensions of `non-MNEs' 
in a cross-national setting (p.730). If that were so, no new theories of organisations 
would be needed — only better existing ones. However, MiNEs do have a number of 
unique features which require 'multi-disciplinary and integrative research'. They are 
'a complex network of differentiated subsidiaries' or 'complex global forms' (p.730). 
They are subject to 'multiple sources of external authority' in that subsidiaries are 
exposed to a variety of different national laws, politics, languages and culture (p.735). 
There is no one mechanism which the MINE can use to handle each environmental 
exchange (p.736). Consequently, another 'distinguishing feature of the MINE 
environment arises at the intersection of differences in country environments' (p.736). 
Rosenzweig and Singh (1991) outline the now-familiar problem. The MINE is a single 
organisation that operates in a number of countries, each presenting a different local 
environment (p.340). Seeing the MINE as a separate set of units in different nations 
overlooks the need for 'shared management', the roles of each affiliate in contributing 
to corporate objectives and the ability to move resources between subsidiaries 
(p.344). This is neatly summed up as 'the tension between forces for global 
integration and national responsiveness' (p.344). In addition to this tension, 
subsidiaries face pressure to become like each other ('organizational replication'), like 
the head office ('mirror effects'), and subject to 'the imperative of control' (p.346). 
The conflicting pressures on the subsidiary of 'isomorphism with the local 
environment' and 'consistency within the [MNE]' can be plotted on two axes so that 
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combinations might vary in each nation in which an affiliate is located (a third axis) 
(p.347). Rosenzweig and Singh (1991:347) add a fourth axis: each combination 
might be different for each subsidiary process in each country represented. They 
summarise the implications for organisation theory using the following hypotheses: 
• National boundaries are an important force in defining organizational 
environments. 
• National boundaries are of varying importance for different elements of 
organizational structure and process. 
• The subsidiary of an NINE faces an environment that includes other sub-units 
within the MNE. 
• Subsidiaries of MNEs can act as conduits that introduce changes into the host 
country's environment. 
• Subsidiaries of MNEs can act as conduits by which features of the host country's 
environment are introduced throughout the organization. 
• National environments are increasingly linked, and they affect each other. 
(Rosenzweig & Singh,1991:353-5) 
Using these authors' work as a basis for asking questions about MINE compensation 
systems, resource theory might suggest that the environment for MINE subsidiaries 
consists of the host nation plus other affiliates of the same MINE. The compensation 
system of the subsidiary might therefore be developed using resources of head office 
as well as of other subsidiaries. Dependence on local resources is therefore less 
(p.356). An example might be the use of a common job evaluation system throughout 
a global MINE irrespective of the host nation. By comparison, the compensation 
systems of multi-domestic firms may more closely resemble those of local companies. 
Institutional theory of organisations emphasises the need for subsidiaries to 'take on 
structural forms sanctioned by their environments' (p.356). But these environments 
will include other parts of the MINE as well as the host nation elements. The theory 
has therefore to incorporate the pressure for compensation conformity in the MINE 
and local pressures for adaptation. Ecology theory studies have tended to concentrate 
on environments within national boundaries (p.356), but it is clear that one national 
environment may affect another through the operations of an MNE. 
Research on the MINE head office relationship with its subsidiaries has centred on the 
methods of coordination and control, which included HRM, corporate culture, 
delegation of decision making, and governance structures (p.346). Mechanisms for 
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inter-subsidiary linkages include bureaucratic control, centralisation, 'normative 
integration' (building common values among MNE managers), and 'critical flows of 
capital, technology and people' (De Cieri & Dowling, 1995:139). The difficulty in 
analysing the role of headquarters here is that the functions of affiliates vary. MNE 
subsidiaries of the multidomestic variety are relatively more self-sufficient while in the 
global industries, the affiliate may be reliant on other subsidiaries for 'know–how, 
capital and key personnel' (Rosenzweig & Singh, 1991:349). Ferner's (1994:83) 
findings complement this view in that `polycentric' MNEs decentralise their FIRM to 
subsidiaries with few international guidelines, compared with ethnocentric and global 
MNEs, which manage in , a more centralised way. The ethnocentric MNEs are 
therefore more likely to be FIRM 'innovators' in the host country, compared with 
polycentric firms, which are more prone to be 'reactors' (p.83). 
The evolution of research by more than 80 writers on these aspects has been 
synthethised by Martinez and Jarillo (1989). Their 'mechanism of coordination' of 
international activities is defined as 'any administrative tool for achieving integration 
among different units within an organization' (p.490), and they note that this is not 
exclusive to MNEs. Their proposition is that studies of coordinating mechanisms 
have moved from structural and formal ones such as departmentalisation, 
formalisation, standardisation, and output and behavioural control to more 'informal 
and subtle' devices such as lateral relations and informal communications (p.492). 
Early writers sought the 'right' structure for the MNE and tried to measure the degree 
of centralisation. The inconclusiveness of this research led to more studies of 
functional areas and MNEs of different national ownership (p.497). More recently, 
the research has concentrated on more informal mechanisms such as the stressing of 
corporate culture (see, for example, Ferner, 1994) and the managing of career paths 
— while at the same time not neglecting 'the consistency to take advantage of global 
opportunities' (p.500). 
Thus one cannot generalise about head office control of managerial functions. Some 
functions may be more centralised than others, while others may be more firmly linked 
to divisional headquarters located outside their parent home countries (Ferner, 1994). 
The degree of centralisation may also be due to micropolitical processes and 
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bargaining with subsidiaries (resulting in a loosely coupled system), or due to national 
business cultures, or national differences in structure. 
Past empirical research has investigated these issues, and a selection will suffice to 
illustrate the progression of knowledge. Starting with an early empirical study of 
British MNEs by Roberts and May (1974), already referred to, answers were sought 
from head offices about whether the involvement in subsidiary industrial relations was 
`(1) need for approval, (2) guidance, (3) standard setting, (4) assistance in policy 
planning', or `(5) the provision of staff assistance from headquarters' (p.406). Later, 
Bartlett (1983) suggested that rather than attempting to find the appropriate structure 
to handle the widening of international bases, the problem was more likely 'one of 
managing the process than of changing the structure' (p.138). This approach 
involved building a 'multidimensional and flexible decision process' (p.146). 
The balance involved between the MINE and its subsidiary 'implies decision making 
processes beyond the mere formal organization' (Doz & Prahalad, 1984:55). There 
need not necessarily be a choice between integration and responsiveness — both may 
be found together. Consequently, the balance between responding to the home nation 
and integrating the MINE 'cannot be purely analytical and rational' (p.56). MNEs can 
choose between bureaucratic and personal control systems to monitor behaviour and 
output and probably use a combination of both, depending on cultural distance and 
subsidiary interaction (Baliga & Jaeger, 1984). 
Ghoshal and Nohria (1989) adopted a more theoretical approach in exploring the 
internal differentiation within MNEs. They proposed a contingency framework to 
'develop conditions of "fit'" between the context and the structure of headquarters 
and subsidiary relations (p.323). Their MINE data 'supported the logic of internal 
differentiation' within MNEs so that on a contingency basis a 'fit' can be achieved in 
the parent—affiliate relationship, which will lead to better performance (p.333). For 
instance, they suggest that a hierarchical structure is more appropriate when 
subsidiaries operate in stable environments and have limited resources (p.333). The 
same data were used in a later paper (Nohria & Ghoshal, 1994) discussing the 
importance of 'shared values' between head office and its affiliates. The concept of 
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'fit' in [FIRM was also developed in work by Milliman, Von Glinow and Nathan 
(1991) (discussed in the next section). 
In looking at . subsidiary strategy as a variable in the head office relationship, Martinez 
and Jarillo (1991) hypothesised that the strategy pursued by the subsidiary will 
determine the kind of coordinating mechanism used by the parent MNE. After 
conducting a survey of 50 MNEs operating in Spain, they concluded that there 
appeared to be a strong relationship between the role assigned to the affiliate and the 
control mechanism. As integration of the work of the subsidiary with the rest of the 
MINE increased, there was a larger use of formal and subtle mechanisms 'up to a point 
regardless of its level of localization' (p.441). Subtle mechanisms also became more 
significant 'once the formal ones have been put into place' as the need for 
coordination increased (p.441). 
As mentioned above, research on more specific aspects of parent—subsidiary relations 
has included differences in managerial control due to the nationality of the MINE. 
Ferner (1997) has provided a useful summary of sixteen comparative studies on the 
relationship of an MNE's country of origin to managing HRM in MNEs. He found 
that there was 'a relatively small body of research' on the way MNEs of different 
nationalities manage BRM (p.20). Nevertheless, the research so far provided 
'substantive support' for nationality as a major factor in head office—subsidiary FIR 
management although the impact of nationality was likely to differ according to the 
issue. The weakness of the literature was, however, that it was mainly survey-based, 
with few case studies to show processes and linkages, and with an under-emphasis on 
HRM/lR as opposed to general managerial responsibilities. Past work had also 
focused mostly on US and Japanese MNEs, with European countries 'lumped 
together' (p.22). A few examples of MINE nationality research will perhaps suffice 
here. 
Egelhoff (1984) in a sample of 50 US, UK and European MNEs concluded that US 
MNEs monitored affiliate outputs and required more formally reported performance 
data than did European MNEs. US MINE controls involved more quantitative aspects 
and precise plans and budgets to derive comparable standards (p.81). Kreder and 
Zeller (1988), in comparing US and German MNEs, noted that American MINE 
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control was 'more centralized, indirect, directive and task-oriented' whereas German 
control tended to be 'decentralized, direct, participatory, and socio-emotional' (p.64). 
Negandi, Yuen and Eshghi (1987), in studying Japanese subsidiaries in South-East 
Asia, recorded that in most Japanese subsidiaries, the senior positions were held by 
expatriates who exerted the control together with visits 'from strategic personnel 
from the headquarters, and regular reports and communications with head office' 
(p.78). Negandhi (1987) compiled lists of factors that encouraged centralisation and 
decentralisation of MNE decisions based on a literature review (see p.183). His study 
of 120 subsidiaries of US, German and Japanese MNEs found that in general, on a 
range of decision making, the US affiliates had the least autonomy, the Japanese the 
most, and the German somewhere in between. Compensation decisions were not 
included in the survey, but affiliates from all three nationalities had a very high 
influence on personnel training and layoffs of operating personnel. They had only 
moderate influence on the use of expatriate personnel from headquarters, and very 
little over the appointment of a chief executive for the subsidiary. Obviously, more 
comparative research on countries already surveyed (and on other countries) is 
necessary to establish fully the effect of MINE nationality on head office—affiliate 
management. 
This brief overview of the nature of the MINE head office—subsidiary control literature 
shows that research has considered a number of variables such as structural devices as 
opposed to subtle and informal influence, the need for integration as opposed to 
responsiveness, the strategy and role of the affiliate, and the nationality of the MINE. 
Greater examination of the role of regional offices in subsidiary control needs to be 
added to this area of MINE studies in the future. 
MNE Head Offices and Subsidiary Compensation 
According to Milliman, Von Glinow and Nathan (1991:321), 'there is relatively little 
research' on the link between MINE headquarters and affiliates in international FIRM. 
That statement could also be applied to the position for 11INTE compensation. 
Martinez and Ricks (1989:468) agree that 'only a handful of [HIM] studies' exist on 
the parental influence and those that do, look at that way the affiliate can be 
controlled rather than the way FIRM decisions are affected. One example is a 
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discussion piece on IJVs by Frayne and Geringer (1990:65), who suggest that 
compensation in LTVs can be used as a control device by linking employee bonuses to 
the parent's international operations and achievement of the IJV's long-term strategic 
objectives'. 
On first thought, any generalised finding about the influence of MNE head offices on 
affiliate compensation is likely to overlook the fact that the involvement may vary 
according to the subsidiary in question, the type of employee (HCN, PCN or TCN), 
the type of occupation, and the particular aspect of compensation (such as structures, 
collective agreements, base pay levels, financial incentives, or any of the employee 
fringe benefits). What research there is rarely gets down to this level of detail. Over 
and above the compensation itself is the relationship of pay systems to the other FIRM 
functions and to the MNE strategies generally. 
To put these issues in context, Milliman, Von Glinow and Nathan (1991) provide a 
useful framework for the analysis of the head office—subsidiary relationship, as shown 
in Figure 3.1. 
Figure 3.1 
Four Fits of Strategic International Human Resource Management 
Internal IHRM Fit within 
IHRM Functions 
External Fit of IHRM 
to Organisational Context 
Within Organisational 
Level of Analysis 
Outside 
Organisational 
Level of Analysis 
Internal IHRM Fit (Selection, 
Training, Appraisal, 
Rewards) 
IHRM Fit to Organisational 
Life Cycle Stage 
Foreign Subsidiary Fit to 
Corporate IERM 
IHRM Fit to Cross-cultural & 
Cross-national Environment 
Source: Milliman,J, Von Glinow, MA. and Nathan, M.(1991) 'Organizational Life Cycles and 
Strategic International Human Resource Management in Multinational Companies: Implications for 
Congruence Theory', Academy of Management Review, 16(2), p.322. 
The 2 x 2 framework in Figure 3.1 is based on the proposition that to maximise its 
effectiveness through strategic IHRM, an MNE has to simultaneously achieve an 
external and internal fit. The external fit consists of dealing effectively with the cross-
national and cross-cultural external environment, and using IHRM practices to 
'facilitate the adaptation' of the MNE to those environments and to support the 
MNE's stage of development (p.321). By contrast, the concept of internal fit is based 
on the simplified structure of an MNE corporate office and foreign subsidiary, where 
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fit is obtained when there is an integration of all IHRM practices at each level of the 
MINE (head office and affiliates), and where IHRNI practices are 'congruent between 
the corporate office and the foreign subsidiary levels' (p. 322). The complexity of 
these integrative relationships clearly increases as the number of products and 
affiliates rises (p.323). 
In most of international compensation research, the main quadrant receiving attention 
is that of the 'fit' between the parent head or regional office and the affiliate. This 
observation particularly applies to some ILO surveys. But the relationship is not a 
simple one and the research suggests that the head office influence on subsidiary 
compensation may depend on factors mentioned before in passing — the dependence 
of the subsidiary on head office resources, the importance of the subsidiary, the type 
and level of employee, the kind of compensation element, the nationality of the NINE, 
the method of acquisition of the affiliate and its ownership. Some research 
concentrates on describing the degree of involvement by the head office into affiliate 
compensation, while other work attempts to underpin the relationship with a more 
theoretical approach using some of the above variables included. The simpler 
descriptive research is outlined first. 
Although one of the first research studies of head office control in MNEs probably 
dates back to Alsegg's (1971) work MNE affiliates in Europe, one early major survey 
on head office—subsidiary relationships that specifically included affiliate compensation 
was by Van Den Bulcke and Halsberghe (1984). They evaluated the impact of MINE 
head offices on employment decision making in 260 foreign manufacturing 
subsidiaries located in Belgium in 1976. The authors defined 'decisive influence of 
the parent company' as: `(1) without taking into account the advice of the subsidiary 
and (2) with the advice or proposals of the subsidiary being taken into consideration' 
(p.9). Out of 222 subsidiaries responding to the question, 21 per cent reported that 
there was 'decisive' influence from the parent MINE on employment decisions (p.16). 
The following extract (Table 3.1) shows a more detailed breakdown of the 
percentages for the decisions subject to decisive headquarters' influence. 
The survey was completed by the 'top managers' in each of the subsidiaries, based on 
their personal experience of 39 decision making areas in the affiliate. For 
Decision 	 Percentage of 
Subsidiaries with 
Decisive HQ Influence(a) 
% 
Granting of fringe benefits 36 
Salaries of middle managers 29 
Signing of collective company agreements 18 
Payment systems in general 16 
Actions relating to union demands 14 
Acceptance of collective agreements 14 
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Table 3.1 
Decisive Intervention by the Parent Company in Decision Making of Foreign 
Subsidiaries in Belgium, 1976 (N=222) 
Source: Extracted from Van Den Bulcke, D. and Halsberghe, E.(1984) 'Employment Decision 
Making in Multinational Enterprises: Survey Results from Belgium,' Working Paper No.32, Geneva, 
ILO, p18, Table 2. 
Note: (a) Decisions made by the parent company without consulting or after having consulted the 
subsidiary 
compensation, Table 3.1 shows that the degree of intervention by head office varied 
according to the issue. Because the survey did not seek qualitative responses, the 
reasons for this are not apparent, but there seemed to be more intervention in 
managerial staff pay than in industrial (unionised) employees' rewards. From the 
same survey results, Table 3.2 provides an even more detailed breakdown. It 
indicates four scaled responses: (1) a decision by the parent company, (2) the parent 
MNE taking into account the advice of the subsidiary, (3) the subsidiary deciding but 
taking into account the views of the parent NINE, and (4) the subsidiary making an 
independent decision. 
Table 3.2 demonstrates that responsibility for payment systems in these MINE 
subsidiaries based in Belgium generally rested with the subsidiary. Head office 
intervention was also relatively low for collective agreement administration, but the 
parent MINE did intrude more when top and middle management compensation was 
determined and when employee benefits were granted. The freedom to negotiate 
collective agreements may have been due to the necessity for local knowledge of the 
labour market customs (p.61). Van Den Bulcke and Halsberghe's data suggested that 
the staffing, training and compensation of local managers were among the most 
centralised decisions in MNEs (p.28) although the centralised or decentralised nature 
of HRM is reflected in several ways. Over 90 per cent of Personnel Managers in the 
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Table 3.2 
Parent Company and Subsidiary Personnel Decisions in Foreign 
Subsidiaries in Belgium, 1976, (N as indicated) 
Decision-maker 
(1) 
Parent 
Company 
Decision 
(2) 
Parent 
Company (+ 
subsidiary) 
Decision 
(3 ) 
Subsidiary 
(+ parent 
company) 
Decision 
(4) 
Subsidiary 
Decision 
(5) 
Other 
replies 
Total 
Decisions % % % % % N 
Payment system in 4 12 31 49 4 245 
general . 
Determination of 
salaries for top 
management 
9 24 
. 
44 20 3 242 
Determination of 
salaries for middle 
managers 
8 21 44 25 3 241 
Actions relating to 
trade union demands 
2 12 26 55 6 231 
Signing of collective 
company agreements 
5 13 32 46 4 216 
Acceptance of 
collective 
agreements 
3 11 27 
, 
52 7 216 
Granting of fringe 
benefits 
7 29 41 19 3 242 
Recognition of trade 
unions 
3 6 24 58 9 242 
Source: Extracted from Van Den Bulcke, D. and Halsberghe, E.(1984) 'Employment Decision 
Making in Multinational Enterprises: Survey Results from Belgium', Working Paper No.32, 
Geneva, ILO, p.26, Table 6. 
foreign subsidiaries in Belgium were of host country nationality, compared with 7 per 
cent PCNs and 2 per cent TCNs; 63 per cent of the directors in the subsidiaries were 
PCNs (p.30). The decentralisation of compensation decisions was also reflected in 
the frequency of standardised reports to head office on employment matters, which 
was less than that for financial and commercial data. 
Moving from an examination solely of the degree of head office involvement to 
include other variables, the Van Den Bulcke and Halsberghe (1984) research went on 
to show that the nationality of the MINE could affect employment decision making, as 
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it was 'more strongly determined by [head offices of] European than American parent 
companies' (p.39). The degree of ownership of the affiliate by the parent was also 'an 
important indication of the potential impact of the parent company' (p.45). The work 
of Van Den Bulcke and Halsberghe (1984) is unusual in including data on regional 
offices of MNEs as well, although like MNEs themselves, the form of regional office 
can vary greatly from MINE to MNE. Of all regional offices of US MNEs with 
affiliates in Belgium, 75 per cent could make a decision on compensation systems 
without having asked for advice from the parent company or the subsidiaries (p.70). 
The figures were between 61 and 74 per cent for deciding general HRM policy, 
reacting to union claims and signing collective agreements (p.70). However, the 
corporate MINE head office still retained responsibility for compensation of middle 
and top management and the level of employee benefits (p.71). While the study offers 
copious data, it is limited by the respondents being subsidiary heads only, by being 
restricted to one country, and by omitting references to corporate strategy and the 
external environment. The authors acknowledge that subsidiary managers might also 
be prone to declaring more autonomy than they actually have (p.8). 
The greater authority given to subsidiary management for the design of wage payment 
systems is also evident in Hamill's (1984) study on the labour relations decision 
making of subsidiaries of 30 MNEs operating in Britain in the chemicals, electrical 
engineering and mechanical engineering industries. He interviewed a range of small 
and large subsidiaries and examined operating characteristics including the date and 
method of establishment, degree of inter-subsidiary production integration and 
nationality. Hamill found that the degree of centralisation of labour relations varied 
according to issue. Examples are shown in Table 3.3. 
From Hamill's evidence, the operating budget for a British subsidiary is a highly 
centralised decision, while wage increases are less so. The nature of the wage 
payment system is decided or approved in 11 cases out of 30 at the parent or regional 
head office, with decisions on the type of fringe benefits having the same proportion 
but requiring more consultation or advice from head/regional offices. The conclusion 
is that it is not realistic to see the entire labour relations function as being centralised 
or decentralised. Rather, the amount of head office intervention will vary according 
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Table 3.3 
The Locus of Decision Making in MNE Subsidiaries in Britain (N=30) 
Issue 
Decided 
Mainly by 
Parent/Reg. 
H.Q. 
Approved by 
Parent/Reg. 
H.Q. 
Consulted with 
or Sought 
Advice of 
Parent/Reg. 
H.Q. 
Decided 
Mainly by 
the U.K. 
Subsidiary 
Operating Budget 
Wage Increases 
Wage Payment Systems 
Pensions 
Fringe Benefits 
Nos.of MNEs Nos. of MNEs Nos. of MNEs Nos. of MNEs 
15 
- 
10 
6 
6 
10 
17 
1 
9 
5 
1 
6 
1 
7 
6 
4 
7 
18 
8 
13 
Source: Extracted and adapted from Hamill, J. (1984) 'Labour Relations Decision Making 
Within Multinational Corporations' Industrial Relations Journal, 15(2), 30-34, Table 1. 
to issue (p.33). In addition, the degree of centralisation appeared to depend on a 
number of factors: the nationality of the parent MINE; the degree of inter-subsidiary 
production integration; the performance of the UK affiliate; and the relative 
importance of the parent MINE as a source of funds for the UK subsidiary (p.33). The 
degree of inter-subsidiary production integration was found to be 'the most important 
factor leading to the centralisation of the labour relations function' of the MNEs 
studied (p.33). 
The integration of countries within the European Union has led to speculation that 
MINE head offices will take a greater coordinating role in managing their 
compensation across European affiliates (Shonfield, 1992). This 'pressure' from the 
external environment is being studied by British researchers. Atkinson's (1989) study 
of 35 British MNEs with affiliates in Europe (quoted in Walsh, Zappala & Brown, 
1995:86) again highlighted that MINE head offices handle compensation of different 
occupations with different strategies. The impact of the local external environment on 
compensation design is therefore likely to be different for each employee group. 
Atkinson found that the prospect of a European-wide labour market would not 
dramatically affect the British MNEs as the 'harmonisation' of employment conditions 
across Europe would only affect staff who were likely to be mobile between countries 
— such as young graduates, senior managers and technical staff The integration of 
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pay systems for these levels was through uniform job grading, with actual pay rates 
being decided according to local conditions (Atkinson [1989] in Walsh, Zappala & 
Brown, 1995:86). 
Walsh with co-authors (1995) interviewed representatives from 13 British MINE 
headquarters with outposts in Europe, and concluded that the standardisation of 
compensation along European lines was restricted to 'qualified employees' — 
especially senior managers — and not lower-level white collar or production staff 
(p.89). Like Atkinson's findings, this was evident through the standardisation of 
salary structures for employees who were mobile between subsidiaries. However, 
there were limitations: 8 of the 13 MNEs paid their senior executives according to 
local host country conditions (though with head office approval [p.89]), and all MNEs 
were conscious that different national social security arrangements and taxation and 
pension legislation hindered total standardisation. Nevertheless, several MNEs were 
extending their job evaluation systems for white collar staff to ease career progression 
decisions. Walsh, Zappala and Brown concluded that the majority of the MNEs 
'monitored pay settlements' in the subsidiaries rather than using coercion or 
centralising the decision (p.91). Only one head office decided the percentage pay 
increase for each overseas affiliate, compared with three which provided no head 
office guidelines for pay determination. In the design of compensation systems for 
affiliates, the relationship of the 13 MINE head offices was judged as 'instruct' in five 
cases, 'advise' in two, 'guide' in three, and '[allow] autonomy' in three. The MNEs 
seemed to be responding to the European integration in different ways, but apart from 
the extension of grading systems for mobile senior employees, there was no evidence 
of 'greater central authority over pay deterrnination'(p.95). 
The heterogeneity of the MINE structures and head/regional/local relationships evident 
in the Van Den Bulcke and Halsberghe (1984) paper discussed earlier is repeated in 
the Kuwahara (1985) study of decision making structures and processes in more than 
100 foreign MINE affiliates in Japan. FIRM decision processes could differ depending 
on whether they were affecting PCNs or HCNs and, in the US MNEs, might flow 
from head office divisional heads, through regional offices and then on to subsidiary 
general managers and the local HRM managers (p.14). The Japanese data from a 
1984 Japanese Ministry of Labour survey of more than 100 subsidiaries suggested 
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that in about two-thirds of the cases the locus of the decision to change the wage 
system was in local subsidiaries. In about 28 per cent of cases, decisions were made 
after consultation with the parent MNE; about 5 per cent were made by the parent 
head office alone (p.16). By contrast, decisions on planning, investment, R&D and 
technology essentially remained with the parent MNE (p.21). 
Continuing with Japanese MNEs, Negandhi, Yuen ande Eshghi (1987) surveyed 65 
Japanese owned manufacturing firms with subsidiaries in Malaysia, Thailand and 
Singapore. The most senior Japanese and HCN managers in the affiliates were asked 
to complete questionnaires to reflect the differences in perceptions. Extracts from 
their findings are shown in Tables 3.4-3.5. 
Table 3.4 
Japanese Managers' Perceptions of the Degree of Influence of Headquarters 
(HQ) in Subsidiary Decision Making in Japanese Subsidiaries in SE Asia (N=65) 
Responses as a percentage of Total 
No to Little 
Influence 
of HQ 
Medium Influence 
of HQ 
High to Very High 
Influence of HQ 
Setting Salary Levels for 
Locals 
Fringe Benefits for Locals 
74.58 
76.67 
18.64 
15.00 
6.77 
8.33 
Source: Extracted from Negandhi, AR Yuen, E.C. and Eshghi, G.S., (1987) 'Localisation of 
Japanese Subsidiaries in Southeast Asia,' Asia Pacific Journal of Management., 5(1), p.'73, Table 8. 
Table 3.4 indicates that decisions on local staff compensation rested very much with 
the local subsidiary, with the head office perceived by the affiliates' Japanese 
managers to have 'no to little' influence in setting salary levels and fringe benefits. 
This contrasts with an opposite situation for corporate planning and budgetary 
decisions, in which the headquarters involvement is much greater. When local (non-
Japanese) managers were surveyed, a slightly different result emerged as shown in 
Table 3.5. 
The tables show a common theme of a high level of subsidiary influence on salary 
setting and fringe benefits as perceived by the Japanese and local affiliate managers 
although the local managers did not perceive this influence to the same extent. 
Negandhi, Yuen and Eshghi (1987) observed that the lack of participation of local 
staff in decision making led to half the responses showing some or major difficulties 
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Table 3.5 
Local Managers' Perception of Local Managers' 
Involvement in Decision Making in Japanese Subsidiaries in SE Asia (N=77) 
Responses as percentage of Total 
No to Little 
Influence of Local 
Manager 
Medium Influence of 
Local Manager 
High to Very 
High Influence of 
Local Manager 
Setting Salary Levels for 
Local Managers 
17.10 26.32 56.58 
Source: Extracted from Negandhi, A.R. Yuen, E.C. and Eshghi, G.S., (1987) 'Localisation of 
Japanese Subsidiaries in Southeast Asia,' Asia Pacific Journal of Management. 5(1), p.7,Table 10. 
with the implementation of decisions made by the Japanese headquarters relating to 
salaries and benefits. In general, the affiliates were tightly controlled by head offices 
through the placement of Japanese expatriates, regular reporting and communication, 
and restriction of key decisions to expatriates. Nevertheless, the external environment 
appeared to play 'an important part in shaping the management style of local 
subsidiaries' (p.78). Researching these issues is complicated, however, by the fact 
that the relationship between head office and subsidiary may change over time (Evans, 
1993). 
A similar study, again using Japanese MNEs, was undertaken by Putti, Singh and 
Stoever (1993), who examined the degree of perceived autonomy and of localisation 
of 34 US, 28 European and 16 Japanese subsidiaries operating in Singapore. They 
hypothesised that the nationality of the MNE would be a significant factor. Seeking 
information on 26 types of decisions on a five-point scale, all three 
nationalities/groups saw themselves as having a high degree of autonomy, but gave a 
lower rating for the extent to which parent MNE practices had been adapted to the 
local situation. Autonomy does not, therefore, necessarily mean more management 
practices will be adapted. For all three nationalities, local wage and salary increases, 
union relations and employee benefits could be administered reasonably autonomously 
by subsidiaries. Executive benefits had more head office involvement in US and 
European MNEs, but were more often left to the affiliate for determination in the 
Japanese MNEs operating in Singapore. All MNE affiliates believed they had more 
autonomy on operational matters than on strategic ones (p.116). 
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From the research so far discussed, it appears that head office is more concerned 
about its contribution to compensation at the higher levels of the MINE, particularly 
expatriate PCNs and TCNs. The location of the decision on compensation for these 
staff is of some interest. Kuhne and Toyne (1985) researched 83 US owned and 
based MNEs to determine (1) where compensation policies and procedures for PCNs 
and TCNs were developed, (2) who financed the programs, and (3) who supervised 
and controlled the systems (p.35). The findings (pp.36-40) were: 
• PCN and TCN compensation policy development was usually highly centralised in the 
head office or international division. 
• Centralisation was positively correlated with the number of countries employing 
expatriates and the industrial diversity of the reporting MNEs. 
• The financing of PCN and TCN programs was 'considerably less centralised' than were 
the policies and procedures (p.38). 
• The supervision and control of PCN and TCN programs was usually centralised and 
monolithic. 
This last finding was in line with a study by Martinez and Ricks, who found that 
(1989:483) US parent MNEs 'were more active' in the decision process for 
compensation of expatriates because expatriate salary determination is more costly 
and complex (p.483). In the context of this thesis, Kuhne and Tope's (1985: 41-2) 
conclusion that responsibility for expatriate compensation programs 'is not 
determined by external pressures' but is more affected by the MNE's operational 
characteristics is significant. 
Resource dependency and the possibility that the importance of the subsidiary to the 
MINE head office might affect the relationship between them has already been referred 
to. The Martinez and Ricks (1989) study of 115 Mexican subsidiaries of US owned 
MNEs with subsidiaries in Mexico used the hypothesis that the influence of the US 
parent on FIRM decisions of the affiliate would be positively related to the extent to 
which the MINE headquarters provides resources to the subsidiary and, secondly, the 
importance of the affiliate. They indeed found a positive correlation, and resource 
dependence appeared to influence the involvement of the parent MINE in specific 
HRM decisions (p.476). Their conclusion was that compensation in the subsidiary 
could be handled at local level with approval of head office 'or in a combined effort 
between the parent company and the affiliate' (p.477). Headquarters' involvement 
seemed to depend on (1) 'the affiliate's resource dependence on the US parent', (2) 
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'the nationality of the affiliate managers', and (3) 'the type of ownership structure' 
(p.4'77). Martinez and Ricks were aware that in the study, some variables had been 
overlooked, that the observations were made at a single point in time, and that it 
applied only to Mexican subsidiaries (p.481). The survey also covered only US 
expatriate and local managers rather than a full range of staff 
Resource dependency was also a theme in another relevant study by Hannon, Ing-
Chung Huang and Bih-Shiaw Jaw (1995:531) who analysed 100 subsidiaries of 
Japanese, American, European and Asian parent MNEs operating in Taiwan to 
determine how the tension between 'global integration and local responsiveness' 
affected the 'dimensions and determinants' of IHRM strategy. Compensation policy 
was one of the areas surveyed. They proposed hypotheses on inter-organisational 
independence, dependence on parents' and local resources, and ownership and 
dependence on host institutions. Their main findings were that 'dependence on 
parent's resources [was] associated with globally integrated strategies', that 
'dependence on local resources [was] related to locally responsive IHR strategies', 
and that 'the influence of host institutions on lHR strategy [depended] on the level of 
the parent's ownership'. While this is a useful addition to the current integration—
localisation debate, compensation policy is only handled as a general concept without 
the separation of policies for rank and file, and executives. 
Finally on a larger scale, Rosenzweig and Nohria (1994) analysed the FIRM practices 
of 249 US affiliates of foreign-based MNEs to identify the extent to which the 
practices resembled those of local firms or those of the parent MINE, or other global 
standards. The authors used six FIRM practices for comparison: (1) extent of 
employee benefits, (2) amount of annual leave, (3) use of executive bonuses, (4) 
degree of participation in decision making, (5) gender composition of management, 
and (6) amount of employee training. Testing 13 hypotheses, Rosenzweig and Nohria 
found that all six FIRM practices more closely resembled local than parent practices, 
with benefits, time off, training and gender composition being 'significantly closer to 
local practice' than they were to parent practice (p.241). The resemblance to local 
FIRM practice was not related to the age or size of the affiliate, or the international 
experience of the parent MINE. HRM practices affecting the 'rank and file' and 
'subject to clear norms' tended to resemble local FIRM practice, whereas those 
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affecting executives were 'relatively closer to the parent' (pp.245-6). Subsidiaries 
that were acquired by MNEs and depended on the local environment for inputs, 
tended to resemble local FIRM practices. In comparison, where there were high 
numbers of expatriates and close communication with the parent MINE, the affiliate 
shared more practices of the parent (p.246). 
Summing up then, this section has selected literature showing the relationship 
between the MINE head office and the subsidiary in the control of the affiliate's 
compensation system. Because of the limited number of IHRM studies in this area, 
generalisations are difficult to make. The difficulty for research is that the function 
and structures of subsidiaries vary with coordinating devices, which can be formal, 
informal or personal. Any explanation has to account for the level of head or regional 
office intervention and influence, which can range from none (complete subsidiary 
autonomy) to total (no affiliate autonomy). There are numerous variables to be 
included such as the nationality of the MINE owners, the degree of subsidiary 
embeddedness in business networks (Andersson & Forsgren, 1996), the interaction 
between subsidiaries, the dependence on head office for resources, the type of issue 
and employee involved, the life cycle of the affiliate and the cross-national and cross-
cultural environment. However, even subsidiary autonomy may not necessarily mean 
that the affiliate will adapt to local conditions. From the studies which have been 
done, the general conclusion is that the subsidiary has a considerable degree of 
autonomy in the design of compensation systems for local industrial staff The picture 
is less clear for management staff, as PCNs, TCNs and senior HCNs appear to attract 
more control. Employee benefits as (opposed to pay) may also be subject to different 
administrative devices. Generalised statements about whether compensation is 
completely centralised or decentralised are therefore likely to be inappropriate. It is 
more likely, as Hamill (1984) suggests for labour relations in the MINE, that each 
MINE will adopt a different compensation strategy according to the internal and 
external environment of each subsidiary. 
Conclusion 
The last two chapters have summarised the main literature on the external factors 
influencing compensation in a domestic organisation and the unique external 
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environment facing an MNE subsidiary in designing its compensation system. This 
was all done within the context of the research question about the way the external 
environment influences the design of an affiliate's compensation system. 
We accepted that the MINE is an open system, is conceptualised as an inter-
organisational network embedded in an external network, and is subject to multiple 
sources of external authority. Its uniqueness is the location of its subsidiaries in 
different countries to which it has to adapt, and the relationship between the head 
office and affiliate and other subsidiaries, which can vary from nation to nation. There 
is a uniqueness about the economic, political and legislative environments facing an 
MINE, where, for example, the legislation and regulations affecting the MINE may be a 
combination of local host national, home country, regional and international 
obligations. To accommodate these, there is a tension in the MNE between obtaining 
conformity and consistency, and achieving local adaptation in its affiliates. In 
addition, any theoretical framework has to allow for corporate MINE strategy, 
national origin, the subsidiary's strategic role, inter-unit linkages and local 
sensitivity/strategy 'fit'. The complication is that MNEs may have strategies at 
different levels: domestic, foreign (country specific) and international. The strategies 
of two affiliates within the same MINE may be different. 
The general literature on domestic compensation in Chapter 2 confirmed that the 
external environment should be included in any explanation of pay design. There was 
no ideal compensation system, as corporate strategies and contexts change over time. 
Moreover, the concept of 'fit' between business strategy, compensation, other HRM 
activities, environment and performance is problematical. The literature on life cycles 
and compensation is tentative, and does not distinguish clearly between product, 
market, industry and company life cycles. However, there is some evidence to link 
SBU compensation systems with diversification strategies. 
There is little empirical work on environmental dimensions that might affect the 
compensation of a business unit. Management does have a choice of compensation 
systems, but this choice is not unlimited. Choices may be in clusters of practices or 
individually designed. They may form a part of an overall BRM strategy. Research 
on a direct link between compensation systems and an organisation's culture is not 
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plentiful. 	Although there is evidence that societal changes have affected 
compensation systems (e.g. greater use of incentives in developed nations), linking the 
economic environment to internal compensation structures creates some difficulties. 
However, governments, through legislation, can have a direct effect on wage rates, 
hours of work and employee benefits (through tax legislation). But the process is not 
all one way; there is some evidence of MNEs' attempts to shape legislation and even 
compliance may become a matter of degree if laws, rules and codes are not enforced. 
There is substantial research on the effect of union presence on compensation 
(including benefits), but it is difficult to formulate definitive theories in the absence of 
data from organisations that are identical save for the presence of unions. This 
challenge has now been expanded to compare industrial relations climates in 
organisations. The changes in compensation systems over the years appear to have 
been part-responses to the external environment, including unions, but we do not 
know how the information on the environment is processed or scanned by 
organisations, in particular by MNEs. The literature goes on to suggest that social, 
demographic, government philosophy, trade unions, collective bargaining and legal 
factors are likely to have a marked effect on employee benefit design. 
In Chapter 3, the unique compensation issues of MNEs were considered. Some facets 
of MNE subsidiary compensation may be due to head office culture and MINE 
ownership characteristics, but it was not normally in the interests of the MINE to far 
exceed local compensation rates. Apart from matching local competitors and 
conforming with local legislation and infrastructure, the composition of subsidiary 
employee benefits could reflect national origin. But the types and levels of employee 
benefits usually vary significantly from country to country because local legislation 
particularly affects pensions, health cover and social security conditions of service; 
benefits have to be adapted accordingly. 
Research is limited on several aspects of expatriate (PCN and TCN) and senior HCN 
compensation and HCN non-management levels, although there have been several 
recent works. There are indications that in some MNEs, head offices will administer 
international and expatriate conditions. For HCNs, the ILO surveys of MNEs in some 
industries suggest that collective bargaining (local or national agreements), the legal 
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environment, government regulations, prevailing local practice and other companies 
are significant in subsidiary compensation design for HCNs. The MINE subsidiary is 
usually subject to the same host government rules on compensation design as apply to 
locally owned firms. 
As we have shown, although there is a thriving literature on HRM in individual 
nations, there are only a limited number of studies on how 'exported' compensation 
patterns work in other countries and how culture affects their effectiveness. There are 
some hypotheses about which compensation designs are appropriate for particular 
cultures, but only a few empirical tests of these, especially in relation to performance 
of subsidiaries. There is a debate as to how critical national culture is in 
compensation design in relation to other institutional factors. We noted the general 
criticism of MNE IHRM research that it concentrates on US, Japanese and European 
organisations, with less attention to other Asian and Australasian MNEs and to other 
regions such as the Middle East, Africa and India. 
According to the IHRM literature, the extent to which the external environment of a 
host country subsidiary could influence its compensation systems for HCNs, and the 
extent to which that system will follow local practices and/or those of the parent 
MNE appear to depend on the international business strategy of the MINE, the 
strategic role of the affiliate, its method of founding (e.g. greenfield investment or 
acquisition), the industry and host country characteristics, the structure and nationality 
of the MINE, the MNE's degree of dependence on the affiliate, the MNE's stage of 
internationalisation, the international orientation of its head office and its experience in 
managing international operations, the presence of expatriates, the frequency of 
communication between MINE parent and the subsidiary, the parent MINE and 
affiliate's cultural and legal distance, the inter-subsidiary linkages, and the employee 
groups in the affiliate who are crucial to its strategic effectiveness. 
However, as mentioned before, there may be some relevant parent MINE policies that 
relate to corporate culture. For example, the literature suggests that an MINE head 
office may impose its policies on union recognition and collective bargaining on the 
subsidiary even though local legislation and general customs of host nations also 
affect MINE recognition of unions and the degree of influence that unions have at 
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various levels. An MINE may have a better chance of transferring its preferred pay 
philosophy and systems into a new greenfield affiliate where the new recruits can be 
matched to the reward system, rather than into an acquired concern in which 
compensation is already integrated with the local environment. 
We went on to show that the nature of NINE head office coordinating mechanisms 
may depend on the way subsidiaries interact with each other. Moreover, the type of 
coordinating mechanism used by the parent organisation may be dependent on the 
business strategy pursued by a subsidiary. From a research viewpoint, the complexity 
is that intervention by the parent company in IHRM decision making by the affiliate 
seems to vary according to the issue and the level and type of employee (e.g. HCN, 
PCN, or TCN), and could be open to negotiation, rather than being a one way 
direction. Thus the effect of the local environment on subsidiary compensation has to 
be analysed for each element of compensation (including benefits) as well as for each 
HCN, PCN and TCN occupation, and against a background of relationships with 
other affiliates and the head office. That is the significant challenge for IHRM 
research because, arguably, performance is maximised when the subsidiary 
compensation system for all employee groups fits the internal MNE factors and is 
adapted effectively to the host nation external environment. While much of the 
relevant (and excellent) [FIRM research so far has used survey methods, it is 
recognised that these show the position at one point in time only, and cannot show the 
dynamism of the process and its fluctuations over time to give a full explanation of 
MINE responses to changing internal and external conditions. Nevertheless, any 
research methodology has difficulty in isolating and assessing the impact of the 
various elements of the internal and external environment. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
The Research Questions 
The objective of this thesis is to explain the relative influence of elements of the 
external environment on subsidiary compensation design with a view to generating an 
explanatory framework and set of propositions based on case study findings and 
existing literature. The central guiding research question for the thesis is: 
How does the external environment of an MNE subsidiary influence the design of 
its compensation system? 
To maximise theory generation from the findings of the case studies undertaken, 
Eeisenhartdt, (1989:536) advises that it is important that a case analysis should start 
with a 'clean theoretical slate' as far as possible, in order not to limit or bias the 
findings. However, this is usually impossible to achieve so at most, researchers 
should specify some 'potentially important variables' from the current literature 
(p.536). From the review of the literature on MINE compensation in Chapter 3, while 
not excluding any other possible features, it appeared that there are some key 
elements of the external environment which are a priori relevant to the research 
question and which could be incorporated into the analysis of each pair of case studies 
and the cross-case conclusions. The first is the effect of host country employment 
legislation on subsidiary compensation design. Although the exact relationship cannot 
be specified at this stage and should emerge from the cases, prima facie, one might 
assume that the MNE would design its compensation to meet legislative requirements 
and international codified standards (Milkovich & Newman, 1996; ILO, 1977c; 
1991b), that tax laws might affect the composition of compensation (Dowling, Welch 
& Schuler, 1999), and that any mandatory minimum wage or bonus would be 
included in the affiliate's compensation design considerations. This leads to the first 
research question: 
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Research Question 1 
Haw does employment legislation affect the compensation design of an MNE 
subsidiary? 
The impact of the economic environment on compensation design is problematical, 
but the state of the host country economy may affect the internal structure of the pay 
system because of the differing demands for the range of skills in the labour market 
(Milkovich & Newman, 1996). Macroeconomic policy of governments may also 
affect a range of factors such as the expectations of employees for compensation 
increases, the power of unions, and the discretion for unions and management in 
compensation setting under an incomes policy (Kochan & Barocci, 1985). This leads 
to the second research question: 
Research Question 2 
How does the economy affect the compensation design of an MNE subsidiary? 
There is debate about the extent to which MNEs should attempt to align their 
compensation systems to host country national culture (see Gomez-Mejia & 
Welbourne, 1991; Huo & Steers, 1993). The issue is how much discretion national 
cultural factors might allow an MINE to choose compensation systems that facilitate 
both global and subsidiaries business strategies at the same time. Empirical work by 
Newman and Nollen (1996) suggests that MNEs should take national culture as a 
'given' and design managerial practices accordingly (p.774). This leads to the third 
research question: 
Research Question 3 
How does national culture affect the compensation design of an MNE subsidiary? 
Jackson and Schuler (1995) argue that national culture cannot explain all HRM 
differences across countries and that variations may be due to differences in 
economic, political, legal, labour markets, industry characteristics, and industrial 
relations systems (p.253). It has already been noted that unions may have a broad 
impact on compensation policy (Balkin, 1989), and that the extent to which a MINE 
recognises unions for bargaining purposes may depend on host country legislation 
(Brewster, 1995) and MNE head office orientation (Bean, 1994). Inevitably an MNE 
will face unique employment legislation, custom and practice, union movements and 
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industrial institutions in each host country in which it operates. This leads to the 
fourth research question: 
Research Question 4 
How does the industrial relations system affect the compensation design of an 
MNE subsidiary? 
While not a part of the external environment facing a subsidiary as defined earlier, the 
role and orientation of the WINE head office is likely to be a 'significant influence' on 
compensation practices in a subsidiary (Schuler, Dowling & De Cieri, 1993: 749). 
The orientation may determine the discretion that affiliate management has in deciding 
its own compensation system in the context of its local environment. It was noted in 
Chapter 3 that decisive intervention by the parent company in the subsidiary's choice 
of compensation may vary according to the element of compensation in question (Van 
Den Bulcke & Halsberghe, 1984; Hamill, 1984). There has been little research which 
has examined how a head office controls the compensation design of HCNs, PCNs, 
and TCNs, particular occupations, and specific elements of the compensation system 
in relation to a subsidiary's external environment. This leads to a fifth research 
question: 
Research Question 5 
How does the MNE head office international orientation affect the choice of 
compensation design in a subsidiary? 
In relation to the different country external environments of each pair of subsidiaries, 
what should emerge is how MNEs handle the integration and differentiation of pay 
systems and how they are integrated, controlled and co-ordinated (Schuler, Dowling 
& De Cieri, 1993). The degree of affiliate autonomy in determining compensation 
systems and the nature of compensation policies and practices in interunit linkages are 
crucial in this. 
In terms of internal operations of the MINE, the other variables are the balance of the 
'competitive strategy imperative' with the 'cultural imperative' (Schuler, Dowling & 
De Cieri, 1993: 735). The business strategy of the MINE and subsidiary is not 
discussed in detail in this thesis as it was decided that a full analysis of corporate 
strategy of the MNEs studied could only be achieved by discussions with corporate 
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head office personnel. Such interviews were beyond resources available as two MINE 
head offices were in Europe. However, the 'cultural imperative' encompassing 
aspects of the local culture, economy, legal system, religious beliefs and education are 
addressed (Schuler, Dowling & De Cieri, 1993: 735). The effects of exogenous 
factors including industry characteristics and, in particular, country characteristics are 
considered in detail. Other variables are also relevant to the thesis. These issues are 
the orientation of the MNE head office HRM function towards compensation in 
affiliates (already selected as a research question) and the location of the HRM 
function. In relation to Sill-1RM policies and practices, questions are posed about the 
extent to which the MINE lays down general or specific policies for subsidiary 
compensation. In the thesis, the main focus is thus the impact of the exogenous 
elements on subsidiary compensation design. Endogenous factors are not addressed 
in the same detail. However, the implications of the close interaction of endogenous 
(such as headquarters' international orientation) and exogenous (political, economic, 
legal and socio–cultural) factors on compensation systems are discussed. 
This research takes up the challenge of Ricks (1993) and Adler and Boyaciggiler 
(1996:543) that international management research and organisational behaviour 
respectively need to adopt more multi-level approaches that 'explicitly incorporate 
aspects of the external environment'. However, the researcher acknowledges that 
trying to gain a full understanding of cross-national management behaviour by 
'looking simultaneously at economic, social, political, and cultural factors' is a 
somewhat 'grand expectation' (Peterson, 1993:15). The impact of each of these 
elements on cross-national management could provide a major study itself. 
The Use of a Qualitative Research Design 
The research design for the thesis is based on a qualitative approach and the use of 
case studies in particular. Qualitative research is not conducted according to an 
agreed set of methods (Marshall & Rossman, 1989), but it has usually encompassed 
the terms 'descriptive study' field research', 'participant observation' and 'case 
study' (Wright, 1996). Tesch (1990:55) states that, to be precise, there is 'no such 
thing as qualitative research' — only qualitative data, defined as any information that 
is not expressed in numbers. It is pointless to debate here whether a quantitative 
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approach to this study would have been more rigorous (Wright, 1996). Both 
qualitative and quantitative data have a place in research (Downey & Ireland, 1983). 
The use of the qualitative research design is frequently defended by the 'promise of 
quality, depth and richness in the research findings' (Marshall & Rossman, 1989:19) 
and its appropriateness for exploratory studies (Haldm, 1987). Downey and Ireland 
(1983) advance an argument (which is accepted here) for using qualitative research 
methods to assess the attributes of an external environment for their relevance before 
attempting to use quantitative methods to measure the participants' interpretations of 
those attributes. In this study, the qualitative research approach also had the 
advantage of providing flexibility for the researcher, who was able to explore some 
unexpected features and relationships in MINE compensation once the research was 
under way. 
A qualitative approach could also be justified by distinguishing between theory 
generation and theory verification (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). As theoretical 
understanding of international management is at an early stage, the objective of this 
project is to generate some propositions grounded in comparative data. At a later 
stage, quantitative methods could be applied to aid understanding of the interaction 
and effect of variables, and to test and verify them (Wright, 1996). Wright propounds 
that 'the process of data collection and analysis and theory generation are much more 
closely linked in qualitative than in quantitative research' (p.69). Secondly, qualitative 
research can accommodate data from a variety of sources and a range of issues that 
may interact and be dynamic (p.69). Third, a qualitative approach affords the 
researcher some flexibility as to 'why' and 'how' issues occur and not just 'what' 
(p.70). Many international management topics are 'complex, unstructured problems' 
that cannot be studied quickly (p.72). In particular, in case studies, it may be easier to 
see how parts integrate to form a whole (p.71). Against this, however, stands the 
criticism that the qualitative approach in international management research has 
resulted in many qualitative studies which have not built on established theory 
(Wright, 1996). In this study, an attempt has been made to place the research in the 
context of existing literature on MNEs, [FIRM and compensation. 
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The Phrasing of the Research Questions 
Central and subsidiary 'how' questions were used throughout to guide the research 
(Yin, 1989). Strauss and Corbin (1990:37), in their text on grounded theory, suggest 
that the research question should be phrased to give 'the flexibility and freedom to 
explore a phenomenon in depth'. It should not be so broad as to be unmanageable, 
but not too narrow as to restrict 'discovery'. The central research question for this 
thesis ('How does the external environment of an MNE subsidiary influence the 
design of its compensation system?') identifies the phenomena to be studied and is 
oriented towards action and process (Strauss & Corbin, 1990: 38). For example, if the 
local environment changed, how did the compensation practices of the corporate 
MNE and its subsidiaries react? While Strauss and Corbin (1990) posit that a 
theoretical framework should ideally evolve from the research itself rather than using 
existing theories, the latter is acceptable if the purpose is 'to open these up and to find 
new meanings in them' (p.50). It is in this context that the propositions of Hodgetts 
and Luthans (1993b) shown in Table 4.1 (p.132) were selected and adapted for 
testing in relation to the Research Question 3 on the influence of national culture on 
compensation design. 
The central guiding research question assumes that the external environment has 
particular properties. These properties affect a particular compensation system — a 
system with specific dimensions within a particular context, and with intervening 
conditions (such as subsidiary size and technical process) that may facilitate or 
constrain the interactional strategies adopted within a particular context (i.e. 
managing the compensation system). Placing compensation management in this 
analytical context can accommodate change occurring within the conditions (the 
environment) or the intervening variables (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). 
Elements of the external environment normally incorporated in HRM models have 
already been discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. The problem in examining these 
separately is that the interaction between, say, the economy, unions, industrial 
tribunals and national culture can be overlooked. This thesis focuses on the way the 
companies appeared to adjust to the different environmental variables and on the main 
differences and similarities in compensation between the home and host nation 
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affiliates. Because the researcher gave a guarantee that the actual wage and salary 
figures which were not already published in public documents like awards would not 
be sought (and probably would have not been provided anyway), the emphasis of the 
research was on the main practices of the compensation system. The thesis 
concentrated on the detection, identification, classification and interpretation of 
similarities and differences of the compensation systems of the case study MINE 
subsidiaries. 
A Comment on Culture 
In international comparative studies the concept of culture has been problematical. 
Adler and Boyaciggiler (1996:546), for example, argue that past cross-cultural 
management research is not global organisational behaviour research. The cross-
cultural inquiry had 'limited itself primarily to multidomestic definitions of 
organizational phenomena' and had ignored the 'issues of cross-border interaction and 
integration', or had over-emphasised the effects of culture, or had had trouble in 
defining 'the concept of culture itself. 
Historically, a large number of international studies have used culture as an 
independent variable and as an equivalent to 'nation' (Boyaciggiller, Kleinberg, 
Phillips & Saclunan,1996). The same approach has been adopted in this thesis 
because of its cross-national nature. The researcher was aware that this is not ideal 
because of the possibilities of 'cultures within cultures', but Boyaciggiller et al. are of 
the view that with our present state of knowledge, we are still asking whether 
organisational science is transferable across countries. Moreover, there will continue 
to be a need for 'studies that focus on nation-based culture' as variations at country 
level are still important (p.167). 
Naturally, there is the danger of assuming culture to be 'a given, single, and 
permanent characteristic of an individual' (p.168) whereas the level of analysis should 
be clarified. One question, for example, is how different cultures might affect the 
individual as well as the organisation (p.168). The goal of this thesis is not to 
conclude how culture might influence behaviour or the design of compensation 
systems, but to suggest a proposition to this end. It is too easy, as Dorfinan 
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(1996:321) suggests, to assume that culture is 'the root cause of cross-national 
differences'. Hence in the thesis it is acknowledged that other external factors and 
internal variables may influence compensation design. Moreover, culture may even 
affect the other external environmental factors, making the isolation of these for 
analysis very difficult. Dorfman (1996) states that one way to deal with this problem 
is to match samples for nations studied as closely as possible, recognising that 
obtaining identical samples is likely to be impossible, and to examine other likely 
variables that could influence the outcome. 
In this study, much preliminary reading and several interviews were undertaken to 
learn about Singaporean culture. The empirical basis to facilitate the cross-national 
comparison of Australia and Singapore was the Hofstede (1980) typology of culture. 
As noted before, the Hofstede typology is not without its critics (Dorfinan & Howell, 
1988; Roberts & Boyacigiller, 1984). However, the 'quantitative' dimensions of this 
typology do allow the calculations of the 'cultural distance' between the two 
countries, and there are precedents for using this approach in IHRM (Schuler & 
Rogovslcy, 1998) as well as in accounting (Gray, Radebaugh & Roberts, 1990) and 
strategy research (Li & Guisinger, 1991). The work of Trompenaars (1994) is also 
referred to as a second piece of (more recent) empirical evidence to evaluate the 
differences in culture between Australia and Singapore in Chapters 5 and 6, although 
Trompensaars uses additional dimensions. 
Earley and Singh (1995:333) describe four approaches to international or intercultural 
management research. They include the Gestalt form, in which the emphasis is on 
analysing the systems as a whole without dividing it into parts. The other is the 
reduced form, where breaking the system down into parts assists in the explanation of 
processes. In this study, the reduced form is mainly used to discuss the elements in 
the external environment, but the discussion is placed in a cultural context, and some 
link of culture to compensation is considered — culture is not regulated to 'black 
box' status (p.334). 
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The Stages of the Research 
The stages in the research for the project roughly followed the progression of 
overlapping steps suggested by Wright, Lane and Beamish (1988:65) for conducting 
an international field research project, namely: 
1. The guiding research problem, conceptual definitions and case study methodology 
were determined. 
2. The literature review on 1HRM, compensation, MNEs and the Singaporean and 
Australian environments was undertaken from sources in Australia and Singapore 
over a period of four years (1991-94), and subsequently updated with material 
available as at October 1998. 
3. Initial contact was made with MINE head offices and subsidiaries in Australia and 
Singapore. 
4. Some initial interviews were held with Australian-based MNEs to define the units 
for analysis. 
5. The final list of MNEs and comparative cases for study was compiled. In addition, 
two subsidiaries in Singapore agreed to be studied even though their Australian 
counterparts had refused. (It was decided to interview in these companies first to gain 
experience and to generate background Singaporean compensation data on other 
organisations which could be used subsequently to refine the interview checklist). 
6. Checklists of issues and formats for recording answers were designed for the semi-
structured interviews, and profiles for data on employee benefits were prepared. 
These are shown in Appendices 4.1 and 4.2. 
7. The first round of interviewing in the Australian-based MINE subsidiaries was 
carried out in 1992. Interviews in Singapore were undertaken in two 5—week blocks 
in 1992. While the researcher was in Singapore, secondary data were collected from 
a number of sources, and interviews were conducted with a range of consultants, 
unionists, expatriate Australian managers, employer associations and government 
officials. 
8. The writing up of case material continued through the period 1992-95 and was 
finally edited in 1999. 
9. A second round of interviews for all companies was undertaken in two blocks in 
Singapore and Australia in the second half of 1995. Recently published literature and 
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statistics on Singapore were collected during five short business visits to Singapore 
from 1996-99. 
10. The case study data were analysed and a format for presentation developed. 
11. An explanatory framework and set of propositions were generated from the case 
studies and existing literature. 
The cut-off date for the case data and description of the external environment of 
Singapore and Australia (Chapters 5 and 6) was 31 August 1995, but some relevant 
issues occurring after 1995 are also discussed. 
Rationale for the Use of Case Study Design 
After weighing up the range of research methodologies available for the study, the 
case study method was selected as the main data source. Every research method has 
drawbacks, but with the objective of the study in mind, the case approach had some 
advantages over, say, a mailed questionnaire survey. Although the case study has 
been stereotyped as 'the weak sibling' among social science research methods, it 
continues to be used widely in social science research and in dissertations (Yin, 
1989:10). In fact, Yin (1989:12) argues that international researchers have 
'rediscovered the importance of the case study as a serious research tool' (p.12). 
Examples of case study research which incorporate international HRM include the 
work of Dore (1973), Littler (1982), Gospel and Littler (1983), Ackroyd, Burrell, 
Hughes and Whitaker (1988), Briggs (1988), Dowling and Welch (1988), Von 
Glinow and Teagarden (1988), Gleave and Oliver (1990), Saha (1993), Love, Bishop, 
Heinisch and Montei (1994), Easterby-Smith, Malina and Yuan (1995) and Festing 
(1997). 
Plowman (1991:23) states that the case study is often used in industrial relations 
research and enables 'a somewhat eclectic approach to data collection', facilitating the 
drawing up of 'a detailed set of relationships' useful for developing theory from 
preliminary investigations. Mintzberg (1979) has also defended his field method of 
researching the role of managers, arguing that his descriptions of managerial activity 
challenged 'accepted wisdom' and yielded 'more useful results' (p.583). The results 
were used in a 'purely inductive' way, and could happily be referred to as 
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'exploratory' as long as this term was not used in a derogatory way (p.584). Miles 
(1979:590) found qualitative data 'attractive' because of its richness, limited need for 
'front–end instrumentation' and possibility of 'serendipitous findings'. Against that 
was the high labour intensity of the collection of the data, 'the sheer range of 
phenomena to be observed', the time taken in writing up, and more seriously, the lack 
of 'clear conventions' to protect the data from unreliable or invalid conclusions 
(p.590). 
According to Yin (1989), the case study should not be seen in a hierarchy of research 
methods and should not be relegated to the class of 'exploratory' investigations 
(p.15). Research approaches incorporating 'how' and 'why' questions are more 
explanatory and lend themselves to the case study method (p.18). The case study 
approach also attempts to deal with phenomena and contexts over time — something 
for which the survey method is 'extremely limited' (p.23). The prejudice against case 
studies is that they may lack rigour and include bias, provide little basis for 
generalisation and are occasionally over-long (pp.21-2). This is further reflected to 
some extent in Wallace (1983), who discusses personnel and industrial relations 
research methodology in 'consecutive levels' beginning with the exploratory design 
and case study and moving to experimental designs (p.7). However, Dyer (1984) 
advocates the use of case studies to show the links between organisational strategies 
and HRM strategies. Case studies using longitudinal or retrospective designs can be 
useful in showing 'the dynamic nature of strategy and strategy-making processes' 
(Dyer, 1984:167), although in this study the change in compensation over time was a 
'series of snapshots' rather than a continuous process (McNeill, 1985). Nevertheless, 
a longitudinal design does permit the identification and analysis of any patterns that 
are occurring (Minichiello et al., 1995:170). This is not to say that survey techniques 
are inappropriate; surveys can supplement the intensive case data rather than being the 
main data source, as is now typically the case (p.167). 
The seeking of data in some case studies about compensation systems used in the past 
did assist in the understanding of the present and likely future compensation systems 
(Van Maanen, 1983). Against this, of course, extending the study over a long period 
has the potential practical disadvantage that personnel initially interviewed may resign, 
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and the company itself may even change hands, as happened in one of the cases in this 
study. 
The case method was chosen for this thesis because it is concerned with complex 
phenomena in a real-life context. Where possible, data have been collected to show 
the development of compensation systems of selected employee categories over time. 
As the research is about the interaction between the environment and compensation 
systems, attempts are made to examine 'the dynamics present within single settings' 
(Eisenhardt, 1989:534). Second, the research deals with an area of HRM (especially 
at managerial levels) that is of some sensitivity. As Weber and Rynes (1991:92) 
pointed out, using methods such as field surveys for compensation research is 
inappropriate on a large scale because 'companies typically regard information about 
pay strategies, pay-setting processes, and job pay levels as highly sensitive and 
proprietary'. The case method enables the researcher to build a level of trust with the 
organisation and provide assurances on confidentiality. 
On the other hand, it is accepted that statistical generalisations from five comparative 
cases cannot be made, and that this weakness can only be minimised by using 
comparative cases in which the features of companies are as close to identical as 
possible (Wright, 1996). Rigour can be improved by negative case analysis in which 
propositions or hypotheses are constantly revised as the research progresses, negative 
cases are found (Minichiello, 1995), and revised propositions are checked against all 
past data as well as future data (Wright, 1996). 
Research Methodology 
In choosing a case study methodology for a study of NINE subsidiary compensation, a 
number options were available. The first was to study a single MNE subsidiary as a 
holistic case. The assumption of the single case is that the unit for study is a unique 
and relevatory one representing a 'critical case' and meeting all the conditions for 
testing a well-formulated theory' (Yin, 1989: 47-9). Apart from the difficulty of 
finding a suitable MINE affiliate, there is a danger that changes in the subsidiary over 
time may make the initial research design inappropriate (Yin, 1989). Moreover, at the 
present state of development of [FIRM theory, this was considered an inappropriate 
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method. The alternative was to select, as an embedded case, a single MINE that had a 
number of subsidiaries located in different countries, and to compare the 
compensation practices in each affiliate. While this has the advantage of reducing the 
number of variables for comparison (such as differences in industry, product and 
technology), and providing more data for inter-subsidiary comparisons, from the 
researcher's viewpoint, detailed knowledge of the features of the external 
environment of each country would be needed to assess the environmental impact on 
compensation. The number of countries selected would also depend on time and 
resources available. However, if this approach was limited to two subsidiaries in two 
countries only, it would be it easier to isolate and identify the inter-linkages of the 
external environmental elements. According to Yin (1989), one caution to be 
observed is the possibility of ignoring the holistic aspects of the MNE through over-
emphasis on detail of the sub-units (p.52). For example, the interlinlcing of the 
corporate strategy of the MINE with the role of subsidiaries may be overlooked 
because of a concentration on business strategies of the affiliates. 
A further option for the methodology was to study various combinations of two or 
more MNEs with subsidiaries located in two or more countries. For this project, five 
MNEs were chosen that had subsidiaries and companies in both Singapore and 
Australia. The number of countries was limited to two because of the scope and cost 
of this project. The five MINE (and ten case sites) represent the research sample, the 
term 'sample' being used here in the theoretical rather than statistical sense. 
According to Eisenhardt (1989:537), cases can be selected to 'replicate previous 
cases', 'extend emergent theory', 'fill theoretical categories', or 'provide examples of 
polar types'. Eisenhardt suggested that cases should be chosen to provide 'extreme 
situations and polar types' that are likely to 'replicate or extend the emergent theory' 
(p.537). However, Eisenhardt's suggestion was not followed entirely as it was 
decided to focus on private sector MNEs only; government owned, religious and 
international non-profit organisations were eliminated from selection. This choice 
was made to exclude extra variables that would have had to be considered in non-
commercial organisations alongside commercial ones. 
There was no attempt to generalise statistically from the cases. Rather, the five 
MNEs (ten cases) are considered to be 'multiple experiments' (Yin, 1989:38) leading 
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to 'analytic generalisation' (p.38). Thus 'if two or more cases are shown to support 
the same theory, replication can be claimed' (p.38). The essence of analytic 
generalisation is the attempt to 'generalise a particular set of results to a broader 
theory' (p.44) through the replication of findings through a series of cases. 
Sampling logic was not part of the decision to choose five MNE cases for study, but 
the number of cases is relevant in terms of literal and theoretical replication (Yin, 
1989). The higher the number of cases, the greater the certainty in the replication 
(p.57). Based on the literature, the initial expectation was that the findings on the 
influence of the external environment on the compensation design in each of the 
subsidiaries would be similar (literal replication). For example, one would expect that 
socially responsible MNEs would normally observe legislation of the host or home 
country relating to compensation irrespective of the nationality of the MINE. The 
findings of each case were taken as the data needing replication in the subsequent 
cases (Yin, 1989:57). No attempt was made to choose MNEs that might produce 
contrary results for predictable reasons (theoretical replication) because of the time 
and scope constraints in studying more than five MNEs, and because of the limited 
number of empirically tested theories of MINE compensation. 
The selection of companies for study was seen as crucial because the cases represent 
the theoretical research sample and the limits for generalising from the findings 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). The main criterion for selection of MNEs for the study was the 
presence of operations located in both Australia and Singapore. While an ideal 
scenario would have been a number of Australian owned MNEs with a head office 
and subsidiary situated in Australia and with an affiliate in Singapore, a number of 
factors such as access, freedom to investigate and a variety of sizes and products 
mainly determined the selection of companies. In some cases, the Singapore affiliate 
was willing to cooperate, but a negative response was received in Australia. This 
particularly applied to small Australian privately owned MNEs. The eventual 
outcome happily provided a range of five MNEs in a variety of industries. They 
varied markedly in size and ownership patterns and so provided good contrasts for 
analysis. The MNEs and affiliates are given pseudonyms in the thesis, as explained 
below. 
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As mentioned earlier, the desired outcome from the data of the study was an 
explanatory framework and a set of propositions that were validly and logically 
grounded on the case findings and developed from the existing literature, and that 
were likely to provide a strong lead for further research in the area (Yin, 1989). 
Proposition building and testing are seen as useful intermediary steps in theory 
construction (Negandhi & Prasad, 1971). 
Apart from choosing the two countries for study, the initial interviews with personnel 
in the Australian operations clarified which parts of the subsidiaries would be used as 
the unit for analysis. Some of the MNEs in Australia had businesses located in several 
states, and one had a number of locations in the state of Victoria. Time and money 
would not allow analysis of the inter-subsidiary linkages of affiliates located in 
Singapore and Australia. Had that course been adopted, the scale of the project 
would have been considerably increased; clearly further research along those lines 
could follow on from this study 
The units selected for study are defined in the cases themselves, but wherever 
possible, similar structures for comparison were chosen in Australia and Singapore. 
The level of analysis is thus at business unit production level together with the head 
office where relevant. In the cases of `Oilco' and Toodco', the global head offices 
are situated in Europe, and it was beyond the resources of this project to visit these 
offices. The analysis of the HRM external environment is at a macro level for both 
nations. 
The main data-gathering method for the MNEs was a semi-structured interview using 
a recording check-list of headings of issues, a copy of which is shown in Appendix 
4.1. A profile to gather detailed information on employee benefits was also used, as 
shown in Appendix 4.2, and respondents were asked to indicate and elaborate on the 
benefits that were offered in their subsidiaries. Other sources included copies of 
publicly available collective agreements, company reports, and newspaper cuttings. 
In that regard, as a pilot study, a brief visit was made to a second subsidiary of the company with the pseudonym of 'Build& in 
Singapore.. 
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By applying the Algorithmic and Experiential Summary Profile of Compensation 
Patterns of Gomez-Mejia and Balkin (1992) (shown in Appendix 4.3) to each 
compensation system in the case subsidiaries, it was possible to establish a pattern for 
cross-case comparison (Eisenhardt, 1989). The application also provided a 
measurement of the extent to which the compensation systems were Algorithmic or 
Experiential thus showing inter-case similarities and differences. From the complete 
list of compensation features in the Patterns, 'Superior Dependency' is not used in this 
study because of the lack of a definition in the text to assist in the classification of the 
case data. 
The Algorithmic and Experiential Summary Profile of Compensation Patterns of 
Gomez-Mejia and Ballcin (1992) is used in this research because empirical research 
undertaken in the United States suggests that organisations tend to choose meaningful 
clusters of pay features that are internally consistent rather than designing 
compensation systems based on each feature in isolation (Gomez-Mejia and Ballcin, 
1992: 60). Based on a review of 18 compensation articles over a fifteen year period 
and an empirical study of pay choices of 243 firms, the authors extracted two 
dominant pay patterns, one which they termed 'mechanistic' or 'Algorithmic' 
(because of its emphasis on formal rules and procedures to 'routinize' decision 
making and encourage standardise decision making across an organisation) and the 
other, 'organic' or 'Experiential' (because of its greater response to varying 
conditions, contingencies and individual situations)(pp. 60-6). 
The advantage of the Algorithmic and Experiential classifications is that 19 individual 
features of a pay system can be categorised and compared between subsidiaries 
together with an overall profile summary. The pattern can be completely Algorithmic 
or Experiential in every feature of a company's compensation system, or, as is more 
likely to be the case, have elements of both. The complete Algorithmic and 
Experiential categories are two poles on a continuum, and totalling each decision 
choice can show the extent to which the compensation system is either Algorithmic or 
Experiential. In assessing the effect of the environment on pay systems, rather than 
treating all pay systems in a MNE subsidiary as one generic whole, one might 
anticipate that the environment might affect each feature of compensation in different 
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ways. In addition, the nature of each element of an occupation's compensation 
system can also be shown separately as has been done in the cases. 
It is accepted that there is some danger of ethnocentricism in applying a Western 
model to Asian systems (Peterson, 1993), but no assumption is made that one pay 
system is superior to another. While it is also acknowledged that the Algorithmic or 
Experiential pay patterns are US orientated, and that management in Australian and 
Singaporean subsidiaries and companies may not make compensation choices in 
consistent clusters, the patterns do provide a convenient mechanism for analysing the 
convergence or divergence of pay systems internationally. 
Alternative classifications that could have been used in the thesis to classify the 
comparative compensation systems include the headquarters' international orientation 
(i.e. ethnocentric, polycentric or geocentric) for each occupational pay system. This, 
however, is too broad a classification for the purposes of this study. Other 
international approaches such as the 'going rate' and the 'balance sheet' are 
predominantly used in the explanation of expatriate compensation (Dowling, Welch & 
Schuler, 1999) and are largely unsuitable for discussion of HCN pay. The 
Algorithmic and Experiential labels can be applied to expatriates in any case, as the 
compensation of an expatriate can be analysed in terms of whether the basic pay is 
based, for example, on skill, job factors, performance or a combination of each. 
The data on compensation systems of the case study companies are also used to test 
some of Hodgetts & Luthans' (1993b:42) recommendations relating to compensation 
and national culture (as adapted by Gomez-Mejia and Welbourne [1991], and Schuler 
& Rogovslcy [1998]). These recommendations have the status of propositions and 
are an attempt to suggest which compensation features would be most effective in 
particular national cultures whose dimensions are based on the findings of Hofstede 
(1980). It was decided to test these propositions in addition to drawing general 
conclusions in each case chapter because they cover the whole range of compensation 
system elements and because the effect of national culture on MNE affiliate choices is 
a source of current debate. The nature of compensation systems in some countries in 
relation to the Hofstede (1980) dimensions has recently been tested empirically (see, 
for example, Schuler & Rogovsky, 1998), as noted earlier. For each of the cases, the 
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features of each main occupational compensation system are compared with the 
propositions and the degree of support for the propositions shown. No attempt is 
made to generalise the support to the status of a statistical sample supporting a 
hypothesis, as the degree of support is applied more in an 'analytic generalization' 
way (Yin, 1989:38). Here the case study data are compared against a pre-existing 
template, and literal or theoretical replication may follow (p.53). 
It is accepted that the recommendations of Hodgetts and Luthans are designed to 
apply to local managers only, but they are generalised to apply to all staff in this 
thesis. The reason for doing so is this researcher's initial assumption that national 
culture, if it is an influence, would be likely to have an impact on the compensation 
systems of all local staff and not just on the managerial staff. There are problems of 
classification of the pay systems in that the Hodgetts and Luthans (1993b) pay 
propositions are not always specific. For example, in high Masculinity cultures 
(Hofstede, 1980), they suggest the NNE should pursue a compensation strategy for 
local managers that recognises and rewards competitiveness, aggressiveness and 
dominance' (p.44). Therefore, to add further specificity to some dimensions, there is 
some reliance on Gomez-Mejia and Welbourne's (1991) and Schuler and Rogovsky's 
(1998) extrapolation of Hofstede's (1980) dimensions to compensation. Table 4.1 
shows the compensation indicators used in the compensation analysis of the MINE 
subsidiaries in Australia and Singapore to reflect Hofstede's (1980) cultural 
dimensions. 
It is recognised that the selected compensation indicators shown in Table 4.1 are used 
as representations only of major national cultural dimensions, and that there are 
differences, as mentioned earlier, as to how dimensions such as Masculinity should be 
reflected in particular employee benefits. Another caution by Gerhart, Minsoff and 
Olsen (1995:545) is also noted in relation to the Hofstede (1980) dimensions of 
culture that 'average differences in culture are just that, averages, and should not 
necessarily be viewed as factors that must be taken as a given'. For this study, 
'decentralised pay policies' is interpreted as the degree of centralisation of the 
compensation system in relation to the structures of the MINE affiliates, and not the 
whole corporate MNEs, of which three were Australian and two were non-Australian. 
'Many family benefits' was judged on how many benefits, definable as 'family- or 
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Table 4.1 
Recommended Compensation Features for National Cultural Dimensions 
Hofstede Dimension 	 Recommended Compensation 
Moderately Low Power Distance (Australia) • Low salary gaps between lowest and highest paid 
• Low benefits gaps between lowest and highest paid 
• Gain-sharing 
• Profit-sharing 
High Power Distance (Singapore) 	• Hierarchical compensation strategy 
• Pay and benefits tied to place in structure 
• Large salary gaps between lowest and highest paid 
High Individualism (Australia) 	 • Individual performance-based 
• External equity/competitiveness 
• Emphasis on short-term achievements 
Low Individualism (Singapore) 	 • Group compensation plans 
• Seniority-based pay 
Moderately High Masculinity (Australia) 	• Few family benefits 
• Gender pay differences 
Moderately Low Masculinity (Singapore) 	• Many family benefits 
• Quality of worldife emphasis 
• No gender pay differences 
Moderately Weak (Australia)/ 	 • Emphasis on performance 
Weak Uncertainty Avoidance (Singapore) 	• Sharing of risk associated with MNE's success or 
failure 
• Competitive salaries to avoid poaching of staff 
• Decentralised pay policies  
Note: Dimensions are based on Hofstede(1980). Recommended compensation adapted from 
Hodgetts and Luthans (1993b), Gomez-Mejia and Welboume (1991), and Schuler and Rogovsky 
(1998). 
female-friendly', were provided by the MINE in addition to those which are mandatory 
or set by industrial tribunals. The term 'family- or female-friendly' is defined as those 
benefits 'that support or assist employees in managing the dual responsibilities of 
work and family life' (ACIRRT, 1998:32). 
The only mandatory 'family' benefit in Singapore is maternity leave under the 
Employment Act, which provides for eight weeks paid leave. In Australia, the 
situation is more complex, but under an Australian Industrial Relations Commission 
(AIRC) test case (AIRC, 1990:36 IR 1), unpaid parental leave was allowed for up to 
twelve months in awards. This was reinforced by a similar entitlement in the 
Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993 (Section 170KA[3]). Carer's leave was also 
another AIRC test case (ALRC, 1995) whereby five days from an aggregate of paid 
sick and bereavement leave entitlement could be used for caring for a sick family 
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member. This had not been subsequently incorporated into legislation by the August 
1995 cut-off date for this study, and so had to be negotiated and included in awards 
or enterprise agreements to have a legally-enforceable status. Alternatively, annual 
leave or unpaid leave could be used. Therefore, 'many family benefits' of Table 4.1 is 
taken to mean the offering of a majority (at least four) of the following seven 
additional benefits: 
• paid carer's leave 
• child-care facilities at workplace 
• flexible working hours 
• health care for family members 
• paid marriage leave 
• paid paternity leave 
• unpaid leave (in Singapore) 
There are conclusions drawn in each case about the possible role of exogenous factors 
in each MINE subsidiary's compensation system. These conclusions do not, of course, 
have the status of a set of findings that can support or refute hypotheses about the 
effect of the external environment on pay. Ideally, it would have been useful to trace 
the changes in compensation systems of each subsidiary and relevant head office prior 
to 1992, but the limiting factors here were cost, and getting access to staff who knew 
the history of the compensation systems. As mentioned earlier, the first round of 
interviews took place in 1992, and the second round in the second half of 1995, with a 
cut-off date for the study of 31 August, 1995. By library research, it was possible to 
obtain some past published collective agreements relevant to Oilco Australia, Oilco 
Singapore, Foodco Australia, Buildo Australia and Metalco Australia. In some cases, 
these went back 25 years and were incorporated into the case findings. 
The study of the external environments of Singapore and Australia was undertaken 
using a combination of published texts, annual reference books, journals, theses, 
government statistics, and reports. In addition, while the researcher was in Singapore, 
to gain knowledge of the general state of human resource management in Singapore, 
interviews were carried out with Singapore Department of Labour officials, the 
Registrar of the Industrial Court, Australian Consulate officials, representatives from 
management, employers and BR professional institutions, expatriate Australian 
managers working for Australian MNEs not connected with the study, National Trade 
Union Congress officials, local management consultants (Hay Ltd. and Towers, 
Perrin, Forster & Crosby Ltd.), and some academics. The data gained in these 
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interviews was mainly used in Chapter 5 of the thesis. The interviewees were not 
expected to have a detailed knowledge of the basis of the management decisions on 
compensation systems in the case study companies. Problems were experienced with 
the continuity of Singaporean national statistics and information on the industrial 
relations situation at macro level for the first 10 years after the founding of Singapore, 
after its separation from Malaya. Since that time, the published national data have 
been much enriched and standardised, and local academic 1-1RM research is beginning 
to emerge. 
The frill list of the positions of people interviewed for the cases is shown in the case 
reports in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2 
Number of Interviews with Case Study Interviewees 
NINE 
Company/Subsidiary 
Number 
of 
Interviews 
Interviewee 
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Remunemtion Manager 
badustrial Relations Manager 
Oilco Singapore Director of Personnel 
Industrial Relations Manager 
Refinery Personnel Manager 
Full-time Union Official 
Combined IR manager, Personnel Director and Union 
Official 
Foodco Australia Factory Human Resources Manager 
Corporate Remuneration Manager 
Corporate Human Resources Manager 
Foodco Singapore General Manager 
Administration Manager 
Operations Manager 
Buildo Australia Group Head Office Human Resources Manager 
Buildo Singapore Managing Director 
Financial Controller 
Remuneration Manager, International Division, Corporate 
Head Office 
Metalco Australia Corporate Remuneration Manager 
Corporate Employee Relations Manager 
Employee Relations Manager, Processing Company 
Plant Employee Relations Manager 
Metalco Singapore General Manager 
High Tech Australia Company Secretary/Chief Financial Officer 
Manufacturing Manager 
Pay Officer 
High Tech Singapore Chief Executive Officer 
Administration Manager 
The first point of contact for each organisation was as follows: 
1.Oilco Australia—Director of Personnel and Public Affairs 
2.Oilco Singapore—Director of Personnel 
3.Foodco Australia—Personnel Director 
4.Foodco Singapore—General Manager 
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5. Buildo Australia—HRM Manager, Group Head Office 
6. Buildo Singapore—Managing Director 
7. Metalco Australia—General Manger, Organisations. Australian Corporate Head Office 
8. Metalco Singapore—Managing Director 
9. High Tech Australia—Company Secretary and Chief Financial Officer, Head Office 
10.High Tech Singapore—Chief Executive Officer 
Some of these staff provided the majority of information, particularly in the small 
firms, as they were directly involved in the compensation system design for the NINE. 
In the larger firms, the task was delegated to an HRM/IR manager or compensation 
manager. On occasions, interviews were also granted with payroll officers, 
administrative managers and line managers. The perspective was therefore a 
managerial one. With a smaller number of companies for analysis, or with more 
resources, the union aspect could have been included in cases where the MINE was 
unionised at a certain plant. For this study, this omission was not considered to be a 
major deficiency. Another possibly less than ideal feature of the project was the use 
of a single researcher. This is unavoidable in a thesis project. 
The researcher was aware of three other issues relating to a cross-case study 
approach, namely replication (Yin, 1989), the underpinning by grounded theory 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1990) and triangulation (Huberman & Miles, 1994). The project 
followed the principle of replication in two senses. In the principle of 'Safari' or 
'replication' research (Harpaz, 1996:38), the researcher repeats the same research in 
another country. The advantage of this is that one person has control of the whole 
project. However, possible problems may arise from similar methods in a different 
cultures or `intracultural explanations' (p.38). To overcome this, preliminary reading 
and some early background interviews in Singapore were undertaken to ensure that 
culture-specific terms were understood and to ensure that the terminology of 
Singaporean compensation, law, unions and industrial tribunals, in particular, had 
'conceptual equivalence' (Harpaz, 1996:43). Familiarity with the meaning and range 
of employee benefits in Singapore had to be gained. The list of benefits was refined 
after these discussions. There were no language or translation problems, as English is 
the business language of Singapore, but the researcher bore in mind that the comfort 
in using English might have affected answers, and that interviewees might have 
responded differently if questions had been put to them in Mandarin (Wright, 1996). 
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The methodology followed the principles of 'grounded theory' (Glaser & Strauss, 
1967), which arguably any qualitative study has to pursue (Turner, 1988). In 
grounded theory, data are collected and then inspected to discover whether any 
theory, hypotheses or propositions can be developed from the patterns in the data 
(Tesch, 1990:23). This method of induction accepts that theory generation is closely 
involved in the research process rather than preceding it (Blailcie, 1993:191), involves 
a 'constant comparative method' of placing data into preliminary categories 
'according to their conceptual contexts', and is constantly looking at data within and 
between categories and exploring whether several concepts were related to enable 
hypotheses to be formed. These conceptual categories are 'grounded' in the data 
(Tesch, 1990:24). Thus the relevance of a conceptual category and its properties 
gathered from the data in one social context can be analysed in another context to 
establish any generalities (Blaikie, 1993:191). According to Blailde (1993:193), the 
theory may be a 'set of propositions' or a 'running argument'. The grounded theories 
are likely to be modified as the research proceeds, should fit the data, be 
understandable to those practising in the area, be capable of generalisation, and have 
been 'systematically derived from actual data related to that ... phenomenon (Strauss 
& Corbin, 1990:23). Grounded theory differs from mere description by the greater 
use of concepts and statements of relationship (p.29). 
Another concern of the case study is the validity of the data generated. To reduce 
misinterpretations of the data, triangulation ('the combination of methodologies in the 
study of the same phenomenon' Pick, 1983:135-6D was used as far as possible. As 
Huberman and Miles (1994:438) note, the different sources can complement each 
other, but 'independent measures may never converge fully'. The triangulation 'is less 
of a tactic than a mode of inquiry' (Huberman & Miles, 1994:438). While no 
observation is perfectly repeatable (Stake, 1996; Jick, 1983), as mentioned earlier, 
alternative sources of data on the case companies' compensation were sought, 
including in-company literature relating to compensation structure and policy, annual 
reports, material issued to employees, publicly available awards and collective 
agreements, interviews with the same person spaced over a number of years (so that a 
check could be made as to whether the original story had changed), and interviewing 
of second or third persons in the organisations. Thus a 'test of between-method 
comparability' was attempted (Denzin, 1970:474). Head office officials in several 
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cases could also verify details about the main features of compensation in subsidiaries 
and the relationship between head office and the affiliates. In validating the data from 
the subsidiaries, contrasts and comparisons were made; analysis was undertaken to 
identify key findings for the replication; negative evidence was looked for; and case 
notes were checked with interviewees following interviews where necessary 
(Huberman & Miles, 1994:438). 
Once the data were collected, themes that cut across the cases were identified. 
Huberman and Miles (1994:436) call this 'pattern clarification'. Some of these 
emerged in the way the MNEs perceived the effect of each parameter of the external 
environment. The researcher followed the advice of Huberman and Miles (1994:437) 
that cross-case analysis is more easily made with a 'matrix' of data in a shortened 
form to allow analysis of its main features. Finally, after the writing up of the case 
studies, a set of propositions was developed in conjunction with the extant literature. 
Similar findings from HARM research were compared to enhance the internal validity 
of the propositions (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Problems in Interviewing Internationally 
Most case study data were gained from semi-structured interviews with company 
executives. The questions were asked in a consistent and systematic order, but 
interviewees were allowed to digress into environmental, company or compensation 
issues, and answers were subject to further probing as necessary (Berg, 1989). The 
questions did not have fixed wording and the discussion allowed for some flexibility 
(Minichiello et al., 1995). This puts extra pressure on the interviewer not to over-
edit, distort or make recording errors (Crouch, 1984). The list of interview headings 
was revised slightly after the early pilot interviews in Singapore. The essence of the 
interviews was two-fold: the gaining of data about the organisation and its 
compensation and benefits for the major categories of staff, and secondly, the 
perceptions of the interviewees about the influence of elements of the external 
environment on their pay practices. The conceptualisation of these sub-environments 
was therefore provided for interviewees, rather than being left up to them to interpret 
(Downey and Ireland, 1983). 
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Marshall and Rossman (1989) see the advantages of the interview as a data collection 
method as being the speed of collection of contextual data and immediate follow-up, 
its usefulness in discovering complex interconnections and validity checking, and its 
flexibility for formulating hypotheses. Against this, cooperation is essential; the 
interviewer may not wish to divulge information; there may be personal biases in the 
interaction, and the resulting data may be difficult to manipulate. Harpaz (1996:53) 
also discusses the concept of 'authenticity' in the interview — 'the ability of the 
interviewer to obtain trustworthy, sincere, and pertinent information from the 
respondent'. Some of the potential problems that might occur could be due to the 
interviewer him/herself, perhaps through affiliation to an organisation, image or bias. 
Minichiello et al. (1995) speak of the difficulty in picking up the difference between 
exaggeration and distortion (p.94). This might be defended by the argument that a 
researcher is more interested in the 'truth as the informant sees it to be' (p.94). In 
Australia, there was an advantage for the researcher is that his employer was a well-
known and respected university business school. This also helped in Singapore, as the 
university is well recognised for having taught its degree courses in the country for 
more than 10 years. The researcher also dressed formally for interviews because of 
the status of interviewees and the Singaporean preference for formality (Fontana & 
Frey, 1994). 
The interviewer adopted 'friendly but not over-sociable behaviour' in order to 
minimise problems of bias (Burgess, 1984:101). At the start of the interview, the 
interviewees were told of the areas that would be covered in the interview. They 
were asked the maximum time that could be made available. Verbatim written 
records were taken at the time of the interview on proforma sheets that had the 
interview headings on them. While detailed note-taking can restrict non-verbal 
contact, it does have the advantages of forcing the interviewer to listen more carefully 
and of allowing partial analysis to occur (Minichiello et al., 1995). The handwritten 
notes were dictated on to tape as soon as possible on the day of the interview, then 
later transcribed. This had the advantage over a complete recording of the interview 
in that those parts of the interview not needing to be quoted verbatim in the thesis had 
been 'sanitised' with correct grammar (Buchanan, Boddy & 1VIcCalman, 1988). 
Those parts of the conservations that were quoted verbatim were extracted from the 
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original interview notes. Interviewees were contacted again by phone for clarification 
of any issues remaining unclear. 
In both countries, assurances were given that confidentiality would be maintained, 
that data would not be divulged to the MNE head office or to any other subsidiary, 
and that no salary quanta would be asked for. In the event, a number of companies 
did pass on written data about salary policies, structures and levels, and indicated 
when awards or collective agreements were published and available to the public in 
both countries. There was some initial reticence from Chinese managers in the 
smaller companies in Singapore about speaking openly about their pay systems where 
compensation pratices were very informal. This was overcome with time, by not 
using a recording device, and when it was accepted (usually quickly) that the 
researcher was not there from overseas 'to tell them how to do it'. All interviews 
took place on the interviewees' company premises on a one-to-one basis. The 
exception was at Oilco Singapore where three interviews of the series were with the 
Personnel Director, Industrial Relations Manager and the General Secretary of the 
Oilco Union sitting together to supplement each other's answers. As far as possible, 
the researcher tried to identify some other biases quoted by Harpaz (1996:53) such as 
an interviewee answering a question regardless of knowledge, giving ridiculous 
answers or providing answers which the interviewee thinks the researcher wants to 
hear. Data could be checked in any case, from other sources such as the MNE head 
office. Cross-checks were undertaken to compare the consistency of data during the 
interview and at following interviews (Minichiello et al., 1995). 
The Case Study Companies 
An initial difficulty for the MNE subsidiary researcher is sorting out who owns what. 
One is faced with a labyrinth of whole- and part-owners and holding companies, local 
and overseas head offices and regional offices. It was impossible to find identical 
affiliates in Australia and Singapore of the same size, technology and product 
belonging to the same MNE. Doing so would have reduced some of the variables that 
complicate comparison. 
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Another assurance given by the researcher in order to gain access was anonymity. 
While this detracts to some extent from the validity of the research and negates the 
opportunity for further study of these MNEs by other researchers, the necessity to 
give the undertaking was weighed against the probability of additional information 
which might be forthcoming in such a sensitive area. This particularly applied to the 
smaller subsidiaries in Singapore which are not accustomed to receiving researchers 
on their premises. The pseudonyms used are (1) Oilco, (2) Foodco, (3) Buildo, (4) 
Metalco, and (5) ffigh Tech. 
A summary of the main characteristics of the MNEs as at the end of 1995 is as 
follows: 
(1) The Oileo Companies 
Oilco is one of the world's largest oil companies; its parent corporate headquarters 
are in Europe. It operates in most of the developed and developing nations; some of 
the operations are joint ventures, but the majority are Oilco subsidiaries. Oilco 
Australia, wholly owned by the European corporate MNE holding company (which is, 
in turn, owned by the European parents), is a holding company for all the Oilco 
companies operating in Australia. These enterprises explore for, manufacture and 
market petroleum and petrochemical products, and explore for, produce and market 
coal. Production facilities in Australia date back to the beginning of the century. 
Some of the holding company's subsidiaries are not wholly owned by Oilco Australia. 
From the main Australian registered Oilco wholly owned operations, the three units 
selected for comparison with Singapore were a refinery, a terminal and the Australian 
head office. 
Like Oilco Australia, Oilco Singapore is a holding company which is also, in turn, 
owned by a holding company of the European-based corporate parent. The 
Singaporean group holding company has 100 per cent ownership of the main 
operating companies. Oil operations in Singapore date back about 100 years, 
originally as storage facilities only. Over the last 30 years, refineries have been 
established in Singapore. Oilco has also bought into other Singapore companies and 
heavily invested in processing plant. Prior to the establishment of the independent 
nation of Singapore in 1965, some of the Oilco Singapore group of companies which 
were parties to the collective agreement in 1962 were registered in a European 
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country. Parties to current agreements are incorporated in Singapore. For the 
purposes of comparison, the refinery, terminal and Singaporean head office were 
chosen for particular study. However, the collective agreement does cover employees 
at other Oilco Singapore locations. 
(2) The Foodco Companies 
Foodco is one of Australia's major food and beverage companies, engaged in the 
manufacture and distribution of high-quality foods and soft drinks with widely known 
brand names. Foodco Australia is a wholly owned subsidiary of the corporate MINE 
Foodco which has a head office in Europe. The parent MNE, whose history dates 
back more than 160 years, has manufacturing facilities in 23 countries and products 
selling in over 190 nations. Foodco Australia was incorporated in the 1970s as a 
holding company to accommodate a series of Australian company mergers and has 
three operating divisions: confectionery, food and drinks. Its first Australian 
manufacturing operation dates back to the 1920s. Foodco Australia has six 
production sites in Australia and six in wholly owned affiliates in New Zealand and 
Asia. One manufacturing plant in the confectionery division in Australia and the 
Australian head office, which were both located in the same capital city, were selected 
for the study. The factory originally started in the 1880s, but was purchased by 
Foodco Australia in the 1960s. 
Foodco Australia wholly owns Foodco Singapore, a separately registered subsidiary 
in the confectionery division of Foodco Australia. It is a manufacturing facility 
engaged in processing raw confectionery resources for use in further production in 
Australia and New Zealand. The entire production is exported and is thus dependent 
on the Australasian sales teams. The factory was purchased in Singapore in the mid-
1980s. 
(3) The Buildo Companies 
Buildo Australia has its headquarters in Sydney, and the associated building materials 
manufacturing plant which was selected for analysis is located in Brisbane. It has 
manufacturing plants and offices in five mainland capital cities and an extensive 
network of regional sales offices (of about three people each) throughout Australia. 
Its origins date back to the 1920s and, over the years, it has had several owners. It 
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was purchased by one of Australia's biggest MNEs in the late 1980s. This MINE has 
its corporate head office in Melbourne and Buildo Australia is part of its Building and 
Industrial Products division. However, the structure is complicated, in that Buildo 
Australia's headquarters is also responsible for two other companies, also owned by 
the MNE, which form a Special Building Materials Products Group of companies. 
Buildo Singapore, by comparison, reports to the international division of the large 
corporate Australian MINE through a regional manager for South-East Asia, a 
relationship which has operated since February, 1992. Prior to this, it reported to one 
of the MNE's Australian domestic divisions. Buildo Singapore has an independent 
board and is 50 per cent owned by the Australian MINE and 50 per cent by a 
European group. This is an unusual arrangement for the Australian MINE, which 
usually prefers to have 100 per cent ownership of subsidiaries. The Buildo Singapore 
board has four directors from each owner. Buildo Singapore and Buildo Australia 
produce very similar steel reinforcing products. 
(4) The Metalco Companies 
Metalco Australia is a remotely situated smelting plant of a business unit in the metals 
industry, the plant being one of 14 locations around Australasia belonging to a metals 
processing company. It also has overseas interests. Two-thirds of the shares in this 
company are owned by a big Australian corporate MINE (with 18,000 employees) 
which recently merged with a European MINE, the latter previously holding a 49 per 
cent stake in the Australian company. For the purposes of the case study, the 
situation prior to amalgamation is described. The processing company has its own 
board, but the Australian MINE has three directors sitting on its board to provide the 
managerial link. The metals processing company head office and the Australian MINE 
have head offices in Melbourne. The metal processing company is divided into 
business units with a high degree of delegated authority and the affiliate selected is a 
part of one these business units. Figure 4.1 shows the relationships of the subsidiary 
analysed. Metalco Australia's association with the MINE dates back to the early 
1960s and the plant is managed by a General Manger for operations. The plant gets 
its raw materials from another part of the MNE, processes them and sells them on the 
world market. 
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Metalco Singapore was the company selected for study for this project, but it was 
sold to a local Singaporean company by the corporate Metalco MNE in April 1993. 
The case study thus reflects the position as at that date. Metalco Singapore had a less 
Figure 4.1 
Organisational Links for Metaleo Australia 
Main Australian owned MNE with own board. 
(European MNE had 49 per cent stake in this and three members on the Australian board, but 
merged in 1996) 
I 
Metals Processing and Manufacturing Company 
67 per cent owned by the Australian MNE 
I 
Company divided into four operating business units 
I 
One business unit with 3 processing operations 
I 
Selected processing plant for study (Metaleo Australia) 
complicated relationship to the Australian MNE than does Metalco Australia. It was 
formed in Singapore as a result of a merger of two engineering and manufacturing 
companies. It was a wholly owned subsidiary of an Asian-based holding company 
(with its head office in Singapore) which operated as a separate business unit of the 
Australian MNE, coordinating trading in metals and raw materials and manufacturing 
throughout Asia. This company was wholly owned by the Australian MNE. Metalco 
Singapore was managed by a General Manager, providing specialist manufactured 
products. It had two 'sister' companies in other parts of the world which were not 
owned by the Australian ME. 
(5) The High Tech Companies 
High Tech Australia is a medium-sized independent designer, manufacturer and 
supplier of data communications equipment and services. The company was founded 
by a sole owner in Australia in the 1970s and subsequently set up bases in Hong Kong 
and New Zealand. A head office and factory were set up in an Australian capital city 
in the 1980s and the Singaporean subsidiary was established in 1984. In the mid 
1980s, the company went public, built a second factory alongside the head office, and 
also commenced operations in Malaysia. Through buying into other companies, High 
Tech moved into China and Thailand and representatives are situated in Indonesia, the 
Phillipines, Taiwan and Papua New Guinea. Its Asian Regional headquarters were 
transferred from Hong Kong to Singapore in 1994. For the purpose of the research, 
the compensation of the clerical, sales, technical and managerial staff in Australia were 
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used as the basis of comparison with the compensation systems operating in the 
Singaporean affiliate — High Tech Singapore. To be precise, the comparison is of 
the compensation systems of the Australian parent MNE's head office and operations 
in Australia (i.e. a company) with its Singaporean affiliate, rather than of two 
'subsidiaries' as defined in Chapter 1. Thus composite tables and the title of the thesis 
refer to 'subsidiaries' and 'companies'. The reason for this exception was that the 
manufacturing plant and head office were on the same site with services such as 
payroll and finance interlinked. Other functions such as R & D were also being 
centralised on to the same site. While the manufacturing function could have been 
termed a 'subsidiary', it was not appropriate because it was not a discrete entity. 
Despite this exception in the thesis, the findings from the study of the Australian and 
Singaporean operations did show the effects of the respective external environments 
on their pay systems. 
High Tech Singapore is a subsidiary of the corporate MINE High Tech Australia 
which opened, as mentioned above, in the mid-1980s. High Tech Singapore is 100 
per cent owned by High Tech Asia, a publicly listed company now based in Singapore 
(previously in Hong Kong), which in turn is 56.25 per cent owned by the corporate 
High Tech MNE. High Tech Singapore has one work site in Singapore specialising in 
sales and service only. Manufacturing of the systems is done in Australia or Taiwan. 
Presentation of the Case Studies 
The comparative case studies for each of the MNEs are presented in a standard 
format. As there was a cut–off date for the interviews, the case have been written up 
in the past tense. Each subsidiary is described separately. The case first gives 
background data on the organisation, technology, objectives, HRM/1R organisation 
and unionisation of the affiliate. An overview of all compensation systems then leads 
to a description of the system for each major category of employee. This usually 
starts with the industrial/blue collar (unionised) employees, followed by 
clerical/administrative, sales and/or technical, and finally, managerial staff A list of 
employee benefits offered by the company is shown in a standardised format. A 
consideration of the role of the MINE head office in relation to affiliate compensation 
leads to a general discussion of the effect of the external environment on reward 
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systems. Once both subsidiaries have been described, for ease of analysis, the 
similarities and differences of the basis for pay, design issues and administrative 
framework of the two compensation systems are displayed using the Summary Profile 
of Algorithmic and Experiential Compensation Patterns developed by Gomez-Mejia 
and Balkin (1992:61). The fitting of all pay systems into single concepts in the Profile 
was not always easy. For example, for the criteria for pay increases, the Profile lists 
either tenure or performance. In some affiliates, the criteria for increases were both 
length of service and performance. 
The discussion of the external environment in relation to the subsidiary compensation 
follows the sequence of the influence of legislation, the economy, the industrial 
relations systems including the National Wage Cases and recommendations in both 
countries, national culture, other variables, and the inter-linkages with internal 
characteristics. The testing of the Hodgetts and Luthans (1993b:42-48) propositions 
on the relationship between national culture and compensation follows, and a 
conclusion based on the cross-case analysis concludes each case chapter. 
Limitations of the Research 
The practice of field research has been defined as 'the art of the possible' (Bresnen, 
1988:55). The researcher is therefore conscious of the limitations of the approach 
used in this thesis. The advantages and disadvantages of using the case study 
approach have been examined (Gutnmesson, 1991). The problems associated with 
using comparative cases as a methodology, the difficulty in defining culture in a study, 
the unique issues involved in international studies, and the difficulty of obtaining 
identical cases for analysis in Australia and Singapore have been referred to. Peterson 
(1993:16-20) succinctly lists his criticisms of comparative management studies over 
the years. They include the lack of a theoretical base or conceptual model, 
ethnocentricism, the heavy reliance on 'convenience samples', an over-emphasis on 
cultural variance, an assumption that important factors in one nation have equal value 
in another, and a bias towards large companies and to studying one category of 
employee only. 
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This study has tried to avoid the worst of these weaknesses by the careful selection of 
comparative cases, by acknowledging that culture within Singapore and Australia is 
not without variation, by accepting that there is no perfect compensation system, by 
studying the case companies at two different time periods and incorporating their 
historical data, by using large and small MNEs, by articulating some cultural 
explanations of differences in compensation design and by describing compensation at 
all levels in the subsidiaries and companies. 
Finally, it is acknowledged that because of the scale and nature of the research, it was 
confined to two countries. At the beginning of the project, data were being collected 
for a third country, on a joint venture and a major locally owned Singaporean 
company to permit an intra-country comparison (Cavusgil & Das, 1997), but the scale 
was becoming too large for the purpose intended, and the study was therefore 
restricted to two countries in the Asia–Pacific region. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that, in conjunction with the existing literature, the use of 
comparative case studies is an appropriate way to develop a framework to explain the 
impact of the external environment on MNE subsidiary compensation design, and to 
generate propositions for further study. The research proceeds by describing the 
MNE compensation systems in Australian and Singaporean subsidiaries and 
companies, identifying similarities and differences, and analysing the impact of the 
external environment and the MNE head office. Details of the research design — 
including the study questions, units of analysis and the principles underlying the 
methodology — were outlined. To place the case study reports into context, we next 
consider the macro environments of Singapore and Australia. 
147 
CHAPTER FIVE 
SINGAPOREAN COMPENSATION IN ITS LOCAL CONTEXT 
Physical Geography and Brief History 
The Republic of Singapore is a small island country of 3.04 million predominantly 
Chinese people. It has 58 islets within its territorial waters which are located about 
140 kilometres north of the equator (Department of Statistics, 1997:1). The country 
is separated from the Malaysian Peninsular by the Straits of Johor and from the 
Indonesian Islands to the south by the Straits of Singapore. The main island of 
Singapore is 42 kilometres from west to east, and 23 kilometres from north to south. 
Much of its total land area (which includes the islets) of 639.1 square kilometres is 
within 15 metres of sea level, and the highest point is 165 metres above sea level. A 
causeway joins Singapore to the Peninsular Malaysia mainland. Apart from its natural 
harbour and strategic location, the country has few natural resources (Leggett, 1993). 
It is subject to mean daily temperatures of 31°C degrees and 74 per cent humidity. 
Singapore's history prior to the fourteenth century is rather sketchy (Tan Ding Eing, 
1975). There are some records of a Chinese presence on the island in 1330 (Tan, 
1992). However, the most notable change occurred around the beginning of the 
nineteenth century when Britain sought a port which it could operate in the Straits 
area to preserve trade with China, and refit and protect its merchant fleet (Tan, 1992). 
In 1818, Sir Stamford Raffles, an official of the English East India Company, was 
given permission by the British Governor—General of India to make a treaty with local 
chiefs to establish factories and administer the Singaporean port in return for an 
annual fee and half of the duties (Tan Ding Eing, 1975). Estimates of the population 
at this time vary from 150 (Marriott, 1921) to 1,000 (Turnbull, 1989), rising to 
10,683 by 1824 (Foo Siang Luen & Rocha, 1995:30). 
In 1826, under the Straits Settlement, Singapore, Malacca and Penang came under the 
control of British India and eventually under the British Government's Colonial Office 
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in 1867 (Tan, 1992). Singapore benefited from the advent of steam ships and the 
opening of the Suez Canal. With the increasing prosperity up to 1913, Singapore's 
population grew to over 80,000 by 1860 as 'emigrants from China poured in to 
become traders and workers' (Cady, 1980:391). The British established a naval and 
air base in Singapore in the 1930s. The Japanese overran the British and Australians 
protecting the island in February 1942 and remained its rulers for three and a half 
years (Tan, 1992). After the war, the British military retook control; the Straits 
Settlement was dissolved and Singapore was made a separate British crown colony. 
From 1948 to 1959, there was a state of emergency in Singapore as the Communist 
Party of Malaya tried to take over Malaya and Singapore by force (Tan, 1992). In the 
1950s, after local elections, the resignation of the chief minister and negotiations in 
London, self-government was obtained in 1959. The subsequent general election was 
won by the People's Action Party (PAP), and Lee Kuan Yew became the State of 
Singapore's first Prime Minister in June, 1959. The PAP and communists cooperated 
uneasily to overcome British rule and eventually split, the pro-communists forming an 
alternative party (Tan ,1992). 
In 1961, the Malayan Prime Minister proposed an economic and political federation of 
Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, North Borneo and Brunei. In Singapore, there was 
support for the federation and Malaysia was formed in 1963. However, the merger 
collapsed in August 1965, mainly because of racial rivalry for control between the 
Chinese and the Malays (Josey, 1974). Singapore then became an independent 
republic in December 1965. Without natural resources except for its people's skills, a 
program of foreign-investment driven industrialisation, economic restructuring, 
technology expansion, computer education and urban development was undertaken 
(Tan, 1992). The British withdrew their armed forces from Singapore in 1971 
causing temporary economic turmoil as the naval base employed 25,000 local people 
(Turnbull, 1989). The country has remained politically stable, with the PAP as the 
dominant party in Parliament. The last formal Singaporean links with Malaysia were 
severed in 1973 when the currency, stock exchange, and rubber market were 
separated. Lee Kuan Yew continued as Prime Minister until November 1990 and was 
succeeded by Goh Chok Tong. Lee is still very influential in Singapore's Government 
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and cabinet and is referred to as the 'Senior Minister'. His son is one of two Deputy 
Prime Ministers. 
Demography 
Estimates of Singapore's population for selected years are as follows. 
Table 5.1 
Singapore Population for Selected Years 
Year Population 
1824 10,683 
1860 81,734 
1881 137,722 
1901 226,842 
1921 418,358 
1947 938,144 
1957 1,445,929 
1967 1,955,600 
1982 2,440,000 
1990 2,705,100 
1995 2,986,500 
Source: Saw Swee-Hock (1969) 'Population Trends in Singapore, 1819-1967' Journal of Southeast 
Asian History, 10(1), 36-49; Ministry of Information and the Arts (1996); Reports on 
Census of Population; Balachander, S.B.(ed.)(1996) Singapore 1996, Singapore, Ministry 
of Information and the Arts, p.35. 
The rapid growth of population shown in Table 5.1 is mainly due to immigration. The 
early immigrants were Chinese and Indian traders and Indonesian immigrants from the 
neighbouring East Indies islands. Growth after the Second World War was also 
mainly due to immigration and the demand for labour for public works, the decline in 
mortality rates, high birth rates, and movement from the Malaysian mainland (Saw 
Swee-Hock, 1969). 
Singapore has never had a native population as such and has always been composed 
of Chinese, Malays and Indians. Various attempts to influence the number and 
intellectual composition of the Singaporean population have attracted 'world-wide 
attention' (Saw Swee-Hock, 1985:92). The Government runs three matchmaking 
agencies for young singles differentiated according to educational qualifications, and 
male graduates are encouraged to marry their female equivalents rather than their 
educational inferior (Straits Times, 24 September 1994). In 1995, the Singaporean 
population consisted of 77.4 per cent Chinese, 14.2 per cent Malays and 7.2 per cent 
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Indians (Balachander, 1996:35). The national language of Singapore is Malay, with 
English as the language of business, although the official languages are Malay, 
Chinese, Tamil and English. Mandarin is increasingly used by Chinese residents 
instead of the local Chinese dialects, and 45 per cent of Singaporeans are literate in at 
least two languages (Luen & Rocha, 1995:32). 
The Economy 
The Singaporean economy has been described as 'one of the most spectacular 
economic developments in the world' (Chia Siow Yue, 1986). Singapore has 
combined high growth, low inflation, rising living standards, modernisation of 
industry, a focus on exported manufacturing goods, full employment, and a major 
financial services sector alongside its thriving entrepot trade. In 1996, it was ranked 
first on a global competitiveness index by the Swiss-based World Economic Forum, 
and assessed as the country with the best prospects for growth over the next five to 
ten years (Wicks, 1997). 
The economic problems facing Singapore in the 1947-57 period were mainly due the 
high population growth (Chia Siow Yue, 1986). Unemployment in 1959 was 
estimated at 13.5 per cent (Krause, 1987). Industrial development consisted of 
mainly small household or backyard repair or service units 'with little capital 
equipment and obtaining low productivity' (Lee Soo Ann, 1973:78). On the 
separation from Malaysia in 1965 (with unemployment around 10 per cent), 
Singapore changed its strategy to greater emphasis on labour-intensive export-
orientated industrialisation and more foreign investment. During the period 1959-69, 
the Singaporean economy grew at a compound annual growth rate of 9.4 per cent, 
mainly as a result of the trade and manufacturing sectors (Chia Siow Yue, 1986). The 
foreign investment in manufacturing (mainly from the United States, Britain and the 
Netherlands) trebled within 12 months of the passing of the 1968 labour laws 
(Buchanan, 1972). 
The pressure on wages in the 1970s from the continuing economic growth, low 
unemployment rates, and the declining growth rate of the labour force, led to a policy 
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of restructuring of the economy and a high wage policy in 1979 (Itodan, 1992). The 
same strategy continued into the 1980s with the emphasis on increasing the level of 
wages to encourage labour saving and productivity, an expansion of tertiary education 
and training, and tax incentives to promote research, mechanisation and 
computerisation (Lim & Pang Eng Fong, 1986). Wage levels were increased by about 
20 per cent in 1979 and 1980, and 17 per cent in 1981 (Business Week, May 25, 
1981:49) to encourage more value-added and sophisticated production (Rodan, 
1987). This policy 'partially backfired' in 1985 when high wages were blamed for the 
economic slump (Asia and Pacific Review, 1993:224). GDP real growth rates in the 
years 1980-84 averaged 8.5 per cent, largely generated by international services 
(Ministry of Trade and Industry, 1986), but fell to 'a paltry 1.8 per cent in 1986' (Asia 
and Pacific Review, 1993:224) after negative growth in 1985. The main economic 
indicators for selected years the period 1980-95 are shown in Table 5.2 below. 
Table 5.2 
Summary of Economic Indicators, Singapore, Selected Years 1980-95 
Indicator 1980 1990 1995 
GDP (S$M) 
(at current market prices) 25,090.7 67,878.9 121,080.8 
Annual % change over previous year 
(at 1990 prices) 7.4 9_0 8.8 
Inflation (% change over previous year) 2.7 3.4 1.7 
Unemployment % (aged 15+) 3.5 1.8 2.0 
Per capita GNP (S$) 
(at current market prices) 
9,940.6 22,645_0 35,005.4 
Overall Balance of Payments (S$M) 1,433.8 9,892.5 12,173.9 
Current Account Balance (S$M) -3,345.6 5,612.9 20,448.3 
Source: Ministry of Trade and Industry (1997) Economic Survey of Singapore,  1996, Singapore. 
Attributing reasons for Singapore's economic success is not easy. The nation has the 
special characteristic of being small, with the smallness making it easier to govern 
(Lim Chong Yah, 1988). It has a very open economy with an 'exceptionally high 
trade/GNP ratio' and an 'export market much larger than its domestic market' (p.3), a 
large service sector, and a dependence on foreign investment, labour and technology. 
Its dependence on foreigners increases its vulnerability to external events as can be 
seen from its GDP growth rate of 1.5 per cent for 1998 compared with a realised 7.8 
per cent in 1997 (Foo Siang Luen & Kwih Toi Chi, 1999). 
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MNEs in Singapore 
Companies with at least 50 per cent of their shares owned by shareholders who have 
residential or registered addresses outside Singapore are designated 'foreign—
controlled companies' (Department of Statistics, 1995:68). From 1983-93, the 
number of MNEs in Singapore increased from 6,156 to 11,243 of which 1,323 were 
in manufacturing, 5,043 in commerce and 3,400 in financial and business services 
(p.70). The policy to attract MNEs in large numbers dates back to the 1965 
separation from Malaysia. The economic strategy was very successful in attracting 
medium-sized and large organisations (Chong Li Choy, 1986). Nowadays, 
Singapore's top 1000 companies tend to be MNEs (Straits Times, 21 December, 
1996). MNEs were attracted by the low wages and tax incentives. Mirza (1986) 
states that MNEs with 'pioneer status' employed over 70 per cent of labour working 
for MNEs in 1981. To be a 'pioneer', the business had to make large capital 
expenditures and use knowledge-based technologies (p.88). 
After the world oil crisis in 1973-74, Singapore became more selective in the type of 
MNEs it wanted, and in 1979, placed more emphasis on high value-added and 
technology-intensive industry (Chong Li Choy, 1986). This resulted in more chemical 
processing, sophisticated electronics, and biotechnology companies in the early 1980s 
(p.3). According to a 1985 survey, reasons given by MNEs for establishing in 
Singapore were, in order of importance, economic stability, geographic location, tax 
incentives, lower costs, good communications systems, high quality labour and no 
foreign exchange controls (Chong Li Choy, 1986). However, by the 1990s, MNEs 
with an eye to the future were concerned by labour shortages (particularly of 
operators), rising wages, the security of the long term water supply' from Malaysia, 
and lease and land costs (Natarajan & Tan Juay Miang, 1992). 
Malaysia has an agreanan with Singapore to supply it with water until 2061, but relationships between the two countries 
have experienced strain from time to time. 
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The System of Government 
Singapore is a republic with a written constitution and a parliamentary system of 
government. The state is headed by a President who is elected by Singaporean 
citizens although he is normally the only candidate and is nominated by the 
government. The cabinet, headed by the Prime Minister, is in charge of the 
administration and is collectively responsible to Parliament. There are 20 registered 
political parties in Singapore, but of the 83 seats in Parliament, the ruling People's 
Action Party (PAP) won 81 in the January 1997 election. In opposition, there is one 
Singapore People's Party and one Workers' Party MP in the current Parliament. The 
Singapore Democratic Party, which won three seats in 1991, did not win any in 1997 
(Singapore International Foundation, 1997: 5). 
The PAP was formed in 1954 'as a nationalist movement' with the Cambridge 
educated Lee Kuan Yew as Secretary—General (Josey, 1971:8). Lee won subsequent 
elections after the 1965 separation from Malaysia, in 1968, 1972, 1976, 1980, 1984, 
and 1988, with hissuccessor (Goh Chok Tong) winning in 1991 and 1997. Singapore 
has no government-funded social security (medical and unemployment) scheme 
(except for the Central Provident Fund and Medisave compulsory savings), and very 
strict laws on internal security, drugs, litter, chewing gum, public toilet flushing, and 
the use of private cars. Criminal sanctions include capital and corporal punishment. 
There are also restrictions on the local media, and friction with overseas media, 
churches and academics from time to time. Nearly 170 English-language publications 
are banned in Singapore (Straits Times, 28 February, 1998). While the style of the 
government has been criticised by some Singaporeans for its intolerance of 
opposition, some academics believe 'the people are not in a hurry to change the 
government' (Chua Beng Huat, 1993:106). In 1993, the first direct election of a 
Singaporean President occurred, with powers to veto the budget, decide on the use of 
foreign reserves and appoint public servants (Age, 4 August, 1993). 
The role of the government in Singapore's industrialisation and competitiveness is 
well documented (see Rodan, 1989; Lee Soo Ann, 1973), although not always in 
positive terms (see, for example, Loh, 1998). Agencies such as the Economic 
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Development Board, the Singaporean Productivity and Standards Board, Housing 
Development Board, Jurong Town Corporation, and Temasek, a government holding 
company, have all played a major role. In the labour area, the government has 
imposed such levies on employers as the former payroll tax, Skills Development Levy, 
foreign workers' levy, and Central Provident Fund contributions. The government 
has greatly influenced the design of Singapore's compensation system by means of 
employment and industrial relations legislation, control of the trade union movement 
and involvement in National Wage Council decisions. 
The Labour Force 
According to the 1996 Labour Force Survey (Research and Statistics Department, 
1997:1), Singapore had labour force of 1.8 million, of which 58.5 per cent were male. 
About two thirds of the workers were in the 30-59 age category, 29.1 per cent in the 
15-29 age bracket and 3.6 per cent in the over-60s. The male participation rate (aged 
15 and over) has been stable at around 79 per cent since 1986, whereas the female 
rate was 45.6 per cent in 1986, but is now 51.5 per cent. Of the workforce of 1.8 
million, 85 per cent are employees and 15 per cent self-employed. Of the latter 15 per 
cent, 5.6 per cent are employers. The 'up-skilling' of the workforce is shown in the 
doubling in the number of graduates since 1986 to 11.6 per cent of the workforce. 
Post-secondary /diploma qualification holders have also increased from 11.6 per cent 
in 1986 to 18.9 per cent in 1996. At the same time, the proportion of those 
employees without a secondary education has declined to 38.9 per cent compared 
with 53.1 per cent in 1986. 
The median age of the workforce in 1996 rose to 36.5 years; 23 per cent of them 
were in manufacturing and 23 per cent in commerce. Financial and Business Services 
accounted for 14 per cent (a 5 per cent increase since 1986) and Community and 
Personal Services another 21 per cent (stable). The growth in skill also changed the 
pattern of employment. Professionals and managers accounted for 19.7 per cent of 
the labour force compared with 11.9 per cent in 1986. Technicians and associated 
professionals similarly were in greater proportions (now 17.6 per cent compared with 
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10.2 per cent in 1986). By contrast, the percentage of production and related 
workers decreased to 31 per cent in 1996 from 42 per cent in 1986. 
The challenge for Singapore is to provide the labour supply to generate continuing 
economic growth. Chew Soon Beng and Chew (1992) believe that the high levels of 
male participation demonstrate that 'this pool is almost completely exhausted' (p.5). 
The 1995 overall female participation rate of 50 per cent peaked in the 20-29 age 
group at around 80 per cent, but dropped to below 50 per cent over the age of 45 
years. This may suggest that there is some potential in that area. With the policy to 
encourage more educated females to marry and either join or remain in the workforce, 
Wan, Wyatt, Tsai-pen Tseng and Ho Beng Chia (1989) note that the government has 
offered civil servants subsidised child-care, child-rearing leave, up to four years' 
unpaid leave without loss of job or seniority, part-time work and paid leave to cater 
for sick children. These measures are not so prevalent in private industry because of 
the cost. Another source of labour is the older generation and in 1993, legislation 
increased the retirement age to 60. This may be raised in stages to 67 by 2003 (Ow 
Kheng Tot & Ma Wei Cheng, 1996) but was set at 62 years on 1 January 1999 
(NTUC News 1 August 1997). 
More part-time work has been seen as another solution to the shortage of labour. 
Part-timers (defined as those whose regular working hours are less than 30 per week) 
made up only 3.4 per cent of the workforce in Singapore in 1996, two thirds of whom 
were female (Research and Statistics Department, 1997). These employees have 
received recent attention from Singaporean academics (see Wan et al., 1989; Chew 
Soon Beng & Chew, 1992; Lee and Tan Hwee Hoon, 1993). Another strategy for 
overcoming the labour shortage in Singapore has been the use of strictly controlled 
foreign workers. The control is exercised by the issuing of work permits, percentage 
limits of foreigners allowed to be employed in an organisation and, since 1984, the 
imposition of a levy on the employer for each foreign worker. The policy dates back 
to the mid-1960s and there are estimates of about 300,000 foreign or 'guest' workers 
including 80,000 domestic workers or maids in the country at present (Labour News, 
January, 1995). The levies are regularly changed according to the labour market. In 
1995, the monthly levy was raised to S$330 per month for foreign workers in the 
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manufacturing, service and domestic sectors, S$200 per month for skilled workers 
and S$400 per month for unskilled construction workers2. The levy prevents the 
'guest worker' from being a cheap source of labour at the expense of local 
Singaporeans. The government policy on foreign labour is to complement the local 
numbers, but to be a buffer in the event of an economic down-turn as in 1974-75 and 
1985-86. During the 1985 recession, 60,000 were repatriated (Lee Tsao Yuan, 
1987). Unemployment rates for the period 1974-95 are shown in the Figure 5.1. 
Figure 5.1 
Unemployed Persons and Unemployment Rates, Singapore, 1974-95 
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Source: Labour News, April, 1993; Department of Statistics (1995) Yearbook of Statistics, 
Singapore 1995. 
The impact of low unemployment and wages growth on national cost competitiveness 
has been a key focus in Singapore's economic strategy (Rodan, 1989), so there has 
been great government involvement and interest in wage movements. The 
Employment Act of 1968 altered the pay and conditions of employees, specified 
working hours, and reduced public holidays and annual leave (Rodan, 1989). The 
rapid wage growth of the late 1960s and early 1970s led to fears of 'a wages blow-out, 
and so the government set up a tripartite National Wages Council in 1972 to advise 
on orderly wage development, recommend annual increases and to 'assist in the 
development of incentive schemes to improve national productivity' (Lee Tsao Yuan, 
1987:178). The problem for the booming Southeast Asian economies was to offset 
the rising wage with increasing productivity (Chowdhury & Islam, 1993). 
2 As from 1 April 1998, monthly levies for skilled foreign workers were cut by half to S$100, and unskilled construction 
employee charges increased to S$470. The revision of levies was intended to make the employment of skilled workers more 
attractive, and employment of unskilled people more unattractive (Straits Times, 8 November, 1997). 
157 
The monthly earnings, inflation rates and productivity growth of Singapore for 
selected years 1987-95 are shown below in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.3 
Wage Increases, Inflation and Productivity 1987-95, Singapore 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1995 
Indicator °A) % % % % 
Increases in monthly earnings 3.2 8.2 9.3 9.3 6.4 
Inflation Rate 0.5 1.5 2.4 3.4 1.7 
Productivity Growth 5.1 5.0 5.1 4.1 3.6 
Source: Research and Statistics Department (1991) Report on Wages in Singapore 1990, Part 2; 
Research and Statistics Department (1992) Report on Wages in Singapore 1991, Part 2; Ministry 
of Trade and Industry (1997), Economic Survey of Singapore, 1996, Tables A2.9 and A 2.7 
With the tight labour market, the increases in monthly earnings regularly exceed 
productivity rises as Table 5.3 indicates. In June 1996, the median gross monthly 
income of an employed person was S$1,625 (Research and Statistics Department, 
1997:9). Males received S$1,800 per month compared with females at S$1,350. 
Educational qualifications played a large part in earnings with degree holders 
receiving a median of S$4,000 per month. A 1992 Singapore National Employers' 
Federation survey of salaries quotes monthly averages of $S11,309 for chief 
executives, $S5,846 for a marketing manager and $S997 for a production operator 
(Straits Times, 10 January 1992). Management salaries are considered locally to be 
the third highest in the world (Straits Times, 17 June 1995). However, average 
salaries conceal the escalation in property and motor vehicle prices 3 which has led to 
declining purchasing power for assets and the strain on social cohesion (Lee Tsao 
Yuan, 1996). Only 14 per cent of the population live in private property with the bulk 
of the population living in government-provided accommodation (p.33). 
3 	. The Singapore Government has strict controls on the number of cars allowed to be run on the island. The position for 1995— 
96 is described and based mainly on data from the Singapore International Chamber of Commerce (SICC, 1995). Each 
potential car user had to obtain a Certificate of Entitlement (COE) for which quotas and tenders were organised monthly. The 
COE lasted for ten years only and could cost more than S$50,000 depending on the vehicle type. However, the exact amount 
depended on the quota available and the bids put in. Where quotas were not totally used, speculative bids might be successful 
(as was the case in December 1997 when a COE for a Mercedes-Benz E2000 was obtained for S$50. The previous month, it 
cost S$64,100 [Straits Times, 13 December, 1997]). Any imported vehicle had 41 per cent import duty placed on it. A 
Registration fee was then payable of 5$1000 for private use and S$5000 for company use. A new or second hand vehicle 
registered for the first time in Singapore had an Additional Registration Fee of 150 per cent of its Open Market Value. Annual 
Road Tax was calculated on engine capacity and in 1995 would have been 551440 per annum for a 1600cc vehicle, or S$5250 
for a 3000cc car. Motor cars over 10 years old incurred a surcharge on Road Tax payable on a sliding scale of up to 50 per 
amt for a vehicle of over 14 years of age. A modest imported Daihatsu Charade 1.5 litre saloon would have cost S$62,000 in 
1995 excluding COE. The Government announced in March 1998 that from 1 September, 1998, there would be a shift from 
charging for car ownership to paying for road usage (Straits Times, 7 March, 1998). 
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The nominal working hours for Singaporeans have stayed remarkably constant over 
the last 50 years or so. The 1968 (and amended) Employment Act laid down 
maximum normal and overtime hours for those earning up to a specified monthly 
salary. The 1995 salary ceiling for those covered by the Employment Act was 
$S1500 per month. Under the Act, the working hours in a company must not exceed 
an average of 44 per week over a two-week period. Overtime is to be paid at time 
and a half, and is limited to a maximum of 72 hours per month, unless Ministry of 
Labour (now Manpower) permission is granted. Data from the Department of 
Statistics (1995c) show that the number of hours worked per week has increased 
slightly in the period 1985-95. The average for all industries was 44.6 in 1985, and 
47.1 in 1995 (p.48). Within the overall figure there is some industrial variation, the 
highest number of hours being worked in manufacturing, construction and transport, 
storage and communications. 
In terms of skills of the workforce, as early as 1952, the government was indicating 
that if Singapore was to attract industry, it would have to develop skilled trades 
people (Blythe, 1952). There is evidence of technical training by large employers in 
the 1950s, but a major government initiative was the setting up of a Skills 
Development Fund (SDF), which placed a levy of two per cent on the salaries of all 
workers earning less than S$750 per month (Chew Soon Beng & Chew, 1992). The 
rate of the levy has been adjusted regularly and the salary ceiling was raised to cover 
all workers earning less than S$1,000 per month in 1995. Companies can claim back 
between 30 and 90 per cent of the training costs for structured training programs from 
the SDF pool. 
The National Wages Council in its 1996-97 recommendations which noted that while 
the estimated percentage of national payrolls spent on training was 3.6 per cent in 
1995, some larger companies with more than 500 employees were spending more 
than 7 per cent, compared with less than 2 per cent in small and medium size 
enterprises (Labour News, October, 1996). In all, the Singaporean Government spent 
S$3.6 billion on education in 1995 (Department of Statistics, 1995: 245). 
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The National Culture of Singapore 
The complexity of analysing national cultures has already been discussed in Chapter 4, 
together with the weaknesses of using several dimensions to approximate a culture 
(Hofstede, 1991). Nevertheless, Hofstede's (1991) work does permit a comparison 
between Singapore and Australia on five dimensions. Table 5.4 below shows the 
value of the indices and ranks of Australia and Singapore out of 53 countries on the 
dimensions of Power Distance, Individualism, Masculinity, and Uncertainty 
Avoidance, and out of 20 nations for Confucian Dynamism. The dimension 
'Confucian Dynamism' was introduced by Hofstede and Bond (1988) to show the 
relative preferences of nations of values associated with Confucian Dynamism. These 
included the relative importance of 'persistence (perseverance), ordering relationships 
by status and observing this order, thrift and having a sense of shame', and the relative 
unimportance of 'personal steadiness and stability, protecting your face, respect for 
tradition, and reciprocation of greetings, favors and gifts' (Hofstede & Bond, 
1988:17). 
Table 5.4 
Scores on Five Hofstede Dimensions for Australia and Singapore 
Value of the Five Hofstede Indices for Australia and Singapore 
Indices/Rank* Australia Singapore 
Power Distance 
Index 36 74 
Rank 41 13 
Individualism 
Index 90 20 
Rank 2 39-41 
Masculinity 
Index 61 48 
Rank 16 28 
Uncertainty Avoidance 
Index 51 8 
Rank 37 53 
Confucian Dynamism 
Index 31 48 
Rank 11-12/20 8/20 
Source: Hofstede, G and Bond, M.H. (1988) 'The Confucius Connection: From Cultural Roots to 
Economic Growth', Organizational Dynamics, 16(4), 5-21, and Hofstede, G. (1991) Cultures and 
Organisations, London, Harper Collins 
Notes: *Rank numbers: 1=highest; 53=lowest. Confucian Dynamism is for 20 nations only and 1 = 
highest; 20=lowest 
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The number of Singaporeans surveyed by Hofstede (1980/1988) in his 1971-73 study 
was 58, and the results were interpreted as showing that Singapore had a high Power 
Distance ranking, offset by a weak Uncertainty Avoidance ranking. A low score was 
recorded on Individualism ('loosely knit social framework') and an average score on 
Masculinity ('preference for achievement, heroism, assertiveness, and material 
success') (p.337). The outcomes have been interpreted in different ways. For 
example, Hodgetts and Luthans (1993b) tabulate the Singaporean Masculinity score 
as 'high' (p.45), whereas Punnett and Ricks (1997:152) list it as 'moderately low'. 
Based on Hofstede's (1991) clusters of nations on dimensional matrices, in this study, 
Singapore is interpreted as having 'high' Power Distance, 'low' Individualism', 
'moderately low' Masculinity, and 'weak' Uncertainty Avoidance. Singapore was 
placed 8th out of 20 nations on the Confucian Dynamism index which was construed 
by Hofstede and Bond (1988:18) as 'quintessential Confucianism' in action. As the 
Confucian Dynamism scores were high for the other four 'Dragons', Hofstede (1988) 
argued that one could perhaps attribute some of their high economic growth to their 
national culture. 
Hofstede's dimensions scores can be compared with the more recent cultural data of 
Trompenaars (1994) on Singapore. Hoecklin (1995) adapted Trompenaars's findings 
to devise a set of continua for each relationship dimension showing the position of 20 
countries on the dimensions. Singapore was placed at the mid-point between 
Universalism and Particularism, meaning that it did not focus more on relationships 
than rules (Hoecklin, 1995). It was placed at the extreme Collectivism end of the 
continuum for Individualism and Collectivism, meaning that 'people ideally achieve in 
groups which assume joint responsibility' (Trompenaars, 1994: 67). Singaporeans 
were more Neutral than Affective, interpreted as not revealing what they thinking or 
feeling (p.77). On the Specific and Diffuse scales, Singaporeans tended more towards 
Diffuseness appearing more 'indirect ... evasive, tactful, ambiguous [and] even 
opaque' (Trompenaars, 1994:98). Finally, Hoecklin (1995) summarised the 
Trompenaars data as suggesting that Singaporeans supported Ascription slightly more 
than Achievement as the basis for according status and power in society. This results 
in more use of titles, respect for seniors in a hierarchy and senior management 
comprising of middle-aged males qualified by their backgrounds (Trompenaars, 
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1994). According to Trompenaars, this would make MBO and pay-for-performance 
less effective than direct rewards from a manager (p.116). Trompenaars's (1994) 
findings have links with those of Hofstede in that, despite different definitions, 
Singapore again appears more collectivist than individualistic, and the ordering of 
relationships by status and observing this order (Hoftsede & Bond's [1988] Confucian 
Dynamism) conforms with the tendency of Singaporeans towards Ascription in 
Trompenaars's results. 
Redding (1990) states that the cultural determinants of individual Chinese values stem 
from the fundamental beliefs and values of Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism. 
These, in turn, influence the social structures of the family, networks and ethnicity, 
and relationship rules such as filial piety, collectivism/face, trust and non-cooperation 
(p.43). The 1995 General Household Survey indicated that 85.5 per cent of 2.5 
million Singaporeans over 10 years of age professed some kind of religious or 
spiritual faith (Balachander, 1997:37). Of the approximately 2.5 million, 53.8 per cent 
(almost all Chinese) were either Buddhists or Taoists, the latter believing in the 
Chinese sages (Confucius, Mencius, Lao Zi), practising ancestor worship or belonging 
to other Chinese sects (p.37). In Singapore, Buddhism, Taoism and Confucianism are 
traditionally mixed. Islam was the religion for 14.9 per cent of the population (mainly 
Malays) and 3.3 per cent were Hindus, all of whom were Indians. Christians formed 
12.9 per cent of Singaporeans, nearly all being Chinese (p.37). 
Kuo (1987:22) argues that the fundamental Confucian ethic of the value of filial piety 
is 'still strongly held among the Chinese in Singapore'. The way it is expressed has 
changed, but the obligation to care for a family's older members still prevails. The 
patriarchal family is also being replaced by the egalitarian one. The Confucian 
tradition supports respect for authority, government and bureaucracy, with the 
government being for the good of the people rather than the ruler (Chwee Huat Tan, 
1989). There is loyalty to good leaders, a preference for order and harmony, and 'a 
taste for education and hard work' (p.13). Singapore is not 'a pure Confucian 
society', and so it is difficult to attribute the economic success to Confucianism 
(Wong & Wong, 1989:7). Devan (1990:4) agrees that economic success was not so 
much due to 'some mystical Confucian magic' as an intelligent and hard-working 
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population and good leadership. However, Prime Minister Goh has referred to 
Hofstede's work for political purposes; he interpreted it as showing a 'strong 
statistical correlation between economic growth and dynamic Confucian values' 
(Cheng Soon Tab, 1991:3). 
The Singaporean Government has inevitably taken an interest in the values system of 
its people and has used several instruments to promote values and national 
integration. They include 'the promotion of economic development, public housing, 
national [male military] service, educational policies, the mass media, periodic national 
campaigns, and grassroots organizations' (Quah, 1990a:45). In 1989, the government 
commenced a two-year debate on formulating some core values for a national 
ideology in order to cultivate national identity and counter over-Westernisation. 
Work Values 
There has been some limited research by local and foreign writers such as Hsu (1987) 
and Redding and Casey (1976) on the values of Singaporean workers. Singaporeans 
are conscious of the interaction of their culture with the work organisation and there 
have been past calls for a change in Singaporean values from senior government 
officials, moving them from 'individualism' to 'team-work' in the development of 
'new industrial relations' (Chua Beng Huat, 1982:328). The rise of 'individualism,' 
apart from traditional cooperation within the family, has been attributed to the 
emphasis on educational and occupational achievements and the material gain from 
the capitalist system (p.329). 
Local writers have stereotyped the Singaporean worker in the past as exhibiting 
loyalty and commitment to a job, job-hopping, unpunctuality, and a reluctance for 
overtime and shiftwork (Chew Soon Beng, 1983). Regarding management, Chong Li 
Choy (1987) argues that although Chinese management values in Singapore have been 
based on Chinese family and cultural traditions, these values and practices have had to 
change over time. The proliferation of MNEs has led to a second source of influence, 
although the Chinese influence still holds sway. The traditional Chinese family 
business is run on paternalistic and authoritarian lines, but the industrialisation and 
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changing social structure 'has made it increasingly difficult to retain family in the 
business' (p.137). Keys, Case and Edge (1989) support the view that management 
practices have been affected by the Chinese family system, although Singaporean 
managers have assimilated overseas practices so that 'Singapore must be observed as 
a multinational mix' (p.392). 
Employment Law in Singapore 
Prior to independence, Singaporean employers were subject to various statutory 
instruments dating back to 1921. Arbitration boards, courts of inquiry and industrial 
courts to handle industrial disputes were set up in 1940, followed by British Colonial 
Government Ordinances for union control, minimum working conditions, and the 
Industrial Arbitration Court in 1961. With the separation of Singapore from Malaysia 
in 1965, significant legislation quickly followed. Work permit legislation was passed 
to restrict the numbers of unskilled workers coming into Singapore, as unemployment 
was very high. Unions were recognised for collective bargaining, but non-
Singaporeans and those with criminal records were excluded from holding office. All 
union officials and employees had to be registered. From 1967, statutory body 
employees could only join company (in-house) unions, and in 1968, the two 
fundamental pieces of employment legislation were passed — the Employment Act 
and the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act. The former was designed to increase 
productivity, standardise working conditions, and eliminate excessive fringe benefits 
and overtime payments, with a view to attracting MNE investment (Goh Mong Hak, 
1969). The latter defined the rights of management and unions, and placed selection, 
promotion, work allocation and retrenchment of staff clearly within the prerogatives 
of management (Josey, 1976). 
Throughout the 1970s, redundancy payments, workers' compensation, unfair 
dismissal, safety, and employment of young persons were all legislated for, and the 
Skills Development Levy was imposed in 1979. From a compensation viewpoint, the 
1975 amendment to the Employment Act was important, in that the government 
provided for stricter controls of the system of annual wage supplement (AWS) 
(commonly known as the '13th month), and for bonuses and wage increases which 
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had been recommended by the National Wages Council in 1972 and incorporated in 
Section 46. Employers could only pay an additional annual wage supplement in 
excess of the quantum frozen in 1972 with the written prior consent of the Minister of 
Finance. 
The 1968 Employment Act has been amended several times in recent years to include 
more flexible arrangements for maternity leave, work schedules, greater annual leave 
with length of service, and clarification of rest days and public holidays. From 1975, 
the Act only applied to those earning less than S$750 per month, but the government 
raised this to S$1500 per month in 1992, and S$1,600 per month from 1 March 1996 
(Labour News, November, 1995). The Employment Act covered about 72 per cent 
of the workforce in 1995, the exceptions being those employed in a managerial 
executive or confidential position, seamen, domestic servants, and persons employed 
by statutory bodies or the government (Labour News, November, 1995). Rising 
incomes has caused this percentage to drop from 79 per cent in 1992. The current 
Employment Act gives the period of notice required according to length of service, 
how payment of salary should occur, sets overtime rates and limits, the AWS, rest 
days, weekly hours of work to a maximum of 44 hours per week over an average of 
two weeks, a maximum working day of 12 hours with some exceptions, shift work, 
public holidays, annual and sick leave, retirement benefit, and fixes the minimum age 
for employment of young children (12 years), sets maternity benefits, and defines a 
'part-time employee'. 
The Singaporean Industrial Relations Act (revised 1985) is designed 'to provide for 
the regulation of the relations of employers and employees and the prevention and 
settlement of disputes by collective bargaining and conciliation and arbitration' (p.3). 
It covers the functions and powers of the Industrial Arbitration Court, collective 
bargaining, arbitration, awards, and Boards of Inquiry. Under Part 3 of the Act, any 
employee who is hired under a contract of service can be a union member of a 'rank 
and file' union, unless the Minister of Labour (Manpower) deems otherwise or the 
person is an executive or manager. A registered trade union can seek recognition 
from an employer provided that it represents the majority of eligible employees 
(Section 16). An employer can refuse recognition on the grounds that there are 
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insufficient members or that another union already has coverage, The Industrial 
Arbitration Court can be asked to settle the matter (Section 16). There is legal 
employment protection for existing or potential union members. 
The union, once recognised, may invite the employer to negotiate. Similarly, the 
employer may invite the union to negotiate. Failure to do so may result in the 
intervention of the Commissioner for Labour (Section 19). Negotiations may end in a 
collective agreement. Under the Act, this must be of at least two years' duration and 
not more than three (Section 24). To preserve managerial prerogative, an agreement 
must not include provisions on the promotion, transfer, hiring, retrenchment, dismissal 
or work allocation of the employees (Section 17). The provisions may not be more 
favourable to employees than those under Part 4 of the Employment Act (which 
covers rest days, hours of work, sick and annual leave) if the employee is working in 
an organisation that started operations after 1 January 1968, unless the firm is given 
permission by the Minister to do so. Any disputes arising out of the collective 
agreement can be submitted to the Industrial Arbitration Court for adjudication. 
Registered collective agreements and awards are enforced by Ministry of Labour 
(Manpower) inspectors, who may enter any place of work at any time (Section 55). 
There is no minimum wage or equal pay or opportunity legislation in Singapore. 
While the author could find no official reason for this, it seems to be in line with the 
rest of the Asian region (Jackson, 1997). One might conjecture that this may be to do 
with the presence of Islamic law alongside the legislative system in some Asian 
countries such as Malaysia (p.263). As mentioned earlier, Singapore has large 
numbers of adherents of Islam. 
The implications for the MINE setting up in Singapore are that a large operation may 
attract union interest, and if the union gains formal recognition through recruitment of 
sufficient members, the MINE may have to negotiate a collective agreement. 
However, this will only apply to employees who are first-line supervisors without 
staffing authority and below. The Employment Act provided a 'floor' for conditions 
of those earning up to S$1,500 per month in 1995, but above this salary limit, the 
MINE had considerable freedom to negotiate compensation on an individual basis. 
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Personal and Company Taxation 
One aspect which may particularly affect the packaging of compensation for 
employees is the rate of income and benefits taxes. The direct taxes in Singapore are 
company income tax, personal income tax, property tax, estate duty and stamp duty 
(SICC, 1997). There are no capital gains or payroll taxes, although a Goods and 
Services Tax was introduced in April, 1994. For the 1994 tax year, company tax was 
27 per cent, and the maximum rate of the sliding scale income tax was 30 per cent 
(Foo Siang Luen & Rocha, 1995:126). Assessable individual employment income 
includes pay, commissions, bonuses and gratuities. Benefits in kind from the 
employer such as employer—provided houses and cars are also taxable. Personal tax 
relief is granted on family criteria, educational course fees, the foreign maid levy and 
other items (SICC, 1997:51). 
The Central Provident Fund 
The Central Provident Fund (CPF) was introduced by the Colonial Government in 
1955 'to provide financial security for workers in their retirement or when they are no 
longer able to work' (CPF, 1992:2). Since its inception, the Scheme has become a 
comprehensive social security system which caters for retirement, home ownership 
and health-care needs. Both employees and employers must contribute a sum to the 
CPF based on a percentage rate of the employee's salary. The accumulated wealth 
thus 'accrues disproportionately to higher income groups' (Asher, 1993:157). The 
rates are reviewed by the government annually in the light of the economy's 
performance and international competitiveness. On 1 July 1994, the CPF 
contributions were adjusted to 20 per cent each by employees and employers (40 per 
cent in total). Lesser contributions are payable by both employer and employee where 
the employee is aged 55-59,60-64 and 65 and over (SICC, 1997:63). 
The CPF contributions are calculated on the ordinary and any additional wages of the 
employee. These include basic pay, overtime, incentives, commission, bonuses, leave 
pay, acting allowances, child-care subsidy, festive allowance, housing allowances, 
shift allowances, and tips. The CPF savings are not taxed and accumulate with non- 
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taxable interest fixed at a rate based on average savings rates at four local banks. By 
adjusting the percentage payable, the government can influence the savings rate of the 
economy as a whole. The savings fund can be used to purchase a home, insure for 
medical care (Medishield), insure or purchase a Housing and Development Board flat, 
meet hospital expenses (Medisave), pay for life insurance (The Dependants' 
Protection Scheme) and for tertiary education or to invest in approved investments 
such as a property, unit trusts, and gold. The implication for the MINE is that while 
the CPF may not influence the structure of its compensation system, it will have a 
dramatic impact on the overall cost of labour. 
The Industrial Relations System in Singapore 
Like the system of any other nation, Singapore's industrial relations (IR) system is 
unique and a product of its history, and economic, social, legal and political 
constraints (Schregle, 1981; Anantaraman, 1990; Foo Check, Chan Choon Hian & 
Ong, 1991) despite drawing heavily initially on the Western Australian IR model 
(Oehlers, 1997). The main features are said to be its recent institutionalisation in law, 
its centralisation and legalism, and the central role of government and its agencies 
(Foo Check Teck et al., 1991; Abraham, 1988). The centralisation of decision 
making has been partly attributed to the compactness of the island, its vulnerability as 
a strategic port and the need to attract MINE investment. The dominance of the 
government in industrial relations through its legislation and administrative rules is 
thought to 'explain in part why the essentially conservative international businesses 
find Singapore such a reassuring place' (Pang Eng-Fong & Tan Chwee-Huat, 
1975:131). The official view was that it was 'too risky and dangerous' to leave the 
maintenance of industrial relations to the parties to the employment contract 
themselves (Tan Boon Chiang, 1979a:197), and that while employment and industrial 
relations law might appear anti-union to the outsider, it has brought a greater 
distribution of wealth and well-being to the workforce (Tan Boon Chiang, 1979b). 
While worker organisations existed in Singapore prior to 1946, they were not 
involved in collective bargaining. Trade unionism in Singapore is essentially a post- 
war phenomenon, with the first union being registered in 1946 (Tan Siew Eng, 
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1979/80). The period 1950-69 was characterised by bitter rivalry between unions and 
employers. After independence in 1965 and the greater regulation of unions, the 
National Trade Union Congress (NTUC) was asked to emphasise the interests of 
society rather than of labour, to replace adversity with cooperation, play an educative 
role, and start up some cooperative business ventures in the economy (Anantaraman, 
1990). It cooperated with the government in adopting a more consensus—driven 
tripartite approach to industrial harmony. The 'development orientated' industrial 
relations system emerged from 1965-68 (Tan Joke Fong, 1980/81). 
In 1963, the number of days lost through official industrial stoppages was 388,219 
(State of Singapore Annual Report, 1963 [19641: 237); this steadily declined to none 
by 1978. Since 1978, there have been no official industrial stoppages in Singapore 
except for one of two days' duration, settled by conciliation in 1986, which resulted in 
the loss of 122 man-days. The reason for decline in overt conflict has been attributed 
to the government's encouragement of the National Trade Union Congress (NTUC) 
to become 'more responsible' and 'less politicised', and to an expectation that the 
government would deal severely with any union militancy (Wilkinson, 1986:111). 
Conciliation and arbitration channels can be used to process a dispute over the 
legislated areas for negotiation and/or referred to them by government (Anantaraman, 
1990). Foo Check Teck et al. (1991) conclude that this has led to two main 
characteristics of the Singaporean system: (1) the tripartite interaction of government, 
employers and unions on various national bodies that 'has forged a common ideology 
which is closely aligned to the economic and socio-political goals of the country' 
(p.5), and (2) the legislation of the dispute resolution and collective bargaining 
process which permits voluntary negotiation and conciliation, and if necessary, 
compulsory arbitration. 
A model of the industrial relations system in Singapore is shown in Figure 5.2. This 
model shows the environmental context for industrial relations, the actors, the process 
of collective bargaining, joint consultation at the enterprise level and at national level 
through the National Wages Council (NWC), Skills Development Council (SDC), and 
the Economic Development Board (EDB). It also indicates the conflict resolution 
methods of local grievance procedures, conciliation, and arbitration, which are 
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Figure 5.2 
A Model of the Industrial Relations System in Singapore 
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constrained by the rules of collective bargaining, legislation, IAC awards and NWC 
guidelines. Krislov and Leggett (1985a:175) sum up the Singapore system as having 
a long-standing commitment' to compulsory arbitration, possessing the constraints 
on the scope of collective bargaining, and achieving 'the engineered transition from 
"confrontational" to "non-confrontational" labour—management relations'. 
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The Ministry of Labour and Industrial Arbitration Court 
The government's leading role in Singaporean industrial relations is played through its 
legislation, and its two main agencies — the Ministry of Labour' and the Industrial 
Arbitration Court (IAC). Employers and unions may submit a dispute to the 
conciliation section of the labour relations department of the Ministry of Labour. The 
Ministry staff cannot arbitrate, but in the event of failure to resolve an issue, the 
parties may jointly or separately request the dispute to be arbitrated by the IAC. The 
Minister of Labour or the President of Singapore may also submit a case to the IAC, 
the latter for disputes affecting the public interest (Section 31d of the Industrial 
Relations Act). In 1995, the Conciliation Section of the Ministry of Labour received 
305 trade disputes compared with 333 in 1994 (Ministry of Labour, 1996). Including 
cases carried over from the previous year, 311 disputes were settled by conciliation 
and only three were referred to the IAC for arbitration, a pattern which has been 
evident for many years. A number of claims are withdrawn each year by the parties 
once the conciliation process has started, and individual non-union employees may 
also seek redress through conciliation at the Ministry. 
The Ministry of Labour administers the recognition of unions procedures, unfair 
dismissals and registration of unions. By contrast, the IAC, set up in 1960, tries to 
prevent and settle disputes through its powers given to it by the High Court. It has 
jurisdiction, as Foo Check Teck et al. (1991) write, to: 
(a) arbitrate trade disputes 
(b) certify collective agreements freely and mutually agreed between employers and trade 
unions 
(c) interpret, vary, set aside and extend collective agreements and awards 
(d) appoint referees 
(e) order compliance with an award of the Court and to enjoin a trade union or person from 
committing or continuing a contravention of any provision of the Industrial Relations Act 
or breach or non-observance of and award 
(f) provide a limited form of informal conciliation powers. 
In addition, the IAC can punish for contempt of court and inspect work sites, 
materials or machinery relating to a trade dispute. An IAC decision is final and not 
subject to appeal (Balachander, 1997). In 1995, the IAC received 11 cases, 9 of 
which involved variation of collective agreements, and 2 of which related to non- 
4 The Ministry of Labour was renamed the Ministry of Manpower on 1 April 1998 (Manpower News, August. 1998). 
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compliance with terms of collective agreements (Ministry of Labour, 1996). The IAC 
remains important and 'has never been seriously challenged' (Krislov & Leggett, 
1985b:23), and the increased 'authority, status and prestige' which the Singaporean 
Government has bestowed on the Ministry of Labour has also been thought to have 
led to union and employer respect for its activities (Wan Liang Tin, Yacob & Soo Kia 
Twee, 1986:250). 
The Unions 
In Singapore, anyone over 16 can join a union, except those serving in the 
Singaporean Police Force and the Armed Services. A person may not join a union if 
he or she has direct responsibility for, or substantive influence on hiring, firing, 
promotion, transfer, reward or discipline of staff, has duties which may conflict with 
union membership, has access to confidential information, or has to represent the 
employer in labour relations (Labour News, April, 1992). The main criterion for 
exclusion from joining a union is 'conflict of interest'. According to an interviewed 
SNEF official, 'sometimes the employer will give bogus titles like "assistant manager" 
to avoid unionisation'. Other restrictions are placed on employees working for some 
statutory boards who have to form or join house unions only. At least seven 
intending members must apply to register a union to the Registrar of Trade Unions 
who examines the proposed rules and constitution. However, a union can only 
bargain on behalf of its members if it has recognition from an employer. This can be 
granted directly or through secret ballot to show majority support if the employer is 
unwilling to provide recognition (Chew Soon Beng, 1991). A registered union can 
sue and be sued, and can enter into a collective agreement. The right to sue does not 
exist if the union stops its members working as part of a trade dispute. The officers 
and members are similarly protected. However, a union cannot order industrial action 
unless a majority of the members support such action through a secret ballot. 
In 1995, there were 81 registered unions in Singapore, of which 72 were affiliated to 
the NTUC, the main coordinating federation of unions (Balachander, 1996:241). 
From unpublished data provided by the NTUC, in 1991, there were 75 unions 
affiliated to the NTUC and 11 non-affiliated. Of the 75, 3 were general unions, 34 
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were house unions and 38 were industrial, craft or other types. Of the 11 not 
affiliated, 3 were house unions and 8 were industrial, craft or other types. The 
membership of NTUC affiliated unions was evenly divided between the industrial 
(33.9 per cent), service (34.6 per cent) and public (31.5 per cent) sectors. There were 
some 8,000 union officials in the branches, 1,338 in union head office roles and 21 on 
the NTUC central committee. With the changing occupational and skill profile in 
Singapore, the percentage of NTUC affiliated union members of the estimated 
bargainable workforce declined from 25.18 per cent in 1985 to 23.37 per cent in 1994 
(NTUC News Weekly, 23 June 1995:3). General branch membership is available to 
trade union members in a non-union shop. Benefits include discounts in departmental 
stores, holiday resorts and cooperatives, but not collective bargaining rights. The 
membership and number of unions for selected years from 1985-95 is shown in Table 
5.5. 
Table 5.5 
Union Numbers and Membership, Singapore, Selected Years, 1985-95 
Year Total Number 
of Unions 
Membership Union Density of 
Total Workforce 
% 
1985 84 201,132 15.6 
1990 83 212,204 14.2 
1995 81 235,157 13.4 
Source: Department of Statistics (1995) Yearbook of Statistics, Singapore, 
Department of Statistics, p.50: Research and Statistics Department (1995) 
1995 Singapore Yearbook of Labour Statistics,  Singapore, Ministry of 
Labour, pp.3 and 74. 
Table 5.5 depicts a fairly low overall level of union density in Singapore. This may be 
the result of the NTUC's recruitment strategy as it has not fought for the introduction 
of closed shops or for compulsory levies on `free-riders'; in addition, there are no 
union preference clauses in collective agreements or closed shops. 
The Employer Associations 
Research on employer associations as actors in the Singaporean industrial relations 
system is minimal. Employer associations in Singapore have to be registered under 
section 2 of the Trade Unions Act. Their principal objectives are to promote good 
industrial relations, to improve working conditions and to increase productivity for 
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the benefit of employees, employers and the Singaporean economy. Membership of 
an employer association is not compulsory and the Singaporean Statistics Yearbook 
for 1995 (Department of Statistics, 1995) shows there were three main registered 
employer associations, with 1,225 members. However, these government 
membership figures seem to differ from those reported by individual associations. 
The largest employer association — the Singapore National Employers' Federation 
(SNEF) — was established in 1948 and merged with another association (National 
Employers' Council) in 1980. SNEF had a membership of 917 employers of 204,404 
employees by 1988 (Foo Check Teck, Chan Choon & Ong, 1991) and 1580 members 
in 1998 (SNEF: www.snef org.sg/co_info.html, 15/01/98). The staff of the SNEF 
consist of industrial relations and occupational health and safety advisers, training and 
development and research and publications staff. The SNEF historically has 
concentrated on participating in and advising on collective bargaining; coordinating 
negotiating panels for industry groups; acting as an information centre; providing 
advice on a daily basis on conditions of service issues including salary structures; 
undertaking surveys, training and development; and giving advice on occupational 
health and safety. At a national level, the SNEF participates in tripartite committees 
such as the National Wages Council (NWC), the Singapore Productivity and 
Standards Board (SPSB), and Central Provident Fund. Along with the Singapore 
Confederation of Industries (founded in 1932 and claiming 1,400 corporate members) 
and the Singapore Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry, the SNEF 
attempts to develop common employer policies, especially in times of change of 
wages guidelines or employment legislation (Yaw & Leong Choon Chiang, 1996). In 
the past, the SNEF has openly declared that it wants a union movement which is 
'viable and strong' and viewed the NTUC and the unions as 'an asset' (Singapore 
Employer, July 1985), but resists the coverage of managerial staff by unions. 
In the early 1970s, the SNEF was happy to support an incomes policy via NWC 
guidelines, but since 1979, has shown more preference for direct negotiation at plant 
level 'using moral suasion' on companies not to exceed NWC recommended rises 
(Chew Soon Beng & Chew, 1995:98). The SNEF, as a member of the NWC, has to 
abide by its decisions, although would prefer the NWC to have a reduced role (p.98). 
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In recent years, it has been a strong advocate for more flexibility in the wages system, 
particularly in linking pay to company productivity and performance (p.105). In this 
regard, the SNEF emphasised the dangers of increasing the retirement age with 
compensation systems based on seniority. 
Incomes Policies 
In Singapore, strong government intervention is evident in both the demand and 
supply side of the Singaporean labour market. As well as being a large employer, the 
government has passed laws affecting compensation, the supply of local and foreign 
labour, and the role of trade unions (Ho Soo Kiang, 1988), and is an active participant 
on the National Wages Council (NWC). This body consists of equal numbers of 
employer and union representatives, government officials and a neutral chairperson. 
When first formed in 1972, it was estimated that the NWC might last for two or three 
years. However, it has endured to the present time and its original terms of reference 
have not changed. The objectives of the NWC are to: 
(1) assist in the formulation of general guidelines on wages policy; 
(2) recommend necessary adjustments in wage structure, with a view 
to developing a coherent wage system consistent with long-term 
economic development; and, 
(3) advise on desirable incentive schemes for the promotion of 
operational efficiency and productivity in various enterprises. 
(NWC,1992:vii) 
The NWC's main concern is with national wage issues and not compensation at 
company or industry level. However, in recent years its scope has gone beyond 
national wages only. It is an advisory body that reviews wage rates and trends 
annually in a macro economic context, and then makes recommendations to the 
government for acceptance, rejection or modification them (NWC, 1992). The 
government to date has never rejected the recommendations of the NWC. The 
government, union and employer representatives have to be unanimous in their 
decision, and while the wage guidelines do not have the force of law, the 
government's support gives them significant authority as the basis for collective 
bargaining. The various parties put up separate position papers but use government 
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economic data sources. Only recommendations are made public to encourage freer 
exchange by the parties. 
Oehlers (1991) believes the close adherence to the guidelines results from (1) the 
apparent tripartite support which lends legitimacy, (2) their full acceptance in the 
public sector, and (3) the use of the guidelines by unions for benchmarks in 
negotiations. The government appoints members to the NWC, implements the 
guidelines in the public sector, and, very occasionally, directs the NWC to accept 
certain wage increase guidelines (Ho Soo Kiang, 1988). Non-unionised workers are 
not represented on the NWC; neither are employers not in the major employer 
associations. The employers represented are usually large local and multinational 
companies (Oehlers, 1991). 
Over the years, the NWC has not just set wage guidelines. Its discussions have 
ranged over job-hopping, employee benefits, CPF increases, exchange rates, 
retirement ages, flexible wages systems, training, part-time workers, and foreign 
workers as well (NWC, 1992). A summary of the guidelines from 1972-97 is shown 
in Appendix 5.1. Its recommendations, which apply from 1 July of each year until the 
following June, can be divided into four phases: 
(1) Moderate wage increases, 1972-78 
(2) High wage increases, 1979-84 
(3) Wage restraint, 1985-87 
(4) Qualitative wage guidelines, 1988 to present. 
(NWC, 1992) 
Following the 1985 economic recession, the NWC set up an inquiry in 1986 which 
examined ways in which the wages system could be made more flexible and 
responsive to changing business conditions. Their recommended new compensation 
structure, to be phased in over five years, was as follows: 
(1) a basic wage based on job value 
(2) an annual wage supplement of one month's basic wage which was 
adjustable in exceptional circumstances 
(3) a variable wage component, the size depending on profitability 
and/or productivity 
(4) a small service increment for length of service, loyalty and 
experience 
(5) a reasonable salary range of 1.5 times between the maximum and 
the minimum salary. 	(Summarised from NWC,1992:xiii) 
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To expedite a flexible compensation environment, the NWC has since 1988 provided 
qualitative rather quantitative guidelines, with employers being urged to pay bonuses 
in line with company and individual performance. The problem at issue was wage 
structures which were 'typically seniority-based, with long salary scales and pre-
determined wage increases' (NWC, 1992:xxiii). The quantitative wage increase 
recommendation therefore exacerbated this, and was a particular problem in the 
recession years. The NWC concluded that despite the complexity involved in 
changing their systems, 'many companies' have now changed to more flexible 
compensation approaches using profits as a criterion for overall wage rises and 
bonuses (NWC, 1992:)odii). 
In 1993, a NWC committee reviewed the flexible wage system with a view to 
maintaining Singapore's competitive edge and protecting employers and employees in 
times of recession (Straits Times, 20 November, 1993). Its recommendations, which 
were accepted by the government, gave companies the choice of giving fixed annual 
or service increments for two or three years in their collective agreements or 
negotiating a separate increase each year. Other recommendations included making 
annual built-in pay rises lag behind productivity, making maximum salaries 1.5 to 2 
times more than starting pay, incorporating more than one month's AWS into basic 
pay, raising the variable component of wages and AWS to 20 per cent (the national 
target), discontinuing the two months' cap on wages if both parties agree to greater 
sums, introducing more performance appraisals for individuals and teams, and 
encouraging firms to disclose performance indicators during negotiations. Flexible 
wage systems were said to be operating in 85 per cent of unionised companies and 70 
per cent in non-union ones (Straits Times, 20 November, 1993). The variable 
component of the national wage bill was estimated by the NWC to be about 16 per 
cent, compared with the national target of 20 per cent (NTUC News Weekly, 16 June 
1995). While its recommendations have no statutory force and are nowadays more 
qualitative than quantitative, the NWC is likely to remain a significant institution in 
the coming years in Singapore (Leggett, 1993c). It has contributed to an initial 
national 1R/HR strategy of cost containment through tripartism, centralised wage 
determinism and restricted areas for bargaining, followed by a more recent strategy of 
decentralisation to the enterprise, worker flexibility and skills development (Kuruvilla, 
1996). 
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The Overall State of Singaporean HRM 
As the design of compensation systems in an organisation interacts with other FIRM 
functions, the current pay systems in Singapore should be considered against a 
background of other HRM functions in the country, but space will only allow a brief 
summary of the main research findings from several surveys on HRM practices. 
A 1990 monograph on FIRM practices published by the National Productivity Board 
and the Singaporean Institute of Personnel Management was based on a survey of 408 
companies (one third of which were MNEs) employing more than ten people. The 
main findings were that the existence of an HR department was positively correlated 
with company size and most frequently found in MNEs (p.4). Of the firms with FIR 
Departments, half had a HR manager and a fifth had the department reporting to the 
CEO (p.6). As might be expected, organisations with HR Departments were more 
likely to have HRM policies, formalised systems, and computerised records (pp.16 & 
44). Over 80 per cent of the respondents provided formal training and more than 
three-quarters conducted formal performance appraisals of managers, supervisors and 
'rank and file workers' (p.31). Perhaps the most interesting finding in the context of 
this thesis was that more than three-quarters of companies claimed to use some form 
of incentive scheme (p.29). Individual performance-based pay was the most common 
incentive for managers (66 per cent), supervisors (61 per cent) and 'rank and file 
workers' (65 per cent) (pp.28-9). The rank order for managerial incentives was 
profit-sharing, productivity incentives, employee stock ownership plans and small 
group incentives. About one quarter of incentives for supervisors were productivity 
based, another quarter received profit-sharing, with 11 per cent on small group 
incentives and 5 per cent on employee stock schemes. Apart from the individual-
based schemes, about 33 per cent of rank and file incentives were based on 
productivity, 26 per cent on profit-sharing, 16 per cent on small groups and 4 per cent 
on employee stock ownership (p.30). The monograph does not detail the features of 
these schemes or distinguish between individually based, business unit or corporate 
performance criteria. There is also no discussion on the concepts of variable pay as 
defined by the NWC, but the survey does imply that compensation flexibility was 
widespread. 
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These results can be compared with Chew and Teo's (1991) survey of recruitment 
and selection, job analysis and training methods in 173 establishments of one to 500+ 
employees, 52.6 per cent of which were foreign owned, 15.6 per cent were joint 
local—foreign ownership, and 31.8 per cent locally owned (p.30). Of the local 
companies, 78 per cent had HR departments, compared with 59 per cent of the jointly 
owned firms and 72 per cent of the foreign owned businesses. Newspaper advertising 
and employee recommendations were the most popular recruitment methods for all 
ownership types as was the structured interview for selection (pp.32-3). Foreign 
owned firms were more likely than local ones to have written job descriptions and 
formal annual training plans. 
Other studies have been conducted on particular aspects of Singaporean HRM. Yuen 
Chi-Ching and Yeo Keng-Choo (1995:262) concluded that 'most corporate human 
resource systems' mainly concentrated on the traditional functions of personnel 
administration such as recruitment, welfare, discipline and grievance handling. The 
government had encouraged more attention to compensation design, performance 
appraisal and training, but while performance appraisal was widespread, it was mainly 
for compensation rather than development purposes, and was very subjective, difficult 
at lower levels because of different dialects, and usually 'closed' because of the 
cultural fear of 'loss of face' (p.258). Shaw, Kirkbride, Fisher and Tang (1995) 
compared HRM practices in Singapore and Hong Kong and found that the use of Hay 
job evaluation by local firms in both countries was small (p.33), that Singaporean 
firms (of all ownership types) were more likely to use formal performance appraisal, 
extensive selection procedures, and sophisticated compensation systems (including 
incentives) than Hong Kong organisations (p.34). 
Finally, it must be remembered in a summary like this that family businesses 
employing between 10 and 100 workers still form about 80-90 per cent of the 
companies in Singapore (Lee, 1996). While major research studies on these are 
scarce, the distinctive features of Chinese firms in Singapore are 'human—centredness, 
family—centredness, centralization of power, and small size' (p.63). With the 
exposure to Western management concepts, Lee reports that 'many Chinese 
organizations have started implementing monthly meetings, planning sales strategies 
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and budgets, setting recruitment criteria, and producing reports' (p.66). While the 
perceived approaches to productivity improvement in larger locally owned companies 
and Western MNEs in Singapore appear to be generally similar, Foo Check-leek 
(1992:604) believes that there is a greater emphasis by Western MNEs on using 'a 
broad spectrum of means' to improve productivity. In any case, there is an argument 
that applying Western-style methods to transform an 'informal, loosely structured (but 
tightly controlled) Chinese enterprise ... will fail' (Weiddenbaum, 1996:155). 
Wage Systems in Singapore 
For the purposes of this section, wage systems are taken to mean the compensation 
systems of those employees (blue and white collar) who are covered by the provisions 
of the Employment Act in Singapore and who are eligible to participate in a collective 
agreements (i.e. bargainable employees). Documented material on wage systems used 
in the 1960s is unavailable, but more recently, data have been collected by the NWC, 
the Ministry of Labour and the Singapore National Employers' Federation (SNEF) 
through the latter's surveys. As might be expected, data are richer for wage systems, 
but less plentiful for salary structures and executive compensation. 
Wages schemes in Singapore can probably be divided into two types: the informal and 
the collective bargain. As many Singaporean companies are small or medium-sized 
family owned businesses, they are mainly non-union. According to an interviewed 
SNEF manager, the owner or 'father' of the family would decide the compensation 
for each individual in the firm. Added to these are the occupations which cannot be 
represented by a union. As a result of the Employment Act, the position in 1994 was 
that one million employees were eligible to be covered by unions (bargainable 
employees) and 646,000 (such as managers) ineligible (NTUC News Weekly, 1995, 
23 June). There is therefore more freedom to design systems for the non-bargainable 
employees. The wage system choices facing the MNE include using a job evaluation 
system, paying for skills, education, length of service, age (junior staff), performance, 
or qualifications (Magota & Suzuki, 1988), and/or incorporating one or more of these 
in a collective agreethent. There is no stipulated minimum number of employees for a 
collective agreement and it can be as low as three. 
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The wage system in Singapore of the 1960s (which until then had conformed to the 
various Labour Ordinances of the mid-1950s) underwent a change in focus when the 
Industrial Arbitration Court (IAC) began operations on 24 October, 1960. By June 
1962, 219 agreements covering 45,924 employees had been certified by the IAC (Foo 
Chee Hiang, 1962). Koay How Seang (1966) estimates that by the end of 1965, 
between 900 and 1,000 agreements had been certified. A key issue of this era was 
whether bonuses were a right or a privilege (Foo Chee Hiang, 1962). Prior to 1960, 
it had been the practice for Asian firms to pay low wages but to supplement these 
with a bonus 'loosely linked to profits' at the time of the main festival (Chinese Lunar 
New Year) (p.40), a custom which eventually became enshrined in law (Oehlers, 
1997). MNEs adopted the same principle, paying a bonus as a flat sum, an annual 
increment, or an amount based on profits. While the IAC decided that a bonus was at 
the employer's discretion, Foo Chee Hiang (1962) argues that by 1962 the annual 
bonus had become a traditional and accepted condition with the majority of small and 
large employers (p.41). 
Another feature of the wages system in Singapore is attributed originally to the salary 
scales established by the British Colonial Government for civil servants (NWC, 1992). 
The salary scales with their pre-determined fixed points were then adopted by private 
industry and incorporated into collective agreements. Two advantages perceived for 
the system were the automatic compensation for the loss of purchasing power due to 
inflation, and a sense of advancement and reward for length of service (N'WC, 1992). 
The number of collective agreements (usually of three years' duration) certified by the 
IAC remained fairly similar from 1980-90. There were 394 certified agreements in 
1980, a peak of 470 in 1981, then dropping to 348 in 1987, and 344 agreements in 
1990 (Ministry of Labour, 1991). The IAC certified 462 collective agreements in 
1995 affecting 46,169 employees, 98 per cent of the agreements being in the private 
sector (Ministry of Labour, 1996:16). After the high wage increase years of 1979-84 
driven by the NWC recommendations, the deterioration in the economy in 1985 led to 
some rethinking of compensation systems in Singapore. In 1986, most firms in the 
non-unionised private sector (which covered 56 per cent of the work force) had some 
form of salary range in which the annual increments were not predetermined (NWC 
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Secretariat, 1986:1). Compensation rises would be determined by market forces, 
NWC guidelines or copying unionised companies' increases. Nevertheless, most non-
union firms paid the AWS (NWC Secretariat, 1986). Employees in the unionised 
private sector, which covered 28 per cent of the workforce, had their wages governed 
by collective agreements which usually incorporated salary scales or ranges, pre-
determined annual increments in each scale, annual NWC wage adjustments and either 
the AWS or bonus. Occasionally, special merit increases were given as well. The 
wage system of the mid-1980s in Singapore was therefore (1) fixed increments, (2) 
increments based on seniority rather than performance, (3) a fixed AWS, (4) topping 
up for NWC adjustments, and (5) NWC Guidelines not based on company 
profitability — all of which compounded wage escalation and granted increases 
irrespective of company performance (Lee Kok Wai, 1989: 6). 
These shortcomings led to the concept of flexible wages being advocated in 
Singapore, with some initial apprehension by unions as to the outcome (NWC, 1992). 
Issues confronting management and unions were how performance, productivity and 
profit should be measured, the formulae for annual bonuses, the lack of performance 
appraisal schemes, and how to attract and retain employees in a tight labour market 
(NWC, 1992). The initial response by companies to the wage reform (i.e. a basic 
wage, a service increment, 1 month AWS and a variable component of 2 months) was 
cool. 
The Singapore National Employers' Federation (SNEF, 1987) tried to encourage 
wage reform by publicising wage reform models to members. It analysed 29 wage 
models operating in Singapore and found that profit-sharing had been the most widely 
adopted model. In the majority of cases, the company had decided on a 'threshold 
level of profits', and bonuses would only be paid when this was exceeded (p.17). A 
few other firms had agreed to a productivity-related model using the national 
productivity figure. The intention was to ensure that wage rises did not exceed 
national productivity increases. The suggested flexible structure was then a basic 
wage, one to three months of AWS (13th month), and a variable component that 
could be divided into a service portion and a productivity portion (p.19). 
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By 1988, the SNEF (1988:i) stated that 'a large number of companies' had still to 
introduce wage reform. Data from the NWC (1992) appeared more optimistic than 
those of the SNEF. The NWC believed that over 80 per cent of unionised companies 
had a 'formal flexi-wage system', and while the figure was less for non-union firms, 
there might have been flexible (though not formalised) arrangements in these 
organisations (p.)ocvii). Their conclusions were that 'many of the rigidities in our 
wage system have now been removed' (p.xxviii), and that the variable component in 
most compensation schemes was 15 per cent of total compensation (p.)coc). The 
chairman of the NWC has been quoted as saying that the desirable national level 
would be fixed wages as 80 per cent of total compensation (New Paper, 29 May, 
1991:11). 
On 16 November, 1992, the government announced another review of the flexi-wage 
system, and the following year received a report which was accepted by the NTUC. 
The NWC Flexible Wage System Review Committee made the following 
recommendations: 
1. Built-in annual wage increases should lag behind productivity growth. 
2. Companies should keep maximum salaries [in a pay grade range] to 1.5 to 2 times more 
than starting pay. 
3. AWS that is in excess of one month's salary can be incorporated into basic pay if company 
and union agree. 
4. Companies and unions are free to decide on the size of the variable component. If 
circumstances permit, the variable payment can go beyond the ceiling of 20 per cent of 
total wages or, in some cases, two months' wages. 
5. The variable payment can be made at more frequent intervals instead of once every year. 
6. Companies should have proper a staff appraisal system to accurately determine staff's 
performance. 
7. Companies should share relevant information with unions and workers. 
(NTUC News, 1 December 1993) 
Despite the pronouncements on flexible pay from government, employers and unions, 
by 1994 the union movement was still saying that the outcomes with employers over 
service increments and variable bonuses varied from industry to industry. Companies 
were still having problems with measurable performance indicators, linking rewards to 
performance, the ability of union leaders to analyse productivity and financial data, 
and developing good relationships with the unions on these issues (NTUC News, 
Mid-June 1994). The seniority compensation systems were still in evidence as well 
(NTUC News, mid-October 1994), although unions were coming around to the 
notion of compensation linked to individual performance (via performance appraisal 
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schemes and inclusion in collective agreements) (NTUC News mid-August 1994). In 
1995, across the economy, the variable payment (AWS and variable wage 
component) was 2.28 months of basic wage or 16 per cent of annual wage — still 
short of the 20 per cent desired by the NWC (Labour News, October 1996). 
However, in 1997, the NWC supported an NT'UC initiative to move wage systems to 
a `base-up' model by which pay ranges for a job grade would be narrowed to a ratio 
of 1.5 for minimum and maximum of the grade (to reduce the pay for service impact). 
Variable pay would still be augmented on to these base scales (NWC, 1997). 
Salary Systems in Singapore 
Research on the compensation systems of non-bargainable employees in Singapore is 
extremely limited. These are the staff who are in managerial, executive or confidential 
positions under the Employment Act. The NWC (1986) Sub-Committee Report 
estimated that 16 per cent of the workforce were in non-bargainable positions (p.2). 
One potential data source is the SNEF biennial survey of executive pay, but this 
cannot be quoted for copyright reasons (except from extracts in press reports), and its 
cost exceeds S$1000 per issue. 
Salary increases for these managers and executives are usually negotiated annually 
according to company performance and labour conditions. In addition to the basic 
salary, the executive may receive bonuses in the form of one-off lump sums (NWC, 
1986). An SNEF official interviewed by the author stated that the most common 
salary system is a monthly basic salary reviewed annually and then increased by length 
of service increments, the Annual Wage Supplement (usually of one month, but higher 
in sectors such as banking, finance and insurance), adjustment against labour market 
movements, and variable merit bonuses (expressed in months of salary, usually an 
average of one to two months across all sectors). Merit rises may be based on 
performance appraisal results because pay-for-performance 'had been around for a 
number of years' at top corporate levels; companies were now considering it for 
lower-level staff, although performance appraisal schemes were usually subjective. 
However, some firms were doing objectives-setting with younger managers, while 
assessing the older managers on subjective criteria as before. 
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A consultant from Hay Management Consultants (Singapore) Ltd. suggested that 
MBO was not liked in Singapore, as many Singaporeans would 'prefer the boss to set 
their objectives'. Nevertheless, Hay Consultants operate in the country, use the same 
job evaluation (JE) system as in other nations, and have a major market share of the 
medium and large organisations in Singapore. The company also undertakes annual 
salary surveys that are summarised in the press. The SNEF offers assistance in 
installing an SNEF JE system for non-executive jobs and another in conjunction with 
Watson-Wyatt Worldwide Ltd. for executive positions called the SNEF—Wyatt 
Compers 5 JE System. 
The Hay executive interviewed said that smaller companies can use the SNEF job 
evaluation scheme with collective agreements, as it is 'cheap and easy'. With the Hay 
system, 'the local context was taken into account and points allocated accordingly'. 
The points concept was still the same, 'but we translate the definitions to fit'. Most 
companies had salary ranges with minimum, mid-point and maximum levels. The 
SNEF rationale for JE was that the 1986 NWC wage reform recommendations 
included the principle that wages should reflect the value of jobs. An SNEF 
interviewee stated that the MNEs use the Hay system, whereas the SNEF system with 
its different factors is thought to be 'more suitable for Singapore'. Singapore 
Airlines, some public utilities and the Army were Hay JE system users. The Shell 
company used a Hay pay system tied into its performance appraisal scheme. A few of 
the Singaporean banks had more informal JE systems with grades and hierarchies. In 
general, the Hay JE system was not used widely for the non-executive levels as the 
SNEF alternative was more attractive. 
Recent data on the composition of fixed and variable components of salaries were not 
available, but Hay Management Consultants' survey of 101 organisations (public and 
private) in August 1991 showed that 74 per cent of them were operating 'flexi-wage' 
policies compared with 68 per cent in the previous year (Straits Times, 26 October 
1991). Basic compensation had remained the same, although the variable bonus had 
on average declined to an average of 1.44 months' pay in 1991, compared with 1.81 
months' salary in 1990. Executive bonuses averaged 1.9 months' salary in 1992, 
5 'Cowers' is an acronym for 'Communication Based Personnel Systems' 
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according to a compensation survey of 80 medium and large companies (Straits 
Times, 3 October 1992). A Hay survey in 1993 of 105 companies found that bonuses 
averaged 1.8 months in 1993 compared to 1.97 months in 1992 (Straits Times, 30 
October 1993). 
Employee Benefits in Singapore 
Conspicuously absent from the debate for reform of the compensation system in 
Singapore in the mid-1980s were recommendations for a review of employee benefits, 
with the minimum conditions being incorporated into the Employment Act of 1968. 
However, the NWC has made recommendations about the overall level and range of 
benefits in its annual guidelines, and more recently there have been proposals for 
flexible benefits in packages. The benefits given can be divided into the categories of 
statutory and negotiable. 
The Employment (1968) and Industrial Relations (1960 and 1968) legislation sought 
to standardise and limit the range of employee benefits and restrict the area for 
collective bargaining. The Employment Act currently legislates for rest days, hours of 
work, public holidays, annual, maternity and sick leave, and retrenchment benefit. 
Although the Act does not expressly require medical benefits to be provided, Ong 
Chin Siew (1990) believes that section 44(1) 'appears to suggest that the employer 
does have such a legal obligation' (p.48). The Central Provident Fund (CPF) 
(established in 1955 and already discussed) provides financial and social security to 
retired employees. Pension (superannuation) schemes existed in the Civil Service and 
some large employers before contributions to the CPF became mandatory, but with 
the increasing contributions, were phased out by companies except in a few special 
cases (Teo See Sin, 1981/1982). 
The employee benefits, which are negotiable, include hospitalisation benefits, health 
and medical benefit, insurance, dental benefit, transport, education, festive advance, 
payment for time not worked (various types of leave), savings plans, loans, clothing, 
legal advice, and employee services such as sports and social clubs, canteens, discount 
purchases, and health centres (Teo Ee Sin, 1981/1982; NPB/SILS,1993). An 
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indication of the types of employee benefits incorporated in collective agreements for 
all sectors, signed between 1 July and 31 December 1986, is given in Table 5.6. 
Table 5.6 
Types of Employee Benefits Covered in Collective 
Agreements for all Sectors, Signed Between 1 July and 31 December, 1986 
Type of benefits 
Distribution of Cas 
Number 	Percent 
Major benefits 
1. Retirement Age 123 100.0 
2. Annual Leave 123 100.0 
3. Compassionate Leave-Death of family member 119 96.7 
4. Compassionate Leave-Critical illness of family member 91 74.0 
5. Marriage Leave 81 65.9 
6. Paternity Leave 48 39.0 
Other Benefits 
7. Uniform/Wearing apparel 80 65.0 
8. Dental Care 62 50.4 
9. Life/Accident Insurance 48 39.0 
10. Shift Premium 47 38.2 
11.Laundry Service Allowance 40 32.5 
12. Acting Allowance 30 24.4 
13.Overtime Premium 28 22.8 
14.Transport Allowance 23 18.7 
15. Study Incentive/Exam Leave 20 16.3 
16.Festival Leave 20 16.3 
17. Service Benefits 19 15.4 
18.Meal Allowance 14 11.4 
19.Tea/Coffee 14 11.4 
20. Death Cash Grant 13 10.6 
21. Outstanding Site Allowance 10 8.1 
22. Maternity Allowance 9 7.3 
23. Attendance Bonus 8 6.5 
24. Fairprice Share Purchase 8 6.5 
25. Welfare Contribution to Union 8 6.5 
26. Productivity Incentive 7 5.7 
27. Standby Allowance 7 5.7 
28. Car/Housing/Personal Allowance - Less 
29. Housing Allowance - than 
30. Time off for festivals - 5% 
31. Work Hazard Allowances - 
Source: NTUC (1986) Technical Newsletter 14, and Chew Soon Beng (1991) Trade Unionism in 
Singapore, Singapore, McGraw-Hill, p.99 
The table shows that all agreements had provision for annual leave and retirement age, 
and that the majority cater for other types of leave, marriage leave ranging from 2 to 
14 days according to industry (Chew Soon Beng, 1991). The Employment Act does 
not include provisions for compassionate, marriage or paternity leave. While the table 
shows the overall pattern of benefits, there is variation across industry and, 
surprisingly, no mention of hospitalisation benefits. Chew Soon Beng (1991) studied 
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153 1985-86 agreements in the manufacturing sector and found that all of them 
provided for free or subsidised medical consultation, 14 days sick leave and a median 
of 60 days of hospitalisation leave per annum (p.103). The contribution to health 
costs for outpatient care, hospitalisation, and medical insurance by the employer in the 
majority of 1000 collective agreements analysed in 1995 by the NTUC was also noted 
(NTUC Weekly, 21 July 1995). However, few collective agreements give medical 
cover for dependants. 
More recently, in 1993 the National Productivity Board and Singapore Institute of 
Labour Studies surveyed 300 companies (of which only 30 per cent were locally 
owned) to determine the types of non-mandatory benefits provided for all ranges of 
staff The results are shown in Table 5.7. 
Table 5.7 
Types of Non-Mandatory Benefits in Singaporean Companies, 1993 (N=300) 
, 
Type of Benefit % of Companies 
Health Care(I) 90 
Insurance Benefit 86 
Transport Benefit 73 
Education Benefit 70 
Festive Advance 56 
Recreation Benefit 52 
Attendance/Perfonnance(2) 50 
Loans 46 
Clothing Benefit 45 
Product Discounts 43 
Funeral Benefit 42 
Food Benefit 40 
Club Membership 34 
Retirement Benefit 33 
Retrenchment Benefit 32 
Suggestion Plan 29 
Shift Allowance 26 
Flexible Working Hours 18 
Health Promotion 12 
Legal Advice 12 
Investment Benefit 8 
Others 7 
Scholarships for Dependents 5 
Vol. Resignation Benefit 4 
Child-care Facilities 2 
Source: Adapted from NPB/SILS (1993) NPB—NILS  Survey on Employee Benefits, 
Singapore, NPB/SILS, Figure 2.5, p.21 
Note: (1) Comprising medical benefit, dental benefit and leave for long term illness (2) Good 
Attendance/Performance/Productivity Incentive 
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The table shows that health care, insurance and transport benefits were the most 
common benefits provided. Few companies offered child-care benefits or flexible 
working hours to support the increasing numbers of women in the workforce. The 
survey data also stated that only 28 per cent of firms were interested in flexible benefit 
programmes, that managers received higher levels of transport, business membership, 
loans and investment benefits, and that the range of benefits correlated with company 
size. Totally owned MNEs (as opposed to joint ventures) tended to give more 
generous club membership, education, health care and insurance benefits (NPB/SILS, 
1993. The rest were on a similar scale to those of locally owned companies. By 
comparison, an SNEF survey of 473 companies in 1993 found more maternity leave 
being given to female executives for the birth of a third and fourth child, more 
executive paternity leave, company cars for three-quarters of CEOs, and mobile 
phones and club memberships for more than half the CEOs (Straits Times, 9 October 
1993). 
In summary, then, Singapore demonstrates a wide range of compensation systems 
ranging from the formality of large MINE subsidiaries to the informality of the family 
firm. The sophistication of the HRM varies enormously, and each MINE possibly 
brings with it some features of its corporate culture. Although it is relatively easy to 
make recommendations for reform, implementation depends on the skills and 
motivation of the organisation's management and unions to introduce change, the 
adaptability of the organisation, and the industrial relations climate, at the same time 
balancing these with the pressures of the tight labour market. 
A Comment on the External Environment and Singaporean Compensation 
Having provided an overview of the external environment and compensation systems 
in Singapore, this section assesses the implications for compensation systems design 
for an MNE establishing a subsidiary there. 
Historical Influences on Singaporean Compensation 
As Magota and Suzuki (1988:1) note, 'wage systems are generally legacies of past 
decisions taken over the years'. Prior to the advent of Singapore as a separate nation, 
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some general principles of compensation system design had already been well 
entrenched in the employment relationship. The first was the payment for length of 
service as reflected in annual increments. Automatic annual increments were 
originally only paid to the British Colonial Government staff, whereas daily-rated 
employees were paid at a fixed rate that was increased after a stipulated length of 
service (Sharma & Chew, 1992). After the 1939-45 war, the unions targeted the 
statutory boards and major trading and importing houses, which conceded annual 
fixed salary increments. One of the first awards of the new Industrial Arbitration 
Court (IAC) in 1960 gave fixed annual increments to daily-rated employees in the 
Straits Times Group, which set the pattern subsequently for compensation settlements 
(p.18). That feature survives to this day in collective agreement structures of non-
executive staff, particularly in the public sector, and was only being challenged in the 
mid-1980s. 
The second principle that appears to have historical roots is the concept of the 13th 
month or Annual Wage Supplement (AWS). This was originally an end-of-year 
bonus and is institutionalised in Asian countries such as Japan (Whitehill, 1991). In 
Singapore, ad hoc bonuses became formalised by the Employment Act 1968, which 
restricted individual or collective agreements to pay bonuses to a maximum of one 
month's wages. There were further restrictions in 1975 which constrained the 
amount depending on when a company was established or when a collective 
agreement was signed. While the AWS is usually one month's pay and can be 
theoretically adjusted downwards in a recession, it would be a brave employer who 
did not pay it. As an NTUC official interviewed by the author mentioned, the 
majority of employers pay one month, but supplement this with other bonuses. The 
unions have resisted changes to the AWS as it is a form of savings for the employee 
for annual tax liability and children's school fees. 
The question for the MNE establishing in' Singapore now would be whether the 
seniority issue and AWS could be ignored for staff covered by a collective agreement. 
The NWC still referred to 'small service increments' and one month's AWS in its 
recommendations for reform in 1986. While there is more freedom for compensation 
for managers and executives outside the scope of union coverage and the 
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Employment Act, room to manoeuvre at lower levels is considerably less, 
notwithstanding the government's expectation that NWC guidelines should be applied 
equitably to all groups of staff including managerial, professional and executive staff. 
Legislation and MNE Compensation 
The implications of the legislation for compensation is the restriction of choice for the 
MINE. If the MINE is non-unionised, it could theoretically design any system it liked 
provided the conditions for those paid below S$1,500 (later S$1600) per month 
complied with the Employment Act and other legislation. There are no minimum pay 
or equal pay laws to be considered. A single compensation system would be possible. 
If the MINE is of a certain size, it will attract the attention of Singaporean unions and, 
if enough employee support and membership can be obtained from supervisors and 
below, is likely to have to negotiate a collective agreement. The implication for a 
large MINE subsidiary is that it will then have at least two different compensation 
systems (or three, if one counts a global top executive expatriate system as well). 
While the government does not determine the compensation systems at micro level, its 
legislation creates over-arching rules for some aspects of the compensation package. 
Furthermore, through its involvement on the NWC and acceptance of its 
recommendations, it has influenced the general level of wages in Singapore as part of 
a clear strategy to make labour expensive and encourage use of higher technology and 
productivity. Its stance on issues such as social welfare, self-sufficiency and 
privatisation of services (e.g. health) arguably affects the range of benefits demanded 
by employees. 
The Economy and MNE Compensation 
The link between the economy and the compensation system in Singapore emerges 
from the state of the demand and supply of labour. Wage levels were deliberately 
increased in 1979-81, but this policy backfired in 1985 and 1986 when the US 
slowdown, falling commodity prices and high wages among other factors caused 
growth rates to slump suddenly. This, in turn, caused the NWC to advocate flexible 
compensation systems with the backing of the government. An Economic Committee 
argued for wage restraint, a move away from fixed compensation structures, the 
shrinking of length of service increments and more variable pay. It is obvious that the 
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MINE cannot be insulated from the host nation labour market which is, in turn, 
affected by the policy and strength of the host country's economy. While the 
economy does not directly determine the type of compensation system used by the 
MINE subsidiary, it will inevitably affect the level of pay, bonuses and range of 
employee benefits, and perhaps influence the structure indirectly through measures 
taken to control various stages of economic growth. 
The Unions and MNE Compensation 
We noted that legislation on unions in Singapore and their relationship with the 
government ensures that union influence is restricted to certain levels of employee, 
collective bargaining, providing advocacy for members, provision of services, and 
participation in tripartite bodies such as the NWC. The NTUC and individual unions 
are unlikely to push a policy that is unpopular with the government. Singapore prides 
itself on industrial peace, which makes it attractive to MNEs. The MINE in Singapore 
has the choice of recognising unions or not, and the decision may be influenced by the 
global policy of the MNE. With union recognition and a collective agreement, the 
MINE will have to formalise its conditions of service, perhaps pay more than it would 
have done before, and have compensation rates publicly available if ratified by the 
IAC. The MINE has the option of forming a house union to obtain a better fit 
between pay and productivity. Union recognition is either given willingly by the MINE 
or via a secret ballot, but without a union presence, individual contracts would 
prevail. 
The Industrial Relations System and MNE Compensation 
The Singaporean industrial relations system is very centralised and arguably unitarist 
and paternalistic. The interesting question here is what impact this environment might 
have on the quality of employee relations of a newly established MINE subsidiary. 
One could assume that aggressive action by a union towards a new employer would 
be unlikely to get the support of the NTUC or Ministry of Labour (Manpower). At 
the same time, the MINE would be obliged to conform with the legislation and norms 
of Singaporean industrial practice, while perhaps taking the initiative in using 
imported practices that are part of the corporate MINE culture. 
192 
The National Wages Council and MNE Compensation 
We have already discussed the phases of compensation strategy in Singapore and the 
role of the NWC. The implication here for the MNE in Singapore is that apart from 
its top executives and expatriates, it would be expected to follow the 
recommendations of the NWC. With the recommendations now in qualitative form, 
rises in the variable portion of the compensation package are now more open to 
negotiation. From its inception, the NWC has been involved in attempting to change 
the nature of compensation systems in Singapore, as well as commenting on training, 
retirement ages and employee benefits. One issue is therefore the extent to which the 
business plan of the MNE can be achieved by the full acceptance of the NWC 
guidelines. 
National Culture and MNE Compensation 
With regard to national cultural influences, the strength of the external environmental 
factors already discussed perhaps gives the impression that the influence of national 
culture in Singapore has a more modest influence on compensation design. One 
difficulty in translating Hofstede's (1980) national cultural dimensions' rankings into 
organisational practice in Singapore is that most local companies are small or 
medium-sized. The compensation systems are therefore likely to be informal and 
dominated by the owners, who may be influenced by cultural factors. The unionised 
firms and the public sector are obviously more formalised and managed in a more 
impersonal way. The other difficulty is that while the country is multi-racial, most of 
the research presumes that the Chinese Confucianism dominates the values. 
However, the values are changing, and preference is shown for employment in MNEs. 
It might then be argued that differences in value systems between Western countries 
and Singapore may not be great, and that they might narrow even more with the 
presence of MNEs, industrialisation and affluence. In that case, Western principles of 
compensation could more easily transferable. 
Hodgetts and Luthans (1993b:43) postulate that where Power Distance is high, 
MNEs should 'pursue a hierarchical compensation structure for local managers'. The 
pay and benefits should vary accordingly, and there should be a large gap between the 
lowest and highest paid in the organisation. Decision making would usually be 
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autocratic and paternalistic. One might argue that salary scales and ranges are 
common in Singapore, and that job evaluation (JE) is now being encouraged to ensure 
that compensation should reflect the value of the job, as recommended by the NWC. 
The major organisations have adopted US JE methods, interestingly without any 
major modification of the factors to suit the local culture. Anecdotal evidence by 
Wong Kwei Chong (1991:85) suggests that JE is performed in some local firms. The 
gap between highest and lowest paid is high in some organisations in Singapore, as 
Singaporean executives are reputed to be the third-highest paid in the world6 (Straits 
Times, 17 June 1995 [quoting Intersect Japan—Asia, June 1995 Issue]). Civil servant 
and political salaries are also very high by Australian standards. A Singaporean 
Government Minister's gross salary from 1 July 1996 ranged from S$440,400 to 
S$714,000 per annum (Straits Times, 1 June 1996). The median salary for a bank 
teller was S$9600 per annum in 1996 (Research & Statistics Department, 1996:38). 
According to Hodgetts and Luthans (1993b), with a low Individualism culture like 
that of Singapore, MNEs should rely on group compensation plans, as individual 
managers would not like to be singled out for their success. The compensation should 
be 'designed to help the group, not the individual manager succeed' (p.44). Rigorous 
data on the main types of incentives in Singapore are not available, but as mentioned 
before, the NPB/SIPM Survey (1991) of 408 companies found that over three-
quarters of the respondents used incentives, with individual performance-based 
incentive pay being the most widely used for managers, supervisors and rank and file 
employees. Other managerial incentives were profit-sharing (37 per cent), 
productivity incentives (20 per cent), stock options (11 per cent), with small group 
incentives being only 8 per cent (p.29). A similar general pattern existed for 
supervisors and rank and file, save that fewer stock options and slightly more small 
group incentives were offered. While the NWC recommended that reformed 
compensation should be based on the profit-sharing or variable productivity payment 
models, it also recommended individual performance appraisal. 
6 Generalising about executive salary levels across the world is obviously fraught with problems as local and MNE salaries 
may not be distinguished, and data may not show size of the company or nature of the job or industry. A study of CEO pay in 
US-based subsidiaries in 12 countries with sales of US$100 million by Lutyens (1997) of Watson Wyatt Worldwide showed 
the Singaporean CEO total compensation in 7 th place out of the 12 nations and the Australian in 9 th (p.47). There was a gap of 
about US$50,000 per annum. However, once the total compensation was adjusted for purchasing power parity exchange rates, 
the Australian CEOs moved up to 5th place out of 12, and the Singaporean CEOs down to 9 th (p.48). It has to be noted, of 
course, that the average compensation of the whole workforce is considerably higher in Australia than in Singapore, and so the 
gap between minimum and maximum is much higher in Singapore. 
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If Hofstede's (1980) moderately low Masculinity value is an accurate reflection of 
Singaporean society, then 'social benefits, quality of life, and equity' are advocated 
for compensation strategy (Hodgetts and Luthans, 1993b:44). One could argue that 
equity is demonstrated in many collective agreements in Singapore in pay scales that 
do not discriminate on the basis of gender, despite the absence of equal pay 
legislation. It is also usual for business unit general bonuses to be based on a common 
number of months' salary for all employees across the unit. Against this, there is not 
much evidence on quality of worklife initiatives or that, apart from the Civil Service, 
employee benefits are particularly 'family-friendly', which might be expected with 
Singapore's moderately Masculine cultural dimension. In 1997, the Singaporean 
National Employers' Federation and the National Trade Union Council introduced 
Pro-Family Company Awards to encourage family friendly policies (Koh, 1998). 
On Hofstede's dimensions for culture, Singapore was ranked low on Uncertainty 
Avoidance. Hodgetts and Luthans (1993b) considered unstructured, decentralised 
and flexible compensation strategies were appropriate for such a rating, where local 
managers' salaries were linked to performance so that they took some of the risk of 
the MNE's success. To an extent this happening in Singapore in that the NWC has 
only given qualitative guidelines to employers since 1988 and has advocated that total 
wage increases should be based on company performance. The questions here are 
whether the Uncertainty Avoidance dimension is an accurate reflection of 
Singaporean culture, and whether organisational effectiveness in Singapore will now 
increase because of stronger ties between performance and pay. The increased 
flexibility of the compensation system was encouraged for mainly economic reasons, 
and the spread of pay-for-performance across the world suggests that this is perhaps 
more to do with greater competition than with cultural suitability. 
Finally, the medium Singaporean ranking on Confucian Dynamism would suggest that 
Singaporean actions are often based on moderate support of the values of persistence, 
hierarchical status relationships, thrift, and a sense of shame (Murphy, 1992). We 
have already referred to the grading and hierarchy and the wide range of incomes in 
Singapore. The persistence dimension can perhaps be queried by the concern about 
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'job hopping' in the tight labour market, but the thrift is manifested in the state's 
attitude towards self-sufficiency and absence of safety nets. This has implications for 
the type of employee benefits expected of employers, particularly health benefits. 
Because of the costs of medical provision, there was discussion in 1997 to make 
employees pay for all their own medical expenses, the offsetting factor being that the 
employer would make a contribution into a health fund at a set rate. 
Summing up, assessing the impact of national culture on compensation in Singapore is 
problematical. Singapore is not a pure Confucian society in any case. A normative 
view might be taken (echoing Hodgetts and Luthans, 1993b) in proposing certain 
systems to fit the culture. However, the Singapore culture appears rather to be 
reflected in its consensus in relationships, and respect for authority. The emphasis on 
education and its resulting status may result in more payment for skills, and an 
increased emphasis on Individualism, which commentators believe would not be 
diminished unless reward systems were applied to overcome it. 'There is no trend in 
pay for skill yet, but there is talk in big MNEs,' said an interviewed Hay Consultants 
executive. The government is attracted to Japanese methods of management, but the 
range of compensation methods in the country including piecework, US JE systems, 
various incentive schemes and pay for length of service derived from the British Civil 
Service, lead one to suggest that culture is a smaller influence on compensation than 
other external factors in MINE subsidiaries in Singapore. An alternative explanatory 
proposition is that large employers in Singapore have become more 'Westernised'. 
Another might be that culture might be reflected in the actions of the institutions of 
the industrial relations system which influence pay design, or in the individual 
employee who desires, and is more motivated by, a particular type of compensation 
system. It could also be that culture is significant in the process of the design of the 
system as well as in the final design itself 
Concluding Summary 
This chapter has outlined the key economic, political, legal and cultural features in 
Singapore that are relevant in compensation design. It has described the industrial 
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institutions and actors in some detail, showing their impact on compensation systems. 
In particular, we have noted how employment law and union recognition may result in 
more than one pay system in an MINE, and how the NWC recommendations have 
influenced general trends in compensation design, particularly since the mid-1980s. 
The chapter concluded with a discussion on what impact the Singaporean external 
environment might have on the compensation systems of an MINE setting up a 
subsidiary in Singapore. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
AUSTRALIAN COMPENSATION IN ITS LOCAL CONTEXT 
Physical Geography and Brief History 
The continent of Australia has a land area of 7,682,300 square kilometres which is 
approximately the same as continental United States excluding Alaska. The latitude 
(north to south) distance between its extremities is 3,680 kilometres and longitude 
(east to west), about 4,000 kilometres (ABS, 1993b). Apart from Antarctica, 
Australia is the driest of all the continents, and can be divided into the Western 
Plateau, the Central Lowlands and the Eastern Highlands. The island continent 
experiences a wide range of climates, varying from the tropical north to the arid 
interior and the temperate south. The estimated resident population of 18.0 million in 
1995 (ABS, 1997a:74) was mainly concentrated in two coastal regions — the south-
west of Western Australia, and a larger coastal band stretching from South Australia 
(SA) through Victoria and New South Wales (NSW) and on, through Queensland. 
More than 70 per cent of the population live in the combined state and territory 
capitals and six other cities of 100,000 persons or more (ABS, 1996a:78). All capital 
cities except one (Canberra) are situated on the coast. 
The history of the nation can be divided into two main phases — the arrival of the 
native Aborigines perhaps more than 40,000 years ago, and the arrival and possession 
of the Australian east coast by the Englishman Captain James Cook in 1770. The 
country therefore has two main cultures — one Aboriginal and the other European 
(Clark, 1982). Estimates of the number of Aborigines at the time of the European 
landings vary from 250,000 to over one million (ABS, 1985). By 1996, the national 
Census stated that the total of the Indigenous population was 352,970 (ABS, 1997c). 
From the viewpoint of this thesis, the Aboriginal presence and culture are considered 
to have played no part in influencing the design of modern compensation systems in 
Australia. 
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There is uncertainty about which Europeans first reached Australia, but the British 
navigator Captain James Cook eventually took possession of the east coast on 
returning from New Zealand in 1770. However, it was not until 1 787 that the British 
Government accepted a recommendation to establish a penal colony on the continent 
to relocate prisoners from the overcrowded British jails. The First Fleet of 11 ships 
carrying about 750 convicts plus officers, marines, ships' crew and children as well as 
the governor and nine staff; arrived in 1788 (Shaw, 1974). More fleets and prisoners 
arrived in 1790 and 1791, and convict-worked farms started in 1792. Grants of land 
were given to officers and soldiers and hard-working convicts. 
More than 150,000 British convicts had been deported to eastern Australia and 
Tasmania by 1852 when transportation ceased (World Book [23], 1980). With labour 
becoming short, the British Government subsidised migration to Australia, as a result 
of which the population of NSW and Tasmania reached more than 335,000 by 1851 
(Disher, 1987). Self-government was eventually given by the British to all colonies 
(now states), and legislatures were set up, one task of which was to sort out land 
titles. From 1860 to 1890, subsidised migration expanded the population to three 
million, a move welcomed by employers, but opposed by workers, who feared a 
deterioration of wages. By 1890, about 133,000 employees were employed in 9,000 
factories in Australia (usually in appalling and uncontrolled conditions), with two 
thirds of the workers being in Victoria (Clark, 1982). 
In the late 1880s, Australia was 'a disjointed collection of loosely linked economies 
and societies fluctuating independently' with much inter-colonial rivalry (Buxton, 
1974:215). The majority of residents were Australian born and living in cities, with 
the community dividing itself into recognisable classes (Disher, 1987). But with the 
rise of national pride and the realisation that unification was necessary for 
independence, a convention was held in 1897-98 to draw up a constitution for 
Australia. This was approved by the Australian people by ballot in 1898-99 and by 
the British Government in 1900. On 1 January 1901, the six colonies became states in 
the new Commonwealth of Australia. The British monarch was retained as head of 
state and the first federal parliament met. Between 1910 and 1914, over 250,000 
British immigrants came to Australia (Disher 1987), and from 1945 to 1973, over two 
million immigrants arrived, with two-fifths coming from Britain and the rest mainly 
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from Europe. With the declining proportion of British entering the country, by 1979, 
Clark (1982:233) asserted that 'Anglo-Saxon Australia had been changed into Ethnic 
Australia'. US and Japanese foreign investment in mining, heavy industry and 
manufacturing overtook the contribution of the British. Japan (purchasing minerals, 
meat and wool) and the United States (buying meat) became the major trading 
partners. With unemployment and inflation high in 1973, immigration was cut back. 
Similar cuts were made in 1997. 
At the time of writing, the British monarch (Queen Elizabeth) is the head of state and 
a Governor—General based in Canberra, the nation's capital, is her representative. 
While Australia has natural advantages of mineral resources, a stable democracy and a 
multicultural, tolerant society, the main concern for government is the steady decline 
in economic performance, the country's massive debt and low level of savings. The 
reduction of protective tariffs and intensive international competition has forced 
rethinking of compensation systems in the nation as part of the strategy for economic 
survival and reform. The country is going through a phase of questioning its own 
identity, and the future role of the British monarch and the setting up of a republic is 
now the subject of extensive public debate, with mainstream media polls showing a 
majority of people in favour of a republic. A model for a republic resulting from a 
convention in February 1998 is to be put to a national referendum in late 1999. 
Demography 
Past estimates of Australia's population for selected years are shown in Table 6.1. 
Since 1967, following a change in the Australian Constitution to recognise Aborigines 
as Australian citizens, Aborigines have been included in official population numbers. 
Immigration policies and economic trends in Australia and overseas have all affected 
population levels. The most significant has been the convict transportation, 
substantial Chinese immigration in the 1850s, the development of the Queensland 
sugar industry in the late nineteenth century, the migration to Australia after both 
world wars, and migration from New Zealand (ABS, 1994a). As well as being highly 
urbanised, the Australian population is also multicultural. About 23 per cent of 
Australians in 1995 had been born overseas (ABS, 1997a:94). Of this 23 per cent, 44 
per cent had been born in Europe (p.4). The median age of the population in 1996 
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Table 6.1 
Australian Population for Selected Years, 1828-1995 
Year Population 
1828(a) 36,598 
1841(a) 130,856 
1881 2,250,194 
1901 3,773,801 
1911 4,455,005 
1921 5,435,734 
1933 6,629,839 
1947 7,579,358 
1961 10,508,186 
1971 13,067,265 
1981 14,923,260 
1993(b) 17,661,500 
1995(b) 18, 054,000 
Source: ABS (1988) Year Book Australia 1988, p.256; ling Shu, Siew Lan Khoo, Struik, 
A.and McKenzie, F., (1994) Australia's Population Trends and Prospects 1993, p.1; 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (1997a) 1997 Yearbook Australia,  ABS, Canberra, p.74. 
Notes:(a) NSW figures (b) Estimate as at end of June. All other figures are as at 31 
December. 
was 34 years (ABS, 1997a) and is likely to rise to 40 years by 2021 (Jing et al., 1994). 
The sex ratio within the population in 1996 was 50.5 per cent females and 49.5 per 
cent males (ABS, 1997a). The median age for males on marrying was 23.4 years in 
1971 and 27.3 in 1995 (ABS, 1997a:83). For females, the figures were 21.1 and 25.3 
years respectively. Life expectancy at birth for Australian males was 75.4 years and 
81.1 years for females in 1995 (ABS, 1997a:88). The life expectancy of Aborigines is 
considerably shorter (57 years for males and 64 years for females). 
The Economy 
Despite its natural advantages, Australia in 1994 had just come out of a major 
recession, had unemployment reaching 11 per cent, weak business investment, a 
current account deficit of over 4 per cent of GDP and foreign debt of more than 40 
per cent of GDP (EPAC, 1993). Rather than being a temporary phenomenon, it could 
be argued that compared with other industrial countries, the economy has 'been 
performing relatively badly for a very long time', with deterioration traceable back to 
the nineteenth century (Caves & Krause, 1984:4). 
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The nineteenth-century economy was centred around gold, wool and meat (Helliwell, 
1984), and manufacturing 'was negligible' (Turnbull, 1983:90). By the 1890s, sheep, 
the mines and potential mineral discoveries 'were still the only substantial sources of 
Australia's wealth' (Disher, 1987:121). By 1911, Australia had the beginnings of 
steel and chemical industries; the latter industry developed explosives for mining and 
fertilisers for the land (Turnbull, 1983). The early 1920s were a time of comparative 
prosperity until world wheat and wool prices dropped in 1927, and with other 
countries undercutting on price, depression followed (Disher, 1987). 
The 1939-45 war stimulated secondary industry in Australia, and after its conclusion, 
MNEs began to invest in car production, food processing and large scale oil refining 
(Turnbull, 1983). Even by 1979, however, mining and agriculture still accounted for 
71 per cent of total Australian exports (ABS, 1980a). Unemployment in the post-war 
years 1949-69 averaged 1.3 per cent (Department of Labour, 1975), but by 1975, 
unemployment had risen to 5 per cent and inflation to 15 per cent (Disher, 1987). 
Fundamental deterioration in the economy continued with a GDP negative growth 
rate of-2.0 per cent in 1983, inflation at 11.5 per cent and unemployment at over 10 
per cent (Caves & Krause, 1984:3). 
The main parameters of the economy at the cut-off date of 1995 were as follows: 
• GDP in 1995-96 was A$429,629 million (at average 1989-90 prices) representing a growth of 
4.5 per cent on 1994-95. There was negative GDP growth in 1982-83 and 1990-91. 
• Household savings as a percentage of GPD fell from 9.8 per cent in 1974-75 to 1.6 per cent in 
1995-96. General government saving had been negative since 1991-92. 
• In 1995-96, the value of merchandise imports exceeded exports by A$1,820 million. In 1994— 
95, they exceeded exports by A$7,568 million. Main commodity exports were coal, gold, wheat 
and iron ore. Main imports were motor vehicles, computer and telecoirmuuncations equipment, 
aircraft and associated equipment. 
• In 1995-96, inflation was 3.1 per cent; average earnings had risen by 4.2 per cent; the 
unemployment rate was 8.5 per cent (never having been below 6 per cent since 1989 and 
exceeding 11 per cent in 1992-93); the current account balance was —$A20, 298 million or —4.1 
per cent of GDP; net foreign debt was 39 per cent of GDP compared with around 7 per cent in the 
late 1970s; official reserve assets were $A19, 059 million compared with A$24, 047 million in 
1991. 
(Source:ABS,1997a; AGPS,1996) 
While a number of recent initiatives for economic reform have occurred (deregulation 
of financial markets and currency, reduction in tariffs, reform of some service 
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industries, and tax and labour market changes), there are still major obstacles to 
overcome to ensure longer-term renewal and restructuring' (EPAC, 1993:3). 
MNEs in Australia 
The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) does not publish data on the number of 
foreign owned MNEs that operate in Australia, but staff at the federal Department of 
Corporate Affairs informed the author that, according to their records, there were 
2,829 foreign owned companies registered in Australia as at 16 December 1994. 
However, this figure did not reflect locally registered firms which are controlled from 
overseas. The ABS does provide data on foreign investment in Australia, but warns 
about the quality of the information. At 30 June 1995, it was estimated that non-
residents held 30 per cent of total equity on issue by Australian enterprise groups 
(ABS, 1997a:739). The Bureau of Industry Economics (1993:66) estimated that 
foreign direct investment amounted to about 22 per cent of Australian GDP, and that 
MNEs were responsible for 25 per cent of manufacturing employment in Australia. 
As a British colony, foreign investment in the first 150 years of Australia was, of 
course, from Britain. In the period immediately after the 1939-45 war, investment 
from the United States and Canada occurred, so that by the 1960s, foreign capital 
dominated some industries, especially automobile manufacturing and some parts of 
food processing (Turnbull, 1983). Overseas money and MNEs were the main impetus 
to the development of the mining industry (Krause, 1984). 
The major Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (AWlRS) of 1995 found 
that 28 per cent of the 1,363 surveyed workplaces with 20 or more employees in the 
private sector were partly or predominantly foreign owned (Morehead, Steele, 
Alexander, Stephen & Duffin, 1997:66). The degree of overseas ownership was 
correlated with size, and 33 per cent of workplaces with more than 500 employees 
were predominantly foreign owned. About 18 per cent of the 1363 workplaces 
sampled had their head offices located outside Australia. 
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The System of Government 
Australia is a federation of six states and two territories. It has three levels of 
government: federal, state and local. The federal government's powers cover foreign 
affairs, defence, immigration, trade and tariffs, and inter-state issues; the state 
governments retain control of land legislation, education, police and health. Only the 
federal and state governments can pass employment legislation to set up industrial 
tribunals that can influence compensation systems. The federal government cannot 
directly legislate on the terms and conditions of the nation's employees, although it 
has recently legislated for the provision of superannuation (pensions) for employees 
(with certain exceptions), and imposed taxes on employee benefits, which has affected 
packaging of conditions. By contrast, state governments have the power to set up 
their own industrial tribunals and to legislate for conditions such as working hours, 
long service leave and public holidays for employees in their states. Decisions of the 
High Court l over time have delineated the dividing line between federal and state 
legislative powers (Dabschek & Niland, 1981). 
Most of the federal government's powers are incorporated in Section 51 of the 
Constitution. The remaining powers are with the states which regulate local 
government. The federal and state systems of government have borrowed aspects of 
the American and British models. All federal and state parliaments (except 
Queensland) are bicameral. As mentioned previously, the English Queen is the head 
of state and is represented at federal level by a Governor—General and by State 
Governors at state levels. In 1997, there were 224 federal (Commonwealth) members 
of Parliament and 618 State and Territory members (ABS, 1997). The two territories 
have representatives in both the lower and upper houses of the federal Parliament (the 
House of Representatives and the Senate respectively). 
A brief explanation of the Australian court system nomenclature may be helpful here The highest federal court in Australia 
is the High Court, with powers vested in it by the Constitution, both original and appellate. It hears major cases such as 
disputes between states or interpretations of the Constitution or federal legislation and appeals from certain lower courts. The 
neat level is the Federal Court of Australia (created in 1976 as an original and appellate court) which has general and industrial 
divisions, and deals with federal cases such writs or injunctions againat an officer of the Commonwealth of Australia, or a 
federal trade union. Each State and Territory than has its own separate Supreme Court for handling matters under State and 
Territory statutes and certain federal matters. Most criminal matters whether arising under Commonwealth (federal). State or 
Territory law, will be dealt with at this level. 
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Both federal and state governments operate on a Westminster system with two main 
political parties and several smaller parties. The leader of the party or coalition of 
parties that has a majority in Parliament is invited to become the Commonwealth 
Prime Minister or, at state level, the Premier. The major parties at federal and state 
levels are the Australian Labor Party (ALP), the Liberal 2 .Party and the National 
Party. The two latter conservative parties usually work as a coalition, especially at 
federal level. They are currently in power, but minor parties hold the majority in the 
Senate (the upper house). The ALP was created by the trade unions in the 1880s and 
works closely with the unions when in power. The significance of the political parties 
in Australia is that they have offered different policies on industrial relations, which in 
turn have set the context for compensation systems. 
According to Deery, Plowman and Walsh, (1997), governments in Australia have 
intervened in the labour market since convict times. By the beginning of the twentieth 
century, wages boards and Conciliation and arbitration machinery were being set up in 
states as a means of averting industrial relations disputes (Dabscheck & Niland, 
1981). This pattern was followed at the federal level when the new Constitution gave 
industrial relations powers to the federal Parliament, which then passed the 1904 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act to set up the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation 
and Arbitration (now the Australian Industrial Relations Commission) (Dabscheck & 
Niland, 1981). The federal Commission, under section 51 ()my) of the Constitution, 
can legally only be involved in 'the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes 
extending beyond the limits of any one state'. 
Like the state governments, the federal government acts as legislator, major employer, 
and policy-maker on industrial relations and compensation. It is also a source of 
funding for its various industrial tribunals, and has the right to intervene in 
proceedings of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission, including National 
Wage Cases. The other ways in which the federal and state governments can affect 
compensation systems are through the management of the economy and social 
equality, and the handling of industries which governments directly control such as 
public transport. 
2 In Australia, the Liberal Party is a conservative. right-wing party of similar philosophies to those of the British Conservative 
Party. The term 'liberal. therefore differs here from the usual American (or UK) political usage. 
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The Labour Force 
The Australian labour force in 1995-96 was 9,066,400, but of these, only 8,299,700 
were employed (ABS, 1997a). The male participation rate (those aged 15 and over) 
was 73.0 per cent compared with 53.8 per cent for females. While the male rate has 
declined from 82.1 per cent in 1973, the female trend has been upwards from 41.4 per 
cent in the same year (ABS, 1994b:15). One major change in the labour force has 
been the increasing participation of married women (Norris & Wooden, 1996). The 
most significant growth in demand for labour has been in the service sector. Services 
now account for 65.7 per cent of the workforce, compared with 47.8 per cent in 1970 
(Norris & Wooden, 1996:6). Manufacturing, by contrast, declined from 24.5 per cent 
in 1970 to 13.6 per cent in 1995. Despite its contribution to the economy, 
agriculture, together with fishing and forestry, only employs 6.0 per cent of total 
labour (p.6). 
In terms of the educational level of the population aged 15-64, the percentage of 
people with post-school qualifications rose from 37 to 42 per cent from 1986 to 1996. 
However, 54 per cent in full-time work in 1996 had these qualifications (ABS, 
199'7b:84-87). Just under 12 per cent of the workforce had a bachelor's or post-
graduate qualification as at May, 1995 (ABS, 1997a:251). The most dramatic data 
perhaps are the number of school children with 12 years of full-time education: the 
level rose from 29 per cent in 1970 to 72 per cent in 1995 (EPAC, 1996:x). In terms 
of occupation, an average of about 11 per cent of the employed labour force in 1995— 
96 were in managerial or administrative positions, compared with 20 per cent in 
professional or para-professional jobs, 15 per cent in trades, 16 per cent in clerical 
roles, 16 per cent in sales/personal services, and 22 per cent in operating, driving or 
labouring work (ABS 1997a:109). In the last 25 years, the proportion of managerial 
and professional employees in the population has increased, clerical staff have 
remained the same, and the percentage of trades and labouring personnel declined. 
The percentage of the female workforce in senior positions has also increased, but 
female employees are still mainly concentrated in the clerical and sales areas (ABS, 
1997a). 
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Unevenness in workforce participation between the sexes is also shown in the degree 
of part-time working. In 1995-96, only 11 per cent of employed males were in part-
time positions, compared with 42 per cent of employed females (ABS, 1997a). The 
incidence of part-time work is greatest among married women. Part-time workers are 
defined as those working less than 35 hours per week. The growth in this type of 
employment since the mid-1960s has been seen as 'one of the more striking features' 
of the labour market (Sadler & Aungles, 1990:286). There are statistical problems in 
defining casual and part—time staff, but it is estimated that the proportion of the 
workforce in part-time jobs in 1969 was 11 per cent, rising to 24.3 per cent by 1994 
(Norris & Wooden, 1995:8). Accompanying the growth of part-time work has been a 
rise in casual employment. Norris and Wooden (1995:8) report that 23.7 per cent of 
the workforce were in casual employment in 1994, compared with 17.8 per cent in 
1984. 
Like Singapore, Australia has strict regulations regarding temporary foreign labour 
entering the country to work, but no levy is imposed on employers for employing 
foreign workers. Permanent immigration quotas are set annually, together with the 
criteria for entry. Temporary labour quotas are set each quarter for various categories 
of short and long-term stays by the Minister of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs. 
There is community sensitivity about temporary and permanent immigrants because of 
the high levels of unemployment in Australia. Unemployment rates for selected years 
for 1973-95 are shown in Table 6.2. 
Table 6.2 
Unemployment Rates, Australia, Selected Years, 1973-95 
Year % 
1973 1.8 
1975 4.7 
1977 5.5 
1979 6.2 
1981 5.6 
1983 9.9 
1985 8.2 
1987 8.0 
1989 6.1 
1991 9.5 
1993 10.8 
1995 8.5 
Source:ABS (1977) Yearbook No.61, 1975 and 1976,  Canberra, ABS; ABS(1982) Year 
Book 1982, Canberra, ABS; ABS (1994b) Labour Statistics, 1993, Canberra, ABS; AGPS 
(1997) Budget Strategy and Outlook 1997-98, Canberra, AGPS. 
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What the composite unemployment statistics conceal for 1995 were the half a million 
employees who wanted to work more hours (ABS,1997a:114), and the one-third of 
unemployed people who had been without work for more than 12 months (EPAC, 
1996:x). Unlike Singapore, benefits are payable to unemployed adults under certain 
conditions which are becoming more stringent, but remain relatively generous 
compared to the US system. 
• Average weekly earnings in May 1991 in Australia (combined award, over-award and 
overtime pay) were A$484.303 per week (ABS, 1997a:123) 3 . By May 1996, these 
had increased to A$564.40 per week, a 16.5 per cent increase. Like Singapore, the 
average masks the lower average earnings of women. In May 1991, average weekly 
earnings for women were A$378.90 compared with A$569.90 for men. By May 
1996, male earnings had increased to A$671.50 per week and female earnings to 
A$441.10 per week (ABS, 1997a:123). A similar disparity of earnings between the 
sexes applies in all major occupational groups in Australia. For example, the average 
weekly total earnings for male managers and administrators were A$978.70 in May 
1995, compared with A$749.30 for females (ABS, 1997a:125). Since 1985, there has 
been a significant increase in the inequality of average earnings in full-time positions. 
One factor in this has been the greater rate of growth in executive salaries over 
average weekly earnings since 1987 (EPAC, 1996:99). Using 1997 data from six 
management consultancies, Ferguson and Laurence (1997:37) quote median salaries 
for a managing director (MD) 4 in Property as $A400,000 — $450,000, an MD in 
industrial manufacturing as $A223,000 — $250,000, and an MD in Communications as 
A$ 670,000 — $900,000 per annum. A 1997 survey by the Australian Institute of 
Management of 600 businesses also concluded that senior management percentage 
salary increases continued to exceed those for the rest of the workforce (AIM, 
1997:20). 
Hours of work in Australia are determined by a combination of federal awards, state 
awards and state (but not federal) legislation, supplemented by workplace agreements. 
Average weekly hours worked in Australia have gradually declined since the 1900s. 
3 On 1 May 1991, AS1=USS0.7760. On 1 May 1995,A51=USS0.7290. On 1 May 1996 A$1=US$0.7828. 
4 
Managing Director in Australia is the equivalait of a company President in the USA. 
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In 1914, employees were working about 49 hours per week (ABS, 1988). In 1995– 
96, average weekly hours for all employees were 35.9. However, males in all 
industries averaged 40.8, with a range from 37.7 in electricity, gas and water supply 
to 48.1 hours in agriculture and fishing. Female hours averaged 29.5 per week (ABS, 
1997a:135). Since 1985, there has been a marked increase in the number of 
employees working 49 hours per week or more. An analysis of the overtime data 
suggests that the majority of these hours are unpaid (Norris & Wooden, 1995). 
In developing the skills of the present and future workforce, the state and territory 
governments have the main responsibility for funding primary and secondary schools. 
The technical and further education sector and 36 public universities are funded by the 
federal government, the latter according to agreed student profiles. While 
compensation levels may be correlated to an extent with a university education, it is 
vocational and technical qualifications which have become more closely integrated 
with compensation systems over the last ten years in Australia. Vocational and work-
based training has now become an important part of labour market reform as skill 
levels are recognised as being crucial to industrial competitiveness. 
In the late 1980s, attempts were made through the Australian Industrial Relations 
Commission (A1RC) decisions and legislation to reform out-dated work design, and 
rigid occupational and pay classifications that did not encourage skill formation 
(Tovey, 1997). The AMC decided that increases in award wages and salaries would 
be approved only if the employer and the union established 'skill-related career paths', 
and linked an educational attainment to a wage group/classification — in short, a 
payment for skill framework for bargainable employees (Deery & Plowman, 
1991:418). This spawned national standards for competencies from which industry 
training programmes are being developed (Tovey, 1997). However, it appears that 
these initiatives are not being fully resourced by employers. A government survey of 
training expenditure in 1996 showed companies only spent A$185 per employee in 
1996 compared with A$191 in 1993, and that managers and professionals attracted 
most of the training hours (ABS, Catalogue 6353.0). 
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The National Culture of Australia 
The controversial Australian historian, Manning Clark (1982:8), noted some years 
ago: 'So far there have been two cultures in Australia — one Aboriginal and the other 
European'. For the purposes of this project, only the European will be referred to, 
initially in general terms and then as represented by the cultural dimensions of 
Hofstede (1980) and Trompenaars (1994). 
Shaw (1962:291) saw Australia in the 1960s as 'the product of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries'. Its youth meant it had no or few traditions, no aristocracy or 
'wealthy leisured ruling class'. Power was originally vested in British officials, but as 
there was no inherited wealth, there was 'no landed gentry' (p.292). This led to a 
society that lacked special privileges and emphasised equality. The desire to own 
one's home and the general high standard of living had 'always been a moderating 
influence countering doctrinaire ideas of socialism' (p.303). There was acceptance of 
a capitalist system with a strong government intervention to protect the 
underprivileged. Turnbull (1983:30) reminds us that European settlement in Australia 
occurred before industrialisation had really taken off in England, so the early culture 
of Australia reflected that of Georgian England — 'a certain hardness, a sardonic 
attitude', and 'a rebelliousness which marked all classes in the early years'. So close 
were the ties with Britain towards the end of the 1800s, that rarely did Australians 
think of developing a culture distinct from that of the original British and Irish 
(Clarke, 1992). 
Since that time, the nature of immigration has changed the cultural landscape. The 
proportion of immigrants from the UK, Ireland, and other European countries has 
decreased and been replaced by Asians, particularly from Hong Kong and Vietnam. 
The rise of subcultures is shown in the changing pattern of religious affiliation since 
the first national census in 1911. The nation's predominantly Christian affiliation has 
declined because of immigration patterns. In the first census of 1911, 96 per cent of 
the population reported their religion as Christian. This had dropped to 86 per cent 
by 1933 and 74 per cent by 1991 (ABS, 19940. In the period 1981-91, the 
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percentage of Catholics exceeded Anglicans' for the first time and became the biggest 
religious group (27.3 per cent). Anglicans and Catholics together accounted for 51 
per cent of all religious affiliation. Just under 3 per cent of the nation follow non-
Christian religions. In the 1991 census, about a quarter of the population did not state 
their religion or did not have one. Although growing from a small initial base, 
Buddhism and Islam were two of the three fastest-growing religions from 1981-91, 
the other being Pentecostal (ABS, 1994a:Table 2). The growth of Catholicism and 
the non-Christian religions in the decade prior to 1991 was essentially due to the 
immigration policy. 
Summing up the general features of Australian culture in the 1960s, Horne (1968) 
refers to its high social stability, tolerance, scepticism of authority, aggressive 
individualism, openness and directness of manner, strong materialism, mediocrity, 
love of sports, and an expectation that the government would cater for the needy. 
But Mackay (1993) believes current Australian society is now undergoing a cultural 
revolution. The roles of women, marriage and the family are being redefined, and a 
redistribution of income is causing a big 'new rich' class, a big 'new poor' class, a 
shrinking middle class (p.23), and an increasing interest in 'traditional values' (p.247). 
In the name of 'multiculturalism', Australians were 'redefining their cultural identity' 
while 'experiencing some pain and anxiety in the process' (p.23). Whether some of 
these trends will eventually affect compensation systems is an interesting question as 
caution is needed when drawing general conclusions on national culture. As Belbeck 
(1993:73) notes, 'a moment's reflection will reveal that Australia is neither egalitarian, 
nor an equal society'. 
Hofstede and Bond's (1988) scores and ranking for Australia's national culture were 
provided in the previous chapter. In brief, Australia appeared moderately low in 
Power Distance, very high on Individualism, and moderately high on Masculinity and 
moderately weak on Uncertainty Avoidance. According to Hofstede (1991) in 
relation to compensation, such a value profile could be manifested in narrow salary 
ranges between the top and bottom of the organisation, a dislike of status symbols, a 
desire to be consulted, an emphasis on the management of individuals rather than 
groups, opportunities for jobs with 'recognition, advancement and challenge' (p.94), 
5 The Anglican Church of Australia is similar to the US Episcopal Church. 
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the creation of the assertive, decisive and aggressive hero type (p.94), 'working hard 
only when needed', 'no more rules than is necessary', and 'motivation by achievement 
and esteem or belongingness' (p.125). On Hostede and Bond's (1988) value measure 
of Confucian Dynamism, it was noted in Chapter 5 that Australia's index was in 1 l th 
equal position with Germany (F.R.) out of 20 countries and regions, below Japan and 
the four Asian dragons. Australia's score was similar to those of Great Britain, New 
Zealand, Sweden and the United States. 
Hofstede's findings can again be compared with the more recent research by 
Trompenaars (1994). Trompenaars found that 57 per cent of Australians conceived 
of a company as a 'system designed to perform functions and tasks in an efficient 
way' rather than as a group of people working together (p.19). The figure from 
Singaporeans was 38 per cent. Unlike Singapore, Australians had a stronger 
Universalism (rules) than Particularism (relationships) dimension, which Trompenaars 
believes makes the process of, say, a Hay job evaluation more culturally acceptable 
(p.46). Australia was also much more individualistic than Singapore. According to 
Trompenaars (1994), the application of pay-for-performance systems will be less 
popular in 'diffuse' cultures than in 'specific' ones, this dimension reflecting 'the 
degree to which we engage others in specific areas of life' or diffusely 'in multiple 
areas of our lives ... at the same time' (p.79). In this context, Australia appeared 
highly 'specific' and more amenable to directness, objectives, targets, confrontation, 
and a separation of private and business agendas (p. 99). Australia was also ranked 
highly on 'achieved' status rather 'ascribed', which Trompenaars concluded would 
make MBO and pay-for-performance more effective than in an ascribed culture where 
direct rewards from the manager would be more successful (p.116). 
These recommendations can be compared with those of Hodgetts and Luthans 
(1993b), who agree that with low Power Distance cultures, there should be smaller 
gaps in compensation between the highest and lowest paid, together with the use of 
profit-sharing and gain-sharing. With a moderately weak Uncertainty Avoidance, 
compensation should be more closely linked to organisational performance. Similarly, 
the high Individualism ranking may suggest individual performance-based 
compensation, while a compensation strategy which rewards 'competitiveness, 
aggressiveness, and dominance' may be more appropriate for a moderately high 
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Masculinity culture (p.44). Future research will no doubt indicate whether domestic 
and international organisations possess the recommended compensation systems for 
the various cultural dimensions of the countries in which they operate and, if so, 
whether they are effective. 
Work Values 
The stereotype of the Australian employee of the 1960s was graphically described by 
Horne (1968:2) thus: 
Ordinary Australia is not a society of striving and emulation ... Life assumes meaning in 
the weekends and on holidays ... To some they [Australians] seem lazy. They are not really 
lazy, but they don't always take their jobs seriously. They work hard at their leisure. 
On the same theme, Lansbury and Spillane (1983:21) interpreted Hofstede's (1980) 
results as denoting that Australians' attitude to work and leisure was based on 'self 
interest', and that they were prepared to allow management 'to exercise authority' in 
return for 'economic and job security'. Generally, surveys done in the 1970s have 
suggested that Australians had low expectations about fulfilment from work apart 
from the compensation (p.24). Hilmer (1985) attributed the work attitudes of the 
1980s to the legacy of history and the 'conscript' mindset of the early convict 
workers. He hoped that this would be replaced by a 'volunteer' mindset. Australians 
are constantly reminded that other nations, such as Japan, work much harder than 
they do, and that the country cannot afford high levels of leisure (Fox & Lake, 1990). 
In examining recent studies, Vecchio, Hearn and Southey (1992:141) found that 
compared with the Americans, Australians 'tend to have a more external locus of 
control [O'Brien and Kabanoff, 1981], to be less authoritarian [Ray, 1984], to have a 
less pronounced work ethic [Feather, 1974], and to be less extroverted [Shaughnessy 
et al., 1990]', but warn that these studies should only be taken as 'a general flavour' 
of the Australian culture (p.142). Indeed, in a more recent study of work 
commitment in Australia, Ticehurst (1992) used several research studies of US and 
Japanese employees, and then surveyed 2,712 Australians using the same survey 
instruments. He noted that organisational commitment appeared higher in Australia 
than in Japan, but not as high the United States. Furthermore, Australian employees 
were prepared to exert more effort to help their organisations be successful than was 
213 
evident for the United States and Japan. Unfortunately, there is little empirical data 
on the level or progression of the Australian work ethic. 
Employment Law in Australia 
According to Creighton and Stewart (1994:22), Australian labour law performs the 
three functions of, first, rationalising the individual employment contract; secondly, 
regulating the 'relations between organised labour and employers and/or the state'; 
and thirdly, moderating the operation of the labour market 'in certain circumstances'. 
In Australia, generally speaking, the conditions of service of employees have 
traditionally been established in two ways. Employees who are eligible to be 
represented by a union registered under federal or state legislation have had their 
compensation determined by federal or state industrial tribunals in the form of legally 
enforceable industry, occupation, single or multi-employer 'awards,' or single-
business certified agreements. These awards and agreements cover about 80 per cent 
of employees (Creighton & Stewart, 1994). Those who are not covered by unions 
and/or awards (about 20 per cent) (usually middle and senior management in private 
industry) have had their conditions set in individual contracts independently of the 
tribunals. Space limits a discussion of each state's tribunals and legislation, so only 
the federal system will be discussed. The 1995 Australian Workplace Industrial 
Relations Survey (Morehead et al., 1997:209) showed that 18 per cent of all 
workplaces had employees covered by federal and state awards, 32 per cent by federal 
awards only, and 45 per cent by state awards only. Five per cent of workplaces had 
no award or were unaware of which award was relevant to their workplace. 
Although more employees are covered by state awards, the federal system is more 
influential in compensation design rules and principles 6 . 
As stated earlier, the federal industrial relations system was regulated for over 80 
years by the Conciliation and Arbitration Act (1904) which set up the initial machinery 
(a Court of Conciliation and Arbitration), independent of government, for the 
compulsory conciliation and arbitration of interstate disputes. The Court was given 
the power to determine and interpret awards, which then became legally binding, but 
6 
To complicate matters further, in 1996, the state of Victoria abolished its state IR system and transferred its coverage to the 
federal system, but reserves the right to retrieve it at will. Other states have not followed this initiative, and retain their own 
separate systems. 
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its conciliation and arbitration functions were transferred to the (now named) 
Australian Industrial Relations Commission (A1RC) in 1956. Interpretation and other 
functions were given to the Federal Court. A new Industrial Relations Act (1988) 
(passed by the ALP Government) maintained the division between determination and 
interpretation of awards, so there is now an A1RC presided over by a legally qualified 
President, and panels of Commissioners who preside over dispute hearings and 
regulate compensation and conditions — usually on an industry, occupational, or 
company basis. Prior to 1996, an Industrial Relations (IR) Court interpreted and 
enforced statutory rights and duties laid down by the IR Act and awards sent to it. 
The new 1996 Liberal/National conservative coalition Government passed a new 
federal Workplace Relations Act (1996), to operate from March 1997, which 
preserved the AIRC with a reduced role, abolished the lR Court, and transferred 
some of its functions to the existing Federal Court'. 
The AIRC continues to set minimum entitlements for all employees under 
international legal obligations, sets minimum conditions or 'safety nets' for federal 
awards, and certifies workplace agreements (which are usually between unions and a 
single business or part thereof) (CCH, 1997). Where state and federal awards 
conflict, the federal award has priority (Deery, Plowman & Walsh, 1997). There is 
more emphasis on conciliation than on arbitration in the AIRC, and the system does 
not exclude collective bargaining. If the unions and employers reach an agreement 
themselves, they may ask the AlRC to register this as a certified agreement, provided 
it meets certain conditions. Where no agreement can be reached on an item, the 
AIRC may arbitrate on selected issues. While local informal over-award bargaining 
has been present in Australia for many years, the Industrial Relations Reform Act of 
1993 enacted by the federal Labor Government promoted formal enterprise and 
workplace bargaining through a newly-established Bargaining Division of the AIRC 8 . 
7 The new act set up another statutory body (the Employment Advocate) alongside the AIRC to monitor individual and 
collective non-union Australian Workplace Agreements (AWAs) that employers and employees wished to register. 
8 The LiberaVNational Govenunent's Workplace Relations Act (1996) has accelerated this process by legislating that general 
federal A1RC awards (which could apply to an industry or a complete ocamational group) will only be permitted to include 20 
minimum conditions. These have to be supplemented at workplace levels by enterprise agreements either in the form of a 
certified agreement, an Australian Workplace Agreement or over-award bargaining (Deny at aL,1997), thus forcing 
decentralisation of the industrial relations system to the enterprise. 
215 
While awards have set minima for wages, hours, sick leave and allowances, the 
common law and a range of federal and state employment legislation have obligated 
the employer to provide minimum standards of treatment. These laws have applied to 
annual leave (state), long service leave (state), parental leave (state), occupational 
health and safety (federal and state), equal employment opportunity (federal and 
state), affirmative action (state and federal), compensation for work-related injuries 
(federal and state), equal pay (federal), termination of employment (state and federal), 
apprenticeships (state), and superannuation (pensions) (federal). State and federal 
jurisdictions use different mechanisms to set minimum wage entitlements in 
agreements (Creighton & Stewart, 1994). 
For an MINE setting up in Australia, the number and location of plants and offices will 
determine the range of laws that will influence compensation design. Location in 
more than one state will mean that the MINE has to observe each state's laws as well 
as federal legislation. The industry and occupational structure will initially determine 
which existing federal and state awards and unions the MINE may be subject to. The 
MINE would only be immediately be subject to a federal award if a union decided to 
name it as a respondent in a federal award. Alternatively, the MINE would be bound 
by a relevant federal award if it joined an employer association which had a federal 
industrial award with unions. Both of these outcomes would depend on the MNE's 
union recognition policy. There has been some ambiguity in Australia about the 
extent to which parties could, in the past, 'opt out' of the system of conciliation and 
arbitration (Fox, Howard & Pittard, 1995), and attempts have been made recently by 
some employers — with some difficulty — to transfer all unionised (blue collar) 
employees to individual (white collar/managerial) contracts to avoid the rigidities of 
the award system and to minimise union involvement. The attempt of the Australian 
relations system (historically based on collectivism) to handle individual and collective 
rights equally has been a source of many disputes (Keenoy & Kelly, 1996). 
Personal and Company Taxation 
The main taxes levied on Australian employers are imposed by state and federal 
governments. Local government income is mainly derived from property taxes. 
Employers in Australia usually also have to pay additional state level expenses such as 
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payroll tax, and a loading for annual leave. Employees have income tax deducted at 
source (pay-as-you-earn: PAYE) at rates determined by their income. The top 
marginal tax rate in Australia is 48.4 per cent, 'one of the highest marginal income tax 
rates in the world' (Payne, 1990:73). For non-managerial employees, this has not 
unduly affected the design of compensation systems. However, two federal taxes (the 
Fringe Benefits Tax of 1986 and the compulsory superannuation [pension] levy of 
1992) have had a major effect on compensation systems. 
For executive compensation, legislation on fringe benefits, income tax non-
deductibility and capital gains tax 'all have a direct influence on the planning, design 
and management of executive packages' (O'Neill, 1990b:xii). Fringe Benefit Tax 
(FBT) legislation was introduced in Australia in July 1986 to broaden the tax base. 
Prior to its introduction, executive compensation typically consisted of a base salary, 
superannuation, employee benefits (such as a motor vehicle, holiday travel and spouse 
entertainment allowances) and a bonus (O'Neill & Clark, 1990). The package was 
selected in a 'cafeteria' fashion to suit personal requirements, maximise available cash 
and minimise PAYE liability (p.3). While all components of the package were 
theoretically taxable, the then tax laws and administration 9 usually failed to collect tax 
on motor cars and various cash allowances. Many high-income earners therefore 
received a large proportion of their compensation tax free (Clark, 1992). 
The introduction of FBT, a tax borne by the employer, soon led to the withdrawal of 
many employee benefits (O'Neill & Clark, 1990). The current FBT rate is 48.25 per 
cent, while the company tax rate is 33 per cent. It is only advantageous to employers 
to provide employee benefits instead of cash by packaging concessionally treated and 
exempt items. Company cars are still marginally tax effective, as is child-care on an 
employer's premises. Employer superannuation contributions and discount benefits 
on employee share schemes are excluded from FBT and are concessionally taxed 
under the Income Tax Assessment Act. It is difficult to obtain national data on the 
effect of FBT on packaging. The latest ABS survey available conducted in 1992 (and 
quoted in CCH Australia, 1997:6792), suggested that 'most benefits showed a 
decrease in 1992 compared with 1991', except for superannuation. Unlike Singapore, 
Australia does not have a goods and services tax, but does have a capital gains tax 
9 Under the federal conservative Liberal/National Government 
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(under the provisions of the Income Tax Assessment Act) that affects employee share 
plans, and particularly, executive share plans. However, a goods and services tax in 
Australia will commence on 1 July, 2000. 
National Superannuation 
Unlike Singapore, with its longstanding national Central Provident Fund, 
superannuation in Australia has developed in an ad hoc fashion and has been uneven 
in coverage of employees. Paatsch and Smith (1992) identified four main types of 
superannuation: public sector, private sector/single employer sponsored, national, and 
industry or award superannuation. The oldest superannuation schemes in Australia — 
for state public servants in the colonies — commenced in the 1850s and 1860s, but 
were somewhat transitory (p.3). Superannuation for Commonwealth public servants 
was introduced in 1922. Private sector/single employer schemes have historically 
been focused at executive level, and more junior white collar employees working in 
sectors like banking and insurance. Wage earners were not so well covered, and in 
November 1991, 750,000 (15.3 per cent) full-time employees out of a full-time 
workforce of 4.9 million were still not in a superannuation scheme (ABS, 1991a: 
Catalogue 6319.0). 
Because of this disparity of benefit, the unions sought to expand superannuation 
through award negotiations. Taking up their cause, the (ALP) Federal Government 
introduced the Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act (1992), under which 
employers could avoid paying an equivalent tax levy only if they made minimum 
superannuation payments into an appropriate fund for all employees irrespective of 
their award coverage. The minimum employer superannuation support as a 
percentage of ordinary time earnings was 3 per cent for payrolls of A$1 million or less 
in 1993, and 5 per cent for payrolls of more than A$1m. This will rise to 9 per cent 
for all payrolls, irrespective of size, by 2002. Any shortfall in contributions to an 
official superannuation scheme results in a 'charge' to the employer equivalent to the 
amount of superannuation that should have been paid. The definition of an employee 
under the superannuation legislation goes beyond that in awards and includes 
contractors as well as casual and part-time staff 
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The Industrial Relations System in Australia 
As already noted, Australia has six industrial relations systems rather than one. As the 
federal system dominates, it will receive most emphasis. Major legislative changes 
operating from 1997 are touched on only briefly to show recent developments, as the 
legislation applying to the case studies was that in force in August 1995. 
The formation of national industrial relations institutions in Australia at the beginning 
of the twentieth century was the result of the emergence of the factory system, new 
general and industrial trade unions, and concern over the compensation and conditions 
of service in some 'sweated trades' (Dufty & Fells, 1989). Major industrial conflict in 
the 1890s led governments towards the concept of a national arbitration system 
(p.255). Industrial relations systems and tribunals were set up in Victoria, New South 
Wales and Western Australia around the turn of the century, and later in the other 
states. In order to ensure that disputes within state boundaries remained state 
matters, the new Constitution of 1901 confined the federal government to making 
laws for conciliation and arbitration only for disputes that extended beyond the limits 
of any one state. 
The Conciliation and Arbitration Act (1904) was eventually passed by a coalition 
government and set up the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration 
(now the Australian Industrial Relations Commission) (AIRC) to handle inter-state 
disputes. Prior to 1996, the main role of the Commission was to prevent and settle 
disputes. The determination of wages was only an 'incidental part' of this process 1° 
(Deery & Plowman, 1991:329) 1°. However, since wage settlements have economic 
implications, governments over the years have tried to usurp some of the functions of 
the tribunals because of their concerns over price and wage rises. Governments have 
also tried to redirect the level at which pay negotiations take place particularly 
through the legislation of 1988, 1993 and 1996 which restructured the federal system. 
Since 1988, the AIRC has had to encourage and facilitate the making of agreements at 
workplace or enterprise level, to establish and maintain a framework for protecting 
to The Workplace Relations Act (1996) of the conservative Liberal/National Government changed the principal objective of 
the AIRC to one of providing 'a framework for co-operative workplace relations which promotes the economic prosperity and 
welfare of the people of Australia' (s.3). 
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wages and conditions of employment through awards, to prevent and settle disputes, 
encourage representative bodies (e.g. unions) to register under the Act, and to 
prevent and eliminate discrimination. 
Disputes can be notified to the AIRC by employers or their associations, or registered 
unions. The mechanism for generating a dispute is that one side (usually the union) 
serves a letter of demand on the other side (the employer) containing a log of claims. 
The log of claims sets out the wages, conditions or other issues demanded. If the 
employer rejects the log or fails to reply within a set time, the union formally notifies 
the AIRC of the dispute. The AIRC then determines whether a dispute exists under 
IR legislation. The bulk of the AlRC's work is to settle 'paper disputes' rather than 
those involving industrial action (Plowman, 1992a). If the AlRC agrees that there is a 
dispute under its jurisdiction, it would initially attempt to deal with the problem by 
conciliation through compulsory conferences involving both parties. If conciliation 
fails, the members of the AMC can then give an arbitrated decision in certain 
situations. From 1 July 1994 to 30 June 1995 there were 18,401 matters determined 
by the AlRC (AMC, 1996:28). Of these, 601 (3 per cent) were new awards, 2,416 
(13 per cent) were approved or certified agreements, and 6,660 (36 per cent) were 
unlawful employment terminations. 
The main product of the Australian lR system is the 'rules' or 'awards' which 
determine the conditions of employment (Deery, Plowtnna & Walsh, 1997:9.1). 
These awards are the main influence on the compensation design of non-managerial 
staffs in Australia and may be classified in different ways: federal or state, industry or 
occupational, single or multiple employer awards, and minimum rates or paid rates 
awards" (Plowman, 1992a). The most influential awards, according to Plowman 
(1992a), are the multi-employer awards which set the conditions for large numbers of 
employees in many enterprises. While the number of single-employer awards is 
greater than the multi-employer category, only about 10 per cent of the workforce in 
– 11  Paid rates in an award are the actual wages which had to be paid by the employer and could not be supplemated by over- 
award payments. Under the Workplace Relations Act (1996), paid rates can no longer be awarded by the AIRC. The 
govenunat strategy was to make the Commission a body that could set only national minimum standards, leaving the parties at 
the workplace to negotiate amounts over and above these, with the employer setting conditions and standards for pay increases 
— another factor to encourage decentralisation of the system. 
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1992 were covered by single-employer awards (p.81). However, with the trend 
towards enterprise agreements, this figure is likely to increase. The other dominant 
type of award has been the occupational award by which occupational unions (such as 
the Transport Workers' Union) had the legal right to have their own awards applied 
across various industry sectors. 
With multi-unionism and occupationally based awards, most large establishments have 
to manage several different awards. Although the number of unions is declining and 
companies are trying to negotiate enterprise awards, Morehead et al. (1997:147) 
found in the 1995 Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey of 1,958 
organisations with more than 20 employees that unionised workplaces with more than 
500 employees had an average of 3.8 unions compared with a national average of 2.0 
unions. The average number of unions present in workplaces with 500+ employees in 
the 1990 survey was 6.3 (p.147). The average number of awards in workplaces is 
positively correlated with size, and sites with more than 500 employees had an 
average of 7.5 awards, compared with 2.1 for those with 20-49 employees (p.519). 
The average number of awards for all 1,972 workplaces with more than 20 employees 
surveyed was 2.5. While union members are less likely to be found in smaller 
workplaces, it is the award covering a company that is most influential in 
compensation paid, rather than union numbers. 
The other categories of awards are paid or minimum rates awards. As noted in the 
footnote, the paid rate award prescribes the actual rather than the minimum rate of 
pay to be received by employees in a particular job classification. Most private sector 
awards are minimum rate awards, and the employer may then negotiate an 'over-
award' rate depending on the capacity to pay and the labour market. Over-award 
payments have historically been private agreements between the employer and the 
employee or union negotiated outside the AIRC system, and will not be ratified by the 
AIRC. 
Unlike Singapore, since the 1890s, Australia has experienced a relatively high level of 
overt industrial conflict when measured by number of strikes. However, since 1980, 
the number of industrial disputes has fallen steadily. The number of conflicts 
decreased from 2,429 in 1980 to 642 in 1995 with the number of working days lost 
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falling from 649 per thousand employees in 1980, to 79 per thousand in 1995 (Decry, 
Plowman & Walsh, 1997:10.8-10.11). The total of 518 strikes in 1996 was the 
lowest number recorded since 1940 (p.10.8). 
The Department of Industrial Relations 12 
Like the Ministry of Labour in Singapore, the Department of Industrial Relations of 
the federal government in Australia (and similar departments in the states) have 
responsibility for assisting the government in the development and implementation of 
policies and programs 'designed to achieve its industrial relations and wider social 
and economic objectives' (Yerbury & Karlson, 1992:96). These policies and 
programs are aimed at producing an efficient labour market and industrial relations 
system. The Department's functions also include providing advice to the government, 
promoting sound industrial practices, preparing and presenting the government's 
submissions to the National Wage Cases at the AIRC, developing appropriate 
legislation, and negotiating for the government on compensation for the Australian 
Public Service (Decry & Plowman, 1991). The observance of awards is encouraged 
by the Department's Inspectorate, which can visit employers and demand 
documentation to check compensation rates (Deery, Plowmwn & Walsh, 1997). 
Employers breaching awards may be prosecuted. Unlike its Singaporean counterpart, 
the Australian Department of Industrial Relations does not provide a conciliation 
service for differing parties. This is done in the industrial tribunals. 
A second main actor in the IR system is the Federal Court of Australia, which hears 
cases on interpretation and enforcement of awards, breaches of union membership or 
election rules, and the recovery of underpaid wages (Decry, Plowman & Walsh, 
1997). The Australian Industrial Registry is the administrative arm of the AMC; it 
maintains a register of employer associations and unions 13 . 
12 The Deparunent of Industrial Relations has undergone a number of name changes since 1995 to reflect the greater focus on the 
enterprise industrial relations, and to redistribute portfolios to ministers in the present LiberaVNational Government The 
Department's cuffent name is Employment, Workplace Relations and Small Business, but it still performs a similar industrial 
relations role to that performed in 1995. 
13 The Workplace Relations Act (1996,1 as noted earlier, created the new role of Employment Advocate to monitor non-union 
individual and collective Australian Workplace Agreements. 
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The Unions 
Before the introduction of the conciliation and arbitration systems in Australia, trade 
unions were subject to the English Trade Unions Acts of 1871 and 1876, under which 
they were required to register (Creighton, Ford & Mitchell, 1993). Further legislation 
was introduced in the period 1876-1902 regulating union status, but the advent of the 
conciliation and arbitration system at state and federal levels further defined the status 
of unions and guaranteed them security against employers and rival unions (p.889). 
Their recognition and encouragement by the industrial tribunal systems pushed their 
relative numerical strength to one of the highest in the industrialised world (p.889). 
The first unions in Australia were small mutual benefit societies for skilled craftsmen 
which were formed in the early nineteenth century to protect members against 
unemployment and illness (Deery & Plowman, 1991). The coordinating bodies of 
Trades and Labour Councils commenced in Sydney and Melbourne in 1871 and 1884 
respectively and spread to other capital cities in the 1890s. By 1891, Australia had 
124 unions with nearly 55,000 members (Creighton, Ford & Mitchell, 1993). 
Depression and some severe defeats of union strikes in several main industries in the 
1890s led to the formation of the Australian Labor Party in 1891 and to union 
pressure for a compulsory arbitration system. Between 1901 and 1926, the number of 
unions rose from 198 to 372, falling slightly in the 1930s and then hitting a peak of 
375 unions in 1956. The percentage of the workforce in unions increased from 6.1 
per cent in 1901 to 55.2 per cent in 1926 and 59 per cent in 1956 (p.225). The 
membership trend from 1961 to 1996 can be seen in Table 6.3. 
Table 6.3 
Membership of Australian Trade Unions, Selected Years, 1961-96 
Year Number of 
Unions 
Total Members 
('000) 
Total Members as 
percentage of total 
employees 
1961 355 1894.6 57.0 
1971 351 2452.2 51.0 
1981 324 2994.1 56.0 
1991 275 3382.6 53.0 
1996 132 2800.5 40(a) 
Source: ABS, Trade Union Statistics Australia, Catalogue No.6323. 
Note: (a) ABS data on financial membership suggests that this percentage could be 35 per 
cent. 
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Table 6.3 shows that the number of unions has been declining (mainly due to 
amalgamation) and that increased membership has not necessarily raised the density of 
membership. Deery and colleagues (1997) suggest that the figures need to be treated 
with caution as these data are supplied by unions. Other ABS data (for example, 
Trade Union Members Australia, Catalogue No.6325.0) collected by household 
surveys puts the union density level at 31 per cent and membership at 2,194,000 in 
1996. There are also statistical problems in the counting of employees who belong to 
more than one union, and the numbers of federal and state unions. In 1991, there was 
a total of 275 unions in Australia, of which 119 were federal and 134 state (ABS, 
Catalogue 6323.0). The data in Table 6.3 also conceal variations in membership by 
occupation, gender, and private and public sectors — union density in the public 
sector being traditionally higher. It is in the private sector that the decline in union 
density has been dramatic — from 38.6 per cent in 1982 to 29.4 per cent in 1992 
(ABS Catalogue No. 6325.0). Various reasons have been given for the decline in 
union density. Deery, Plowman and Walsh (1997) posit that it might be due to the 
growth of the service sector, the unpopularity of unions, the decline of traditional 
areas, the growth of smaller work places, the rise of non-regular forms of 
employment, and changes in the gender composition of the workforce. In addition, 
the rise in the number of self-employed people and high levels of unemployment have 
been proposed as other reasons for the decline in union density (Fox, Howard & 
Pittard, 1995). 
Australia possesses four types of union organisation — craft, occupational, industrial 
and general unions (Creighton, Ford & Mitchell, 1993) and a large number of mainly 
small unions. Union density varies by state mainly because of industrial structure, and 
significantly between industries. The employees permitted to be covered for 
membership by a union is determined at registration. Apart from two exceptions (in 
banking and [formerly] in public broadcasting), enterprise unions are unknown in 
Australia. Concern about the decline in membership caused the main coordinating 
body — the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) — to restructure the unions 
through amalgamation to seventeen broad industrial groupings" (Deery, Plowman & 
14 
In order to encourage enterprise unions, the Workplace Relations Act (1996) has reduced the minimum number of members 
needed for registration from 100 to 50. 
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Walsh, 1997). This has proved to be a difficult process because of resistance by the 
occupational unions and ideological differences between unions (p.7.26). 
Inter-union cooperation operates through a system of federal and state peak councils. 
Several national councils have now been absorbed into the ACTU, which is the main 
national body. Its main role is mediation in large disputes, representing the union 
movement on a range of committees, presenting the union case at National Wage 
Case hearings and providing a vision for unions in areas like economic and social 
policy, productivity, skill formation, and education and training (Gardner & Palmer, 
1992). 
The Employer Associations 
Apart from Plowman's work (1987; 1992a; 1992b), employer associations have not 
attracted much interest from Australian academics. Plowman (1992a:143) defines 
employer associations for the purpose of analysing their role in industrial relations as 
'associations consisting predominantly of employers whose activities include 
participating in determining employees' conditions of employment on behalf of 
members'. No official data are available on the number of employer associations in 
Australia. Plowman (1992a) estimates that there may be about 100 employer 
associations that meet his definition quoted above, and about 2,000 employer 
organisations in total. The earliest employer associations were temporary alliances of 
employers in the early 1800s who combined to handle labour problems. According to 
Morehead et al. (1997), the 1995 Australian Industrial Relations Workplace Survey 
showed that three-quarters of workplaces in the private sector with more than 20 
employees belonged to an employer association, compared with 62 per cent in the 
public sector (p.427). About 70 per cent of all workplaces used an employer 
association to gain advice on award rates of pay, and 62 per cent to obtain 
information on award standards and variations; in 30 per cent of workplaces, the 
employer association represented the company in negotiations with unions. 
If an employer association is prepared to handle a company's industrial relations 
issues, it can represent employers in collective bargaining, present cases before state 
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and federal tribunals, provide information, research, advice and training programs, 
represent employers in relations with governments and the media, and act as a forum 
for the exchange of views (Fox, Howard & Pittard, 1995). Despite the 
decentralisation of industrial relations to enterprise agreements, representation of a 
group of employers in tribunals is likely to remain a major role, along with training in 
local negotiating skills, benchmarking and performance management. Most employer 
associations are still respondents to many awards (Plowman, 1992a). 
The predominant employer association is the Australian Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry (AC CI). The ACCI (formed in 1992 as a result of an amalgamation of the 
Confederation of Australian Industry and the Australian Chamber of Commerce) 
consists of 14 State/Territory employer associations and 26 national industry 
employer associations (Fox, Howard & Pittard, 1995). The main employer 
associations may well adopt different positions on compensation, which creates a 
problem for the AIRC when, on hearing a National Wage Case, it may receive varying 
submissions from 12 employer groups (Gardner & Palmer, 1992). In the 1990s, the 
employer strategy has been to support labour market deregulation to weaken trade 
unions, while at the same time leading 'legal challenges against trade union action and 
strike breaking' (Gardner & Palmer, 1992:122), and 'attempting to change bargaining 
structures to suit their situation' (Gardner & Palmer, 1997:129). 
Incomes Policies 
The process of wage determination in Australia is an interplay of unions and 
management supplemented by the decisions and influence of the AIRC and the federal 
government (Gardner & Palmer, 1992). The AIRC has been accused by employers of 
perpetuating rigidities in wage determination by fixing wages irrespective of labour 
market pressures. The question for governments has then been whether wages policy 
should be centralised or decentralised through greater collective bargaining, and how 
wages policy should be linked to economic efficiency and social equity issues. 
As mentioned earlier, under the Australian Constitution, the federal government 
cannot determine wages directly, so the AIRC and its predecessors have established 
the nation's wages policy. It has done this through the decisions of National Wage 
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Cases and the setting down of National Wage Principles. However, the federal 
government can legislate on the role and powers of the AIRC, and ARC policy is 
based on the arguments it receives from employers, unions and governments as, in a 
technical sense, it is settling a dispute placed before it. Despite this constraint, over 
the years the wage principles behind its decisions have taken into account the state of 
the economy, the level of employment, and inflation (Section 90, Industrial Relations 
Act [1988]). Nevertheless, the right of the federal government to appear before the 
Commission and to determine the AIRC's powers has meant that governments have 
had indirect influence over wages policy in addition to the submissions of unions and 
employers (Gardner & Palmer, 1992). 
The decisions of the AIRC affect award wages in two ways: (1) the National Wage 
Case policy guidelines, and (2) the fixing of wages in key industrial and occupational 
awards. However, the AIRC has not had complete control over earnings. AIRC 
decisions on wage rates are supplemented by over-award payments, performance pay 
and overtime at workplace levels — that is, 'where management opts to pay more 
than the prescribed minimum award rate' (Callus et al., 1991:42). Furthermore, 
managers (particularly in the private sector) are not covered by awards and are not 
therefore subject to AIRC decisions. Thus, as Gardner and Palmer (1992:320) argue, 
the Australian arbitration system has not necessarily produced 'more inflexibility in 
general and relative wage levels than collective bargaining'. 
For the 80 .per cent of the workforce who are covered by the 5,000 or so state and 
federal awards, various ARC national wage policy principles have emerged since the 
beginning of the century. The first, in 1907, was an attempt to establish a basic wage 
based on the needs of the employee. This was followed in the 1930s by the capacity 
of industry to pay. The third was a margin over the basic wage for skill, and 
comparative wages for equivalent skills. A fourth approach was to award 
compensation increases in line with cost of living indices (known as 'indexation' in 
Australia). Pressures in the economic cycle (such as in 1986) have periodically led to 
the abandonment of indexation by the AIRE. 
The most notable attempt at a long-term incomes policy in Australia was in 1983, 
when the ACTU and the new ALP Government signed a Prices and Incomes Accord 
227 
(`The Accord'), which led to high union involvement in national industrial relations 
policy and substantially agreed submissions to the AIRC until the ALP Government's 
defeat in 1996. The Accord resulted in major revisions of wage guidelines by the 
AIRC and legislation changing wage determination in Australia. The Accord's 
(ALP/ACTU, 1983) main emphasis was on reducing unemployment and restraining 
compensation increases across the economy and was the subject of intense academic 
interest (see, for example, Carney,1988; Ewer et al., 1991; Singleton, 1990; Lewis & 
Spiers, 1992; Hearn, 1987). Arguably, the Accord had more political than economic 
benefit for the ALP Government, because it resulted in a decline in real wages and 
industrial disputes (Fox, Howard & Pittard, 1995). The Accord was renegotiated 
with the ALP Government seven times by the unions over a period of 12 years, and 
developed a strong 'social wage' agenda consisting of the following priorities: 
employment, a universal health care system (Medicare), superannuation for all 
workers, child-care, job protection and security, more equity in taxation and 
occupational health and safety (Harcourt, 1994). The ALP Government and the 
ACTU eventually supported a complete restructure of the award system with an 
emphasis on skill-related career paths, multi-skilling, flexibility and enterprise 
bargaining plus a 'safety-net' wage adjustment for weaker and lower paid workers. A 
summary of the AIRC NWC recommendations from 1975 to 1 995 is shown in 
Appendix 6.1, and thus includes the national wage decisions of the AIRC in relation 
to the Accord from 1983 to 1995. 
Enterprise bargaining is now at the heart of the IR system, with a back-up of awards 
and minimum employment standards. Even non-union workplaces have access to the 
enterprise bargaining system, provided the conditions of an agreement are no less 
favourable than are available through an award.. 
The Overall State of Australian HRIVI 
Prior to 1939, the only personnel role which could be called specialist was that of 
industrial relations, which was possibly needed to 'counter the growing political and 
economic influence of organised labour' (Wall, 1971:25). Wright (1991) argues that 
modern personnel practice dates back to the Second World Wan, when the federal 
government trained welfare workers to assist with the problems of inexperienced 
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employees in the munitions factories. By 1945, they numbered over 150 persons and 
became employed in private industry as well as government owned enterprises (p.3). 
The personnel function expanded after 1945 for three reasons (Wright, 1991). First, 
the growth in industry led to high demand for labour which was prone to high labour 
turnover. Secondly, the advent of management education and professional 
associations resulted in the dissemination of personnel practice; and thirdly, the newly 
arriving multinational enterprises brought with them more sophisticated HRM 
practices and a management training culture (p.6). However, for the 1940-60 period, 
the lack of appropriate personnel training, the dominance of the IR function, and the 
continued use of informal management practices in the smaller firms, all tended to 
leave specialist personnel practice at a fairly basic level. 
Dunphy (1987: 40) states that, on returning to Australia in 1967 from overseas, he 
found 'a largely monolithic organisation culture in Australia'. Organisations were 
bureaucratic and designed on church and military models, possibly because of the 
military experience of that generation of managers. Personnel departments 'were 
low-level operations mainly concerned with hiring, deployment, remuneration, 
retirement and firing' (p.41). By the early 1970s, 'personnel administration' was still 
seen as lacking 'professional standing', with the volume of research on personnel 
management being 'pitifully small' (Wall, 1971:27). Two reasons suggested for the 
slow development of HRM formal policies in Australia were (1) the large numbers of 
small companies in the nation, and (2) the existence of standardised wages and 
conditions based on awards which may have discouraged firms from developing a 
wide range of HRM policies (Gardner & Palmer,1992). 
Two surveys provide an insight into the current practice of BRM in Australia. The 
AWlRS (1990) survey of 1,935 workplaces with over 20 employees asked 
organisations to indicate which new techniques they had introduced from a provided 
list in the five years prior to the survey (Callus et al., 1991). The results are shown in 
Table 6.4. Callus et al. (1991) found that 50 per cent of workplaces had introduced 
three or more efficiency changes in the previous five years from the list and that large 
workplaces were the most likely to have introduced three or more changes. A 
September 1993 survey of 793 respondents carried out by CCH Ltd and the 
Australian Graduate School of Management (CCH, 1995) found that the use of 
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Table 6.4 
Efficiency Changes Introduced in the Years 1985-90 in AWIRS 
Surveyed Organisations (N=1,935) 
Changes Workplaces 
% 
Staff appraisal/evaluation 56 
Formal training scheme 48 
Job redesign 38 
Incentive/bonus scheme 27 
Quality circles/team building 26 
Total quality control 26 
Computer integrated management 19 
Semi-autonomous work group 16 
Skills audit 16 
'Just-in-Time' system 7 
Source: Extracted from Callus et al. (1991) Table 9.5. p.193. 
mission statements and written organisational goals/objectives was high (89 per cent 
and 86 per cent respectively). The planning time horizon had got shorter since 1989, 
and many organisations were still changing their mission statements. Compared with 
a similar 1989 survey, fewer organisations were doing human resource planning and 
of those that did, only 2 per cent were doing 'advanced' RR planning defined as 
'computerised workforce audits and workforce supply and demand analysis' (p.1473). 
CEOs were more involved in HRM activities in smaller organisations than in medium 
to large organisations. The use of complex staffing techniques and job analysis had 
not changed significantly over the previous four years, but there had been a general 
increase in the use of formal appraisal across all occupational groups (p.1475). The 
link between rewards and performance had also strengthened for executives, middle 
managers and administrative/clerical staff. Other areas which respondents stated were 
receiving more emphasis were induction training, identifying training needs, 
management training, culture change programs, staff skills training, team building and 
competency profiling (p.1480). Missing from this list was the evaluation of HR 
programs and organisational learning initiatives. The authors concluded that human 
resource practices had not been sufficiently related to the changes in the corporate 
strategies of organisations (p.1485). 
The National Wage Cases and restructuring of awards from the late 1980s onwards 
stimulated work on competencies and career structures for lower paid staff with union 
support. In addition, more recently, the FIRM function has been grappling with the 
downsizing, rationalisation, restructuring and devolution of organisations, customer 
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service improvements, participative management changes, TQM, benchmarldng, 
industry best practice, re-engineering of work processes, and a variety of change 
strategies (Stace & Dunphy, 1994). Companies in 1995 were particularly active in 
quality circles and team-building initiatives (Morehead et al., 1997). Outsourcing of 
human resource services was being considered on a major scale in some public 
services, particularly in Victoria (State Government of Victoria, 1994). At the same 
time, modification of compensation systems, especially at lower levels, has also been 
occurring in Australia. According to a survey of HR practitioners in 1995 by Dowling 
and Fisher (1997), the complexity of this agenda seems to be matched by a growth in 
the size of many HR Departments from 1990 to 1995 (as reported by 39 per cent of 
883 senior HR managers), and a rising educational level, with 23 per cent of all 2,795 
HR practitioners surveyed having graduate (post bachelor's) qualifications (p.10). 
Wage Systems in Australia 
The distinction between wages (blue-collar) and salary (white-collar) employees has 
been somewhat artificial in the Australian workforce. Using award coverage as the 
criterion to separate managerial from non-managerial staff is not completely 
satisfactory, as many professional and managerial workers in the public sector have 
their compensation determined by awards. However, for the purpose of this section, 
wage systems are taken to mean the compensation systems of industrial and clerical 
employees paid by an award, collective agreements or enterprise agreements, but 
excluding professional and managerial staff paid by an award, and managers and 
executives who are paid outside the award system ('award free'). The Australian 
Bureau of Statistics has used the 'eligibility to receive overtime' as one way of 
distinguishing managerial from non-managerial employees (ABS, 1991b: Catalogue 
6315.0) — the latter receiving payment whereas the managerial would not for 
working beyond normal contracted hours. 
The 1992 CCH survey (CCH, 1995) sought views on which factors had most 
influence in determining the compensation of employees subject to awards or 
industrial agreements. Table 6.5 shows the rank order of the percentages of 
respondents giving factors a 'very important' rating for their impact on compensation. 
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Table 6.5 
Rating of Importance of Factors Considered in Setting 
Compensation Ranges and Benefit Entitlements: Award/Industrial Agreement 
Positions Only (N=391) 
Factors influencing the setting of compensation 
and benefit levels 
Percentage of 
organisations giving this 
factor very important 
rating 
Rates and conditions in state and federal awards 52 
Organisation's capacity to pay 34 
Enterprise-level bargaining with unions 26 
Job evaluation 12 
General market rates and provisions 11 
The level of job skills or competencies required 11 
The strategic importance of the position to the organisation 10 
Competitors' compensation and benefits policies 8 
Traditional internal relativity within the organisation 8 
Source: Adapted from Table 6, CCH (1995) Human Resource Mangement, Volume 1, Sydney, 
CCH Australia. p.5853. 
Table 6.5 depicts that the award system has the most impact on compensation levels, 
but that the capacity to pay and enterprise bargaining with unions were also 
important. As previously discussed, awards can be state or federal, and typically 
prescribe a fixed pay rate for various occupations and classifications without annual 
increments for service. They also usually include the main elements of the contract of 
employment, hours of work, overtime, shift and penalty rates, annual leave, sick leave, 
various allowances, and the conditions for retrenchment and redundancy. Prior to 
their restructuring in the early 1990s, awards were extremely complex. For example, 
the federal Metal Trades Award had more than 300 pay classifications in 1979, each 
of which had seven pay rates according to location of work site across Australia 
(ACAC, 1979, Print D8906). 
As noted earlier, the award system 'has a much wider application than the degree of 
unionisation' (BCA, 1989:49) because awards may apply to all enterprises, whether 
unionised or not, 'by roping-in [other companies] to federal awards or by common 
rule [setting a state-wide pay rate] in the state jurisdictions' (p.49). In 1985, 85 per 
cent of Australian employees were covered by awards, even though less than half the 
workforce was unionised. An ABS Award Coverage survey of 83,000 employees in 
May 1990 found that award coverage had declined to 80 per cent, with 31.5 per cent 
of employees being covered by federal awards and 46.5 per cent being covered by 
state awards (ABS, 1991 b:Catalogue 6315.0). The major awards with estimated 
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employee coverage as at May, 1990 were: Metal Industry (federal – 185,100); Shop 
Employees (NSW state – 107,500); Clerks (NSW state – 107,500); Commercial 
Clerks (Victorian state – 85,200); and Bank Officials (federal – 76,500) (ABS, 
1991b). The distribution of awards coverage can be summarised as follows: 
award coverage is higher in the public sector compared to the private sector (97.8 per 
cent of employees compared to 72.4 per cent) 
award coverage fell more in the private sector in the years 1985-1990 
in May 1990, 85.7 per cent of non-managerial employees were covered by awards, 
determinations or collective agreements 
for managerial employees, 33.7 per cent were covered by awards. 
(Source: ABS [1991b] Award Coverage Australia,  May 1990, Catalogue No. 6315.0, 1-4) 
The AWIRS 1995 survey of 1,972 workplaces with more than 20 employees found 
that the number of awards per workplace had declined from 3.3 in 1990 to 2.5 in 
1995 (Morehead et al., 1995:519) — as noted earlier. The public sector had a higher 
average number of awards because of its different union structure. The difficulty for 
the employer in reforming a compensation system is that an organisation may be a 
party to a multi-employer award, perhaps with important sections covered by 
company awards/agreements. From the 1970s, however, there was 'substantial 
growth of single-employer awards at both federal and state levels', many of these 
splitting off from multi-employer awards (BCA, 1989:52). For example, all oil 
companies were unified and negotiated an oil industry award. They now have 
individual company and even site awards and agreements. 
An indication of the forms of rewards for employees paid via awards or industrial 
agreements can be gained from the 1992 CCH/AGSM survey (CCIL 1995). The 
results are shown in Table 6.6. The high reliance on a base salary only for wages staff 
is to be expected, as is the low incidence of cash incentives. Callus et al. (1991:44) 
states that most awards in Australia 'are silent on performance or merit-based pay 
schemes' (p.44), but the 1995 AWIRS study (Morehead et al., 1997) registered a 
higher use of performance-based pay schemes for non-managerial employees in 
workplaces with more than 20 employees — 33 per cent (p.530) — compared with 
17 per cent in the CCH/AGSM study. The AWIRS research found that the 
distribution of performance-based compensation varied across industry sectors, being 
more common in wholesale and retail, finance, mining, and property/business services 
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Table 6.6 
Forms of Reward For Wages/Award Employees, 1992 (N=394 organisations) 
Form of Reward Percentage of 
Organisations 
Base Salary Only 77 
Performance-based cash incentives/bonuses • 17 
Performance-based non-cash incentives/bonuses 6 
Non-cash benefits as a component of salary package (e.g. 
housing loans, car) 	 . 
20 
Employee share schemes 16 
Intangible or symbolic forms of recognition 36 
Source: Adapted from CCH (1995) Human Resource Management,  Sydney, CCH, 
Table 7. p.5630. and correspondence with survey author. 
(p.530). Of the workplace performance-related pay schemes for non-managerial staff; 
79 per cent were linked to individual performance, 32 per cent to workgroup 
performance, 15 per cent to workplace performance, 15 per cent to profits, and 23 
per cent to the performance of the whole organisation (Morehead et al., 1997:531). 
Another way in which organisations seek to gain more autonomy in compensation 
systems is to pay above the award rates without industrial tribunal ratification. Over-
award payments can be defined as 'payments in excess of award obligations' 
(Worland, Underhill & Brown, 1994:xiii). In the 1995 AW1RS study, the main 
reasons given by respondents for payments were to reward the merit or skills of an 
employee, seniority, 'or to attract or retain employees' (Morehead et al., 1997:215). 
In about 60 per cent of workplaces, over-award pay was not negotiated but set by 
management; unions become more involved in negotiations in larger enterprises. 
Over-award payments date back to 1945, although rarely were enterprise wage 
increases linked to productive and efficient work practices (EPAC, 1992) or to formal 
performance appraisal. Callus et al. (1991) thus conclude that there is a wide 
diversity of pay systems in Australia, even within the regulated system. They 
continue: 'there are many opportunities for management, either unilaterally or through 
bargaining, to introduce systems which improve pay and conditions beyond prescribed 
awards'(p.47). 
As well as over-award payments, the 1995 AW1RS study used three other main types 
of payment system: award rate only, the workplace or enterprise (collective) 
agreement rate and individual arrangements (Morehead et al., 1997). Where a 
particular method covered more than 60 per cent of the employees in a workplace, it 
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was deemed 'the dominant system' (p.223). The results of the survey are shown in 
Table 6.7. 
Table 6.7 
Dominant Compensation Systems at Workplaces With More Than 20 
Employees, 1995 (N=1810) 
Type of System % Workplaces 
State Awards 25 
Federal Awards 14 
Over-awards 16 
Collective Enterprise Agreement 31 
Individual Arrangements 6 
Mixed 8 
Source: Morehead, A., et al. (1997) Changes at Work — The 1995 Australian 
Workplace Industrial Relations Survey. Melbourne, Longman, p.224. 
Table 6.7 records that the award system was the main basis for compensation in 55 
per cent of workplaces, although enterprise collective agreements were the biggest 
single pay method. The general figures conceal differences between industries. 
Reliance on state awards was most common in education, accommodation and 
restaurants; federal awards were dominant in retail and health and community services 
as well as accommodation and restaurants; over-award payments and individual 
contracts were most frequent in the wholesale trade, while 95 per cent of the 
communications industry workplaces had enterprise agreements as their main 
compensation method (Morehead et al., 1997:535). Controlling for employment size, 
non-union sites were more likely to have over-award pay and individual contracts as 
their main payment forms. Although many enterprise agreements have insulated a 
company from industry movements in wages, and linked pay to productivity, many 
agreements still use many of the provisions of the previous federal 'parent award' 
(DIR, 1996: xxvi). 
Summing up, a new MNE subsidiary based in Australia is faced with a number of 
choices for its wage compensation system. The first decision is whether unions would 
be recognised for bargaining purposes. If they are, the MNE subsidiary would 
probably come under an existing federal award. To give itself flexibility, it could 
attempt to (1) negotiate its own federal company agreement with unions (with 
conditions equivalent or better than the existing award) and have it certified by the 
AIRC, (2) negotiate a series of individual workplace agreements if it has locations 
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across the country and have these certified, (3) opt for an enterprise agreement under 
state legislation in some states, or (4) have informal agreements by negotiating 
conditions which were superior to relevant awards (over-award agreements) outside 
the formal system". 
Salary Systems in Australia 
Salary in this context is taken to mean the compensation paid to managerial staff 
classified by the ABS (199lb:23) as adult managerial, executive, and professional and 
higher supervisory staff. Complexity arises here because as at May 1990, one third of 
managerial and executive employees were covered by state or federal awards (ABS, 
1991b). Two-thirds of managers are remunerated on an 'award-free' basis. 
The research on salary systems in Australia is mainly confined to some early work on 
the use of incentives, some annual surveys by compensation consultants, and the 1992 
CCH/AGSM survey on compensation (CCH, 1995). Early texts on salary 
administration in Australia were mainly prescriptive, rather than descriptive of the 
nature of salary systems existing at the time. Issues such as job evaluation appeared 
in the Australian HR.M literature in the 1950s (see Chandler, 1952), although how this 
would integrate with the award structure was the main question (p.19). In a 1960 
survey of 300 undertakings, GepO (1961) found that 126 of these (42 per cent) 
claimed to have a 'definite salary structure' for executives, that 9.3 per cent used job 
analysis or evaluation, and that 7.6 per cent had pre-determined ranges for executives. 
Braybrook's (1969a; 1969b) survey of 145 manufacturing firms in 1968 sought to 
determine the degree of formalisation of executive salary systems, defined as pre-
arranged classifications for positions, with a stated minimum and maximum range and 
incremental steps. The findings were that informal salary systems existed in 74 per 
cent of firms. Only 8 firms used formal job evaluation, but 90 per cent stated that 
salary levels were based on the worth of the job to the organisation. Gunzburg 
(1971a; 1971b) surveyed executive salaries in 132 non-manufacturing firms and found 
that 52 per cent of the sample paid bonuses. Of the 52 per cent, about one-half used 
' As from 1997, if an MNE did not wish to recognise unions, it could negotiate non-union individual or collective Australian 
Workplace Agreements for major groups of employees and register these with the new Employment Advocate. These have to be 
signed by each individual employee. If the MNE wished to remain totally outside the formal system, it could attempt to negotiate 
in-house in individual contracts for all staff. 
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an established formula to determine the size of the bonus; the remainder used 'ad hoc' 
methods. There was a considerable variation of practice across industry and across 
occupations. 
The current salary practice for award-free managers in Australia includes salary 
grading and ranges, total compensation, salary increase mechanisms, salary 
survey/market comparison procedures and superannuation plans (Riggs, 1989). Job 
evaluation is well entrenched in Australia, as are the international firms of consultants 
like such as Hay, PA Consulting and Towers Perrin. Riggs (1989) in his review of 
salary systems in 1988 stated that organisations were 'increasingly looking for 
integrated approaches to performance management, covering target-setting, appraisal 
and merit review of salaries' (p.8), and widening the ranges of salaries for particular 
positions. Cars were provided to the majority of senior managers on salaries above 
A$50,000 and nearly all CEOs (p.9). The concept of 'total compensation' was 
becoming accepted, and income tax, capital gains tax and the Fringe Benefits Tax 
(FBT) all influenced compensation components. Incentives for senior managers were 
becoming more common, but little progress was noted in gain-sharing schemes in 
1988, and there was also scope for more employee share plans. In the same year, 
senior executives' pay had to be disclosed in company annual reports because of 
federal government legislation. 
In a similar annual review of salaries in 1990, Jankelson (1990) noted increasing 
differentiation in salary increases between the lowest and highest paid employees in 
the late 1980s. The flattening of organisations had put pressure on traditional job 
evaluation systems, but the Hay Consultants' survey had detected a greater use of 
bonuses, profit-sharing and target-based incentives (p.32). Despite FBT, the range 
and value of benefits had not changed greatly between 1986 to 1989. 
O'Neill and Clark (1990:3) considered the major influences on executive 
compensation for the early 1990s to be 'taxation, executive wealth creation, social 
and political scrutiny and the link with performance' (p.3). They argued that FBT 
would result in a reduction in employee benefits for executives and a 'move back 
towards cash' (salary and bonuses/incentives) (p.4). This would be accompanied by 
more equity participation by executives, continued scrutiny of executive salary levels 
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by the media, and more compensation 'at risk'. Executives in Australia had received 
regular annual increases in compensation based on the cost-of-living, and market 
trends. Up to the 1960s, salary rises had also usually flowed on from the NWC 
increases. During the high inflation of the 1970s. salary enhancements were expected 
to preserve real income (p.13). Executive salary systems had largely been based on 
internal equity, external competitiveness, developing personal motivation and ease of 
administration (p.15). The main weakness of this approach had been its inward-
looking nature (p.16). 
The final source of data on salary systems is the CCH/AGSM survey (CCH, 1995) of 
394 organisations in the public and private sectors. Table 6.8 shows the form of 
reward for middle and senior management. 
Table 6.8 
Forms of Reward for Middle and Senior Management, 
December, 1992 (N=394 organisations) 
Form of Reward Senior 
Management 
Per Cent 
Middle 
Management 
Per Cent 
Base Salary Only 46 61 
Performance-based cash incentives/bonuses 44 32 
Performance-based non-cash incentives/bonuses 
(e.g. travel) 
10 7 
Non-cash benefits as a component of salary package 
(e.g. housing loans, cars) 
89 72 
Employee share schemes 24 19 
Source: Adapted from CCH(1995) Human Resource Management, Sydney, 1995, Table 7, 
p.5854, and correspondence with the survey author. 
From Table 6.8 can be seen the Australian reliance on various kinds on incentives. 
The non-cash benefits appear high at first glance, but the car is a common employee 
benefit at these levels. As mentioned earlier, the 1992 CCH/AGSM survey (CCH, 
1995) noted that job evaluation was used by 57 per cent of organisations, with 40 per 
cent of these stating that 'objectivity' was the main reason for its use, followed by 
'allowing central group control' (26 per cent), 'allowing comparisons' (25 per cent), 
and 'simplifying decision making' (17 per cent) (p.5631). 
The changing context for salary systems is likely in future to concentrate on (1) 
individual and team performance rather than on job worth, (2) results and 
contribution, (3) competitive total pay, (4) internal relativities based on a combination 
of accountability, contribution and knowledge, and (5) broader-band grade structures 
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with broader pay zones (Cullen Egan Dell Ltd., 1995). As salary earners are award 
and trade union free, employers have more scope and freedom to design system for 
them, but there is ample evidence that the economic and legal external environments, 
in particular, can have a dramatic effect on salary practices. 
Employee Benefits in Australia 
The definition of an employee benefit is problematical, but to indicate the scale of 
benefits in Australia, the ABS definition (ABS, 1993a) is used, being 
concessions, allowances or other privileges received by or provided to employees in their main 
job in addition to wages or salary while the employees were working for their current 
employer (p. 23). 
A national survey of employment benefits by the ABS in 1992 gave the percentages of 
the permanent and casual employees who received particular benefits, as shown in 
Table 6.9. The table demonstrates the four widely paid benefits for permanent staff 
superannuation, holiday leave, sick leave and long service leave. Federal legislation 
was passed in 1992 with a view to extending superannuation to all employees not 
covered by superannuation via an award. Holiday and sick leave entitlements are in 
awards and state legislation. Long service leave is usually incorporated in state 
legislation and in the Metal Industry (Long Service Leave) Award, which forms the 
basis for all other federal long service leave awards (CCH, 1995:10,651). After these 
four, the distribution of benefits drops dramatically. Discount priced goods or 
services were available to 17.8 per cent of employees, and assistance with travel to 
work costs or the provision of a car applied to 17 per cent. Paid or subsidised 
telephone expenses are provided to 9 per cent of the workforce, but the rest of the 
table shows a limited range of provision, possibly due to the existence of the Fringe 
Benefits Tax (FBT). Unlike Singapore, employer-provided private health benefits are 
not common in Australia because of the Medicare (national health) system to which 
each employee contributes a percentage of salary. The ABS defines a casual 
employee as someone not entitled to holiday leave or sick leave (ABS, 1993a:23). 
Table 6.9 shows that apart from discounted goods and services and subsidised 
transport, the entitlements for casual staff are usually considerably lower than those 
for permanent employees. 
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Table 6.9 
Type of Benefit Received by Permanent and Casual Employees, 
Australia, August 1992 
Type of Benefit Received Permanent 
Employees 
Proportion Per Cent 
Casual Employees 
Proportion Per 
Cent 
Superannuation 90.5 40.5 
Holiday leave 98.2 - 
Sick leave 98.0 - 
Long service leave 82.3 5.1 
Goods or services 17.8 18.6 
Transport 18.6 9.6 
Telephone 9.0 6.3 
Holiday expenses 4.6 0.7 
Medical 4.0 0.6 
Housing 3.3 2.7 
Low-interest finance 3.7 0.4 
Study leave 3.1 2.1 
Shares 3.2 1.3 
Union dues/professional association. 3.1 1.5 
Electricity 2.2 3.0 
Entertainment allowance 2.2 0.2 
Club fees 1.7 0.5 
Child-care/education expenses 0.3 0.1 
No benefits - 42.0 
Source: Adapted from Table 9 of ABS (1993a) Employment Benefits Australia August 1992. 
Canberra, Catalogue No. 6334.0 ABS, p.12. 
Note: The permanent employees are estimated to be 4,913,300, and the casuals. 1,262.800. 
Under the Fringe Benefit Tax Assessment Act 1986, employers now have to pay tax 
on certain employee benefits provided to employees. FBT is payable whether a 
company is making profits or not. The three options for the employer are to pay the 
FBT in full, in part, or to cost it into the employee's package so that the employee 
bears the total cost. The most popular packaged benefits for senior executives, 
according to Cullen, Egan, Dell Ltd., in order of frequency are company cars (95 per 
cent), salary-sacrificed superannuation (80 per cent), home telephone expenses (46 
per cent), private health insurance (37 per cent), second company car (32 per cent), 
and extra life insurance (32 per cent) (Ferguson & Lawrence, 1997:40). 
Summing up, executive ranks have traditionally received more benefits than industrial 
employees, and part-time and casual staff have received fewer benefits than permanent 
employees. Legislation and award provisions provide minimum conditions for all 
employees, but employers can exceed these standards. While superannuation has 
been one of the main employee benefits alongside annual leave, sick leave and long 
service leave, its coverage of employees has also been very uneven, a fault which is 
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now being rectified to encourage more savings in the economy and to provide for the 
greater numbers retiring in an ageing workforce. 
A Comment on the External Environment and Australian Compensation 
Like the previous chapter on Singapore, this section makes some preliminary 
observations about the possible influence of the external environment on the design of 
compensation systems of an MINE subsidiary in Australia. 
Historical Influences on Compensation 
As in Singapore, there are some principles of compensation design which have 
emerged historically and become entrenched into IIRM practice. We noted that 
Aboriginal customs played no part in modern compensation in Australia, and that the 
arrival of the British and other settlers and subsequent industrialisation led to 
government involvement in compensation standards and the setting up of tribunals to 
determine awards. Although not discussed in the chapter, the main compensation 
principles in the Australian Public Service were adopted from the British Civil 
Service, namely, pay according to a salary classification for job duties and the skills 
required to do them, pay for length of service and maintenance of job relativities. In 
the private sector, non-award managerial staff appear to have been subject to informal 
systems and, since the 1970s, job-evaluated structures with performance bonuses in 
larger organisations. The award (wages) staff were mainly paid a rate for the job, 
with incentives being applied in some industries such as textiles and sheep shearing. 
Tribunals pushed the principle of equal pay for comparable work across an industry or 
occupation. Maintenance of relativities is also a feature of awards, especially between 
the trades and the unskilled workforce. Only recently have these bases been 
challenged by the desire to pay for skills obtained. 
As the AWIRS research (Callus et al., 1991: 27) posits, we do not know whether 
MNEs import head office HRM practices into Australia on a major scale, but the 
industrial relations system would constrain the choice of system. One could 
hypothesise, therefore, that historically, MINE subsidiaries have had to operate within 
the existing industrial relations framework and design their compensation accordingly. 
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One could also suggest that past compensation practice in MNEs has probably tended 
to follow national design norms, particularly at the lower levels. 
Legislation and MNE Compensation 
We acknowledged that employers in Australia are subject to both state and federal 
legislation. The legislation that indirectly affects MINE compensation is that which 
defines the range and criteria of possible agreements that can be ratified by industrial 
tribunals and union recognition and rights. Income tax, Fringe Benefits Tax and 
superannuation legislation have a more direct impact. If an MINE is large, it is likely 
that unions will seek recognition and bargaining rights via the award system. The 
MINE then has the choice of paying its relevant employees on either state and/or 
federal industry awards or on enterprise agreements. The smaller MINE May not have 
union representation, but will still need to observe any minima in relevant awards for 
that industry or occupation. There is more flexibility with non-award staff, but federal 
and state laws between them set minimum standards for annual leave, long service 
leave, equal pay and minimum wage entitlements. The specific impact of state (as 
opposed to federal) legislation on the MINE, of course, depends on which state the 
MINE is located in. Legislation up to 1995 provided various compensation options 
for the MINE: (1) negotiation of a company agreement with a union above the award 
system safety net levels and registered with the AIRC, (2) negotiation of a series of 
individual workplace agreements with a union, again certified by the AIRC, (3) 
reaching an enterprise agreement under the states' (as opposed to the federal) 
systems, (4) completion of a non-union collective agreement under strict constraints, 
(5) concluding an informal collective agreement possibly with over-award payments 
or, finally, (6) negotiating individual employee contracts. Unless the MINE adopts 
individual contracts for all employees, the inevitable effect of the legislation and 
current decisions of the AIRC is that the MNE is likely to have at least two 
compensation systems within its boundaries. Of the total of the 1,987 Australian 
workplaces surveyed with more than 20 employees, only 25 per cent had only one 
compensation system in 1995 (Morehead et al., 1997:223). 
The Economy and MNE Compensation 
The operation of the economy has inevitably affected the level of compensation paid 
to employees in MNEs in Australia. In the recession of the early 1980s and early 
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1990s, it was not uncommon for organisations to restrict pay increases. What is not 
so clear is whether the economy affects the internal structure of compensation. One 
key goal of the decentralisation of compensation agreements is a closer link between 
pay and workplace productivity. The MNE, as argued before, cannot be isolated 
from the host nation labour market, which, in turn, is affected by the state of the 
economy. The economy does not directly affect the compensation design, but 
according to the state of the economy at the time, governments, the AIRC, other 
employers, and unions, will make policy decisions that will eventually influence the 
decisions of MNEs in establishing appropriate compensation levels and systems to 
maximise their performance. 
The Unions and MNE Compensation 
Union coverage in an MNE is dependent on its union recognition policy, the type of 
industry in which the MNE operates, and the unions that claim to be eligible to recruit 
members in the organisation. A registered union is required, as a condition of its 
registration, to specify its coverage of occupations and industries in its rules. The 
interpretation of these rules is sometimes the cause of jurisdictional and demarcation 
disputes between unions. The eligibility rules of a union define the type of employee 
for whom the union may obtain an award. As discussed before, the larger the 
workplace, the more likely it is to be unionised and to have high numbers of unions 
represented. (Callus et al., 1991). The MNE has a choice of belonging to an 
employer association or not to assist with industrial relations. If it is small, it may 
prefer an employer association to negotiate on its behalf If it joins an employer 
association that is a party to a federal award, then any national industrial agreement 
will be binding on the MNE as well. We accepted that the AlRC decisions and 
principles, together with federal and state industrial relations legislation, set the 
context within which industrial relations at the workplace occur. Nevertheless, apart 
from the constraints of awards, legislation and union presence, the MNE has an 
almost unlimited choice in the style of industrial relations it wishes to foster in the 
workplace. 
The Australian Industrial Relations Commission and MNE Compensation 
Unlike the National Wages Council in Singapore, whose deliberations are private and 
whose recommendations are made to the Singaporean Government (which is party to 
243 
the deliberations along with employers and unions), the main incomes policy 
principles in Australia have come from the decisions of the AIRC. As discussed 
earlier, the decisions are made as a result of submissions put to the AIRC by the 
government, employers and unions in an open tribunal setting, leaving the government 
with only indirect influence on the outcome. Nevertheless, the decisions on 
occupational and industrial awards and national wage principles of the AIRC have 
traditionally taken into account the state of the economy, and in times of crisis, the 
government has asked the AIRC to freeze award increases for a period. We have 
noted, however, that a majority of employers (including MNEs) will augment 
centrally negotiated agreements with over-award payments and performance pay 
schemes, and more recently, have negotiated separate workplace agreements in 
breaking free from awards. In addition, since non-award staff such as managers are 
not subject to award provisions, employers have a freer hand in determining their 
conditions of service within the legal parameters. 
National Culture and MNE Compensation 
It was concluded that the research on culture and work values in Australia is rather 
sparse. The culture was mainly European, with a number of sub-cultures, and with an 
acceptance of the capitalist system coupled with an expectation that the government 
would cater for the underprivileged. Trompenaars's (1994:18) research found that 
Australians were evenly divided on their perception of a company as a 'system 
designed to perform functions and tasks in an efficient way' or 'as a group of people 
working together'. However, Australians were shown to have a high Individualism 
dimension, although not as high as American and Canadian populations. Australians 
scored highest of all nations in suggesting that a leader should get a job done rather 
than being a father figure, preferred flatter organisations, and had the highest 
percentage of respondents of all countries who would not voluntarily help their boss 
to paint his/her house at the weekend (p.87). 
On the Hofstede (1980) measures, it was pointed out that Australia was rated 
moderately low on Power Distance, moderately weak for Uncertainty Avoidance, 
moderately high for Masculinity and high on an Individualism ranking. The suggested 
compensation strategies of Hodgetts and Luthans (1993b) for host country managers 
were that with lower Power Distances, there should be smaller gaps between highest 
and lowest paid. As senior Australian executives are paid considerably less than their 
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overseas counterparts, and as the award system was built on pay comparability 
principles, culture may play a part. Hodgetts and Luthans (1993b) also posit that with 
a moderately weak Uncertainty Avoidance score, compensation should be more 
closely linked to organisational performance. The 'capacity to pay' was a factor in 
early decisions of industrial tribunals, and on a macro level, the ARC has considered 
the effect of pay rises on the economy. However, the tribunal system has awarded 
general industrial or occupational rises, and individual employers in an industry 
(including IVINTEs) have had to cope extra costs outside their control. Rises for 
executives have probably been more closely correlated with organisational 
performance. Despite high Individualism in Australian society, the award system has 
stressed equal compensation for similar occupations. Tribunals and unions have not 
heavily supported incentives, although there has been an increase in the use of 
performance-based pay. One suspects this may be mainly due to economic 
competition than to culture. 
As noted earlier, there is a trend in Australia towards linking compensation to formal 
appraisal of individual performance, putting more compensation at risk and linking 
compensation to organisational performance. While it is tempting to postulate that 
these trends are the result of changing values in Australian society, the problem is to 
'discover what it is that links societal and economic change to management practice' 
(Tyson, 1995:47). Compensation policies are obviously not pre-determined by the 
values of a society, but, as Tyson (1995) argues, are probably due rather to the 
interaction of the perceptions of management to what is changing, the variables at 
organisational level such as the market share and ideology of management, and the 
perceptions of the workforce 'deriving from group norms, concepts of justice, fairness 
and reciprocity' (p.48). At the wages level, in particular, it is also very difficult to 
ignore the institutional factors which impact on the employer. Perhaps, like 
Singapore, Australian values affecting compensation may be more clearly reflected in 
the small firm, where the industrial constraints are less. 
Concluding Summary 
This chapter has summarised the main features of the external environment in 
Australia that might influence the compensation systems of Australian or non- 
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Australian MINE subsidiaries located in Australia. It has particularly noted the 
differences in pay systems between managerial and non-managerial staff, or, more 
specifically, between those subject to the award system and those who are not. While 
legislation such as the Fringe Benefits Tax and the Superannuation Guarantee Levy 
has caused employers to review their compensation systems, employers can devise 
strategies either to become involved with unions and the industrial tribunal system or 
to attempt to opt out. Despite the regulation, employers have adopted flexible 
approaches to facilitate their compensation goals. The role of national culture in 
impacting on Australian compensation is more problematical. While some features of 
the compensation systems applying in Australia could arguably be explained by the 
Australian national culture, the legal and industrial relations institutions have been 
very influential in the past. The extent to which national culture impacts on the 
operations of these institutions is, of course, a possible area for future research. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE OTLCO COMPANIES 
Oilco Australia 
Company Background of Oileo Australia 
Oilco Australia was a holding company for all Oilco companies in Australia. Its 
origins in Australia date back to the beginning of the century, but the present name 
was not registered until the 1920s. It became locally incorporated in the 1960s. Its 
interests covered upstream oil and gas, crude oil production/refining, exploration and 
sale of natural gas, coal mining and retailing of down stream oil. It divested itself of 
chemicals and metals divisions in the 1990s leaving exploration, gas, oil and coal as its 
main businesses. Oilco was wholly owned by two European parents, each of which 
owned parts of Oilco in Australia. Oilco Australia, in turn, had some wholly owned 
affiliates and joint ventures. Its labour force was just under 5,500 by the beginning of 
1995. The refinery used for comparison began operating in the 1950s and in 1995 
employed about 600 employees. The terminal installation opened at the start of the 
century and had a staff of about 350 in 1995. The head office was based in 
Melbourne and contained a number of operating departments and corporate 
employees, numbering about 1000. The group parent multinational Oilco (based in 
Europe) operated in more than 100 nations with more than 130,000 employees, of 
whom more than 5,000 were expatriates working outside their home country. 
Organisation of Oilco Australia 
Oilco Australia was a separate operating company of the corporate Oilco MNE. It 
had a board consisting of a chairperson/CEO and four executive directors (including a 
finance and a personnel director), and one non-executive director. Reporting to them 
were four general managers, the finance controller, the corporate treasurer, and 
company secretary. The manager of the refinery for this study reported to a general 
manager; the terminal manager reported to a head office marketing manager who, in 
turn, reported to a director. At the end of 1982, Oilco Australia had 5807 employees. 
By the conclusion of 1991, this had risen to 6965 staff, but through 'downsizing' and 
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`delayering' in the early 1990s, had declined to 5431 by the close of 1994. The 
company had between seven and eight reporting levels from the lowest employee to 
the chairperson although there was a distinction between reporting and salary levels. 
Prior to negotiating enterprise agreements, Oilco reduced the number of reporting 
levels in its business units, made greater use of contractors, and established the team 
approach on a wider scale especially in refineries. By the end of 1995, there were 14 
different salary levels from the chairperson to the lowest clerical/administrative person 
paid on the non-award salary structure. According to a manager interviewed, 
The company was originally perceived by employees as a 'cradle to grave' organisation and 
most employees joined with a view to staying for a long time. However, in the last 10 years. 
the turnover has increased with downsizing and employees are now moving more frequently 
between jobs. 
Production Technology of Oilco Australia 
The refinery processed crude oil feedstock which arrived by pipeline and sea from 
Australian, Middle East and South East Asian fields. Refining starts with primary 
distillation and then progresses to middle distillation and secondary processing. The 
occupational composition therefore included chemists, accountants, engineers, 
instrument mechanics, fitters, electricians, boilermakers, riggers, industrial relations 
and health specialists, training personnel, and refinery operators. The products from 
the refinery were sent by pipelines to the terminal which, in turn, resold them to 
commercial and industrial users, to service stations and petrol distributors. Products 
were also sent by road and rail to other Australian destinations, and by ship to 
overseas markets. There was large capital investment across the company, 
particularly in upstream activities, joint ventures, new products, processing 
technology and computerised instrumentation for monitoring. Recent innovations 
were the further automation of blending systems and vehicle on-board computers. 
Mission and Objectives of Oilco Australia 
Oilco Australia did not have a corporate publicised mission or vision statement, but 
did have general objectives, stated in its annual reports, which were 'to engage safely, 
efficiently, profitably and responsibly in the oil, gas ... and coal businesses', to seek 'a 
high standard of performance' and to 'maintain a long-term position in these business 
sectors'. It specified four areas of responsibility: to shareholders, customers, 
employees, and to society. Its statement of general business principles also supported 
a market economy, and the voluntary codes of conduct for MNEs, namely the OECD 
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Declaration and Guidelines for International Investment and Multinational Enterprises 
and the ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles. The company had a strong 
corporate philosophy and clear business targets which 'cascaded' down into the 
business groups. A Corporate Planning Group coordinated sector business plans for 
the corporate business plan. This operated on cycles, and the strategy appraisal 
review was for 20 years ahead. There was also a country plan for five years ahead 
plus the twelve-month operating plan. This applied world-wide and was part of the 
parent MINE Oilco culture. 
HRMUIR Organisation of Oilco Australia 
The human resource management function was headed by an executive director and 
had formal personnel policy manuals which covered all locations. The policies 
covered the full range of FIRM/IR practices including compensation and job 
evaluation. According to a manager interviewed, 
The [HRM] policies are a set of guidelines on things like leave, cars and study, but they are 
not a set of black and white rules, as line managers have flexibility to move within these — it 
is their money. 
Oilco Australia tried to get personnel policy recognised as a line fiinction, owned by 
the line management. Each business group had its own business plan and the role of 
FIRM was to support this. A team of personnel development managers (PDMs) 
assisted in the interpretation of policy, but the outcome was really what the line 
manager wanted to do. Some personnel policies were unique to a location although 
most personnel policies, especially those relating to compensation, were very 
centralised in the company. 
The FIRM director had health and safety advisers, employee relations, information 
technology, corporate services, and a team of personnel development managers 
(PDMs) reporting to him. The PDMs provided the FIRM expertise for business 
groups and incorporated some state HRM advisers. The corporate head office PDM 
was the senior PDM, and although he/she did not supervise the other PDMs, the brief 
was to coordinate their work, particularly the career planning of senior staff and those 
with potential for senior appointments. These were the top 50-60 jobs in the 
company. The PDMs' role was to support the line and to facilitate career and 
succession planning. There was no corporate training function, as this was handled by 
external consultants and was recognised as a line function. There were, however, 
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training officers in the refinery for technical training. The refinery had two personnel 
staff who were advisers to the line management in handling personnel issues and 
grievances before they became disputes. These staff worked closely with the 
corporate employee relations staff. 
The Employee Relations function (reporting to the Personnel Director) was 
comprised of four sub-functions: (1) a business performance consultancy, (2) a head 
office administrative issues unit, (3) a personnel services group which covered award 
and non-award head office staff recruitment, compensation reviews and surveys for 
2000 employees, the management of expatriates, and human resources planning and 
information systems, and (4) a management and graduate recruitment unit. The 
industrial relations function devised the compensation strategy mainly for the 
unionised workforce in refineries, terminals, mines and airports. Reporting to the 
Personnel Director, it had the closest links with full-time union officials and the AIRC, 
and included a team of senior IR specialists who were close to the manufacturing 
function. 
Decisions regarding changes to the salary system came from the Remuneration 
Manager with a recommendation to the Personnel Director and ultimately to the 
Chairperson of Oilco Australia. Approval from the European headquarters of the 
MNE was not necessary. Decisions regarding the policy toward award paid 
employees came from the IR specialists who liaised with the Remuneration Manager 
at corporate head office. With enterprise agreements, bargaining occurred at site level 
between management and employee representatives, but the company negotiators 
were guided by the head office specialists particularly before outcomes were finalised. 
Unionisation of Oilco Australia 
Management and senior administrative staff were not unionised in Oilco Australia. 
Some secretarial and clerical staff belonged to the Australian Municipal, 
Administrative, Clerical and Services Union (AMACSU) (formerly the Federated 
Clerks Union[FCUD. The main union presence in the head office was the AMACSU. 
All other non-salaried employees (non-classified) belonged to unions as a condition of 
their employment. The main unions represented at the refinery and the terminal were 
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the AWU—FIMEE Amalgamated Union', the CEEEPPASUA 2, and the Automotive, 
Food, Metals and Engineering Union. The operators at the refinery belonged to the 
AWU—FIMEE, and there were a few drivers who belonged to the Transport Workers' 
Union of Australia (TWU). 
Award negotiations in the oil industry have traditionally been handled between trade 
unions, the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU), the oil industry companies 
working together, and Oileo employee relations staff This system was replaced with 
local enterprise agreements that resulted in more negotiations between managers and 
employee representatives. The refinery had its own enterprise agreements for 
operators and trades employees, as opposed to federal oil industry agxeements.lco 
will eventually have a number of individual enterprise agreements to manage, but the 
strategic considerations were coordinated by the head office industrial relations staff. 
The main aim of the enterprise agreements was to obtain flexibility and multi-skilling 
and to have an 'all salaried workforce' with 'all inclusive salaries' for refinery and 
terminal staffs. The terminal operated a 100 per cent union membership agreement3 
with the same trade unions as for the refinery except for a greater membership of 
drivers in the TWU, and the operators' membership of the National Union of 
Storeworkers, Packers, Rubber and Allied Workers (NUW). An Oilco company-wide 
agreement was negotiated for all terminals in the company. 
Industrial Staff Compensation in Oilco Australia 
Introduction 
As one interviewed manager put it: 
I think you can divide industrial relations in the Australian oil industry into three main 
phases: pre-1974 was the era of chaos; 1974-90 was the era of centralism, and post-1990 
came the era of enterprise agreements. 
Prior to 1974, compensation for the industrial employees was determined by a 
patchwork of oil industry-wide awards and agreements. There was a mixture of 
company awards, industry agreements and single-site agreements. The various 
approaches allowed unions to push for the flow-on of any new rate or feature to other 
oil companies. In the 1970s, oil companies worked together to centralise 
1 Australian Workers Union—Federation of Industrial. Manufacturing and Engineering Employees 
2 Communii=tions, EleriaI, Eledronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia) 
3 	. Since 1996, legislation has made closed shops illegal in Australia. 
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negotiations, and from the late 1970s to the 1980s, sought uniform rates and 
conditions across the industry. It was a device to meet the requirements of AIRC 
principles, but created rigidities when individual oil companies tried to change work 
practices, technology, products and culture. All oil companies were respondents to 
the same eight principal federal oil company awards negotiated by the Central Forum 
of oil companies, the ACTU and national union representatives. 
With the decentralisation of industrial relations in Australia, to overcome the 
inflexibilities, discussions began in the late 1980s to move to company-based award 
compensation systems. The Oil Industry Forum met in May 1991 and agreed that the 
industry should progress to company awards for each refinery, company awards for 
terminals, a restructured Transport Workers' Award, company awards for clerical 
staff and retain paid rates awards; superannuation was left as an individual company 
matter. In the change to enterprise agreements, Oilco adopted a dual strategy. The 
head office specialists had to design the appropriate frameworks for the change (`the 
top—down approach') whereas the line management at local level had to sell the 
concepts of linking pay to efficiency and productivity at the enterprise level ('the 
bottom—up approach'). 
Operators' Compensation in Oilco Australia 
Beginning the story in 1972, the refinery operators of Oilco had their own award with 
the company. The award had nine categories of operator, but did not define the way 
an employee moved from one grade to the next. The top rate was A$108.60 per 
week, and the lowest A$80.60 per week. Another increase of about $5 per week was 
given 12 months later. Various allowances were provided for cleaning boilers or 
flues, working in confined spaces, dirty work, heights, hot places and wet places. 
Hours of work were 40 per week, and shifts were not to exceed 8 hours. Shift 
allowances ranged form 15 to 50 per cent, and annual leave was 28 days. In 1976, a 
length of service allowance was introduced for service exceeding 6 months and 2 and 
5 years. Regular rises were given throughout the 1970s following the National Wage 
Cases, but the wage structure for operators in the oil industry was revised in 1980 in 
the federal Australian Workers' Union (AWU) (Oil Companies) Award (AIRC Print 
E6843). This agreement was part of the process of having a totally integrated 
national wage structure for all oil companies. In this, operators were divided into 
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three categories: Head Operator (5 grades), Senior Operator (4 grades) and Operator 
(6 grades). The work for each grade for each oil company was defined in the award 
and the principle of a rate for the job applied. The AWU (Oil Companies) Award 
with its three operator classifications was revised in line with NWC wage increases in 
the early 1980s (see AlRC Prints E8258, E8259 and F1263). 
Minor revisions to the AWU (Oil Companies) Award were made from time to time, 
but in 1986, the difficulty of applying the three-tiered operator structure across all 
companies in the oil industry surfaced in the AlRC (AMC Print G3115). Companies 
were grading work differently: some were grading the work itself, others were 
awarding higher grades to individuals based on their job knowledge. A joint working 
party under the auspices of the ACTU studied all the operator jobs and the gradings 
of the majority were agreed. New definitions for operators were confirmed, with the 
refinery of Oilco being used as a benchmark. The AMC approved the new structure, 
which resulted in some operators being upgraded and others downgraded. The pay 
rates for the operators were adjusted in line with the National Wage Cases increases 
from 1987-91 (AIRC Prints 06457, G8215, H2234, H8843, H8463, K0667 and 
G6917). Definitions of the operators' jobs were revised because of changing 
technology, but the three-tiered structure of Head Operator, Senior Operator and 
Operator was preserved. 
In January 1992, after much negotiation, Oilco agreed to a new two-year enterprise 
agreement with the unions under the patronage of the AIRC for the refinery selected 
for this study. The agreement had some unique aspects relating to the refinery, but 
also drew on industry standards for conditions such length of the working week. 
Operator and firefighting jobs were reorganised, and production employees were 
classified by the technical, process, business and team competencies they possessed. 
In other words, pay for skill had replaced pay for the job, and operators had to work 
in any job for which they were qualified. The wage structure had six operator 
categories, the competencies being specified for each, plus two levels of General 
Service Operators and a trainee's rate. Progression to at least level 3 was 
compulsory, but advancement in the structure beyond that was voluntary (i.e. taking 
on further training was optional). The production function was reorganised on a team 
basis, with the shift roles being team leader, panel operator and field operator; this 
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was done to gain flexibility and reduce overtime. There was also a suggestion in the 
award that operators undertake some engineering maintenance and laboratory testing. 
Employee compensation was changed to a monthly pay system in which the pay was 
transferred into their bank accounts through electronic funds transfer. This award, 
with rates adjusted annually, applied at the end of 1995. The operators had a choice 
of taking the overall increase given to staff (non-award) employees as a result of 
surveys and economic indicators, or negotiating their own rise with the company. 
Engineering Employees' Compensation in Oilco Australia 
Before the advent of enterprise agreements, the engineering trades maintenance 
employees operated under the oil industry federal award (Engineering [Oil 
Companies] Award) (AIRC Print H8977) at Oilco's refinery and terminal. The basis 
for compensation was rate for the job plus an allowance for length of service. Like 
the operators, the unions were eager to have an award that covered the entire oil 
industry in order to get consistency of wage rates. This award continued until 1988, 
when the AIRC National Wage restructuring principles caused a change in strategy. 
By August 1989, a new Engineering (Oil Companies) Award 1988 was ratified by the 
AIRC (AIRC Print H8977). Binding on all the oil companies, the award defined the 
various trade positions and the qualifications required to be termed 'special class' in 
trades which were paid more highly. Additional payments were granted for post-trade 
certificates and length of service. As with the operators, Oilco had considerably 
redesigned trades work in order to justify wage increases under the principles of the 
AJRC, the Commission recognising in 1992 that individual oil company awards were 
the trend for the future. 
A separate Oilco award for the engineering workers at the refinery was subsequently 
ratified by the AJRC in August 1993. In that award, engineering posts were divided 
into five career streams: mechanical fitting, boilermaking, instrumentation, electrical 
and 'stars' (amalgamated non-trades). Staff were paid on five levels according to 
their qualifications and demonstrated competencies. The award expressed in great 
detail the duties for each category, together with the necessary technical certificates, 
completed courses and assessed competencies for each duty. It also documented 
team coordination payments for duties for the teams such as scheduling priorities, 
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work rosters, running safety meetings and handling team difficulties. The heart of the 
new award was flexibility of work arrangements, incentives to develop further specific 
skills, rewarding responsibility for team performance and allowing individuals a choice 
of career options within their base trade. Progression through the classification 
structure depended on being assessed as competent to perform at the higher level. 
The pay rates were subsequently updated in 1995 and 12-hour continuous shifts were 
being trialled up to January 1996. The 1995 award was in force in 1996. 
Laboratory, Transport, Stores and Packing Personnel Compensation 
The laboratory employees at the refinery originally had their compensation included in 
the general Australian Workers' Union (Oil Companies) Award and later in a 
Laboratory Employees' (Oil Companies) Award (AIRC Print G1006). The 
classifications, in ascending order, were laboratory trainee, assistant, analyst and 
officer. The pay was expressed as a weekly sum plus one allowance based on length 
of service and another for staff supervision duties. With the introduction of enterprise 
agreements, Oilco redesigned jobs in the refinery's laboratory operations with a view 
to increasing flexibility and efficiency, and providing a better career path. The MINE 
had a new Oilco Refinery Laboratory Employees' Award ratified in 1992. The new 
award placed the laboratory staff on to the monthly payroll and divided the work into 
routine and development functions. Jobs were placed into seven levels, including the 
trainee role, with fixed annual salaries. Duties and qualifications for each level were 
specified. By 1995, the annual revision of pay rates was being prescribed in the 
overall refinery award 
By contrast, since at least 1980, drivers and other transport workers in the Oilco 
Australia refinery and the terminal have been covered by a separate national 
agreement in the oil industry, namely the Transport Workers' (Oil Companies) Award 
(AIRC Print E6358). The philosophy of the wage system was pay for the job, with 
different rates for different types of vehicle driven. For example, the base rate for a 
driver at one refinery was A$308.10 per week for a vehicle not exceeding 1.25 tonnes 
capacity. This was raised to A$339.40 per week if the vehicle had between 3 and 6 
tonnes capacity. Various allowances were also added for the type of product being 
carried by the vehicle. Apart from the rate for the job, extra compensation was 
provided for length of service — the stepped duration for recognition being 6 months 
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to 2 years, 2 to 3 years, 3 to 5 years, and over 5 years — the standard clause for the 
industry. This transport structure remained unchanged through the 1980s, only the 
rates being revised in line with NWC increases (see AJRC Prints G5957, G8920, 
H2881 and H8839). 
In the early 1990s, compensation rates for the industry were again raised and 
approved by the AIRC; the use of the job as the basis for pay and length of service 
allowances were retained (see AMC Prints K1925 and J7611). However, the 1992 
Award (AMC Print L0306) marked a change in approach by the ARC because it 
omitted wage rates. The rates had to be negotiated at the enterprise level in certified 
agreements, but these agreements had to apply in conjunction with the Transport 
Workers' (Oil Companies) Award. The AIRC was thus reluctant to grant increases in 
an award that applied to the whole oil industry, and the adoption of local certified 
agreements was a strategy to get around this. This recognised that the degree of 
decentralisation of wage setting that was occurring. 
The position as at the end of 1995 was that the Transport Workers (Oil Companies) 
Award was divided into two parts — part 1 applying to drivers, and part 2 to 
transport workers working at airports. Enterprise agreements applied to each part 
because these areas of operation were separate businesses. Since 1992, the industry 
agreement had been supplemented by two Oilco certified agreements which 
incorporated the wage rates, one for airport operations and the other for fleet driving 
for refineries and terminals. The Oilco Fleet Operations Agreement adopted a 10- 
classification structure that absorbed many of the previous allowances paid to drivers, 
eliminated pay for length of service and combined several rates. Drivers were paid 
according to the type of vehicle they drove — ranging from forklift driving to triple 
road trains — and were thus skill-based to some extent. The parties to the agreement 
acknowledged the need for flexibility and for drivers to be trained to perform minor 
maintenance. Each terminal would have small local agreements to this end. The 
preservation of the remaining oil industry award for all transport workers was due to 
the attitude of the TWU, the fact that each oil company operated out of each other's 
terminals, and the existence of joint ventures at airports. This made it more 
appropriate for Oilco to stay with the existing award. 
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Finally, the terminal operating staff such as store persons, packers, blenders and plant 
operators were covered by the National Union of Storeworkers, Packers, Rubber and 
Allied Workers (NUW) and were previously paid under the provisions of the 
Storemen and Packers (Oil Companies) Award, which applied to all oil companies. A 
new separate Oilco company one-year award was ratified by the AIRC in May 1992, 
the basis of which was pay for the job at a fixed base rate shown as a weekly sum. An 
extra allowance was granted for length of service, with the same steps of duration as 
were used in other oil awards. Additional payments were available when a store 
person, packer or blender had supervisory responsibilities. 
By August 1993, Oilco Australia had negotiated its own agreement for terminal 
operators and store people based on skill acquisition and a flexible approach to work 
at the enterprise. The new production award applied to all terminals; it classified 
terminal operator work into nine levels including a trainee grade, with a fixed pay rate 
for each level. There was no allowance for length of service. Detailed definitions of 
the work and competencies were included for each grade. New operators were 
recruited at Level 1 with the expectation that they would be prepared to accept 
training to develop skills to progress to at least Level 3. The skills included 
communication, minor maintenance, and working in a team. By Level 4, the operator 
should have attained some supervisory and advanced specialist skills, and beyond 
Level 5, appropriate trade or post-trade competencies. The oil industry companies 
and unions agreed in 1991 that there would be separate company awards for 
terminals. In addition, National Skills and Accreditation Standards for Maintenance 
and Laboratory Employees would be introduced. 
Clerical and Administrative Compensation in Oilco Australia 
Starting our discussion in 1978, the compensation for clerical staff in Oilco was 
determined by the federal Clerks' (Oil Companies) Award (A1RC Print D7314), the 
Federated Clerks Union (FCU) being the main union for the employees. The FCU, 
through amalgamation, is now called the Australian Municipal, Administrative, 
Clerical and Services Union (AMACSU). The compensation structure in 1980 was 
job-based, with four grades and annual increments for each year of service, the 
maximum number of increments varying with the grade (AIRC Print E7000). All 
clerical employees were graded on work performed, with the grading decided by 
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Oilco. Proposals for national increases in pay in the oil industry came from the 
Central Forum of unions, the ACTU and employers, and were then assessed and 
approved by the AIRC. The four-grade structure continued through the 1980s in the 
oil industry, salary levels being raised from time to time. However, Oilco spent two 
years redesigning the clerical work in the refinery to get staff to learn additional skills 
and take on extra responsibility. 
In March 1991, the FCU (AMACSU) sought ratification by the AlRC of a local 
refinery agreement with Oilco, and an Interim Refinery Administrative award was 
approved by the AIRC. The new award allowed Oilco to assign clerical staff to one 
of six classifications, the basis of the new structure being flexibility. The 
accountabilities for each level were set out in the award. 
A substantive clerical and administrative award for the refinery was approved by the 
AMC in August 1993 for a period of 12 months to be applied in conjunction with the 
Clerks' (Oil Companies) Award, 1988. It revised the pay rates for six classifications 
and also revised the entry level classification. Clerical and administrative career 
streams were defined for each aspect of administrative work such as payroll, accounts 
and product supply. Under this award, there was no provision for performance 
bonuses for clerical staff, or for differentiated pay rates for people on the same 
classification. Salaries were set fixed points for each grade, with no over-award pay 
or incentives. Several allowances were absorbed into the basic rate and hours of 
work remained at 35 per week, in line with the rest of the oil industry. The rates of 
the new award were revised regularly in the form of a certified agreement. 
Clerical and administrative staff at the terminal selected for this study were paid under 
the Clerks' (Oil Companies) Award, with its four-grade structure, annual increments 
for length of service and rates for age for staff under 21. The rates in this award were 
regularly revised in line with NWC increases. In the early 1990s, these employees 
were transferred to 'staff conditions after their jobs were evaluated according to the 
Hay job evaluation system. The matter was still before the AIRC on the cut-off date 
for the study (August, 1995). 
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At head office, the clerical and administrative staff were paid under the four-grade 
Clerks' (Oil Companies) Award. However, during the early 1990s, their jobs were re-
evaluated using a nine-factor, consultancy-designed, points rating system. From this 
exercise, a six-grade structure (plus a trainee grade) was developed. Junior rates 
were abolished. The range of work was the same as for the four-level structure, so 
the differential between job levels was slightly smaller. This adjusted structure was 
incorporated into a (federal) head office clerical award in 1993; the top clerical grades 
overlapped with the lower levels of the 'classified' (Hay) graduate/managerial staff 
salary structure. The basis of compensation was therefore the size of the job as 
evaluated. Pay for age was no longer used, as age discrimination legislation was 
becoming common at state levels. No extra pay was given for skills, qualifications or 
performance, but performance was appraised annually. Pay was not linked to this 
performance review; neither was there any allowance for length of service — a 
previous feature of oil industry awards. Pay levels were established in the 
marketplace through salary surveys to ensure that the overall salaries were in line with 
competitors. A recent change has been the movement of some clerical and 
administrative staffs from the head office award to the Hay-evaluated staff structure 
as part of the long-term strategy of moving all employees to staff status. The link of 
pay to performance in this system is discussed in the next section. 
The ultimate goal for refinery compensation is to have one combined award that 
includes common on-site conditions for the operators, engineers and clerks. Similarly, 
Oilco would have preferred a common award for all the terminals — one that 
incorporated the production, engineering and clerical employees. For the moment, 
the transport workers will stay as a special case. 
Managerial Compensation in Oilco Australia 
Oilco Australia had a written policy for compensation of managerial and executive 
staff at the head office, refinery and terminal which was distributed to employees. The 
policy stated that salaries would be reviewed annually, would remain competitive at a 
specified percentile of market rates, would have increases based on performance, 
would recognise and reward promotion, and would provide flexibility within each 
range. Employees nominated as 'classified' staff had their jobs evaluated according to 
the Hay System, and then had them placed in a job group with a corresponding salary 
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range. Oilco had a panel of managers who were trained as evaluators with 
considerable experience in job evaluation. This system had been used in Oilco 
Australia for more than 20 years. The system recognised both the position of 
employees in their current job group salary range and their performance during the 
previous year. According to a manager interviewed, over the years the Hay system 
had been adapted slightly, with broader bands being used, an extra grade at the 
bottom being applied, and some of Oilco's own criteria being used. 
Each salary range for a job group had a mid-point (established through market 
surveys and fixed by head office staff) and a margin up to a fixed percentage each side 
of this (not disclosed here by request). The mid-point was used for comparison with 
market rates. Salary ranges were increased annually in April of each year to take into 
account projected market movements for the following 12 months. Because this was 
done at the commencement of the 12 month cycle (and not at the end), the salary 
rates were high at the beginning of the review period and were designed to remain 
competitive for the whole period. Each employee was given a performance rating 
that generated a certain salary percentage within the range. 
The structure was divided into two. At the top, there were four-letter category jobs 
— D being the highest (the chairperson of the company), C being for directors and A 
being the lowest — which were not evaluated, but which had packages finally agreed 
at the European Oilco headquarters on advice from the Oilco Australia compensation 
specialists. Beneath the letter categories were ten number groups which were job 
evaluated, number 1 being the highest and 10 being the lowest. Clerical assistants 
were usually assessed at grade 10, first line supervision at 7, senior management at 3, 
and business unit management and senior specialists at 1. The Remuneration 
Manager continued: 
Although the Hay system has been slightly modified in Australia. with an extra grade at the 
bottom, Australia and Singapore would be using the same scheme. The reason for this is to 
preserve mobility laterally, whatever country the employee is working in. 
The structure of 1 to 10 job groups had a salary plus a hierarchy of defined employee 
benefits. At certain levels, a car and/or telephone and/or club membership fees would 
be provided. There was limited flexibility within the range of benefits. For the 
managers in the top letter categories, a package of benefits could be selected within a 
total pre-determined cost. The changes to the Fringe Benefits Tax affected the cost 
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to the company of this scheme. There was no structured bonus scheme for the 
lettered and numbered categories until recently. However, the Remuneration 
Manager noted that: 
Managers can give 'one-off' bonuses to an employee who has done an outstanding job, but 
these are seldom given and might apply to only 5 people in 1_000. 
Local directors had packages similar to those of senior management. Their incomes 
were recorded in the company's Australian annual report to conform with legislation 
on disclosure. According to a manager interviewed, 
Expatriates working in [Oilco Australia] notionally become employees of the [Oilco's] head 
office in Europe. Expatriate policy is centrally determined and covers education, housing, 
insurance and relocation as well as pay. Expatriate packages are uniform and are built up 
from a basic job-evaluated grade, with the home salary and exchange rate being taken into 
account and the host country allowances added to this. You can therefore get two Australians 
working in two different countries receiving very different packages. You can get two expats 
working in Australia on two different pay packages. One element in the package is a uniform 
incentive to encourage the expatriate to move. 
Each of the major operating companies of the MINE administered expatriate packages 
in its respective nation using these standard principles and taking different tax laws 
into account. Expatriate packages were usually monitored by the MINE European 
headquarters. 
During 1994 and 1995, Oilco Australia reviewed its classified staff compensation 
system and introduced further employee benefits for certain grades of staff and a 
bonus scheme for employees, determined by a combination of (1) the company's 
success against several performance indicators, and (2) an individual's performance 
rating by his/her supervisor. 
Employee Benefits in Oilco Australia 
In Oilco Australia, some employee benefits were common to all grades of staff; and 
others were unique to the grade of employee. All staff were likely to receive the 
following: 
• Access to company credit union 
• Annual leave loading 
• Compassionate leave 
• Discount priced petrol for private use 
• Educational expenses 
• Leave for public holidays 
• Long service awards 
• Long service leave 
• Long-term illness pay 
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• Maternity leave 
• Paternity leave 
• Reimbursement for company required travel 
• Reimbursement of business entertainment 
• Retrenchment benefit 
• Sick leave 
• Superannuation 
• Unpaid leave (if approved). 
Despite the previous union strategy to get consistency of pay and conditions in the 
industry, the oil industry agreed with the unions in 1991 that superannuation should 
be handled separately in each company. Uniforms were provided for industrial 
employees, and they and clerical staff received a meal allowance when necessary, and 
acting allowances for serving in a temporary higher capacity. Provision of cars, loans 
for investment purposes, salary sacrificing for car leases and for superannuation 
payments were also available for certain grades. The employee benefits by category 
are shown in Table 7.1. Under the refinery award, operators and engineers had 
provisions which covered overtime, accident pay, rest periods before and after 
overtime, call-back pay, training and development leave, shift allowances, protective 
clothing and rostered days off. Administrative staff in the refinery had award clauses 
that covered optional afternoon rest breaks, allowances, overtime, shift work and 
training and development. 
Relationship of Oilco Australia to Corporate Head Office 
Oilco Australia was a local operating company that was held fully accountable for its 
activities, with the European head office providing advice and services where 
necessary. The local chairperson had the right to reject advice. The challenge for 
Oilco Australia was to remain competitive in its own local environment. 
Nevertheless, some activities were integrated internationally — such as new areas for 
exploration and the sharing of technology. Management was encouraged to 'think 
globally and act locally'. 
The interest in the Oilco Australia compensation systems by the corporate European 
Head Office varied according to the grade of staff. European head office appointed, 
appraised and decided on the compensation for the operating companies' CEOs. 
According to a manager interviewed, the international head office did not have strict 
day-to-day control of the Australian company. He went on: 
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Table 7.1 _ 
for Oilco Australia as at 1995 — 
Industrial/ 
Blue Collar 
Unskilled 	Skilled 
Clerical/ 
Admin 
Sales/ 
Technical 
Professional/ 
Management 
Board 
Acting allowance 1 (1) 1 (1) 1 (1) 
Annual leave 1 1 1 I J 1 
Attendance allowance 
Business entertainment expenses ,/ 1 I i 1 I 
Cellular phones (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) 
Co-operative shares /(3) /(3) 1(3) 1(3) /(3) /(3) 
Compassionate leave 1 1 J 1 1 1 
Death benefit 1 1 1 1 I 1 
Dental treatment 
Early retirement schemes 1 1 I ,./ i 1 
External/social recreational club 
membership 
1 1 1 
Festive loan/advance 
Fixed monthly transport allowance 
Free medical treatment/medicine 
Funeral leave benefit 
Hospital ward benefit 
Housing loan 
Housing renovation loan 
Laundry benefit /(4)  1 (4) 
Life insurance 
Long service award 1 (5) 1 (5) 1(5) /(5)  1 (5) 1(5) 
Long-term illness 1 1 I I I I 
Machine allowance 
Marriage leave 
Maternity leave 1 1 1 1 I 1 
Meal allowance 1 1 ..1 
Medically board-out benefit I 1 1 I 1 1 
Other loans 1 I 
Paternity leave I 1 1 1 1 1 
Provision of car 1 (6) 1 (6) 1 
Reimbursement for use own car on 
company business 
gi I 1 1 1 1 
Retrenchment benefit 1 1 1 1 1 I 
Service benefit 
Shift allowance I I I / (7) 
Sick leave 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Specialist surgical fee 
Study leave benefit 1 1 J 1 1 
Superannuation (Australia) if 1 I 1 1 1 
Transport benefit/allowance/ 
reimbursement I 1 1 1 1 I 
Uniform J 1 
Union day leave 
Union education leave I (8)  I (8) 1 (8) 
Unpaid leave available 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Voluntary resignation benefit I (9)  1 (9) I (9) 1 (9) 1 (9) 1 (9) 
Notes: 
(1) Long-term absence only. (2) Depends on job. (3) Credit Union. (4) Uniforms. (5) 10,25 and 35 years. 
(6) Some Sales Staff and Senior Management only. (7) Computing Staff only. (8) Negotiable. 
(9) Superannuation contributions. 
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We tell the overseas office what we have done. We will send [Oilco Australia] handbooks and 
policies when they are prepared, but we are our own boss for personnel policies. However, we 
are not a completely free operation. 
Once a year, the Oilco corporate head office would send representatives to Australia 
for several days to appraise the business performance of the previous year and to 
consider the business strategies and plans, objectives, 'yard sticks', major capital 
expenditure and proposed acquisitions and divestments. Industrial relations strategy 
plans would be discussed with the headquarters' representatives, but not the detailed 
operational matters. Career planning for senior employees and the international 
management skill pool were coordinated from Europe. Performance of professional 
staff above a certain level and current expatriates was monitored there as well. 
On head office involvement, the Remuneration Manager said: 
While international head office probably won't intervene directly in enterprise bargaining, an 
[Oilco] subsidiary which decided not to use the Hay system might generate more attention. 
That's because use of Hay enables the head office to compare jobs internationally across 
businesses and to judge the size of a job for promotion and development purposes. However, 
there is no communication between subsidiaries on job points, although there is 
communication between European headquarters on the conditions and a regrading of a 'letter' 
category (top) job. We could move from Hay if we wanted to, and perhaps use Wyatt, but it is 
convenient because it is used world-wide. It's a satisfactory basis for company job sizes. 
The Profile of Oilco Australia Compensation 
For the head office, refinery and terminal of Oilco Australia, 11 different 
compensation systems can be identified, but for the purposes of detailed analysis and 
comparison with Oilco Singapore, three key occupational groups are selected. Tables 
7.2 — 7.4 show Oilco Australia's profile for the compensation of refinery operating, 
refinery clerical, and managerial employees using the Gomez-Mejia and Bain (1992) 
Algorithmic and Experiential compensation patterns. In general, the operator 
compensation had more Algorithmic features than Experiential ones, but the future 
goals of management were to move it more towards the Experiential end of the 
continuum. Again the clerical and administrative compensation was mixture of 
Algorithmic and Experiential elements, with the emphasis being toward the former. A 
similar conclusion could be made for the transport workers and store persons, packers 
and blenders, for whom the rate for the job and payment for length of service were the 
norm, with pay for skills being only recently achieved for the terminal operators. 
Table 7.2 
Summary Profile of Algorithmic (A) and Experiential (E) 
Compensation Patterns of Operating Staff Compensation in the Oilco Australia and Oilco Singapore Refinery" ) as at 1995 
Oilco Australia Refinery Operating Staff Oileo Singapore Refinery Operating Staff 
Compensation Feature A or E Compensation Feature A or E 
(a) Basis for Pay 
Mainly skills 
Skill progression plus annual review of structure 
Not applicable 
Short-term 
Low 
Not applicable 
Internal dominant, but reviewed annually 
Special benefits to executives 
Not applicable 
W
d
  
id
<
  
I
d
 .1 
Job evaluation 
Tenure - annual increments 
Not applicable 
Short-term (annual) 
High 
Not applicable 
Internal, but reviewed regularly 
Special benefits for executives 
Not applicable 
Unit of analysis 
Criteria for pay increases 
Level of performance measurement 
Time orientation 
Risk sharing 
Strategic focus 
Equity concern 
Reward distribution 
Type of control 
(b)Design Issues 
Not known 
Not known 
None 
Low future potential with higher immediate payoff 
Normally annual pay rises 
Pecuniary 
- 
- 
A 
A 
A 
E(2) 
Above average 
Above average 
High 
Low future potential with higher immediate payoffs 
Annual 
Pecuniary 
¢
 <
 w
 ¢
 ¢  w 
Salary market policy 
Benefits market policy 
Incentives in pay mix 
Total compensation 
Reinforcement schedule 
Reward emphasis 
(c) Administrative Framework 
Decentralised to refinery 
High (public award) 
Union involvement 
Carefully documented 
W
 w
w
d
 
Centralised 
High (public) 
Union participation 
Carefully documented 
<  w
 w
 ¢  
Decision making 
Pay disclosure 
Governance structure 
Nature of pay policies 
TOTAL 
A = 8 
E = 5 
A/E = 1 
N/A=2 (3) 
U/K=3 (4) 
TOTAL 
A = 10 
E = 5 
AJE =1 
N/A=3 (3) 
Notes: 
(1) The refinery is selected as one example for comparison. 
(2) It could be argued that work designed on group basis had intrinsic reward elements.(3) 
(3) N/A=Not applicable 
(4) U/K= Unknown 
Table 7.3 
Summary Profile of Algorithmic (A) and Experiential (E) Compensation Patterns of Clerical Staff 
Compensation in the Oilco Australia and Oilco Singapore Refinery as at 1995 
Oileo Australia Refinery Clerical Staff Oileo Singapore Refinery Clerical Staff 
Compensation Feature A or E Compensation Feature A or E 
(a) Basis for Pay 
Job 
Annual overall review 
Not applicable 
Short-term 
Low 
Not applicable 
Internal, but reviewed annually 
Special benefits for executives 
Not applicable 
7ii4  <
4
 I
 <4  d
 
 
• 
Job evaluation 
Tenure-annual increments 
Not applicable 
Short-term (annual) 
High 
Not applicable 
Internal, but reviewed regularly 
Special benefits to executives 
Not applicable 
<
4 <4 	
<
4 w
 	
<4 
• Unit of analysis 
Criteria for pay increases 
Level of performance measurement 
Time orientation 
Risk sharing 
Strategic focus 
Equity concern 
Reward distribution 
Type of control 
(b)Design Issues 
Not known 
Not known 
None 
Low future potential with higher immediate payoffs 
Annual rises 
Pecuniary 
<4 <  d
  
Above average 
Above average 
High 
Low future potential with higher immediate payoffs 
Annual 
Pecuniary 
<4 d
ria
d
d
w 
Salary market policy 
Benefits market policy 
Incentives in pay mix 
Total compensation 
Reinforcement schedule 
Reward emphasis 
(c)Administrative Framework 
Decentralised to refinery 
High 
Union involved 
Documented in award 
w
 
Centralised 
High (public) 
Union participation 
Carefully documented 
FJ.
F-
t 
Decision making 
Pay disclosure 
Governance structure 
Nature of pay policies 
TOTAL 
A = 9 
E = 4 
A/E = 1 
N/A=3 (2) 
U/K=2(3) 
TOTAL 
A = 10 
E = 5 
A/E = 1 
N/A=3 (2) 
Notes: 
(1) The award is mainly job classification based, but the list of duties could be interpreted as competencies as well. 
(2) N/A=Not applicable (3) U/K= Unknown 
Table 7.4 
Summary Profile of Algorithmic (A) and Experimental (E) Compensation Patterns of Managerial Staff Compensation 
in Oilco Australia and Oilco Singapore as at 1995 
Oileo Australia Managerial Staff Oilco Singapore Managerial Staff 
Corn • ensation Feature A or E Compensation Feature A or E 
(a) Basis for Pay 
Job evaluated 
Individual performance (and overall rise) 
Individual and aggregate 
Short-term 
Some pay at risk 
Corporate 
Internal equity plus market review 
Hierarchical 
Outcomes 
<
 .T.1 <
 w
 <  
<
  w
 
Job evaluated 
Individual performance (plus overall rise) 
Individual and aggregate 
Short-term 
Pay at risk 
Corporate 
Internal equity plus market review 
Hierarchical 
Outcomes 
< 	
14 <
 cla < 	
<  cia 
Unit of analysis 
Criteria for pay increases 
Level of performance measurement 
Time orientation 
Risk sharing 
Strategic focus 
Equity concern 
Reward distribution 
Type of control 
(b)Design Issues 
Above market average 
Above market average 
High 
Low future potential with higher immediate payoffs 
Annual reviews 
Pecuniary 
<
  <
 u.1 <
 <
 Lt.i 
Above market average 
Generous 
High 
Low future potential with higher immediate payoffs 
Annual reviews 
Pecuniary  
Centralised 
Low 
Unilateral 
Bureaucratic 
<
 <
 Lia < <
 1.1.1
 <
  <
  <
  <
 
Salary market policy 
Benefits market policy 
Incentives in pay mix 
Total compensation 
Reinforcement schedule 
Reward emphasis 
(c) Administrative Framework 
Centralised 
Low (for individual salaries) 
Staff consulted on design of bonus system 
Bureaucratic 
A 
A ") 
E (2) 
A 
Decision making 
Pay disclosure 
Governance structure 
Nature of pay policies 
TOTAL 
A = 11 
E = 5 
A/E = 3 
TOTAL 
A = 12 
E = 5 
A/E= 2 
Notes: (1) While individual salaries have low disclosure, the structure is well publicised 
(2) Focus groups of staff were used to obtain suggestions on a new bonus system 
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A slightly different story emerged for managerial compensation (Table 7.4). was 
centrally designed, with occasional input from employee focus groups, but had no 
union involvement (marginally Experiential). The managerial and senior 
administrative structure thus had a mixture of Algorithmic and Experiential elements. 
While the pay-for-performance aspects have pushed it more towards Experiential 
features, the system's basic components of job evaluation, external surveys and 
performance-linked merit pay have been unchanged for many years, and were well 
documented. The profile was therefore predominantly Algorithmic. The more recent 
innovations of bonuses linked to individual performance and corporate indicators, 
together with some extra variety of employee benefits for junior management, was 
continuing the trend towards an Experiential compensation profile. 
Oilco Australia Compensation and the External Environment 
Taking the research questions in turn on the effect of the external environment on 
subsidiary compensation, a number of observations can be made without suggesting 
that the external environment actually causes a particular design. 
According to Oilco Australia interviewees, Australian legislation had affected the cost 
of compensation and the way certain parts had been packaged, but also provided an 
opportunity to revise the award staff pay systems. For example, according to the 
Remuneration Manager, 
Equal pay [laws] had no impact on [Oilco] because we didn't have different rates of pay for 
males and females, and there is no difference in awards for males and females. FBT was an 
increased cost for the company though, because it was not picked up by the employees. It was 
seen like a payroll tax. As a result of FBT, we introduced packaging at the top end of the 
organisation. Most senior staff have a say in their own packages now within a set limit. 
Income tax has had no influence up to now. On superannuation. we have not decided yet as a 
result of the changes in legislation [ie the Superannuation Guarantee Charge Act 1992]. It 
may affect terminating employees. We pay all our company taxes and payroll taxes. workers' 
'comp.' etc. because [Oilco] tries to be pure in terms of tax compliance. 
All employers are subject to payroll and workers' (accident) compensation charges. 
Other state regulations and national awards (such as annual leave loading 4 and long 
service leave) allowed no choice for Oilco. Perhaps the biggest legislative effect in 
recent years has been through new industrial relations provisions. The Industrial 
Relations Acts of 1988 and 1994 gave Oilco the option of breaking away from 
4 
Annual leave loading is an additional payment, sometimes included in awards, given to an employee taking accrued leave. 
Federal awards usually provide for a 17.5 per cent loading of wages or salary for the duration of the leave entitlement. 
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centralised industry bargaining and moving to separate enterprise agreements for 
refineries, terminals and the head office. Oilco appeared to be leading the industry in 
this decentralisation. Oilco had formally acknowledged the ILO (1977c; 1991b) 
Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social 
Policy. This principle set a minimum pay rate for the company, while the recognition 
of unions placed Oilco Australia under the purview of the formal industrial relations 
system. 
On the relationship of compensation to the macro-economy, the Remuneration 
Manager said: 
Economic indicators are one factor in setting remuneration levels and these may vary from 
year to year. When the economy is buoyant, this is reflected in salary level and our ability to 
pay. When things are tighter, ability to pay is less. The CPI and average earnings are a factor 
in planning salary reviews. We try to plan for future movements as an effect on the 
remuneration market. Unemployment is not so great a factor. 
The economy was therefore perceived as having an effect the level of compensation, if 
not the actual structure. The compensation for classified managerial, professional and 
administrative employees was essentially market driven. By comparison, as one 
instrument in economic policy, the decisions of the AIRC in National Wage Cases and 
the approval of agreements were more easily identified in their influence on 
compensation for award staff. The Remuneration Manager stated: 
NWC decisions on increases and wage principles have had an immediate impact on award 
staff. They have always had the benefit of the National Wage Cases. The same doesn't apply 
to salaried people — the admin. and managerial groups. We note government pronouncements 
on pay levels, but they are not a determinant on salaries for admin. and managerial staff. We 
have now got to disclose the pay levels for the Directors and this gives ammunition to the 
unions. We don't disclose individual salaries though. 
Oilco unions pursued the announced national compensation rises and then cooperated 
to revise awards to conform with restructuring principles in order to obtain increases 
for their members. Decisions of the AIRC also had an impact on the pace of reform 
especially for innovative agreements in the oil industry. The greater decentralisation 
of the operating and clerical compensation to the refinery enabled the compensation to 
be adapted to the pay levels and availability of skills in the local labour markets. With 
a company-wide salary system for the administrative, professional and managerial 
staff, the labour market was perceived more in national terms. 
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The national cultural attitudes towards education were not seen as a major factor in 
compensation design. Extra qualifications for non-award staff might have increased 
career prospects, and the company would have contributed towards education costs if 
the qualification was relevant. On the award side, the picture was different in that 
reward was now more directly linked to demonstrated competencies rather than 
length of service. However, the Remuneration Manager could only see some 
contradictory links between Australian culture and compensation. He went on: 
You could argue that the Australian concept of fairness was the basis for standard agreements 
across all oil companies and was pushed heavily by the unions, and the oil companies, on 
balance, may have seen merit in not being 'played off' against each other by the unions. and 
so were prepared to sacrifice the extra flexibility of individual agreements ....But [0ileo] is 
status focused... the top jobs are on the top floor, and a car is a function of job level — just like 
other companies. 
In considering the effects of national culture on compensation design, Table 7.5 
shows the extent to which the Hodgetts and Luthans' (1993b) recommendations for 
the 'appropriate' pay systems for the cultural dimensions of Hofstede (1980) for 
Australia are reflected in the Oilco Australia remuneration systems. Table 7.5 uses 
the refinery operators, clerical staff and managers as examples for comparison with 
the pay systems in Singapore. Table 7.5 shows that the Hodgetts and Luthans 
suggestions for the appropriate compensation were not well reflected in the 
compensation systems adopted by Oilco Australia, although the match with the 
management compensation was better than for the refinery operators and clerical 
staff This variation would suggest that other factors may be more influential in 
compensation design than national culture. 
The role of the industrial relations system and unions in compensation design was 
seen by Oilco interviewees to have been very important for award staff The company 
had a union preference clause in agreements, had previously been part of the 
negotiations for a national integrated pay system, and was now developing enterprise 
agreements which were agreed with the relevant unions and ratified in the AMC. The 
union structure in Australia, with its occupational emphasis, meant that Oilco had to 
negotiate with different unions to reach separate agreements for the various 
occupations in the company. This obviously complicated the compensation system. 
An Oilco head office manager confirmed, 
pay strategies have to vary for each occupation according to the attitude of the union 
concerned. 
Table 7.5 
The Hodgetts and Luthans (H&L) Recommendations for Compensation in Australia as Reflected by Oi!co Australia 
AUSTRALIA 
Hofstede Dimension 
Index 
H&L Recommended 
Compensation 
Industrial Staff 
Compensation (Operators) 
Clerical/Staff 
Compensation 
Managerial 
Compensation 
1. Moderately low Power 
Distance 
• Low salary gaps between lowest 
and highest paid 
• Low benefits gaps 
• Gain-sharing 
• Profit-sharing 
Yes within award but not 
within company (No)°  
Not within company (No) 
No 
No 
Yes within award, but not 
within company (No) (1) 
Not within company (No) 
No 
No 
No - not within management 
No - not within management 
No 
Yes 
2. High Individualism • Individual performance-based 
• External equity/competitiveness 
• Short-term achievements 
No 
Yes - survey 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes - survey 
Yes 
3. Moderately high 
Masculinity 
• Few family benefits 
• Gender pay differences 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
4. Moderately weak 
Uncertainty Avoidance 
• Emphasis on performance 
• Sharing of risks associated with 
MNE's success or failure 
• Competitive salaries to avoid 
poaching of staff 
• Decentralised pay policies 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes(2) 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes(2) 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No(2) 
Supported Y (Yes) 
Not Supported N (No) 
Y = 4 
.N = 9 
Y = 4 
N = 9 
Y = 8 
N = 5 
Notes:(1) This is counted as not supported' as the MD's salary exceeded A$ 1M. (2) Taken to mean decentralised within Oilco Australia, not the whole corporate 
MNE Oilco •, 
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The Transport Workers' Union still preferred oil industry-wide (as opposed to 
company or workplace) agreements. Even the enterprise agreements had to be 
occupationally divided and separate. While some new large companies in Australia 
(such as Optus5) have negotiated major enterprise agreements without union 
involvement under recent legislation, it is unlikely that a major oil company 
incorporated in the 1960s could have adopted a non-union recognition strategy and 
got away with it. 
With the consideration of industry characteristics as an another exogenous factor 
(Schuler, Dowling & De Cieri, 1993), Oilco had many global attributes that required 
coordination between corporate MNE Oilco and the operating companies in the 
MINE. The management of expatriate staffing and compensation was part of this. 
Competition for downstream oil was particularly fierce with tight refining margins and 
heavy retail discounting. 	As at 1995, Oilco Australia was rationalising its 
organisation, downsizing, re-engineering processes as well as investing heavily in 
upstream activities, joint ventures and launching new products. The external 
competitive environment strongly influenced the endogenous environment. 
According to the head office Industrial Relations Manager, to be competitive, Oilco 
Australia introduced changes in the 1990s in the areas organisation (flattening of 
hierarchies, contracting out some activities, and flexible working), people (more use 
of teams), technology, and relationships (through better consultation, and negotiation 
of site agreements). The high density of union membership among award staff 
presented a challenge to the changing of compensation arrangements, something that 
does not apply with non-award/non-union employees. The Industrial Relations 
Manager went on: 
You have to involve the unions in the enterprise negotiation to get their commitment to the 
outcome, but you also have to try to empower the affected employees to take the initiative and 
control the union output, as they have the vested interest. 
The technology of the industry is constantly changing and the use of more 
computerised process controls, automated blending systems, and computerised 
support systems necessitated new skills and encouraged new modes of compensation 
such as the skill-based enterprise agreements in the refineries and terminals. 
5 
A reasonably new, privately owned telecommunications company that competes with the publicly owned Telstra company. 
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Continuous process production also required conditions of service for 24 hour 
coverage. 
It is arguable that Oilco Australia's size made it more amenable to the 'due process' 
and to higher employee involvement in compensation design both for award and non-
award employees (Jackson & Schuler, 19995:246). The corporate MINE Oilco had 
extensive experience in managing international operations, and in terms of 
compensation design for non-managerial level employees, allowed Oilco Australia 
substantial scope to design systems that could accommodate local demands (Schuler, 
Dowling & De Cieri, 1993). While there was a high degree of autonomy for design of 
local compensation for the operating and clerical employees (a headquarters' 
polycentric orientation), as mentioned before, the salary structures for the 
administrative, professional and managerial was centrally dictated (an ethnocentric 
approach). 
Finally, the Oilco Australia compensation systems, apart from those of senior 
management, were strongly adapted to the local Australian environment. While the 
Hay salary structures were consistently present in the corporate Oilco MINE 
subsidiaries, even these were adapted and augmented slightly to fit the local internal 
and external environment. In contrast, the compensation for the unionised workforce 
was totally based on the Australian system of industrial relations and laws. There was 
a high degree of local autonomy (differentiation) but also some integration in order to 
facilitate the mobility of expatriates between nations. Apart from the corporate MINE 
approval of top salaries and grades in Oilco Australia, the notification to headquarters 
about local pay rises and the cooperation in managing expatriates, there was no 
evidence of strong linkages with affiliates in other countries regarding compensation 
for non-expatriates. According to the Remuneration Manager, 
We wouldn't talk to Hong Kong or Singapore about a lower level job with say, only 600 Hay 
points. Consistency is achieved by seeing that the letter category jobs are comparable. If you 
get the top jobs right [ie at the appropriate level], the others fall into place. 
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Oilco Singapore 
Company Background of Oileo Singapore 
Like Oilco Australia, Oilco Singapore was a wholly owned operating company of the 
two-European-parent Oilco. It consisted of eight companies manufacturing and/or 
trading in petroleum, diesel oil, solvents, LPG, bitumen, chemicals, blending and 
lubricants in Singapore. The company's history in Singapore dated back to the 1890s 
when it had a storage installation for storing, blending and distributing imported oil. 
A refinery was not built until the 1960s. Since then Oilco Singapore had invested 
heavily into oil technology such as crude distillers, solvents plants, asphalt burning 
systems, hydrocrackers, thermal gasoil units, and catalytic cracking units. In 1992, 
the off-shore refinery complex employed about 1000 staff operating on a three-shift 
system. Another 700 employees were based at either the separate mainland marketing 
centre, or at the city head office. The city headquarters for the subsidiary housed 
various departments including finance, personnel, trading and public affairs. The total 
number of employees in 1982 was about 2300, but this had declined to 1700 by 1992, 
and then risen to 1800 with the company's move into chemicals by August 1995. 
Oilco Singapore had a financial interest in the Petrochemical Corporation of 
Singapore and several other local companies; Singapore being the third-largest 
refining centre in the world. 
Organisation of Oilco Singapore 
Oilco Singapore was one of Singapore's largest MINE investors. It had its own board 
of eight directors, four of whom were local and the other four, expatriates. All 
directors were executive directors, covering areas such as marketing, trading, 
personnel and finance. The board was responsible for the long-term viability of the 
Singapore operations, but like Oilco Australia, could draw on the experience of 
Oilco's specialist functional service companies or other operating companies. It had 
to uphold the standards set in the European headquarters in areas such as accounting 
practices, safety standards and the protection of the environment. The 
chairpersons/CEOs of Oilco Singapore have usually been expatriates, but two 
Singaporeans have had spells in the role since the late 1970s. 
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Production Technology of Oilco Singapore 
Although the bulk of the crude oil for Oilco Singapore came from the Middle East, it 
was also imported from China, Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei. Like Oileo Australia, 
the technology in Oilco Singapore covered crude distillation and then progressed to 
middle distillation and secondary processing of higher-value products. The company 
produced more than 100 types of main fuels, including 15 different kinds of motor 
gasoline, 20 diesel and 20 fuel oils. The majority of the products were exported to 
the Asia—Pacific region and the west coast of the United States. Products for the 
domestic market were sent by pipelines from the off-shore refinery to the mainland 
marketing centre. The mainland also housed bitumen—blending and lubricating plants. 
The international airport was another major work site for the company. The 
occupational composition of the workforce thus included plant operators of various 
levels, technicians, laboratory staff; machinists, maintenance employees, blending and 
dispatch staff, sales people, designers, and the full range of managerial and 
administrative employees for the business function. According to a manager, the 
technology for oil refining and gas/chemical production was changing with the 'state 
of the art' computerised control process. New employees had to be more highly 
skilled and were better educated. The operation was now becoming more capital 
intensive. The jobs with lower-level skills such as those of tanker driver, loader and 
waterfront valve operator had been 'contracted out'. A several billion (S) dollar 
expansion of Oilco's petrochemical complex was announced in 1994. 
Mission and Objectives of Oilco Singapore 
Oilco Singapore had both a mission and a vision statement. The vision referred to 
developing worldscale plants, running export oriented businesses, being 
internationally competitive in all aspects of quality, service and costs, being the best in 
the home market, and being the preferred supplier in the home and regional markets. 
It wanted recognition for its achievements from the Oilco group and the Government 
of Singapore, and had a percentile for a profitability position within the global Oilco 
group. The mission defined the activities of the company, its aim to be a leader, the 
striving for excellence in quality of product and service and its commitment to 
occupational health and safety and the environment. Like Oilco Australia, Oilco 
Singapore had to develop medium- and long-term country plans, and was subject to 
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an annual discussion of these and the twelve—month operating plans with the parent 
MNE Oilco. 
HRMAIR Organisation of Oileo Singapore 
Each function of Oilco Singapore had its own mission statement on Oilco values, 
attitudes, behaviour, organisation, systems and policies. The HRM vision stated that 
the company 'will work towards an organisation structure which is less hierarchical, 
flexible in form and in which jobs are not rigidly demarcated'. The vision statement 
for the staff referred to the value placed on competence, professionalism, attitude, 
learning, recruiting the best talent, safety, and training. Good performance would be 
rewarded according to individual contribution, and in return, the company would 
practise good industrial relations and exhibit a responsible and caring attitude. 
Oilco Singapore had been recognised locally for its progressive HRMAR policies and 
included a Shared Industrial Relations Vision in its latest collective agreement. 
Aspects of its FIRM practices have been adapted and adopted in the public sector, and 
its company collective agreements with the unions were substantial and 'have always 
been received very well', according to a manager. The collective agreements were 
unique to Singapore, but many personnel policies and procedures were derived from 
the world-wide Oilco group. He continued: 
[Oilo° Singapore] is very independent in taking into account the local conditions and trade 
union structures, and we operate in a decentralised way within the broad [Oilco] framework 
compared with America which is very centralised. For example, bonuses are paid locally in 
Singapore, but expatriate staff do not get them. 
The company was renowned for its highly competitive pay levels, its commitment to 
training, a retirement scheme that predated the Central Provident Fund (CPF), staff 
clubs, and good recreational facilities. Against this, downsizing of head office staff 
had occurred on occasions after dips in the economy such as the 1985-86 recession. 
The company had a centralised human resource function headed by a Director of 
Personnel who served on the board, and specialist industrial relations staff based at 
headquarters. The refinery had its own personnel manager and employee relations 
manager, but there was no personnel professional in the terminal. A structure for the 
conduct of Oilco Singapore—union relations was laid out in the collective agreement. 
This identified the appropriate union and company representative to handle shift, 
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department, worksite and company industrial issues and for regular consultation. 
While the emphasis was on the line managing its own relations, if a union delegate 
could not get a resolution to a grievance, the personnel specialist would be brought in. 
The design of the compensation system was the responsibility of headquarters staff, 
with the Director of Personnel making recommendations to the board. 
As noted earlier, Singapore has no equal pay employment legislation, but Oilco did 
not discriminate on sex. According to a manager, the Singaporean Civil Service set 
the trend. The only discrimination was that males commenced with the company two 
annual increments higher than females because of the two years lost through national 
service. New young male employees were normally recruited after compulsory 
military service. There was a small number of foreign workers at Oilco mainly 
recruited from the Phillipines, Malaysia and China. 
Unionisation of Oilco Singapore 
Unlike Oilco Australia, Oilco Singapore only negotiated with one union, which is 
referred to here as the Singapore Oilco Employees' Union (SOEU). From 1955 to 
the present day, Oilco Singapore employees have been represented by a sequence of 
five unions. The first collective agreement, signed between Oilco Singapore and the 
industry-wide United Workers of the Petroleum Industry (UWPI) on 17 August 1962, 
introduced new salary scales, employee benefits, medical insurance, a house 
ownership scheme, a grievance procedure, and union recognition. This led to 
agreements with the other oil companies. In the late 1970s, the Singaporean 
Government adopted a new economic strategy to upgrade technology and improve 
living standards. With the emphasis on productivity, in 1983 the NTUC approached 
the Oilco branch of the UWPI with a view to forming a house union. This was 
accepted, and the Singapore Oilco Employees Union (SOEU) was registered on 31 
August 1984. 
Relations between the SOEU and Oilco Singapore were reasonably cordial. The 
major events for the union were the renegotiation of the collective agreement for 
bargainable employees every 3 years and annual negotiations over bonuses. The day-
to-day activities were to deal with grievance handling and receive briefings from 
management on the company's performance. The union delegates were usually the 
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first line of negotiation, and handled departmental grievances. They had no role to 
play in pay matters except in their role of assisting individuals who queried their 
compensation. The collective agreement negotiations were normally led by the full-
time SOEU General Secretary. No-one attended from the NTUC. A team of union 
delegates did the negotiation, with the NTUC being used for legal advice. Union 
subscriptions were deducted directly from pay (a check-off systee). Future SOEU 
strategy was to attempt to unionise the supervisory grades in the company. 
Compensation for Bargainable Employees in Oilco Singapore 
Because Oilco Singapore recognised unions for bargaining purposes, since 1962 the 
basis for compensation for non-managerial staffs (about 60 per cent of the workforce) 
had been the collective agreement. The first collective agreement between the UWPI 
and Oilco Singapore was signed in August 1962 and was for three years. The UWPI 
was recognised as the collective negotiating body, but senior staff members of the 
refinery, police and confidential secretaries were excluded from the union. The 
agreement covered certain locally engaged staff and separated the conditions for 
industrial employees, staff employees, harbour craft employees and firemen. It was a 
comprehensive and sophisticated document outlining hours of work, grievance 
procedures, maternity leave, and medical insurance and cover as well as the 
compensation structure. Bargainable staff were paid in one of the 144 job 
classifications which were, in turn, allocated to one of nine job groups/categories. 
The pay system was a monthly based salary, plus annual increments for some staff, 
two months' bonus and an annual service gratuity. 
Further collective agreements followed in 1965, 1968, 1973, 1976 and 1979, the 1965 
agreement introducing a 13-grade structure to cover administrative, clerical and 
industrial jobs, and incorporating compassionate leave but excluding the annual 
service gratuity. In 1973, the Annual Wage Supplement (13th month) was fixed at 
23/4 months, an amount that has been included in every agreement up to the present 
day. In 1976, the 13-grade structure was reduced to nine salary groups showing the 
range minimum and maximum and size of annual increment. New benefits included 
housing loans for all employees and free interest car loans for sales representatives. A 
6 Check-off is a systan whereby employers deduct union fees from the wages of union members and then pay them to the union 
concerned, sometimes charging a small percentage fee for administrative costs. Conservative goverrunents in Australia have 
outlawed the practice acmss industry and in the public (civil) service on occasions in an attempt to reduce union membership. 
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holiday subsidy was recorded in 1985, but the 1988 agreement heralded a major 
change in compensation practice. 
While the nine-grade salary structure with annual increments within a range was 
retained, the agreement referred to the salary grade for each job being determined by 
job evaluation with the scheme designed by the company. Job descriptions had to be 
prepared and copies given to the employee and the union. Dissatisfied employees 
could appeal against their grade to the company. The new salary package was as 
follows: 
(1) Annual Increment (within the salary range payable on 1 January annually, which varied 
from S$20 per month per year for lower grades to S$48 for higher grades). The total ranges 
were revised every three years when collective agreements were renegotiated depending on the 
market. 
(2) Annual Lump Sum (payable in January annually for employees with more than one year's 
service, the amount to be negotiated separately). The annual lump stun for 1988 was quoted 
as 15 x 2 per cent of the employee's salary as at 1 January 1988; the amount for the other 2 
years of the agreement was negotiated separately. This sum was not paid if the company 
performance was poor. (In January, 1994, for example, 1.15 months salary was paid, 
according to the interviewed manager). 
(3) Variable Supplementary Payment (payable in December for employees with more than 
one year's service). This was a sum of money which was put into a 'pot' to accumulate over a 
6 year period. The ceiling of the `pot' was capped at 2 months salary in the 1988-90 
agreement, and 'was available for withdrawal by employees when the company is doing badly 
to even out salary', a manager stated. The variable supplementary payment for 1988 was 0.3 
months of the employee's salary at as 31 December 1988. Amounts for the subsequent years 
were negotiable. 
(4) Annual Wage Supplement (AWS) (usually known as the 13th month). Oilco fixed this 
sum at 23/4 months pay and paid one month in July and the remainder in December each year. 
The AWS was introduced by Oilco into its agreements in 1973 at the request of the NWC. 
The rest of the 1988-90 collective agreement was similar to those of earlier years, 
except that some allowances and special leave provisions were enhanced. The 1991 
collective agreement maintained very similar provisions to those of the 1988 
agreement, except that the pay levels in the salary structure were raised. The other 
difference was that the age of retirement for employees joining the company after 1 
January 1991 was increased to 60 years (from a previous 55) to comply with 
government legislation. The nine-grade structure was still preserved. This was the 
case for the 1994 three-year agreement as well, but a new clause entitled the [Oilco] 
Industrial Relations Vision was included. The annual lump sum for 1994 was fixed at 
1.15 months' salary, the cumulative variable supplementary payment for 1994 as 2 
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months' salary, and the AWS at its usual 23/4 months. Shift allowances were enhanced 
considerably, perhaps reflecting the alleged dislike of shiftwork by Singaporeans. 
What this progression of collective agreements shows is the consistency of approach 
over the years. The structure was job-based, with length of service rewarded through 
annual increments of the job range. The allocation of jobs to grades was done by the 
company and the union had no part in the design of the ten-factor job evaluation 
scheme. The company checked the overall level of pay through regular salary 
surveys. The levels were then reviewed at the renegotiation of agreements. The 
other significant feature of the system was the emphasis on bonuses. Although 
bargainable staff were appraised through the performance appraisal scheme, their pay 
was not linked to performance. However, various increments and bonuses could be 
withheld if an employee's work was not to the required standard. 
While the AWS was now entrenched in agreements, the company was following the 
preference of the NWC in preserving a flexible component of pay, based on company 
performance, which could be withdrawn if company performance deteriorated. The 
NWC was trying to move organisations away from the overemphasis on annual 
increments and a seniority based wage system. However, these were still features of 
the Oilco scheme. 
Oilco Singapore did not use any gain-sharing system, but bonuses and compensation 
levels took into account the competition for staff, company performance, NWC 
guidelines and national economic indicators. No one-off special bonuses were given 
to individual staff in Singapore. There were no non-financial recognition schemes 
except for long service. Parties were occasionally given where a manager wished to 
show appreciation for a special effort and congratulatory memos were sent to 
employees when safety targets were met. The company did not use guaranteed 
overtime as a way of attracting staff. 
Bargainable employees usually did not disclose information on their individual 
salaries. For exempt staff, salaries were seen as personal, and were not published, but 
employees would know the range for a particular job. Employees did not have to sign 
an agreement to keep their salaries confidential, although Oilco provided data to the 
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union mainly on a group basis, particularly the numbers of people nearing the 
maximum of their range. 
Managerial Compensation in Oilco Singapore 
Three pay systems covered the staff not paid under the collective bargain. These were 
the (1) expatriate packages, (2) directors' packages, and (3) the 
administrative/managerial staff salaries (known as the exempt staff). The expatriate 
packages were calculated on the European head office guidelines in the same way as 
for Oilco Australia. The European corporate head office was used as the notional 
base, so that 'a German expatriate may be worse off, but a Thai may be better off 
coming to Singapore', suggested a manager. The expatriate directors were also on 
international expatriate packages adjusted for location. The local directors' 
compensation had to be endorsed by corporate headquarters as well. 
For the exempt (managerial) staff; Oilco Singapore used a Hay job-evaluated salary 
structure. According to a manager interviewed, 
The scheme is tied into the [European] head office and other operating companies. The main 
reason for this kind of evaluation is to facilitate mobility of staff between operating 
companies. As countries develop and have an [Oilco] company based there, they will 
eventually be approached to use a Hay system. The number of levels in the structure would 
depend on the size of the operating company. 
Employees at Oilco Singapore were advised of their job classification but not their 
points score. A panel of trained managers was used to evaluate the jobs. The job 
evaluation scheme set the grades and evaluated the size of the jobs, but the whole 
salary structure was adjusted according to market levels. The system was 
performance-based, with pay increases awarded in the 0 — 10 per cent range. 
Employees were rated for performance through the performance appraisal system and 
fitted into pay bands within the job grade. According to the manager interviewed, the 
main problem was to get line management to differentiate between staff. 
The company participated in an annual salary survey with comparable large employers 
such as other oil companies, banks and IBM. They used the Hay points as 
benchmarks. Oilco Singapore was also guided from European headquarters to ensure 
that the salaries being paid in Singapore were comparable with those paid in other 
Asian nations such as Thailand. There was apparently no reaction to the Oilco 
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scheme from the cultural point of view. The company was not intending to use an 
alternative system, as Hay was universal in Oileo, and because most big companies in 
Singapore were using the Hay system as well. In addition to the basic salary, 
managerial staff received the AWS (23/4 months of pay), but the bargainable 
employees would normally get several months more bonuses than the exempt staff 
These could be considerable. In 1991, the bargainable employees received a total of 
more than 8 months' pay in bonuses. In 1992, they received just over 7 months' pay, 
compared with 41/2 for the exempt staff. In 1994, bonuses again exceeded 7 months 
for unionised employees. 
Employee Benefits in Oilco Singapore 
There were some employee benefits which were common to all Oilco Singapore staff 
They were: 
• Compassionate leave (death of family member) 
• Cost of medicines, injections, x-rays or pathological examinations 
• Dental benefits up to a limit 
• Discount for oil products 
• Education assistance and examination leave 
• Hospital and outpatient benefit 
• Housing loan scheme 
• Leave for birth of a child 
• Long service awards at 10 and 25 years 
• Marriage leave 
• Maternity leave 
• Premium for Oilco Medical Insurance Scheme 
• Reimbursement for company travel 
• Relocation and transfer assistance 
• Sick leave 
• Two social clubs 
• Use of company library. 
The employee benefits by category are shown in Table 7.6. Because there was no 
government-run national medical system in Singapore, a contribution towards medical 
expenses was made by the employer. Oilco ran its own medical insurance policy for 
bargainable employees, the premiums for which were paid for by the company for the 
employee. But the premiums for family members had to be paid by the employee. As 
can be seen above, the company would pay for out-patient services and drugs. The 
company provided 'paid medical absence' on a full pay and half pay basis with 
maxima according to the category of the medical disability and the length of service of 
the staff member. Free medical attention was available at a clinic for employees and 
families who lived near the refinery. Any paid medical absence had to be certified by 
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Table 7.6 
Employee Benefits Profile for Oilco Singapore as at 1995 
Industrial/ 
Blue Collar 
Unskilled 	Skilled 
Clerical/ 
Admin 
Sales/ 
Technical 
Professional/ 
Management 
Board 
Acting allowance V V V V V 
Annual leave V V V V V V 
Attendance allowance 
Business entertainment expenses V V V 
Cellular phones ( 1 ) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) 
Co-operative shares (2) (2) (2) (2) 
Compassionate leave I V V V V V 
Death benefit 1 i .1 i 
Dental treatment V V V V V ../ 
Early retirement schemes V V V V V V 
External/social recreational club 
membership 
V (3)  V 
Festive loan/advance 
Fixed monthly transport 
allowance 
V V 
Free medical treatment/medicine I V I V 
Funeral leave benefit V V V V V V 
Hospital ward benefit V (4) /(4) V (4) V (4) V (4)  V (4) 
Housing loan V V V V V V 
Housing renovation loan 
Laundry benefit V V 
Life insurance (2) (2) (2) (2) 
Long service award V V V V 1 V 
Long-term illness V I V 1 V V 
Machine allowance 
Marriage leave V V V V V V 
Maternity leave V V I V V V 
Meal allowance V V 
Medically board-out benefit V V V 1 V V 
Other loans 
Paternity leave V V V V I V 
Provision of car V 
Reimbursement for use of own car 
on company business 
I V V V V V 
Retirement benefit (>CPF) 
[Singapore] 
Retrenchment benefit V V V 1 1 
Service benefit (5) (5) (5) (5) 
Shift allowance V V 
Sick leave V V V V V V 
Specialist iurgical fee V (4) V (4) V (4) V (4) V (4) V (4) 
Study leave benefit V V V V V 
Transport benefit/allowance/ 
reimbursement 
V V V V V 
Uniform V V 
Union day leave 
Union education leave V (6) V (6) V (6) 
Unpaid leave V V V 1 V 
Voluntary resignation benefit 
Notes: 
(1) Selected Staff only. (2) Union Scheme is available. (3) Some only. (4) Insurance premiums paid. 
(5) Increments in agreement (6) For officials only. 
283 
the company doctor. Oilco had no life insurance scheme, but bargainable employees 
could be insured through their union. If any employee was not covered under the 
provisions of the Singaporean Workman's Compensation Act and suffered personal 
injury or sickness arising out of employment, the company would pay compensation. 
Unlike Australia, Oilco Singapore did not run a superannuation scheme because 
employees had to make compulsory contributions to the CPF. The CPF contribution 
was based on total earnings of the employee including bonuses. 
Oilco Singapore used standard packages of employee benefits and did not provide a 
choice because of the extra administration this would have involved. The company's 
attitude was that the CPF was a flexible scheme enabling employees to invest in a 
house, shares or children's education. Employee benefits such as subsidised loans, 
free housing and 'free' trips were taxed. Reimbursement of expenses was not taxed. 
The lR Manager was of the opinion that: 
Executive benefits are not of a 'cafeteria' nature and are similar to those of the bargainable 
employees, but some are exclusive — probably part of our colonial heritage. We used to pay 
the membership fees of European clubs for expatriates, but this has now gone. 
The company was very paternalistic, and had a range of benefits that compared 
favourably with those found in 'developed' nations. This might perhaps be due to the 
culture of Oilco internationally as well as the need to remain attractive and 
competitive in this area in a tight labour market. Of particular interest in the 1994-96 
collective agreement was the option for a female employee to be granted up to five 
days paid leave to attend to young children aged six and below who fell ill. If more 
time off was required, this could be taken as annual leave or unpaid leave. In the 
most recent negotiations, the union pushed for company child-care, but Oilco saw this 
as a national issue. It concluded that the unions and government should develop a 
policy together, the company's view being that working mothers usually had maids. 
The union push was not strong as very few employers provided child-care in 
Singapore and union and privately run child-care centres were available. Special 
provisions existed for special unpaid leave including the right of Muslims to make one 
pilgrimage to Mecca during the duration of their employment. 
2 A 4 
Relationship of Oilco Singapore to Corporate Head Office 
The relationship of Oilco Singapore to the European corporate MNE head office of 
Oilco was similar to that of Oilco Australia. There was no regional office for Oilco, 
but there was a regional coordinator based in the European head office. Both Oilco 
Singapore and Australia were in the same region. Representatives from Europe 
visited Singapore once a year to appraise the performance of the operating company 
and Singapore management also visited Europe annually to present business plans for 
the following year. According to a manager, 
We have a high degree of autonomy in the design of our pay systems system. The main 
interest of the head office is in the impact of labour costs on the cost structure of the 
Singapore operation. 
The Profile of Oileo Singapore Compensation 
The three occupational groups of industrial, clerical/administrative and managerial 
employees are used as comparisons with similar roles in Oilco Australia. The Gomez-
Mejia and Balkin (1992) profiles for compensation at Oilco Singapore were shown in 
Tables 7.2 — 7.4. Taking the collective agreement which covered operators and clerks 
first (Tables 7.2 and 7.3), the company used a job-based rather than a skill-based 
system. The overall impression of the bargainable employee compensation was that 
while it had some five experiential features, the strongest trend (ten features) was 
towards the Algorithmic pay pattern. With the non-bargainable or exempt staff 
(Table 7.4), Oilco Singapore used a similar system to that of its Australian equivalent. 
The unit of analysis was the job that was evaluated (Algorithmic), but as well as the 
corporate bonuses, individual performance was assessed and rewarded (Experiential). 
The managerial pay system, like that in Australia, had a combination of stronger 
Algorithmic than Experiential components. While job evaluation was the basis of the 
system, within this lay some important Experiential aspects, and bonuses provided a 
considerable risk aspect to the package. 
Oilco Singapore Compensation and the External Environment 
In considering the first possible influence of the external environment on 
compensation design, the employment and industrial relations legislation in Singapore 
set the framework within which Oilco designed its systems. There is no minimum 
wage in Singapore and the company observed equal pay even though there was no 
legal requirement to do this. The Industrial Manager continued: 
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Income tax rates are low and are not therefore an influence on pay systems. Some fringe 
benefits are taxable though, such as car allowances. With the CPF, we have no choice but to 
pay of course. 
As Oilco Singapore has recognised unions for collective bargaining purposes since the 
1960s, the Industrial Relations Act defines those who can be represented by unions. 
This resulted in a separate system for non-managerial staff The Act also specifies the 
way disputes arising out agreements are to be settled, and the procedure was included 
in the collective agreements. For managerial staff who were not unionised, the 
management had more flexibility in compensation and so developed a separate system. 
The Employment Act standards for hours of work, rest days, holidays, the AWS and 
other conditions were used as minima only. For example, as the Annual Wage 
Supplement of Oilco Singapore existed before 26 August 1988, it could legally pay 
more than the one month AWS maximum of the Act. It did so by paying 23/4 months' 
bonus. The Retirement Act 1993 caused the company to revise its retirement age 
upwards. 
In relation to the economy of Singapore, the Industrial Relations Manager said: 
The economy does not affect our systems directly, but overall pay rates and the size of bonuses 
are affected indirectly. When we negotiate agreements, we take the company's prospects 
taken into account. We look at economic indicators and the determinations of the 
NWC ....Things like inflation and the tightness of the labour market. 
On the other hand, the National Wage Council (NWC) decisions since 1972 have set 
the standard for wage rises in Singapore. They seem to have had more effect on the 
redesign of the Oilco collective agreements since 1988, when the NWC set about 
reforming the Singaporean method of compensation by recommending variable wage 
components linked to company productivity and capacity to pay. Oilco followed this 
lead with annual lump sums linked to performance, but with a variable supplementary 
payment to 'even out' salaries should the company experience difficulties, as well as 
the 23/4 months of AWS. As a major employer in Singapore, the company felt obliged 
to follow these recommendations in the same way that it followed rises recommended 
by the NWC for the private sector from 1972-85. The Personnel Director continued: 
The NWC doesn't recommend quantum pay increases now, but I think it will continue to 
function because of its political value as a committee of government, unions and employers. 
It could be argued that three of the five 1986 NWC principles for a flexible wage 
system (Ministry of Labour, 1992:xxvi) were being followed by Oilco — (1) wages 
reflecting the value of the job, (2) increases taking into account individual and 
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company performance which are not on a permanent basis, and (3) a measure of 
stability in the worker's income. As Oilco Singapore paid highly competitive salaries, 
it experienced no great difficulty in attracting and retaining staff 
The Oilco Singapore interviewees did not perceive links between national culture 
(including religion) and all elements of compensation system design although the 
Industrial Relations Manager observed: 
Titles are very important to people here and we have to make them compatible. Clerks 
become admin. assistants and operators become technicians. You also have to be careful with 
incentives as in the Asian culture, there is an emphasis on teamwork We have not talked 
about how to reward the individual high performer and how you reward him or her. 
Some reflection of these views on culture could be seen in the compensation systems 
in Oilco Singapore. When the systems are compared to the Hodgetts and Luthans 
(1993b) recommendations for compensation for the Singaporean culture (according 
to Hofstede's [1980] dimensions) shown in Table 7.7, there was a high degree of 
support. This was particularly so for the industrial and clerical and administrative 
staff on collective agreements. The support was less for the managerial 
compensation. Benefits were tied to place in the compensation structures; the 
maximum salary for level 9 in the collective agreement was six times the lowest salary 
point of level 1; the agreements rewarded length of service (and thus status); and 
there was no singling out of high performer among the bargainable employees. The 
situation was different for non-bargainable staff in that individual performance was 
reflected in pay and there were no length of service rises. As mentioned earlier, the 
existence of the Hay system globally across Oilco suggests local cultural factors were 
given less priority than ease of company administration. 
The initial research questions suggested that apart from culture, the other element of 
the external environment that may influence compensation design is the industrial 
relations system. This is particularly relevant in that Oilco Singapore elected to 
recognise and negotiate with unions. Unlike Oilco Australia, however, the 
Singaporean operating company has only had to deal with one union since it 
commenced collective bargaining. This simplified the pay system considerably and 
provided consistency of conditions of service across the whole of the bargainable 
workforce. The fact that the union was a 'house' union gave it undivided focus on 
the management of industrial relations in the company. It was not possible to say 
Table 7.7 
The Hodgetts and Luthans (H&L) Recommendations for Compensation in Singapore as Reflected in Oilco Singapore 
SINGAPORE 
Hofstede Dimension 
Index 
H&L Recommended 
Compensation 
Industrial Staff 
Compensation 
Clerical & Admin Staff 
Compensation 
Managerial 
Compensation 
1. High Power Distance • Hierarchical compensation 
strategy 
• Pay and benefits tied to 
place in structure 
• Large salary gaps between 
lowest and highest paid 
Yes 
Yes, but similar within 
collective agreement - different 
across company 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes, similar within collective 
agreement - different across 
company 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
2. Low Individualism • Group compensation plans 
• Seniority-based pay 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
3. Moderately low Masculinity • Many family benefits 
• Quality of worklife emphasis 
• No gender pay differences 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
4. Weak Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
• Emphasis on performance 
• Sharing of risks associated 
with MNE's success or 
failure 
•Competitive salaries to 
avoid poaching of staff 
• Decentralised pay policies 
Corporate - Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No(I) 
Corporate - Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes - individual and corporate 
Yes 
Yes 
Now 
Supported Y (Yes) 
Not Supported N (No) 
Y = 11 
N = 1 
Y = 11 
N = 1 
Y = 9 
N = 3 
Notes: (1) Taken to mean decentralised within Oilco Singapore and not within the whole corporate MNE Oilco 
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whether the union constrained the company in changing the existing system. The 
agreements have been updated regularly, and they retain the job-based approach and 
emphasis on length of service. Because of the symbiotic relationship between the 
National Trade Union Council and the ruling People's Action Party, it is evident that 
the change to more flexible systems in the late 1980s was probably due to the 
influence of the NWC supported by the unions rather than to the unions themselves. 
However, the advantage for a union in having the collective agreement certified by the 
IAC is that it cannot be varied without IAC approval, and is binding on the parties for 
the duration of the agreement. 
The industry characteristics for Oilco Singapore of strong competition and intensive 
change were similar to those for Oilco Australia. The Singaporean unit's main 
competition was from other major oil companies, and its 24 hour operation required 
conditions of service to support this. Being in the oil industry enabled it to have its 
own house union. Its compensation systems had to accommodate a changing skill 
profile as a result of changing technology, a feature evident in the changing job titles 
in its collective agreements since the 1960s. The size and capital intensity of the 
operation resulted in more formal compensation procedures and an awareness that the 
subsidiary had to conform to at least local standards of compensation. 
Like Oilco Australia, the corporate Oilco head office international orientation was 
both polycentric and ethnocentric for the same reason that Oilco Singapore had 
significant autonomy in the design of its non-managerial compensation, but was 
restricted in its structures for the professional and managerial employees. Moreover, 
expatriate conditions and mobility were centralised too. With its long experience in 
managing international operations and well-equipped specialist HRM function, Oilco 
Singapore had no difficulty in handling this dual approach. 
The conclusion is, therefore, that the local external environment presents considerable 
constraints on compensation design for non-managerial employees through the 
legislation on union coverage, minimum conditions, retirement age, NWC guidelines, 
IAC requirements for bargains, CPF contributions and union structures and 
allegiances. It is tempting to attribute some cultural constraints to elements of the 
collective agreement as well, but it is difficult to measure these and to isolate them 
Large scale 
Process production 
Capital intensive 
Unions recognised for bargains 
Closed union shop in terminal 
Several unions represented 
1/5/20 year planning 
Strong HRM function 
Large scale 
Process production 
Capital intensive 
Union recognised for bargains 
Voluntary membership 
Single union recognised 
1/5/20 year planning 
Strong FIRM function  
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from a possible management strategy based on the notion that 'if it is working well, 
do not change it because of the workload and possible conflict involved'. Cultural 
aspects appear less important at managerial level possibly because all managers are 
expected to adopt a global perspective and can expect at least one expatriate posting. 
Interviews with Oilco staff in Singapore did not give any impression of planned 
dramatic change in the compensation design in the future, whereas the Australian 
company was in the middle of a major strategic change for bargainable employees. 
Differences and Similarities in Oilco Australia and Oilco Singapore 
Compensation 
The main differences and similarities between the operator, clerical and managerial 
compensation systems in Oileo Australia and Oilco Singapore are shown in Table 7.8. 
Table 7.8 
Comparison of Compensation Systems in Oilco Australia and Oilco Singapore 
I OiIco Australia 	 Oilco Singapore 
General Organisational Factors 
General Compensation Features 
Hay job evaluation for administrative and 
managerial staff 
Variety of agreements and awards used 
No job evaluation for non-Hay staff 
Hay job evaluation for non-bargainable staff 
Single collective agreement 
In-house job evaluation scheme for non-Hay 
staff 
Industrial Compensation 
Algorithmic (8A*;5E*;1A/E*;2 unknown; 
3 not applicable) 
Skill-based 
No job evaluation 
Pay for skill progression and overall review 
No seniority pay 
No performance appraisal 
No variable component 
Agreements and awards ratified by A1RC, 
moving away from internal equity 
Decentralised agreements for refinery and 
terminal 
No dependence on company performance 
H&L** recommendations? 4 yes;9 no  
Algorithmic (10A*;5E*;1A/E*; 
3 not applicable) 
Job-based 
Jobs evaluated 
Pay for tenure and overall review 
Increments for service 
No performance appraisal 
High variable component 
Collective agreement registered with the IAC, 
with emphasis on internal equity 
Single centralised system 
Some dependence on company performance 
H&L"reconunendations? 11 yes; 1 no 
Algorithmic (9A*;4E*;1A/E*; 2 unknown; 3 
not applicable) 
Job-based 
Job evaluation at terminal and head office 
Annual review 
No performance appraisal 
No variable pay 
Decentralised to refinery and terminal. 
Separate system for head office 
No dependence on company performance 
H&L** recommendations? 4 yes; 9 no 
Algorithmic (10A*; 5E*; 1A/E*; 3 not 
applicable) 
Job-based 
All jobs evaluated 
Azunial increments for length of service plus 
bonus 
No performance appraisal 
High variable component 
Centralised system in collective agreement 
No separate system for head office 
Some dependence on company performance 
H&L** recommendations? 11 yes: 1 no 
Algorithmic (11A*;5E*;3A/E*) 
Job-based with Hay job evaluation 
Individual performance and overall review of 
scales 
Individual and aggregate performance 
measures for rises 
Some pay at risk 
Hierarchical system, internal equity emphasis 
Above average market position 
Annual review of scales 
Centralised system 
Some dependence on company performance 
H&L** recommendations? 8 yes; 5 no 
Algorithmic (12A*;5E*;2A/E*) 
Job-based with Hay job evaluation 
Individual performance and overall review of 
scales 
Individual and aggregate performance measures 
for rises 
Some pay at risk 
Hierarchical system, internal equity emphasis 
Above average market position 
Annual review of scales 
Centralised system 
Some dependence on company performance 
H&L** recommendations? 9 yes; 3 no 
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Oilco Australia 	 Oilco Singapore 
Clerical Compensation 
Managerial Compensation*** 
Notes:* A is Algorithmic. E is Experiential. A/E is Algorithmic/Experiential, as used in the Gomez-
Mejia and Balkin (1992:61) Summary Profile of E xperiential and Algorithmic Compensation Patterns 
** H&L is Hodgetts and Luthans (1993b) 
*** Excludes expatriate staff 
Among many other elements, Table 7.8 presents the total number of Algorithmic and 
Experiential features for each of the compensation systems in Oilco Australia and 
Singapore extracted from Tables 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4. To ensure a more overall valid 
comparison of the Algorithmic (A) and Experiential (E) patterns in the affiliates, the 
comparison can be restricted to only those common compensation features for which 
data were available and applicable in both subsidiaries. The results are shown in Table 
7.9. 
Restricting the Algorithmic and Experiential classifications only to those selected 
common features for which data were obtainable and applicable, Table 7.9 indicates 
predominantly Algorithmic profiles for the operators', clerical and managerial pay 
systems in both subsidiaries. The overall Algorithmic profiles for all three 
compensation systems for both affiliates given in Table 7.8 are therefore the same and 
Common Benefits for 
Bargainable Employees in Both 
Subsidiaries 
Acting allowances 
Allowance for cover of unplanned 
absences 
Annual leave 
Callout pay 
Compassionate leave 
Discount on oil products for private use 
Early retirement scheme 
Educational assistance scheme 
Laundry of uniforms 
Leave for union education (for officials) 
Local transport allowance 
Long service awards 
Maternity leave 
Meal allowance/reimbursement 
Mobile phones (according to job) 
Overtime 
Paternity leave 
Common Benefits for 
Bargainable Employees in Both 
Subsidiaries 
Pay for long-term illness 
Public holidays 
Reimbursement of travelling expenses 
Retrenchment benefit 
Common Benefits for 
Managerial Employees* in 
Both Subsidiaries 
Acting allowance for long-term 
coverage 
Annual leave 
Business entertainment expenses 
Cars for certain grades 
Club membership in selected cases 
Compassionate leave 
CPF or superannuation 
Discount on oil products for personal 
use 
Educational assistance 
Long service awards 
Long-term illness 
Maternity leave 
Mobile telephones for selected staff 
Paternity Leave 
Public holidays 
Retirement benefits 
Short-term sickness pay 
Travel reimbursement 
Common Benefits for 
Managerial Employees* in 
Both Subsidiaries 
Unpaid leave with approval 
Workers' compensation by law 
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Table 7.9 
Total of Algorithmic (A) and Experiential (E) Compensation Features for Oilco 
Australia and Oilco Singapore as at 1995 — Selected Common Features Only 
Number of Algorithmic(A)/Experiential(E) Features 
Oilco Singapore Oileo Australia 
Operators 
Clerical 
Managerial 
8 A 
9A 
11 A 
5 E 
4E 
5 E 
1 A/E 
1 A/E 
3 A/E 
8 A 
8A 
12 A 
5 E 	1 A/E 
5E 	1 A/E 
5 E 	2 A/E 
will be considered again later. This is not to say that each pair of compensation 
elements taken individually was the same in both subsidiaries. For example, the basis 
of pay (unit of analysis) was Experiential for Oilco Australia operating staff, but 
Algorithmic for Oilco Singapore, as noted in Table 7.2. The differences and 
similarities between the employee benefits of Oilco Australia and Oilco Singapore are 
shown in Table 7.10. 
Table 7.10 
Common and Unique Employee Benefits in Oilco Australia and Oilco Singapore 
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Common Benefits for 
Bargainable Employees in Both 
Subsidiaries 
Shift allowance 
Short-term sick leave 
Standby duty allowance 
Superannuation/CPF 
Uniform where necessary 
Unpaid leave (with approval) 
Workers' compensation (by law) 
Benefits unique to Oilco 	Benefits Unique to Oilco 
Singaporean bargainable Australia bargainable 
employees 	 employees 
Cost of medicines, injections, X-rays or 	Credit union facilities 
pathology 	 Jury service (paid absence) 
Death Benefit Long service leave (industry award) 
Dental treatment allowance to a set 	Make-up pay after accident 
maximum 	 Provision of first aid facilities 
Entitlements for paid leave defined as: 	Rest pause 
-birth of an employee's child 
-death of an employee's immediate 
family 
-marriage of an employee 
-marriage of an employee's child 
-mother's leave to tender sick children 
Free interest car loan for salespeople 
Free medical treatment for some remote 
locations 
Holiday subsidy 
Housing loans 
Medical insurance premium for surgery 
Unpaid special leave for females to care 
for children 
Unpaid special leave to travel outside 
Singapore 
Benefits Unique to Oilco 	Benefits Unique to Oilco 
Singapore Management* Australian Management* 
Employees 	 Employees 
Acting Allowance Credit Union 
Dental Treatment 
	 Death Benefit 
Fixed Transport Allowance 
	Other loans 
Free Medical Treatment/Medicine 	Voluntary Resignation Benefit 
Funeral Leave Benefit 
Hospital Ward Benefit 
Housing Loan 
Marriage Leave  
Note: * Excludes expatriate managers 
Taking the main occupational groups in turn, the external environment has arguably 
had different effects on the design of the compensation systems in Oilco Australia and 
Oilco Singapore. Starting with the effects of employment law on the unionised 
employees' compensation design, the Employment Act in Singapore applied to 
workers who were earning less than S$1500 per month. In Oilco Singapore, this 
applied to the staff in the bottom half of the nine-grade salary structure from 1992-95 
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if bonuses and supplements were excluded. As discussed earlier, the Act lays down 
minimum requirements for a variety of conditions, but Oilco Singapore exceeded 
these where it was permitted under the legislation e.g. the 21/4 months of Annual Wage 
Supplement. There is no similar legislation in Australia. Equal pay was followed in 
the collective agreements of both companies, and charges against labour (such as the 
CPF in Singapore and payroll tax in Australia) were compulsory, but did not directly 
affect the design of the pay system. 
While not influencing the compensation system directly, the state of the economy 
affected the overall increases and bonuses for Singaporean bargainable employees, as 
these were negotiated against a background of economic indicators and predicted 
company performance. Oilco Australia also reviewed and negotiated overall levels 
against economic and company indicators. Reviews for unionised staff were usually 
conducted within the context set by the National Wages Council recommendations in 
Singapore, and the National Wage Case guidelines of the AIRC in Australia. It could 
be argued that these bodies have had the most dominant impact on the nature of the 
collective bargains in both subsidiaries. The emphasis on flexibility and putting more 
pay at risk seems to have been followed by Oilco Singapore since the mid-1980s. The 
changing of the NWC guidelines in Australia from 1988, together with new industrial 
relations legislation, led to a complete review of the compensation strategy for 
unionised employees in the company, but the prevailing union system would probably 
not have permitted a (Singaporean-type) house union to be created, or a move to staff 
status to be made, without massive industrial conflict. 
Linking compensation to the cultures of both nations is more speculative. One could 
make a case that as Oilco Singapore and Oilco Australia have more discretion in 
designing the agreements for unionised employees, they would ensure that the 
bargains had a better 'fit' with the workforce than an imposed system from corporate 
head office. In the 1994-96 Oilco Singapore collective agreement, the high Power 
Distance (Hofstede, 1980) is reflected in the wide difference in salaries from the 
bottom to the top of the nine-grade scale and in the clear hierarchy of the job-based 
structure. Length of service was rewarded annually until the top of the grade was 
reached, and there were no individual incentives — both of which factors fit a low 
Individualistic society. In the Oilco Australia refinery operators' agreement, the 
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highest paid shift team leader was paid 1.4 times the salary of the trainee, which fits a 
low Power Distance society, but until recently, the Australian subsidiary did pay 
allowances for length of service and still does not have individual performance-linked 
pay (despite a high Individualism score as suggested by Hofstsede [1980]). 
With Australia having a slightly higher Masculinity index than Singapore's (Hofstede, 
1980), it might be argued that national culture could be one explanation for more 
'family friendly' policies in Oilco Singapore than in Oilco Australia. The moderately 
weak Uncertainty Avoidance score (Hofstede,1980) for Australia fits the 
decentralised operator and clerical pay systems, but not the managerial. It also fits the 
variable compensation for managers (Hodgetts and Luthans, 1993b). However, the 
trend to decentralised systems and desire for staff status and individual appraisal 
would move the system towards the suggested cultural fit. All this would suggest that 
culture is not the sole, or even the dominant factor in compensation design. 
With the respective industrial relation systems, it could be argued that the nature of 
union structure in Singapore and Australia constrained management in its actions. 
This is probably more the case in Australia, where uniOns have adopted different 
stances on decentralisation — having originally been strong proponents of a uniform 
compensation system for the whole oil industry. This might have continued, had it 
not been for the desire of the federal government, employers and ACTU to 
restructure awards. The eventual support of the AIRC and IR legislation has 
expedited this. However, as mentioned earlier, the ultimate goal of moving all 
employees to staff status and individual contracts would probably be resisted by the 
Oilco Australia unions at this stage. 
One final factor in the external environment which might constrain an employer in 
compensation design for bargainable staff is the industrial relations custom and 
practice of the nation. For example, neither Oilco Singapore nor Oilco Australia had 
individual appraisal and pay-for-performance in its collective agreements. One reason 
may be that the companies did not wish to go beyond the custom and practice in their 
respective countries. 
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Focusing now on managerial compensation, the basis for the compensation structure 
was the same in both subsidiaries. Under corporate directive, the Hay evaluated 
structures were used, with levels being adjusted annually after salary surveys, and 
individual performance being taken into account for position within the job grade. 
Both affiliates maintained levels at the upper end of the labour market as a definite 
policy. The main difference between the two companies was that in Oilco Australia's 
head office and terminal, senior clerical and administrative staff had been moved out 
of clerical award conditions and on to the Hay structure. This necessitated leaving 
their union and moving to staff conditions, which included performance-linked 
salaries. In Oilco Singapore, however, the collective agreement pushed up higher into 
the organisation so that it covered administrative and accounting supervisors, and 
section heads for areas such as invoicing and personnel services. Their compensation 
was negotiated by the Oilco Singapore staff union. 
The other difference was in the provision of bonuses. Oilco Australia had only just 
decided to introduce bonuses based on a matrix of individual and corporate 
performance in addition to the placement within the job grade and rises in pay levels 
for the whole structure in relation to the market. Oilco Singapore paid the exempt 
staff less pro rata bonus than it paid to its bargainable employees, but the distribution 
of bonuses based on the operating company's performance has been entrenched for 
many years. 
In analysing the managerial compensation system of the two affiliates, the Gomez-
Mejia and Balkin (1992) profiles in Table 7.8 show the great similarity of the 
managerial pay systems in the two companies. From a MINE perspective, the Oilco 
managerial compensation demonstrated that an identical job evaluation system can be 
implemented across an international company. It appears that the European corporate 
head office of Oilco was consulted about the packages of the top management in each 
subsidiary, and that it set the compensation for the CEOs and laid down the rules for 
the rewards of the expatriates. Apart from this, the affiliates had reasonable 
autonomy to administer the Hay structure in the context of their own business plans. 
In assessing the impact of- the external environment on managerial compensation 
designs of Oilco Australia and Singapore, one could argue that these were affected in 
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only a minor way by legislation except for Fringe Benefits Tax (FBT). Employee 
benefits were taxable for the employees in Singapore, but the FBI was a charge on 
the employer in Australia. This influenced the type of package offered to top 
management in Australia, where managers could chose benefits within a financial 
limit, the employer paying the tax. Both companies followed equal pay as a policy, 
although this is legislated for in Australia but not in Singapore. Both also contributed 
towards employee superannuation in the form of CPF contributions in Singapore, and 
an Oilco fund in Australia (conforming to Superannuation Guarantee laws). 
The state of the economy clearly had an impact on the professional and managerial 
labour market of both subsidiaries. Both surveyed the salaries of key employers to 
preserve their preferred position for overall pay levels in micro- and macro-economic 
contexts. The level of pay was largely the subsidiaries' responsibility. Both awarded 
bonuses based on corporate performance and capacity to pay. As the professional 
and managerial employees were not unionised in Singapore, the industrial tribunals of 
both nations could not directly affect the design of the managerial system. The 
National Wage Guidelines of the National Wages Council in Singapore, with their 
emphasis on flexibility, have been followed by Oilco in Singapore, and while the 
Council does not now recommend quantum increases, these were taken into account 
as one factor in professional and managerial rises up to 1985. The annual increases 
given to Singaporean civil servants were also taken as another benchmark. In 
Australia, Oilco provided rises independently of the NWC Guidelines of the AIRC and 
did not link any overall increases to NWC determinations. 
Arguably, the effect of the Australian and Singaporean cultures has not been a 
significant constraint on managerial compensation. The Power Distance of the two 
cultures is different (Hofstede, 1980), but both have centralised managerial 
hierarchical compensation systems. While no (Hay) salaries were disclosed to the 
author in Singapore, if the pattern of the figures of the collective agreement were 
repeated at managerial levels, the salary gaps between the lowest and the highest paid 
would be much greater in Singapore than in Australia. This would fit more happily 
with a high Power Distance. Indeed, the Singaporean interviewees indicated that 
there was a 'gap' above the top level of the bargainable employees which would also 
support this view. 
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Turning to expatriate compensation, the principles for expatriate compensation were 
laid down by corporate European head office and were observed in both Australia and 
Singapore. Expatriates notionally became 'employees' of the head office in the home 
country job grade for calculation of compensation and allowances necessary for 
particular locations. This system appeared to be a hybrid of Dowling, Welch and 
Schuler's (1999) 'going rate' (1994) and Phatak's (1992) 'headquarters scale plus 
affiliate differentials' approaches. 
In comparing the employee benefits, Table 7.10 records a large number of common 
benefits for bargainable employees in Oilco Singapore and Oilco Australia. The CPF 
contribution was the most expensive of all the benefits in Oilco Singapore, as 
superannuation would be for Oilco Australia. The high degree of overlap of benefits 
in the two companies is interesting, especially in the light of Singapore's MC status. 
However, a glance at the Oilco Singapore collective agreements of the 1960s shows 
that many of these benefits date back to that time. Identical 7 day x 24 hour process 
operations required special arrangements for cover, shiftwork, and transport, and the 
Oilco corporate culture and labour cost composition may underlie the similarity of 
benefits as well. Apart from superannuation and CPF, the other major difference 
between the two companies was the provision of health insurance premiums and 
dental and other health allowances in the Singaporean affiliate. 
With the high cost of housing in Singapore, Oilco Singapore company housing loans 
were available. Family leave was also provided, a benefit that was approved by the 
Australian Industrial Relations Commission in Australia in 1995. The unique 
Australian employee benefit is long-service leave, which was included in the oil 
industry awards and is usually incorporated in state government legislation. There is 
no jury system in Singapore, so payment of salary during jury service applies to 
Australia only. 
The managerial list shows a common core of conditions for both countries. In Oilco 
Australia, for certain grades, there were investment loans, car provision and additional 
superannuation through salary sacrificing for the Hay-evaluated employees, while the 
pattern in Singapore again reflected the restricted national health system, with the 
provision of a dental treatment allowance for all staff, and free medical treatment in 
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certain locations. The same arguments used for considering the bargainable employee 
benefits could be used for managerial staffs. Only minor differences could be 
detected, and some of those were due to the different legislation and health policies of 
both nations. 
Conclusion 
In this first case study, the process of drawing out the implications for the 
development of an explanatory framework and propositions can commence. In first 
considering the central guiding research question about how the external environment 
of an MNE subsidiary influences the design of its compensation system, it is 
immediately apparent the subsidiaries studied have more than one compensation 
system. In Oilco Australia, there were eleven systems operating in the head office, 
refinery and terminal, compared with four in Oilco Singapore. Each of these systems 
had different features. The question then turns to how each separate system is 
affected by the external environment, whether there are some environmental features 
that affect all compensation systems equally, or whether there are some that only 
affect certain systems or even pay elements. 
With reference to the subsidiary research questions and the effect of employment 
legislation, both Oilco subsidiaries acknowledged the international codes for MNEs 
and therefore paid compensation similar to, or above, local labour market standards. 
Local host country legislation was more specific in effect; some laws applied to all 
compensation systems including expatriates (e.g. FBT in Australia). Other legally 
binding regulations like industrial awards in Australia only affected certain grades of 
employee. Moreover, rather than being a constraint, some industrial relations 
legislation may offer new opportunities in compensation design as was the case for 
Oilco Australia with the Industrial Relations Act 1988. The policy of national 
government is implemented through legislation and this was evident in the 
Singaporean and Australian Governments' approach to the provision of a national 
health system. This was a clear example of how government philosophy and 
legislation can affect the company provision of employee health benefits in different 
affiliates. 
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The economy had more impact on the level of compensation in both countries rather 
on the design of the pay structures. Within the context of the instruments of macro 
economic policy, however, recommendations and principles of the Singaporean 
National Wages Council and the NWCs of the AIRC did have an influence on the 
compensation design for the unionised employees. As these recommendations and 
principles were context specific, inter-country differences were to be expected. These 
recommendations and principles had less effect on non-unionised compensation. 
Judging the effect of national culture on the design of compensation systems of both 
subsidiaries was problematical. Support for the Hodgetts and Luthans (1993b) 
recommendations across both subsidiaries was uneven. The propositions were not 
supported by the compensation systems for the operators and clerical employees in 
Oilco Australia, while there was marginal support from the managerial pay system. 
By comparison, the degree of support for the propositions was much greater for all 
occupations in Oilco Singapore, but again varied between operators and management. 
This result would suggest that national culture is not the main determinant. However, 
management's perception of how far national culture should be heeded in deciding on 
a compensation design may vary according to nation or occupation. 
More clearly an effect on subsidiary compensation was the industrial relations systems 
of both nations. Having decided to recognise unions, both Oilco Australia and 
Singapore worked within the formality of their respective industrial relation systems 
and with the union structures. Agreements with unions were subject to ratification by 
an industrial tribunal and were thus similar to those of local firms. The interaction of 
government philosophy, legislation and industrial relation systems is evident in both 
countries and affects the discretion of the MINE to strike agreements which fiirther the 
goals of the business. Non-unionised compensation is not affected directly by the host 
country IR system. 
We noted that industry characteristics should be included as an external influence on 
pay design. Strong competition in the industry, vulnerability to swings in oil prices, 
external regulation, and changing technology and products shaped RR policies and 
practice. Oilco Australia used the change in lR legislation to rethink its HR and IR 
strategy. The subsidiaries' internal features also affected compensation design. The 
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size of both companies required formal compensation arrangements and conformity 
with local practices to be acknowledged as good employers. Changing technology 
affected skill profiles in both countries and pay systems therefore had to accommodate 
these either in skill-based pay or by change of job content. With the intensity of 
competition, Oilco Australia wished to introduce its own enterprise agreements which 
were skill-based and linked to local performance indicators, rather than being party to 
restrictive industry-wide agreements. 
Despite the differences in host country external environments, when the Gomez-Mejia 
and Ballcin (1992) compensation profiles were applied, the pattern between Oilco 
Australia and Oilco Singapore was very similar in that all three compensation systems 
compared had an approximate ratio of 2:1 of Algorithmic to Experiential features. 
Again, one can ask whether this is due to internal or external factors. Oilco Australia 
was certainly pushing to adopt a more Experiential FIRM/IR strategy with greater 
emphasis on skill-based pay, individual and aggregate incentives and decentralised 
agreements. Industrial relations legislation and the attitude of the AIRC was 
encouraging the decentralisation. 
The corporate Oilco MINE head office international orientation was both polycentric 
and ethnocentric according to the type of employee. The expatriates of both 
subsidiaries nominally became employees of the European head office although their 
conditions were adapted to the country in which they were working. The managerial, 
professional and senior administrative staff were on a nominated structure that 
operated across the world although this was again adapted to fit Australian and 
Singaporean conditions. In contrast, the subsidiaries were free to design non-
managerial compensation systems in their local context. Pay levels for managerial and 
professional and non-managerial staff were attuned to local and national labour 
market levels. The amount of autonomy from the parent MINE therefore varied 
across the affiliates, being less for the top positions where grades and compensation 
packages had to be approved by head office. For the unionised workforce, head 
office would be notified of the type of systems at annual briefings, but most head 
office concern was centred on labour costs. The well-resourced HR departments and 
the international management experience of the subsidiaries arguably facilitated this 
aspect of decentralisation. 
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This comparative case would suggest initially that key elements of the external 
environment vary in their intensity and scope and thus the discretion available to 
management to design compensation in subsidiaries. It was also apparent that some 
of the external elements were strongly inter-linked as were some features of the 
internal environment with the external ones. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE FOODCO COMPANIES 
Foodco Australia 
Company Background of Foodco Australia 
The history of the MNE Foodco dated back more than 200 years. The company had 
manufacturing facilities in 23 countries and beverages and confectionery products selling 
in over 190 nations. It operated primarily in the 'impulse purchase' or 'informal 
consumption' segment of these markets. Employing more than 40,000 people world-
wide, its corporate head office was in Europe. Foodco's products were first imported 
into Australia in 1881, and the first manufacturing plant commenced production in 
Australia in 1921. Incorporated in 1971, Foodco Australia became one of Australia's 
major food companies and at the time of this study employed nearly 6,000 employees 
throughout Australia, New Zealand, Asia and the Pacific. The head office was located in 
Melbourne, where it housed executive and corporate services staff For the purposes of 
this study, a manufacturing site of the confectionery division was selected. The former 
confectionery company operating on this site was bought out by Foodco Australia in 
1967. The Foodco operation had about 750 employees who were involved in 
manufacturing, plus two departments that were non-operational — the computing service 
for Australasia and scientific services for the confectionery division. Foodco Australia 
had international responsibility for the Asia–Pacific region (which was previously 
controlled by the European head office). 
Organisation of Foodco Australia 
Foodco Australia had three operating divisions (confectionery, drinks and food) and a 
corporate services division based at head office in Melbourne. The Australian 
organisation operated through a holding company with its own board of executive and 
non-executive directors. The Chief Executive chaired an operating company that 
Production Manager 
I 	 I 
I 	 I Distribution Manager 	Planning Manager 
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included the Managing Directors of the Confectionery and Drinks Divisions. These latter 
directors reported to the stream (confectionery and drinks) directors at the European 
corporate MNE head office in addition to their links to the Australian board. The 
Confectionery Division in Australia had its own board of management which included the 
Operational Director for the factory under study. The Foodco Australia board made 
corporate decisions and met quarterly, but did not have a role in the operation of 
divisions. 
The reporting relationships for the manufacturing plant studied are shown in Figure 8.1. 
Figure 8.1 
Reporting Relationships for Foodco Australia 
Board of Management (Australia) 
(includes the Operational Director 
Operations Director of Foodco Australia 
I 	 1 Human Resource Manager Opera ons Manager 	Engineering Technical 
Manager 
Area Managers 
(who supervise a production unit of about 100 employees) 
Section Leaders (unionised) 
(who supervise a production group of 10-30 employees) 
I 
Leading Hands 
I 
Operatives 
Apart from the managers and operational staff shown, the site employed professional 
scientists such a chemists, food technologists, and laboratory technicians, some of whom 
had supervisory roles. There were also engineers, some with supervisory roles, and one 
draftsperson. The plant HR Manager forecast that the current authority structure would 
continue. The company believed it was relatively flat, and had not attempted a 
completely flat structure as they believed it would not work. A European Foodco factory 
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had tried a structure with no supervisors and elected leaders, but this had not been 
successful. There had been no work done on developing team structures or group 
bonuses at the plant. Foodco was not considering semi-autonomous work groups or 
cellular methods of production. It had discrete units of production based on the product, 
but they were not work teams. The plant ran as a hierarchy rather as a flat structure. 
Production Technology of Foodco Australia 
The technology of the manufacturing plant was very capital intensive. Where possible, 
the company used 'state of the art' confectionery manufacturing equipment, but was 
limited by the type of products it made. The site produced about 120 different products 
and so production runs were very short, difficult to mechanise, and labour intensive. 
There was a trade-off between the variety of product and mechanisation. The factory 
chosen for this study concentrated on particular product ranges and exported about 5 per 
cent of its output. The process was very much production-line driven. As the company 
became more technologically advanced, it was expecting to need more skills, especially in 
the technical area. Quality assurance had made advances, particularly in microbiology 
and the scientific testing of raw materials. The customers included large supermarket 
chains, milk bars, wholesalers and cash 'n' carry operations. As the Australian market 
was mature, linked to population growth, and highly competitive, the company's 
emphasis was on the Asia—Pacific region. 
Mission and Objectives of Food co Australia 
The philosophy of world-wide Foodco was stated in documents outlining its strategic 
objectives and priorities and values, and was signed by the European Chief Executive. 
The documents referred to the goodwill of the customers as the basis of business, since 
the MNE depended on millions of repeat purchases daily, and to the need to be 
competitive on quality, value and service. They discussed the process for setting 
objectives, the need for innovation, taking advantage of change, maintaining a simple 
organisation structure, openness of communications, commitment, and recognition of the 
role of stake-holders. This theme was developed by Foodco Australia's policy on 
corporate responsibility. The policy statement referred to being an equitable and 
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responsible employer, concerned with employee welfare and showing a willingness to 
provide the opportunity for each employee to achieve satisfying work. In return, the 
company required employees to perform in accordance with the company standards. 
Foodco Australia expected wages and conditions of employment to meet the standards of 
similar companies operating in a similar environment, and to promote the development of 
employee skills by providing educational and career opportunities, when appropriate, to 
those who wished to avail themselves of them. The policy also stated that the company 
aimed to delegate decision making as far down the line as possible, and to appoint people 
on merit and observe equal opportunity. 
The MNE's strong corporate philosophy, which dated back to the original European 
owners, encouraged strong employee involvement and benefits in the nineteenth century. 
According to a manager interviewed, some of this welfare philosophy 'rubbed off' on to 
Australia. Employee welfare was high on the company's list of responsibilities and 
included assisting staff with preventative medical, legal, marital and financial problems. 
Nevertheless, the Foodco corporate Remuneration Manager said that the culture of the 
company was 'to work hard to get ahead'. She went on: 'People are respected for 
working hard and if they do not, they usually leave the company'. Jobs which could be 
mastered between 9 am and 5 pm 'would be seen as unimportant'. 
The major objectives for Foodco Australia were profit, market share and sales growth 
targets. All projects had return-of-investment targets. The operational objective was to 
achieve flexibility and manufacturing efficiencies, including the better application of 
technology to achieve cost savings. In the last decade, the company had increased 
production while reducing staff numbers, and further growth into Asia would enable the 
company to have longer production runs. Foodco competed on price and quality and had 
strong brand loyalty backed by heavy advertising. The philosophy was to provide the 
best quality at a competitive price, but not necessarily to be the cheapest. 
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HRMAR Organisation of Foodco Australia 
The HRM function at Australian head office level was headed by a BR Director and a 
corporate BR team including a Remuneration Manager. The HRM function at the 
manufacturing site was managed by a FIR Manager and his staff, who reported to the 
Operations Director. The HRM activity covered staffing, training, industrial relations, 
payroll, occupational health and safety, rehabilitation, employee relations, and public 
relations. The FIRM strategy was to support the business plan through FIRM policies 
that took advantage of labour market reforms and labour flexibility. Reporting to the FIR 
Manager was an Employment Officer, Occupational Health and Safety Manager, a 
Training Manager, and an Industrial Relations Manager. All FIRM staff were fairly 
flexible and there was an overlap of function because the department was 'seen as an 
employee relations issues department, rather than a separate functional one', said the 
plant's HR Manager. The FIRM procedures were written and formalised. There was a 
corporate policy manual which covered items such as recruitment, selection, induction, 
leave, service with the company, relocation and termination. The site did not have 
separate personnel policies as such, but there was an induction booklet that set out the 
rules and regulations for the plant including health and safety regulations, access to 
facilities and sickness reporting rules. 
With labour costs being 12-20 per cent of operating costs depending on labour content 
of products, the company maintained a core employee structure and a number of 
temporary employees. By using this structure, Foodco had quantitative flexibility and 
could recruit or lay off people according to the demand of the product. Qualitative 
flexibility was achieved through multi-slcilling and a variety of different shift patterns. 
Part-time shifts were employed when necessary. About one-fifth of the production 
employees were put-time. 
The industrial workforce composition of the Foodco factory consisted of 50 per cent 
unskilled employees (who could be trained in 1-2 months), 30 per cent semi-skilled, and 
20 per cent skilled. A skilled confectionery cook usually required 12 months' experience 
and training to understand the process. The workforce of the manufacturing plant 
n es- 
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reflected the ethnic composition of Australia. The company had a policy of requiring 
good written and spoken English as a selection criterion, but the Foodco plant did not see 
ethnic composition as a factor in pay system design. About half of the factory staff were 
male, compared with 80 per cent of the management employees. 
Unionisation of Foodco Australia 
There were three main unions on site — the Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, 
Printing and Kindred Industries Union (the Metals [confectionery] Union), the National 
Union of Workers (NUW), and the Australian Municipal, Administrative, Clerical and 
Services Union (AMACSU). There were previously four main unions on site, but the 
Federated Confectioners' Association of Australia (a union) merged with the metals 
union in the early 1990s and became a division of this. In addition, five other unions had 
about two or three members each. At the time of the first interviews, the company 
operated a closed shop and was 100 per cent unionised. Trade union membership fees 
were deducted from pay. This had been the case since the late 1970s. In 1993, 
employees were notified that the closed shop no longer existed and that they would have 
to sign an 'authority to deduct union dues' to get deducted from pay packets. Many 
employees did not do this, and it led to a dramatic decline in numbers. However, each 
main trade union had a shop steward and the metals (confectionery) union had three shop 
stewards on day shift, two on the afternoon and one on the night shift. At peak 
membership, about 600 members of this union worked on shifts. The unions did not 
operate as a single formal bargaining unit, but this is not to say that it might not occur in 
the future. Foodco did not have regular meetings with stewards, although the Industrial 
Relations Manager probably saw them weekly on a casual basis while walking around the 
site. 
The Metals Union, when representing the metal trades employees, had one shop steward 
and 70 members. The NUW also had 70 members and two shop stewards when fully 
unionised — one on day shift and the other on afternoon shift. The AMACSU had 30 
members and one steward. The company had a formal grievance procedure which was 
incorporated into the site agreements. 
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Compensation for Bargainable Employees in Foodco Australia 
Taking the operators first, on the ratification of a federal Confectioners' Award in 1980, 
Foodco Australia decided in 1980 to move to an enterprise bargain or site agreement for 
its employees, and to opt out of the AlRC National Wage Case system. According to the 
manager interviewed, the main reason for this strategy was frustration with the stance of 
the union, then named the Federated Confectioners' Association of Australia (FCAA). 
The confectionery operators' local agreements on wages and conditions were negotiated 
without full-time trade union official involvement, but with union ratification. 
Negotiations were carried out between the shop floor representatives elected by the 
employees, shop stewards, and the plant FIR Manager. The resulting documents were 
not legally binding, but were 'letters of agreement' including a 'no strike' clause. In 
some cases, the FCAA would not sign agreements. The Factory HR Manager went on: 
This strategy has increased the bond between the plant management and the employees. These 
agreements were the forerunner of enterprise agreements and although they were not ratified by 
the lRC or unions, they were stuck to. 
The position now was that the site agreement covered the wage increases, flexibility and 
operation of shiftwork. As Foodco plant was a respondent to the federal Confectioners' 
Award which covered it and about 40 other respondents, it had to follow the federal 
award. However, as a result of Foodco's log of claims against the union, it had a 
separate appendix to the Award containing the following provisions: 
• Annual leave 
• Conditions for part-time employees 
• Disputes procedure 
• Hours of work 
• Length of the working week (38 hours) 
• Payment of wages 
• Shiftwork conditions (3 shift system) 
• Sick leave. 
The site agreements typically operated for two years and guaranteed wage increases in 
return for certain work practices. The 'no strike' provision was linked to the employees 
agreeing not to claim an increase during the duration of the agreement. The wage 
increases in the local site agreement were not related to AIRC National Wage Case 
decisions. The quantum had been different and paid at different times. Typically, over a 
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two-year agreement. Foodco had paid four instalments at six-monthly intervals. 
Although there was an expectation that companies would not exceed the NWC increase, 
Foodco had sometimes done so in the past. This drew the attention of the governments 
of the day to the pricing of the company's products. Since the advent of decentralised 
bargaining, this has no longer been an issue. 
The company encouraged consultation at shop steward level and would only involve fill-
time officials once a deal had been agreed. The metals (confectionery) union signed on 
behalf of its members, although the agreement was put to a vote of employees. 'This has 
worked well', stated the HR Manager. The company had a better capacity to determine 
wages and conditions, although the agreements exceeded award levels. The federal 
Confectioners' Award was seen as a minimum standard, with the local unique features 
being the wage rates and 'some cosmetic issues'. Overtime was still paid at award rates, 
but the agreement probably had more flexibility in part-time and casual ratios, together 
with unique agreements on sick leave and days on which leave could be taken. 
Before 1990, the federal Confectioners' Award had four grades of pay and more than 100 
job classifications. This structure was subsequently rationalised into four grades in 
which, for each grade, typical tasks were listed (e.g. 'operating chocolate drop depositing 
machine' for Grade 1)(AlRC Print CO53LL). Similar descriptions applied for the award 
as at August 1995. Foodco only worked with three grades of employee and did not 
classify people according to jobs in the Award. It was only partly used in this regard. 
The company adopted a more multi-skilled approach. Three grades — A (high), B and C 
(lowest) — were used to sever the link with the Award. Level A was for systems 
operators who could operate a number of systems. For example, for one product, there 
might be four pieces of equipment and the operator could handle all four. Level B was 
for machine operators who could only run one machine in a group while Level C was for 
packers, who packed the product with very little machine operation, using mainly manual 
skills. This structure still applied, had a fixed single wage point for each scale, and 
contained no incentive elements, production bonuses or piecework arrangements for the 
confectioners. 
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With the trade metals staff, three grades with single pay points based on the federal 
restructured Metal Industry Award were used: Trade Assistant (unskilled), Fitter and 
Fitter Special Class. Only one Trade Assistant was employed and was paid at a fixed 
percentage of the trade fitter's rate (quoted as 100 per cent). At the trades level, all 
employees had to possess a trade certificate. The classification 'Special Class' was added 
to the Metals Award in 1989, applied mainly to people who had pneumatic and hydraulic 
skills, and generated a wage of 115 per cent of the fitter's rate. Foodco's plant changed 
this slightly because there was a need for the 'Special Class' employees to undertake 
unique work in the factory. The rates paid were well above those specified in the Metals 
Award and were incorporated in a site agreement with the shop steward. Typically, if 
someone joined the company as a fitter, it would take him or her 12 months to graduate 
to the 'Special Class' classification. Their competence was assessed by the supervisor. 
The plant designed its own four-level, skill-related structure with single pay points for the 
stores employees. Level 1 was the base level for unskilled employees. Level 2 was for 
forklift drivers (who had to pass a test) with a requirement of understanding the basic 
distribution and store system. Level 3 encompassed the work of levels 1 and 2, together 
with an 'understanding of multiple transactions' needing clerical and administrative skills. 
Staff in Level 4 mastered the work of the other 3 levels and supervised other employees. 
The supervisors of the confectionery operators were unionised and were paid on a 
two-level structure of fixed point rates. Grade A was for the Leading Hands (who 
supervised four to five people), and Grade B for the 20 Section Leaders in the plant. 
Their conditions of service were similar to those of the operators, but the pay was clearly 
higher. They were on individual contracts although they got the same salary increases as 
the confectionery operators. The company had considered productivity-based incentives 
for these supervisors, but had not overcome the problem of work measurement. The 
main difficulty was to distinguish their individual contribution from company 
performance. For example, if the Section Leader did well in reducing labour cost, this 
might not be reflected in sales if the market was flat. Nevertheless, the Section Leaders 
were appraised, but the assessment was not directly linked to pay. It was used as one 
factor in setting pay, but the assessment interview was separated from the pay 
determination date. According to the site HR Manager, 'to have them together would 
spoil the atmosphere of the interview'. The purpose of the appraisal was to generate data 
for performance counselling, training and coaching, to give constructive feedback on 
performance, and to assist in setting an appropriate salary. The criteria for assessment 
were output, quality, ordering, staff development of subordinates, communication, 
housekeeping, self-development, staff hygiene, safety practices, handling of paperwork, 
providing an example to subordinates, and an overall assessment. The document was 
signed by the supervising Area Manager and checked by another assessor. 
The clerical staff, said the manager interviewed, had the least structured compensation of 
all the unionised employees. The site had about 30 clerks, and there was no formal 
compensation structure or particular philosophy about paying above the state clerical 
award level, but the strategy was 'to get the best possible people and to pay what can be 
afforded', said an interviewed manager. There was a site agreement with the AMACSU 
(Clerks' Union), but this was not registered with industrial tribunals. It consisted of an 
exchange of letters between the AMACSU and the Foodco plant specifying salaries for a 
two-year period. The negotiations occurred between the HR Manager, the Industrial 
Relations Manager, the shop stewards on site and the local organiser for the AMACSU. 
The idea for a site agreement dated back to the early 1980s and covered conditions over 
and above the state clerical award, which was seen as the safety net. The state clerical 
award had been replaced by a federal award as a result of the employee relations 
legislation in Victoria. The site agreement outlined the proposed salary increases and 
special conditions such as special leave. As the majority of the clerks were female, they 
could use sick leave to cover absence due to their children being sick. Job descriptions 
were used for clerical positions, but there was no formal job evaluation scheme. In the 
future, the interviewed manager talked of the possibility of attempting to link Foodco 
strategies and organisational structure to clerical pay with some kind of integrated job 
evaluation, job redesign and performance appraisal system. Clerical staff were formally 
appraised without any link to pay. The assessment was used to motivate employees and 
to identify training needs where someone was under-performing. 
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No performance bonuses or incentives were provided for clerical employees, but there 
was access to the Employee Share Plan. The hours of work were 40 per week with some 
staff working 36 hours per week. There were only a small number located in computing 
and distribution areas who worked on shifts, and loading was paid for afternoon and 
evening shiftwork. Overtime was paid on a limited scale. The Foodco site had no 
problems in attracting good staff even in a tight labour market because of its image as a 
good employer. It undertook external salary surveys of the local labour market to ensure 
its compensation competitiveness. 
The basis of compensation was therefore mainly the job scope although 'jobs are not 
defined in a rigorous way', said the manager. With the plant's own three-grade system, 
Level 1 was for base grade clerks with no keyboard or PC skills. Level 2 was for clerks 
with keyboard or PC skills. Level 3 was for clerks with detailed administrative systems 
knowledge or with supervisory responsibilities for Level 1 clerks. Foodco used the state 
clerical award as a guide for conditions, but as the plant paid well above these rates 
(probably A$50—A$100 per week more), it did not see its compensation as relevant to the 
state award. The state clerical award was restructured in 1991 to a six-classification 
structure, and the company was considering the implication of this for its structure. 
However, with the election of the state Liberal/National Party conservative coalition 
Government in Victoria in 1992 and the passage of its Employee Relations Act, all state 
awards were frozen from March 1993 at levels existing at that time, and so became even 
less relevant to Foodco. (As mentioned earlier, the Victorian State Government later 
transferred its entire industrial relations and award system to the federal system). 
In summary, the basis of compensation for the operators was a combination of job and 
skill. Metals trades and the stores employees had a competency basis for their pay. 
Supervisors were paid according to the job they did, but had their wages indirectly linked 
to performance. For all these employees, there were no annual increments or seniority 
pay. Length of service was recognised by a service pin brooch every five years. In 
addition, the Foodco site operated a number of schemes for recognising the Employee of 
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the Quarter and Employee of the Year. A quarterly prize for winners included a paid 
night out with a partner and the right to park in the Operations Director's car park for 
two weeks. At the end of the year, a limousine transported the Employee of the Year and 
his or her partner to a major hotel for the night after a photo session with a local celebrity 
such as a TV newsreader or footballer. The pay levels were checked externally every six 
months and although there were no similar food company competitors nearby, Foodco 
liked to check the local labour market rates. An interviewed manager considered the 
compensation levels at the plant to be high, but paid to a 'lean' workforce. 
Professional and Managerial Compensation in Foodco Australia 
The professional and managerial employees at the Foodco manufacturing site were paid 
on a company-wide salary structure that was managed from the Australian head office. 
The structure had eight grades, with overlapping a salary ranges covering secretaries and 
new graduates at one end and executive board members at the other. The grading system 
was devised in the early 1980s, and while it was based on job size, it was administered in 
a flexible manner. If a new job was created and was similar to another job in the 
company, then it was paid at that grade. If no similar position existed, then the job was 
formally evaluated by the company's own points system. The grade for a job was kept 
confidential within the HRM department and not divulged to employees. There were no 
fixed increments, and the interviewed manager said that 'employees have no idea what 
the money increases will be'. Foodco Australia did not like the Hay philosophy of 
evaluation because the company preferred confidentiality. The Foodco European head 
office used points and salary ranges, and the Australians believed that, if these were made 
general knowledge, the comparisons could 'cause trouble' between the two countries. 
The performance of managers and professional staff was assessed on a one-to-one basis 
in January and February of each year. The head office HRM team checked economic 
indicators such as inflation and the market level of particular occupations for salaries 
through surveys, and the head office Remuneration Manager made recommendations to 
senior management about salary levels and individual salaries. Salary increases might be 
'high', 'medium' or 'low' based on performance in the job which was assessed by senior 
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• executives. They might discuss individual performance with line managers in making final 
decisions. Final salary was dependent on the management of key tasks, which were listed 
as 'achieved' or 'not achieved'. 
The salaries budget was Australia-wide and so if the manufacturing plant (in this study) 
was more successful than others, it might get more money to distribute, but each 
executive usually received the same percentage to spend. Management at the plant could 
make a case to top management to overspend their disposable sum if the plant 
performance was outstanding. The salary philosophy was to move staff through the 
scales so that they could progress to the top end of the scale. Foodco had a strong 
philosophy for paying for good performance, but the danger was that employees reached 
the top of the scale and then stopped. There was pressure on managers, however, to 
keep employees progressing beyond the top of the scale. 
For bonus purposes, the 'managerial' staff were separated from the 'members of staff' 
and bonuses were only paid to the 600 'managerial' employees in Foodco Australia. As 
noted earlier, some scientists and all engineers were included in the 'managerial' 
category. The bonuses were based on profit and the sales volume of the Australian 
operations, and were expressed as a percentage of salary — usually around 10 per cent. 
The Company had no policy on the distance between the bottom and top salaries and the 
external market was very influential in determining levels. 
Foodco's view was that the salary structure was based both on job and skills and that 
additional competencies were required as job size increased. It was more performance-
based than seniority of service-based, except that length of service had a similar effect in 
building up salaries. No compensation was age-related. The Foodco culture of pay 
confidentiality was taken very seriously, and employees were reminded every year about 
the necessity for secrecy about their salaries. There was no trade union or staff 
association involvement in the design of the salary structure. 
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Employee Benefits in Foodco Australia 
In Foodco Australia, some employee benefits were common to all members of staff and 
unique to other categories. The common benefits across all levels were: 
• Annual leave 
• Compassionate leave 
• Death benefit as part of superannuation 
• First aid treatment 
• Long service awards 
• Maternity leave 
• Public holidays 
• Retrenchment benefit 
• Share ownership plan 
• Sick leave 
• Superannuation 
• Unpaid leave after five years. 
The Confectioners' Award laid down other provisions for operating staff which also 
bound Foodco. These included: 
• Accident pay 
• Dining room accommodation 
• Lockers and dressing rooms 
• Payment for jury service 
• Provision of caps, overalls, footwear, gloves and uniforms 
• Provision of rest room 
• Seating accommodation 
• Washing facilities. 
Managerial staff received additional benefits such as private medical and dental cover, 
study leave/benefit if related to their jobs, provision of cars, and mobile telephones. The 
full list of benefits by employee category is shown in Table 8.1. The Remuneration 
Manager for Foodco stated that there was little choice of benefits as the company was 
very conservative. The benefits broadened in range at the top of the company and had 
increased in recent years. In the early 1980s, only items such as leave loading and a car 
were common, and the coming of FBT had raised the costs of benefits to the company. 
By the end of 1995, there had been no real change in employee benefits, although the 
$800 club membership allowance for managers had now been 'grossed up' into salaries. 
The medical benefits were retained, and the car policy had become more flexible. 
Employees could opt for a car allowance instead of a company-provided car, or lease one 
through a salary sacrifice system. 
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Table 8.1 
Em lo ee Benefits Profile for Foodco Australia as at 1995 
Industrial/ 
Blue Collar 
Unskilled 	Skilled 
Clerical/ 
Acimin 
Sales/ 
Technical 
Professional/ 
Management 
Board 
Acting allowance 1(1) 1(1) .1(1) 
Annual leave 1 1 1 1 / 1 
Attendance allowance 
Benefit for overseas assignments 1 1 
Business entertainment expenses 
Cellular phones 1 
Co-operative shares 1 1 1 I / 1 
Compassionate leave 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Death benefit 1(2) 1(2) 1(2) 1(2) / (2) 1(2) 
Dental treatment i 1 
Early retirement schemes 
External/social recreational club 
membership 
/ 1 
Festive loan/advance 
Fixed monthly transport 
allowance 
Free medical treatment/medicine I V 1 1 / 1 
Funeral leave benefit 
Hospital ward benefit / 1 
Housing loan 
Housing renovation loan 
Laundry benefit 
Long service award 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Long-term illness / 1 
Machine allowance 
Marriage leave 
Maternity leave I 1 1 1 1 1 
Meal allowance 1 1 1 
Medically board-out benefit 
Other loans 
Paternity leave 1 1 1 
Personal insurance 
Provision of car 1 1 1 
Reimbursement for use of own car 
on company business 
Retirement benefit (>CPF) 
[Singapore] 
Retrenchment benefit 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Service benefit 
Shift allowance 1 I 1 
Sick leave 1 1 1 ../ it it 
Specialist surgical fee 
Study leave benefit 1 
Superannuation (Australia) 1 I 1 1 1 1 
Transport benefit/allowance/ 
reimbursement 
Uniform / 1 1 1 
Union day leave 
Union education leave 1 1 1 
Unpaid leave 1(3) 1(3) 1(3) 1(3) 1(3) 1(3) 
Voluntary resignation benefit 
Notes: 
(1) As per award. (2) Part of Superannuation scheme. (3) After 5 years service. 
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Social activities were arranged through social and sporting clubs, mid-year annual balls, 
employee open days and family days. The company also offered medical tests, 
cholesterol and diabetes tests and free diet advice. The thinking was that good employee 
relations equalled good industrial relations and a productive workforce. Foodco 
Australia introduced an employee share plan in Australia in 1983, and at the plant studied, 
up to 40 per cent of staff bought shares at 10 per discount repayable over an interest free 
period. The shares were now corporate Foodco MNE shares and so the close link with 
the Australian company had gone; interest in employee share ownership had declined 
accordingly. 
Relationship of Foodco Australia to Head Offices 
The relationship of the Foodco manufacturing plant to its Australian head office was 
relatively simple. Management salaries were administered from head office and the 
structure was managed from there too. The plant management was informed of the 
amounts to be dispersed in salary increases, but the final decision on any 
professional/management salary lay with the head office_ The Factory HR Manager 
continued: 
Corporate head office sets the policies and guidelines for the operation, and we use these to 
consolidate information. But each factory is its own cost centre as well. We have our own budget 
and targets to be achieved There are head office guidelines set down as part of the budget 
process, and we usually negotiate within these. But there is a fair bit of discretion within these. 
The relationship to the [national] head office HR people could therefore be described as loose in 
this sense. 
The plant had no reason to be in direct contact with the European corporate head office 
about its compensation design. 
The Profile of Foodco Australia Compensation 
Tables 8.2 — 8.4 show the Foodco Australia's profile for rewards for operating, clerical 
and managerial staff using the Gomez-Mejia and 13alkin (1992) terminology of 
Algorithmic and Experiential compensation patterns. The operators (Table 8.2) were on 
a skill-based (Experiential) system and were rewarded according to their mastery of 
equipment. There was no extra pay for length of service, nor was performance formally 
appraised or performance incentives offered. Table 8.2 shows a compensation profile 
Table 8.2 
Summary Profile of Algorithmic (A) and Experiential (E) Compensation Patterns of Operating Staff Compensation in 
Foodco Australia and Foodco Singapore as at 1995 
_ 
Foodco Australia Operating Staff Foodco Singapore Operating Staff 
Compensation Feature A or E Compensation Feature A or E 
(a)Basis for Pay 
Skill 
Extra skills plus overall review 
Not applicable 
Short-term 
Low 
Not applicable 
Internal structure plus external review 
Different benefits across company 
Not applicable 
-tt  
Skills 
Skills through length of service (2) 
Individual and aggregate 
Short-term 
High 
Not applicable 
Internal structure plus external review 
Different benefits across company 
Behaviours monitored 
• 	
w
 	
ral 	
LT.1 
Unit of analysis 
Criteria for pay increases 
Level of performance measurement 
Time orientation 
Risk sharing 
Strategic focus 
Equity concern 
Reward distribution 
Type of control 
(b)Design Issues 
Not known 
Not known 
None 
Low future potential/ higher immediate payoffs 
Fewer rewards/low frequency 
Pecuniary 
- 
- 
A 
A (1) 
A 
E 
Above market 
Above market 
High 
Low future potential/ higher immediate payoffs 
Multiple rewards 
Pecuniary 
w
•ct  u
n.4 
Salary market policy 
Benefits market policy 
Incentives in pay mix 
Total compensation 
Reinforcement schedule 
Reward emphasis 
(c) Administrative Framework 
Site agreement — decentralised 
High — formal agreement 
Participative 
Bureaucratic 
Lin
.4
 <  
Own unique system — decentralised 
High 
Participative (unionised) 
Bureaucratic 
t.i.“
4
1,14 
Decision making 
Pay disclosure 
Governance structure 
Nature of pay policies 
TOTAL A = 8 
E = 5 
A/E = 1 
N/A=2 (3) 
Unknown =3 
TOTAL A = 7 
E = 10 
A/E = 1 
N/A= 1 (3) 
Notes:(1) An employee share purchase scheme was available. (2) A review of overall levels also took place on the expiry of the collective agreement (3) Not applicable 
Table 8.3 _ 
Summary Profile of Algorithmic (A) and Experiential (E) Compensation Patterns of Clerical Staff Compensation in 
Foodeo Australia and Foodco S inanore as at 1995 - - - --- --- - 	- r. 	. 
Foodco Australia Clerical Staff Foodco Singapore Clerical Staff 
Compensation Feature A or E Compensation Feature A or E 
(a) Basis for Pay 
Job and Skill 
Regular review of overall levels 
Individual appraisal 
Short-term 
None 
Not applicable 
Internal plus market 
Different benefits across company 
Individual appraisal 
NE 
A 
A (" 
A (2) 
A 
- 
NE 
A 
E 
Job and skill 
Tenure and performance 
Individual and aggregate 
Short-term 
High 
Not applicable 
Market driven 
Different benefits across company 
Individual appraisal (behaviour) 
r.L1
‹
w
 r f.u<
v.1 
Unit of analysis 
Criteria for pay increases 
Level of performance measurement 
Time orientation 
Risk sharing 
Strategic focus 
Equity concern 
Reward distribution 
Type of control 
(b) Design Issues 
Above market 
Above market 
None 
Low future potential/ higher immediate payoffs 
Low frequency 
Pecuniary 
e-:', 
<
<
<
<
<
w 
Above market 
Above market 
High 
Low future potential/ higher immediate payoffs 
High frequency 
Pecuniary 
<
<
w
<
w
w
 
Salary market policy 
Benefits market policy 
Incentives in pay mix 
Total compensation 
Reinforcement schedule 
Reward emphasis 
(c) Administrative Framework 
Site agreement 
High — site agreement 
Informal agreement 
Reasonably bureaucratic 
w
w
w
<
  
Site system 
Probably low 
Non-union 
Reasonably bureaucratic 
E 
A (5) 
A 
A 
Decision making 
Pay disclosure 
Governance structure 
Nature of pay policies 
TOTAL A = 11 
E=5 
A/E = 2 
N/A= 1 (6) 
TOTAL A = 8 
E=8 
A/E = 2 
N/A= 1 (6) 
Notes:(1) The appraisal has no link to pay. (2) There is, however, access to an Employee Share Plan. (3) Clerical staff in Foodco Singapore were not covered by the 
collective agreement. (4) There were rules for increments but no job evaluation or structure. (5) As the salaries were individually negotiated, it is assumed disclosure 
will be low. (6) N/A= Not applicable 
Table 8.4 
Summary Profile of Algorithmic (A) and Experiential (E) Compensation Patterns of Managerial Staff Compensation in 
Foodco Australia and Foodco Sin a ore as at 1995 
Foodco Australia Staff Foodco Singapore Staff 
Compensation Feature A or E Compensation Feature A or E 
(a)Basis for Pay 
Job 
Performance 
Individual and aggregate 
Short-term 
High 
Corporate 
Internal and external 
Benefits vary with status 
Review of objectives 
Job 
Performance 
Individual and aggregate 
Short-term 
High 
Business Unit 
Market 
Benefits vary 
Objectives 
r..:  
<
w
w
<
w
w
w
<
  LLI 
Unit of analysis 
Criteria for pay increases 
Level of performance measurement 
Time orientation 
Risk sharing 
Strategic focus 
Equity concern 
Reward distribution 
Type of control 
(b)Design Issues 
Above market 
Above market 
Moderately low 
Low future potential/ higher immediate payoffs 
Low frequency 
Pecuniary 
a 
Above average 
Above average 
High 
Low future potential/ higher immediate payoffs 
Annual review and annual bonus 
Pecuniary 
g's 
<
  <
  L LI  <
  <
  LI1  
Salary market policy 
Benefits market policy 
Incentives in pay mix 
Total compensation 
Reinforcement schedule 
Reward emphasis 
(c)Administrative Framework 
Centralised 
Low 
Authoritarian ,-..--, 
<
 -<< 
Centralised 
Low 
Authoritarian 
A ") 
A (5) 
A 
NE (6) 
Decision making 
Pay disclosure 
Governance structure 
Nature of pay policies 
TOTAL A = 12 
E = 5 
A/E = 2 
TOTAL A = 10 
E = 8 
A/E = 1 
Notes: (1) Foodco argues that more skills are needed as the size increases. (2) Share purchase is available. (3) While there is a centralised structure, line managers have 
some discretion on individual cases. (4) Although managerial pay is linked to local performance, head office is involved in pay decisions. 
(5) An assumption as they are on individual salaries. (6) The structure has general rules, but salaries are individually determined. 
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with slightly more Algorithmic than Experiential features. The clerical pay system (Table 
8.3) had both job and skill elements, and the preferred policy was to pay above the federal 
clerical award, with the base salary being an important part of the total package. The 
profile was mainly Algorithmic for the basis of pay and the design issues, but, as Table 
8.3 illustrates, the administrative framework was largely Experiential. The professional 
and managerial staff (Table 8.4) were paid according to the job they did although 
Foodco had a strong commitment to 'distribute rewards based on contribution' (Gomez-
Mejia & Balldn, 1992:62). The system had a short-term orientation for rewards while the 
purchase of shares might have provided a more long-term focus for some staff: A 
proportion of the professional and managerial reward was dependent on organisational 
performance. As Table 8.4 portrays, despite these incentives, the profile of managerial 
compensation was more strongly Algorithmic than Experiential. 
Foodco Australia Compensation and the External Environment 
Some comments on the effect of the external environment on Foodco Australia 
compensation systems can now be made. The company was subject to legislation which 
affected the cost of compensation and the way it was packaged. The company had to pay 
payroll taxes and workers' compensation and observe equal pay laws and state legislation 
on long service and other areas. The Foodco plant HR Manager stated: 
I don't see minimum levels in awards and equal pay laws as a constraint for the company as we 
pay above the award in any case to obtain quality staff. However, when FBT was introduced, we 
had to review the managerial benefits to determine the tax bill, and to assess the possibility of 
offering more cash instead of benefits. The new legislation on superannuation has also forced us 
to re-think superannuation policy. As the compulsory charge increases each year, we'll probably 
reduce the company's contribution in proportion. If the government is legislating on 'super', why 
should we offer things to employees? If we have to pay 10 per cent after 2000 plus, we probably 
won't have a company scheme. 
Another external factor considered by subsidiary management to have a significant impact 
on compensation was the state of the economy. The Remuneration Manager referred to 
the effect of inflation on the salaries budget, and on what other companies were paying, 
and spoke of the way the economy affected Foodco sales and its position in the market. 
Incomes policies of the (then) Labor Government did not have much effect on the salary 
system, but if the unions pushed for higher increases in awards because of inflation, the 
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company would take these into account in the determination of supervisors' pay. With 
the rising unemployment of the early 1990s, Foodco found that it was easier to fill jobs 
and there was not the same pressure on pay levels. The plant HR Manager was of the 
same opinion that: 
The Labor Government's Accord with the ACTU, [bringing about moderate national wage claims  
and inflation rates] has meant that the company's wage increases have been moderate as well. 
However, the economy does not completely determine of pay levels because during the tight labour 
market in 1987, we didn't alter our wages to attract staff. Instead, we stressed the company's 
image and employee benefits available and were more successful in attracting candidates than 
other firms. 
The HR Manager said that the plant was in the habit of comparing its pay increases with 
AMC National Wage Case (NWC) decisions and the cost of living increases. Incomes 
policies such as the Accord had had little impact on the compensation structures (as 
opposed to pay levels), as Foodco had its own site agreements. The situation for the 
professional and managerial salaries was the same. Foodco would take into account any 
AIRC NWC decision, but the January salary increases for managers were worked out 
independently. There were no plans for enterprise or site agreements to include all levels 
of staff because the company-wide managerial salary structure 'helps promotion and 
mobility of staff, said the Remuneration Manager. Foodco had adopted a strategy of 
plant agreements with the industrial staff for many years to minimise their involvement 
with the A1RC, state tribunals and the full-time union officials. By doing so, it attempted 
to minimise third party involvement. For non-award staff, the AIRC's Structural 
Efficiency Principles in 1988 had no impact at all on managerial salary systems. 
With regard to the influence of national culture, Table 8.5 shows the extent to which the 
Hodgetts and Luthans (1993b) recommendations for the 'appropriate' pay systems for 
Hofstede's (1980) dimensions of Australian culture are reflected in the Foodco Australia 
compensation systems. There was more support of the propositions in the managerial 
compensation than for the operating and clerical staff. For the operating and clerical 
employees, industrial factors may be more powerful in the final design of their systems. 
Another argument could be that in the managerial arena, where employers have more 
freedom of choice, a better cultural 'fit' is more possible. Foodco interviewees did not 
Table 8.5 
The Hodgetts and Luthans (H&L) Recommendations for Compensation for Australia as 
Reflected in Foodco Australia 
Australia Foodco Australia 
Hofstede Dimension 
Index 
H&L Recommended 
Compensation 
Operating Staff 
Compensation 
Clerical Staff 
Compensation 
Managerial Compensation 
1. Moderately low Power 
Distance 
• Low salary gaps between 
lowest and highest paid 
• Low benefits gaps 
• Gain-sharing 
• Profit-sharing 
Yes within grades - company 
range unknown 
No 
No 
No 
Yes within grades - 
company range unknown 
No 
No 
No 
Unknown 
No 
No 
Yes 
2. High Individualism • Individual performance 
based 
• External equity/ 
competitiveness 
• Short-term achievement 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes - survey 
Yes 
3. Moderately high 
Masculinity 
• Few family benefits 
• Gender pay differences 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
4. Moderately weak 
Uncertainty Avoidance 
• Emphasis on 
performance 
• Sharing of risks 
associated with MNE's 
success or failure 
• Competitive salaries to 
avoid poaching of staff 
• Decentralised pay 
policies 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes°) 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes( ' ) 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes - survey 
No(I) 
Supported Y (Yes) 
Not Supported N (No) 
Y = 5 
N = 8 
Y = 5 
N = 8 
Y = 8 
N = 4 
Unknown = 1 
Notes: (1) Taken to mean decentralised within Foodco Australia, and not within the whole corporate MNE Foodco. 
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see any direct relationship between Australian national culture and the design of their pay 
systems. 
Trade unions had been a factor in influencing the pay system at the Foodco 
manufacturing site, but according to the plant HR Manager, this was difficult to quantify. 
With a forecasted change of federal government in 1996, the Corporate FIR Manager 
speculated on a scenario in which federal awards might not be so rigid under the 
National/Liberal Coalition Government's industrial relations policy. 'We might be able to 
trade off things like shift loadings and penalty rates, and go to annual salaries for the 
unionised employees', he said. The unions had no impact on the professional and 
managerial salary system, but the Remuneration Manager did suggest that Foodco 
'watched the bottom end of the structure'. The reason for this was to ensure that lower-
level employees did not join unions because of a grievance over salaries. 
The conclusion was that under the company's previous policy for 100 per cent unionism 
of industrial staff, Foodco had had to use the award system as the minimum conditions to 
be followed, but it had devised a strategy to maximise its control of local agreements and 
to downplay the intervention of the industrial tribunals and full-time union officials. 
Because of the occupations and union coverage in the plant, it had to adopt several pay 
schemes and not just one. However, compared with other Australian companies, its 
industrial relations strategy was ahead of its time, with its emphasis on local bargaining 
and site agreements. Foodco acknowledged this, but considered that a high price 
(through high wages) had to be paid for this flexibility. This was offset by the lack of 
industrial action in the history of the plant. 
Like the Oilco cases, industry characteristics as another exogenous factor (Schuler, 
Dowling & De Cieri, 1993) were arguably significant in influencing compensation design 
in Foodco Australia. Foodco operated in a highly competitive market requiring new 
products regularly. Its products were subject to seasonal variations in demand affecting 
length of production runs. Raw materials were subject to price fluctuations, and a high 
degree of integration was necessary between supplying and manufacturing subsidiaries 
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and marketing and distribution operations, especially in countries with no manufacturing 
facilities. The placement and compensation of expatriates were part of this integration. 
These exogenous factors influenced Foodco Australia's attempts to maximise 
manufacturing efficiency, and minimise the impact of the relevant federal awards and 
industry unions. The size of the plant, its technology and product range led to particular 
pay structures for the operators. Pay for skill in the form of the number of machines that 
could be operated was preferred by the company, the labour flexibility helping to support 
the short production runs. Use of temporary and part-time staff also added to the 
flexibility of labour. 
The autonomy given to Foodco Australia by the European head office to design its own 
non-managerial compensation systems was arguably due partly to its international 
experience in running decentralised operations. Foodco's European head office adopted 
a polycentric approach to the compensation systems in Australia with even the managerial 
staff across Australia being paid via an Australian-designed system. The Foodco 
Australia plant did not have the same autonomy in designing its own managerial 
compensation system within Australia, but the sophistication in operating outside the 
formal award system was no doubt due to the competence of its specialist HR managers. 
Foodco Singapore 
Company Background of Foodco Singapore 
Foodco Singapore was a small, wholly owned, separately registered subsidiary in 
the confectionery division of Foodco Australia. It was situated on the western side 
of the city in an area where food manufacturers are concentrated. The company 
was engaged exclusively in the processing of raw confectionery resources into 
higher-quality products for use in confectionery and beverage manufacturing, mainly 
in Australia and New Zealand. Foodco started operations in January 1984 through 
the purchase of a manufacturing company on the same site, and was the second-
largest food processor of its type in South—East Asia, with a production through-
put of up to 14,000 tonnes per annum. The attraction of this location was its 
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proximity to two of the world's principal raw confectionery resource-producing 
regions — Malaysia and Indonesia. 
In 1992, at the time of the first interviews, Foodco Singapore had 57 employees, 
which was a much smaller workforce than the plant had under the previous owners. 
The Foodco workforce also doubled the output of the former owners. By the end 
of 1995, Foodco employee numbers had been reduced to 48 permanent employees 
by organisational restructuring and the outsourcing of functions such as security and 
cleaning. Its main products were all made to strict specifications and the majority of 
its production was exported to Australia and New Zealand for processing into 
confectionery products, the remainder going to Africa and other international 
markets. The company had no sales or marketing personnel in Singapore. Its raw 
food supplies came from Malaysia, Indonesia and Ghana; however, Foodco 
scientists also worked closely with plantations in Indonesia and Papua New Guinea. 
Organisation of Foodco Singapore 
The organisation chart for Foodco Singapore in 1992 is shown in Figure 8.2. 
Figure 8.2 
Organisation Chart for Foodco Singapore as at 1992 
General Manager 
I  
	
1 	 1 io 	1 	 1 	 1 Productn Administration 	 Quality Control 	Maintenance 	Accounting Manager Manager Manager Manager 	 Manager 
I 	I 	 1 	 1 
Stores Logistics 	Senior Maintenance 
Shipping 	Officer Supervisor 	 Supervisor 
Officer 
II 	 I 	 I 
I 
4 Shift Trades 
Office/Clerical 	Supervisors 	 People 
Staff 
I 
Process Workers 
In 1992, Foodco Singapore's General Manager reported to the Managing Director 
of the Confectionery Division of Foodco Australia, and had links to a Managing 
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Director for Singapore and Malaysia. The Administration Manager handled all 
personnel matters. The Accounts Manager handled all payroll issues. By 1995, 
Foodco Singapore had been restructured. The General Manager had been 
transferred to another overseas posting and his position was replaced by a new 
Operations Manager whose role included the HRM function. The Administration 
Manager's department was abolished, and stores, shipping and warehousing placed 
under the Production Manager. The Maintenance Manager had become the 
Engineering Manager. This manager was also responsible for projects as well as 
maintenance, and had under him an electrical technician (staff non-union) and the 
trades staff 
The new Operations Manager reported to a new Regional Director for South Asia 
who had an office on the Foodco Singapore site. He was responsible for 
manufacturing in Singapore, and all operations in Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand and 
Malaysia. The sales in Singapore were not related to Foodco Singapore as it was a 
manufacturing plant only. Foodco Singapore had 4 directors at the time of the final 
interviews. They were the Regional Director for South Asia (an Australian 
expatriate), the Regional Director for North Asia, who was a Singaporean, the 
Managing Director of Foodco Australia (Australian), and the Operations Manager 
for Foodco Singapore (an Australian expatriate). 
Production Technology of Foodco Singapore 
Foodco Singapore used process production techniques and technology that were 
not fast-changing. Following quality checks of the incoming shipments of raw food 
materials, they were cleaned, de-stoned, dried and de-shelled. Sterilisation then 
took place, followed by treatment to adjust acidity and colour. The product was 
further refined to specification by drying, roasting, pressing, grinding or filtration 
and eventually packed in containers or blocks. The factory consisted of a series of 
processing units, with process technicians and a central control room. Its goals 
were to meet production targets set daily, and to meet delivery deadlines (for 
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Australia) and quality specifications. High emphasis was placed on product quality. 
No major changes to the technology occurred during the period 1992-95. 
HRIVIAR Organisation of Foodco Singapore 
The corporate philosophy was dominated by Foodco Australia values, the owning 
company's human resource management manual being produced at an interview. 
This manual was sent to all senior managers in Australia and Foodco Australia 
subsidiaries. The policies outlined preferred practices for activities such as 
selection, compensation and dismissal. In 1992, the Company was not unionised 
(unusual for its size in Singapore at that time) and prided itself on its 'family' 
atmosphere. The Foodco Singapore HR policies were influenced by the general 
Foodco Australia corporate policies and were administered by the Operations 
Manager. The corporate policies were used as guidelines, but the day-to-day 
human resource management was strongly influenced by local conditions, and the 
compensation system below top management level was unique to Singapore. The 
company's human resource policy was based on ten main principles, which could be 
summarised as follows: 
• employees are given work suited to their ability 
• emphasis on training, particularly as it could lead to promotion 
• employees are regularly assessed. one function of which is to identify potential for 
promotion 
• promotion will be internal where possible 
• good working conditions 
• fair pay 
• good conununications to keep employees informed 
• cultivation of a team spirit 
• observance of legislation and government strategies relating to employment. 
Despite its small number of employees, the Company had written standing orders 
and operating procedures. Prior to 1993, as noted before, Foodco Singapore was a 
non-union firm and used a strategy of maintaining pay levels and benefits that were 
at the 75th percentile, or better, of packages of similar, possibly unionised, 
employers. The Company felt able to do this as employment costs were only 10-12 
per cent of total costs. Because of the absence of unions, each individual (except 
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the General Manager whose conditions were fixed in Australia) negotiated his/her 
own package on appointment. 
The age range of the workforce in 1992 was between 20 and 50 years. The factory 
had an all-male workforce, the only females being in the laboratory (three) and the 
office (four). It was possible that females could work in the factory in the future, 
but the Company had no facilities for them. No part-time staff were employed. The 
plant employed some foreign workers who got the same percentage wage increases 
as for the Singaporean staff, but were paid at a lower rate because of the Foreign 
Workers' Levy. Unions usually accept this, so most companies operate two scales. 
The Administration Manager stated that short-term foreign workers were not 
subject to the compulsory CPF payments, 'but are still expensive'. As of 1995, 
contract workers were used to empty the bags of raw food material. These were 
usually Bangalees, Thais or Indians. In 1995, one-third of the permanent workforce 
were Malaysian foreign workers for whom the monthly levy was S$330. They 
received a lower base salary but enjoyed all other conditions of the collective 
agreement. They were entitled to join the relevant union, if they wished. Once a 
foreign worker had a three-year work permit, they were defined as a skilled worker 
and the company had to pay CPF contributions. The majority of employees covered 
by the collective agreement were in the 25-39 age range. 
Unionisation of Foodco Singapore 
Between the series of interviews in January and December 1992, Foodco Singapore 
was approached by the Food and Beverage Industrial Workers' Union (FBIWU) to 
organise its employees. Once the FBIWU decided that it could recruit a majority of 
the workforce, it sent a letter to the company seeking recognition. Foodco had the 
option of challenging this or giving immediate recognition. If the company had 
refused recognition, a ballot could have been taken. If 50 per cent or more of the 
employees had voted for the FBIWU coverage, the company would have had to 
recognise it under Singaporean industrial law. Foodco decided to settle the issue 
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with the assistance of Ministry of Labour officials, and gave the FBIWU coverage in 
the plant. 
The employees who became union members were the process technicians and the 
trades people. The supervisors were not unionised, nor were the clerical staff 
because of their handling of confidential business information. Foodco Singapore 
had to obtain clearance from the Australian head office regarding the unionisation. 
According to the Operations Manager, there was much communication with the FIR 
Director based in Australia. When the first collective agreement was negotiated 
locally, it was sent to Australia for review. 
Compensation for Bargainable Employees in Foodco Singapore 
Prior to the negotiation of the collective agreement in 1993, Foodco Singapore 
unilaterally managed the compensation of the 'industrial' workforce. The 
'industrial' category is defined to include the senior supervisor, four shift 
supervisors, trades (maintenance) staff and process technicians. A contract cleaner 
was employed to clean the toilets and offices. The workforce had to be flexible and 
all other cleaning was part of the role of trades and operating staff in their own 
work areas. 'Housekeeping' was one factor considered in assessing monthly 
productivity levels discussed below. The plant maintained a high level of tidiness 
and cleanliness. The company operated on a 24 hour x 7 day production schedule 
and ran four crews of technicians, with three crews on and one crew off. An 
employee would work 21 days in a 28-day cycle. 
The compensation for the process technicians, who were trained in-house, was a 
fixed point in a three-grade structure based on competency and length of service. 
Grade III was usually the starting place for operating one machine only. 
Competency in operating several machines led to promotion to Grade II, while the 
ability to operate in all sections of the plant resulted in promotion to Grade I. These 
promotions were based on supervisors' assessments. The ranges for each grade 
were compared with levels for similar jobs in the locality. On appointment, a new 
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process technician would be provided with a contract showing the salary 
progression after 3 months, 6 months, 12 months and 24 months, plus the transport 
allowance, level of company bonus, group productivity bonus, individual merit pay, 
and shift allowance. 
Trades staff, who held electrical, fitting or welding certificates, were paid on two 
grades, also based on competencies — Grade II being the starting grade. Their 
salaries were on fixed points, but a service increment was given each year. 
Supervisors had in the past been appointed without formal educational 
qualifications, but qualifications were now taken into account, and some were sent 
on courses. Promotion to supervisor was usually from within, and in the absence of 
a supervisor, a technician would act in this role to gain experience. The senior and 
shift supervisors were on fixed rates and were on approximately equal salaries, but 
with different amounts based on length of service. 
In addition to the base rate, industrial staff could earn a flexible component to their 
base rates. This was made up of 
(a) Overall company bonus. Staff were paid on a 4 weekly basis, there being 13 x 4 week 
periods per year. Thirteen pays were guaranteed, but an additional 2-3 months pay was 
available if company targets and budgets had been met at the end of the year. One of these 
extra month's pay was the 13th month (Annual Wage Supplement). 
(b) Group Productivity Bonus. Industrial employees could earn up to 10 per cent of their 
salary, paid 4 weekly based on a points performance scheme. This included 2 per cent for 
good housekeeping 3 per cent for correct flavours, and 3 per cent for quality, plus other 
categories. 
(c) Individual Merit Pay. Within each grade was a salary curve based on an 'average', 
'good'. or 'excellent' assessment of performance. No guaranteed percentage of merit pay 
was promised to staff. It depended on their rating. 
Shift premiums were paid for shift workers at the rate of S$10 per day for an 
afternoon shift and S$17 for a night shift. No shift allowance was paid for the day 
shift. Hours of work were 6.9 hours fewer per week than the 44 hours per week 
required under the Employment Act, but the company paid the full 44 hours to staff 
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provided they were not late or absent on more than three occasions per week. 
Annual leave was in line with Employment Act requirements but staff were given 
extra leave with length of service. Industrial staff were encouraged to take 
additional qualifications, which might not necessarily result in extra pay, but might 
eventually lead to promotion. The government paid 70 per cent of training costs 
under the Skills Development Fund. Individual salaries were kept confidential, but 
the employees probably did discuss their income, according to the Administration 
Manager. 
After unionisation, Foodco Singapore had to negotiate a collective agreement for 
the process technician, tradespeople, storepeople, process controllers and laboratory 
technicians. The first agreement was signed on 10 June 1993, but applied for a 
two-year period from 1 January 1993 to 31 December 1994. It was negotiated by 
the then General Manager and the Administration Manager on behalf of the 
company, and full-time officials of the FBIWU. The scope of the agreement 
covered all bargainable employees except managers, executives, confidential and 
probationary employees, and temporary workers with less than six months' service. 
Employees who were not union members were not entitled to receive more 
favourable benefits than those for union members. The new agreement included a 
grievance procedure, the six-months probation period, the working hours, shift 
schedule, public holiday coverage, retirement age (60) and retrenchment benefits. 
The latter were reasonably generous by Australian standards and included one 
month's salary per year of service for those with more than three years' service. 
Another interesting feature was Foodco's agreement to pay the FBIWU — a union 
— an annual lump sum calculated at S$10 per employee eligible for membership. 
Others conditions stated in the first collective bargain for the technicians and trades 
staff were the shift premiums, the transport allowance, a uniforms and laundry 
service, long service awards after the 5th, 10th and 15th years of service, annual 
leave which increased with service, long-term illness, maternity leave (according to 
the Employment Act), paternity and compassionate leave, four days of (first) 
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marriage leave, a grant on the death of a close relative, leave for official union 
business, examination leave and personal, hospital and surgical insurance. The 
collective bargain therefore formalised conditions, and where mandatory conditions 
were not included in the agreement, the company had to follow the Employment 
Act. 
The heart of the collective bargain was the salary structure. This consisted of 
minimum and maximum points in ranges for the Electricians, Laboratory 
Technicians, Storekeepers, and Storemen. There were two grades for Process 
Controllers, two for tradesmen and three grades of Process Technician. The old 
structure thus still prevailed. For each of the ranges, there was a lower range shown 
for the foreign workers. For example, for a Singaporean Storekeeper, the base 
salary was in the range S$850 to S$1300 per month. The foreign-worker equivalent 
was S$660 to S$1000. 
The progression from the minimum point of the salary grade was by service 
increments of S$40 per month payable on 1st July each year until the employee had 
reached the maximum of the grade. These increments were incorporated into the 
base salary. Not absorbed into the base salary was a merit increment of up to four 
per cent, which could be paid to any employee on 1st July depending on his/her 
preceding year's performance. Another component also not incorporated into the 
base salary was any overall rise in pay levels of the whole structure 'taking into 
account the company's performance and any recommendations of the National 
Wages Council'. A further feature was a one-off bonus based on the company's 
performance each year, and finally one month's•pay of Annual Wage 
Supplement (AWS) less S$10 (which was paid to the FBIWU). Because the 
agreement was new, it had to restrict the AWS to a maximum of one month's salary 
under the Employment Act, but the employees got four months' bonus in total in 
1995. This extra sum was dependent on company performance, NWC guidelines, 
what the market was paying, and Foodco Singapore's capacity to pay. 
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Comparing the compensation structure for the technicians and the trades employees 
before and after the collective agreement, Foodco had given a longer salary 
progression for length of service until the grade maximum was reached, but it had 
preserved an overall flexible bonus conditional on company performance, and 
individual merit pay based on individual performance. The Operations Manager 
stated that there was a separate performance appraisal system for the process 
technicians, and this was used for the awarding of the individual merit increase of up 
to four per cent. The appraisal was oral, with an emphasis on feedback and 
counselling. Any counselling required was recorded on file. The full range of 
salaries was adjusted when the collective agreement was renegotiated unless the pay 
levels became seriously out of line. When recruiting new staff, if a person had 
reasonable experience, they would not necessarily start at the bottom of the range. 
Apart from the bonuses already described in the collective agreement, the 
productivity bonus from the previous scheme was still paid, but was not a 
guaranteed sum and was not included in the collective agreement. It could be up to 
10 per cent for each four-weekly period, and performance was assessed on the 
quality and hygiene of the product. This bonus dated back to 1985 when the 
government sought more flexibility in compensation systems. 'The employees 
averaged 9.9 per cent,' said the Operations Manager. His view was that the 
unionisation and collective agreement had not made the company more inflexible, 
but that 'we discuss more things with the unions now and have a particular 
responsibility to discuss things with the on-site representatives'. There were 2 
employee/on-site FBIWU representatives, namely the elected secretary and 
treasurer. 
The second collective agreement was signed in July 1995 and applied for three years 
for the period 1st January 1995 to 31st December 1997. The agreement was 
substantially the same as for the first one, except that new classifications for Senior 
Process Controller and Senior Process Technician had been added. The Operations 
Manager stated that these senior classifications were introduced to accommodate 
employees who had reached the maximum of the Controller and Technician scale. 
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The annual service increments were also increased to S$45 per year from S$40. 
Some pay ranges had been increased considerably, while others remained at the 
1993-94 rates. Foodco used multiple of 1.5 for the ratio of the minimum to the 
maximum of the range. 
Clerical and Technical Compensation in Foodco Singapore 
The clerical and administrative staff were paid by individually negotiated contract 
with rates in the top 25 percentile of the labour market. Their compensation had 
four components: (1) an annual increment for length of service, (2) an annual merit 
rise, (3) a monthly paid productivity bonus of up to 10 per cent, and (4) the AWS 
and company bonus. An increment of about S$45 per month was paid for each year 
of service with the company. A performance appraisal scheme operated, as a result 
of which annual merit rises for good performance were determined. These were 
based on salary curves prepared by the Administration Manager. The 
clerical/administrative staff shared in the monthly productivity bonus (up to 10 per 
cent of salary) based on the performance on the shop floor and received the Foodco 
Singapore company performance bonus (which incorporated the AWS). Bonuses 
were not written into employment contracts, as they were not guaranteed. This 
category worked a 44 hour week and got no overtime if required to work longer, 
but enjoyed better life policy and hospital rates than those of the industrial staff. 
They were paid four-weekly, with the emphasis on performance to warrant merit 
increases. 
Technical staff were paid by individually negotiated contracts. The rates were 
comparable with market levels and staff enjoyed (1) a base salary for a 44 hour 
week which was revised annually on merit, (2) annual increments for length of 
service, (3) a monthly bonus of up to 10 per cent based shop-floor productivity, and 
(4) an annual company bonus which incorporated the AWS. 
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Managerial Compensation in Foodco Singapore 
The General Manager of Foodco Singapore in 1992 was an Australian expatriate, as 
were the Operations Manager and Regional Director at the time of the second 
interviews. The salary and conditions for the Operations Manager were determined 
by the Australian head office Remuneration Manager. They consisted of an 
Australian standard salary plus a differential to cover the extra cost of living in 
Singapore. 
The terms for the other managers were individually negotiated based on market 
rates gained through surveys. Their salaries moved in line with the Singaporean 
labour market, but the National Wage Council guidelines were also taken into 
account. In 1992, the Singaporean office of an international accounting firm was 
given a briefing by the Australian head office and asked to suggest an appropriate 
package of conditions. In 1993 and 1994, Foodco Singapore used the consultants 
Towers Perrin to assess staff and managers' pay in the local labour market and the 
food industry. Managers were expected to be on 24-hour call, as the plant ran a 
seven-day, three-shift system. Working hours were therefore somewhat flexible. 
In 1992, the package comprised of a base salary, a transport allowance for travelling 
expenses, telephone allowance and medical expenses. No productivity bonus was 
given to the managers, but they shared in the Foodco Australia corporate bonus 
based on the performance of the whole company (confectionery division). By the 
end of 1995, this arrangement had changed, and the Australian corporate bonus had 
been replaced by the same Foodco Singapore local bonus (including the 13th 
month) as was received by the clerical, operating and technical employees, based on 
the plant's performance. The package was thus the base salary reviewed annually 
on merit and CPI, the 13th month AWS, local company bonus and allowances. 
An appraisal of the performance of managers was made in conjunction with the 
Australian head office and salary increases were based on performance, taking 
inflation and the cost of living in Singapore into account. The Foodco Australia 
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performance appraisal form was used in Singapore, and managers saw and signed 
the completed report. The emphasis of the package was therefore on performance. 
Bonuses were not written into employment contracts of service as they were not 
guaranteed. 
Employee Benefits in Foodco Singapore 
The schedule of employee benefits for all levels of staff in Foodco Singapore are 
shown Table 8.6. The majority of benefits for the unionised staff were stated in the 
collective agreement and have thus been subject to negotiation. These include: 
• Compassionate grant 
• Examination leave 
• Group personal accident and term life insurance scheme 
• Hospitalisation leave 
• Long service award (after 5, 10 and 15 years) 
• Long-term illness leave 
• Maternity leave as per the Employment Act 
• Medical Benefits including hospital and dental treatment 
• Paid (first) marriage leave 
• Paid annual leave 
• Paid compassionate/paternity leave 
• Paid public holidays 
• Retrenchment benefit 
• Shift premiums 
• Sick leave 
• Transport monthly allowance 
• Uniforms/laundry service 
• Union education leave for branch officials. 
The employee benefits for the unionised staff were generous and were originally set 
at these levels 'with the objective of maintaining a non-union environment', 
according to a manager. The long service award for over 15 years' service, for 
example, had a value of S$560. The schedule indicates that the same range applied 
to clerical, technical and managerial employees. Travel allowance varied according 
to group, but all employees had access to a subsidised canteen and discounts on 
Foodco products. The company also provided a recreation area and a small 
gymnasium that was used on rest days. Legislation covers workers' (injury) 
compensation, but Foodco enhanced this and insured staff for home to company 
travel. The employees had the option to buy the European parent MNE Foodco 
shares at a discount with an interest free loan. The majority of managers and staff 
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Table 8.6 
Employee Benefits Profile for Foodco Siigapore as at 1995 
Industrial/ 
Blue Collar 
Unskilled 	Skilled 
Clerical/ 
Mmin 
Sales/ 
Technical 
Professional! 
Management 
Board 
Acting allowance 
Annual leave 1 l I V I 
Attendance allowance 
Benefit for overseas assignments 
Business entertainment expenses 
Cellular phones 
Co-operative shares V ‘ V 
Compassionate leave V I V V 1 
Death benefit V V V V I 
Dental treatment V V V V V 
Early retirement schemes 
External/social recreational club 
membership 
Festive loan/advance V V V V 
Fixed monthly transport 
allowance 
V V V V V 
Free medical treatment/medicine l I V V V 
Funeral leave benefit V l I V V 
Hospital ward benefit V V V V V 
Housing loan 
Housing renovation loan 
Laundry benefit V V 
Long service award V V V V V 
Long-term illness V V V V V 
Machine allowance 
Marriage leave V I If If V 
Maternity leave /(1) V(1) I V V 
Meal allowance 
Medically board-out benefit 
Other loans V 
Paternity leave I V V V 
Personal insurance  
Provision of car 
Reimbursement for use of own 
car on company business 
I If V 
Retirement Benefit (>CPF) 
[Singapore] 
Retrenchment benefit V V 
Service benefit 
Shift allowance V V I 
Sick leave V V V V V 
Specialist surgical fee V V If V V 
Study leave/benefit V V V V V 
Transport benefit/allowance/ 
reimbursement 
V I V V V 
Uniform V V V 
Union day leave If If 
Union education leave V V 
Unpaid leave 
Voluntary resignation benefit 
Notes: 
(1) According to Employment Act provisions. 
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owned shares in the parent company, but not in the Australian parent, as that was in 
turn wholly owned. The Operations Manager said that as at 1995, the company 
was under pressure to discuss a choice of benefits for staff, such as sacrificing 
medical benefits for more holidays. 
Relationship of Foodco Singapore to Head Offices 
At the first interviews, the Administration Manager summarised the relationship 
with the Australian head office as follows: 
[Foodco Australian] head office have an input on management salaries, but don't interfere 
in local factory staff. But we keep them informed. Management bonus is governed from 
Australia. The collective agreement will be left to our staff here. The broad [Foodco] 
policies are followed and we try to incorporate what we can. Staff read the [Foodco] stuff, 
but the factory workers don't... 
According to the Operations Manager at the later interviews, the Australian head 
office of Foodco did not 'interfere' in the design of the Singapore pay systems, but 
they were now approved by the Regional Director of South Asia, who was based in 
Singapore. The Australian head office did not get involved in the negotiations for 
the collective agreement, and left to the local management the responsibility for 
determining the level of employee benefits. Discussions were held with the Human 
Resource Director of Foodco Australia regarding the salaries proposed for the four 
local managers at the Singapore site. He would be consulted about the performance 
reviews and the suggested salaries for the following year. No contact by the 
Singaporean affiliate was made with the corporate MNE head office in Europe 
about the compensation systems in Foodco Singapore. 
The Profile of Foodco Singapore Compensation 
The Gomez-Mejia and Balkin (1992) profiles for the compensation in Foodco 
Singapore were shown in Tables 8.2 to Tables 8.4 where it was noted that three 
occupational groups were selected for comparison. With the operating staff 
compensation, the pattern was a compensation system which has about one-third 
Algorithmic and about two-thirds Experiential features. The clerical compensation 
(Table 8.3) had a balanced pattern of Algorithmic and Experiential factors, whereas 
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the management system leaned slightly more towards an Algorithmic profile, 
although there were some strong Experiential features as well. 
Foodco Singapore Compensation and the External Environment 
At the first interviews, Foodco Singapore's perception of the effect of employment 
law on compensation design was coloured by their strategy of paying above the 
market rate in order to remain non-union. The Administration Manager elaborated: 
Our philosophy is to have long-term employees in which we invest training. Therefore we 
pay good salaries. There is no minimum wage here and no equal pay law although we 
practise it. Income tax does not affect pay systems, but CPF does have a big impact on 
employers and employees. 
However, employees with salaries over S$100,000 no longer have to make a 
percentage contribution to the CPF. A reduction in the employer's CPF 
contributions in 1985 meant that the cost of labour was cheaper. The company 
found that these 'savings' enabled it to provide a bonus to its staff. As mentioned 
above, this bonus was not included in the collective or employment contract, so that 
maximum flexibility was maintained. Other aspects of the law, such as the 
recognition of unions and the provisions of the Employment Act in the collective 
agreement, were naturally an indirect constraint on Foodco systems, but the 
amendment to the retirement age and the workers' compensation provisions had a 
direct impact on overall employment costs. 
The unions had the backing of industrial relations legislation in seeking recognition 
from the company. Once this was given, the management had no alternative but to 
negotiate a collective agreement. While Foodco Singapore argued that the 
unionisation had not constrained company activities unduly, the union did succeed 
in introducing a structure that was more service related, and an extra 'senior' grade 
for those who had reached the top of their existing classification. The seniority was 
reflected in the movement within a grade and the skill by movement between 
classifications. Even for the non-unionised non-managerial staff, there was an 
expectation that service would be rewarded with increments. 
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The Foodco Singapore General Manager argued that the state of the Singaporean 
economy had an influence on the supply of labour and the required rates to attract 
and retain staff However, prior to unionisation, the company preferred to leave the 
base rates at a reasonably low level and to enhance conditions for industrial staff 
with higher shift allowances or bonuses. He continued that: 
Inflation is not seen as a major factor here but the level of unemployment is. Different 
races in Singapore opt for different types of work. There are more Chinese in the office, but 
more Malays on the shop floor. This gives us a racial balance. 
Because of low inflation, the general collective agreement rates would only be 
reviewed within the three years of the agreement unless the salaries got seriously 
out of line. 
Before recognising unions, Foodco Singapore used the NWC recommendations 
only as a guide, because the company was not obliged to follow these to the letter. 
Once it was unionised, the union would use these as negotiating guidelines, the 
manager said. If the Singaporean NWC recommended an increase, the company 
would study this in relation to its packages. The rates paid in the public service had 
no impact on the company except that it would ensure it was paying at least equal 
to these rates to retain its staff. With all the compensation systems in the plant, 
Foodco had observed the preference of the NWC and government for flexibility and 
reasonable levels of pay at risk. 
With the rising educational level in Singapore, the Administration Manager stated 
that education as a basis for pay would increase in the future, in that new 
supervisors would probably be expected to have some formal qualifications. Most 
promotions, however, were 'in-house' from the shop floor. Applicants to Foodco 
were asked to suggest the level of conditions they expected. The company did its 
best to get a reasonable match between expectations and the offer. 
In relation to national culture and compensation design, The Administration 
Manager said: 
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We don't make any allowances for different races and we give equal treatment at different 
religious festivals such as Chinese New Year. Your position in the hierarchy is not an issue 
here, and we try to encourage a family culture. 
Employees might have compared each other's pay packages and perhaps have taken 
up a grievance with the supervisor. However, the company's view was that it 
assessed what the job was worth and then compared the market rate outside. It 
tried to cultivate a culture where people wanted to go to work. Families of 
employees were encouraged to use the facilities, and turnover in the plant was low. 
Table 8.7 shows strong support for the Hodgetts and Luthans (1993b) 
recommendations for operator, clerical and managerial staff compensation for 
Singapore's dimensions of national culture, as suggested by Hofstede (1980). 
Unfortunately, only the monetary rates for the collective agreement were made 
available. Because the company was small, it did not have an elevated hierarchy 
although the gap between lowest and highest paid in the collective agreement was 
high by Australian standards. The low Individualism (Hofstede, 1980) fitted the 
Foodco compensation as there was a strong emphasis on the bonuses based on plant 
success and the group productivity bonuses, and seniority at lower levels. Hodgetts 
and Luthans (1993b) also advocate a strong link between compensation and 
performance and risk sharing when the national culture has a weak Uncertainty 
Avoidance; Foodco Singapore had such a link. Lastly, the paternalistic culture of 
Foodco Singapore resulted in additional family benefits, which together with length 
of service increments for lower staff, met the Hodgetts and Luthans 
recommendations for a moderately low Masculinity. In general, there was a closer 
match by Foodco Singapore with the compensation recommendations for 
Singapore's national culture than there was by Foodco Australia with Australia's 
culture. 
The impact of the industrial relation system on compensation design was evident in 
the changes to the pay system of the process technicians and trades staff during the 
Table 8.7 
The Hodgetts and Luthans (H&L) Recommendations for Compensation for Singapore as Reflected 
in Foodco Singapore 
Singapore Foodco Singapore 
Hofstede Dimension 
Index 
H&L Recommended 
Compensation 
Industrial Staff 
(Operators) 
Compensation 
Clerical Staff 
Compensation 
Managerial 
Compensation 
1. High Power Distance • Hierarchical compensation 
strategy 
• pay and Benefits tied to place 
in structure 
• Large salary gaps between 
lowest and highest paid 
Yes 
Yes for whole company 
Yes within collective 
agreement and probably 
company 
Partly (I) 
Yes across company 
Unknown 
No - individual 
Yes across company 
Unknown 
2. Low Individualism • Group compensation plans 
• Seniority-based pay 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
3. Moderately low 
Masculinity 
• Many family benefits 
• Quality of worldife emphasis 
• No gender pay differences 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
4. Weak Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
• Emphasis on performance 
• Sharing of risks associated 
with MNE's success or 
failure 
• Competitive salaries to avoid 
poaching of staff 
• Decentralised pay policies 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No(2) 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No(2) 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes (survey used) 
No(2) 
Supported Y (Yes) 
Not Supported N (No) 
Y = 11 
N = 1 
	 Unknown= 1 
Y = 9 
N = 1 
Partly = 1 
Y = 8 
N --= 3 
Unknown = 1 
Notes:(1) Salaries were increased by increments for length of service. (2) Taken to mean decentralised within Foodco Singapore, not the whole 
corporate MNE Foodco 
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unionisation of the company in 1992. Prior to the entry of the union, the 
Administration Manager stated that: 
The FBIWU stood outside the gate to the factory, and once they thought that they had 
enough interest, we got a letter. We decided to work it out with the Ministry of Labour and 
admitted the union. It means a collective agreement... The union can ask us to voluntarily 
disclose our accounts and wage rates or go to the IAC [Industrial Arbitration Court]... The 
company likes to pay more than the market so we work on the flexible bits like the 
premiums on shiftwork, and adding perks to shifts... In the new CA [collective agreement], 
we will try to link pay to performance rather length of service... The union will probably 
want to introduce pay scales and ranges, but we are waiting to see it. 
Once the collective agreement had been negotiated, it conformed very much with 
the customs and practice of other collective agreements in Singapore. 
Like Foodco Australia, industry characteristics, as an external environmental 
element, could arguably have had an impact on compensation design in the 
subsidiary. The affiliate was located close to its sources of raw material supplies, 
which were subject to price fluctuation. Its main exposure to change, however, 
was in the need for new flavours of its output for new retail products manufactured 
in Australia. The process technology committed the affiliate to a pay-for-skill 
compensation for the technicians/operators to maximise flexibility. While the size of 
the factory was smaller than that of the case plant in Australia, its place in the 
supply chain made it a focus for Australian head office attention, especially in the 
use of expatriate managers and the salaries of the plant management team. While 
the Australian head office monitored collective agreements of Foodco Singapore, 
the agreements were based on the local environment. There was a more 
ethnocentric approach to the performance assessment of the managers. 
Differences and Similarities in Foodco Australia and Foodco Singapore 
Compensation 
The main differences and similarities between operator, clerical and managerial 
compensation in Foodco Australia and Foodco Singapore are summarised in Table 8.8. 
As well as many other elements, Table 8.8 presents the total number of Algorithmic and 
Algorithmic (8A*;5E*;1A/E*; 2unknown; 
not applicable) 
Skill-based 
3 grade structure 
No variable component 
Site agreement not registered with AIRC 
No performance appraisal 
H&L** recommendation? 5 yes: 8 no;. 
3 Experiential (7A*;10E*; 1A/E*; 1 not 
applicable) 
Skill and length of service 
3 grade structure 
High variable component 
Collective agreement registered with the IAC 
Performance linked to pay 
H&L** recommendation? 11 yes; 1 no. 
Algorithmic (11A*;5E*; 2A/E*; 
1 not applicable) 
Based on job and skill 
No payment for length of service 
Performance appraisal not linked to pay 
Site agreement not registered with AlltC 
3 grade structure 
No formal job evaluation 
No variable pay 
H&L** recommendations? 5 yes; 8 no. 
Balance of A/E* (8A*;8E*;2 A/E*; 1 not 
applicable) 
Based on job and skill 
Annual increment for service 
Performance appraisal linked to pay 
No site agreement 
No structure 
No job evaluation 
Individual and corporate bonuses 
H8r.L** recommendations? 9 yes; 1 no; 1 
partly; 1 unknown  
Algorithmic (12A*;5E*; 2A/E*) 
Job based pay 
Australia-wide snlaly structure 
8 grades 
Performance linked to pay 
Local company profits and sales bonus for 
some 
No payment for length of service 
H&L** recommendations? 8 yes; 4 no; 1 
unknown 
Marginally Algorithmic (10A*;8E*; 1A/E*) 
Job based pay 
Individual negotiation 
No structure 
Annual review and merit rise 
Local company bonus 
No payment for length of service 
H&L** recommendations? 8 yes; 3 no; 1 
unknown 
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Table 8.8 
Comparison of Compensation Systems in 
Foodco Australia and Foodco Singapore 
Foodco Australia 	 Foodco Singapore 
General Organisation Factors 
Large scale 	 Small scale 
Process production 	 Process production 
Capital intensive Capital intensive 
Unionised 
	
Unionised 
Three unions Single union 
Strong HR function 	 No HR function 
Relatively flat structure Relatively flat structure 
General Compensation Features 
Common managerial grades 	 Individual negotiation for managers 
Site agreements and structures One collective agreement 
Operator Compensation 
Clerical Compensation 
Managerial Compensation*** 
Notes:* A is Algorithmic. E is Experiential. A/E is Algorithmic/Experiential. As used in the Gomez-
Mejia and Balkin (1992:61) Simunary Profile of Experiential and Algorithmic Compensation Patterns. 
** H&L is Hodgetts and Luthans (1993b) *** Excludes expatriate staff 
Number of Algorithmic(A)/Experiential(E) Features 
Foodco Australia Foodco Singapore 
Operators 8 A 5 E 1 ALE. 5 A 8 E 1 AJE 
Clerical 11 A 5 E 2 A/E 8 A 8 E 2 A/E 
Managerial 12 A 5 E 2 A/E 10 A 8 E 1 AfE 
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Experiential features for each of the compensation systems in Foodco Australia and 
Singapore extracted from Tables 8.2, 8.3 and 8.4. To ensure a more overall valid 
comparison of the Algorithmic(A) and Experiential(E) patterns in the affiliates, the 
comparison can be restricted to only those common compensation features for which 
data were available and applicable in both subsidiaries. The results are shown in Table 
8.9. 
Table 8.9 
Total of Algorithmic (A) and Experiential (E) Compensation Features for Foodco 
Australia and Foodco Singapore as at 1995 — Selected Common Features Only 
Restricting the Algorithmic and Experiential classifications only to those selected 
common features for which data were obtainable and applicable, Table 8.9 indicates 
predominantly Algorithmic profiles for the operators', clerical and managerial pay 
systems in Foodco Australia. By comparison, Foodco Singapore functioned with an 
Experiential system for its operators, a balance of Algorithmic and Experiential for its 
clerical staff, and a marginally Algorithmic compensation profile for its managers. The 
comparison of the overall profiles for the pairs of the three compensation systems in each 
affiliate given in Table 8.8 shows that each pair of pay systems is different. This issue will 
be revisited later in the thesis. 
In relation to the initial research questions, we can distinguish the effect of legislation on 
unionised operating staff first. The Singaporean Employment Act set the minimum 
standards for Foodco Singapore. Both Foodco Australia and Foodco Singapore paid the 
same rates for males and females, although only Australia has EEO legislation. It is 
unlikely that Australian organisations could discriminate by paying foreign workers less 
than local employees. Foodco Singapore had to restrict the size of the AWS to one 
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month, as specified in the Singaporean Employment Act, as its agreements were recent 
ones, and both plants had mandatorily to pay either CPF (in Singapore) or superannuation 
in Australia. Through the tightness of the labour market and the product market, the 
economy indirectly affected the level and composition of pay in Singapore and the level 
of compensation in Australia. The level of income for the Australian employees was 
reviewed more regularly than for those in Singapore, although the latter's rewards were 
adjusted by annual bonuses. 
In Australia, the NWC cases were not directly linked to the pay increases of the unionised 
employees, but adjustment of the federal industrial awards by tribunals fixed a minimum 
set of conditions for Foodco Australia. In Singapore, with Foodco unionised, the NWC 
guidelines were used as negotiating guidelines by the Union. The Singaporean plant had 
obviously acted on requests by the NWC to keep a certain portion of pay at risk. The 
direct association of compensation design to national culture was not perceived by the 
interviewees and was challenged, as usual, by the significance of the industrial relations 
factors. In Foodco Australia, the salary system for the unionised operating staff had only 
three grades and was fairly flat which would conform to a low Power Distance society 
(Hofstede, 1980). But the Australian high Individualism was not reflected in the fixed 
point salary structure without incentives. In Foodco Singapore, the differences in salaries 
between grades was high, which suited the high Power Distance Singaporean culture 
(Hofstede, 1980) within this category of staff. However, the difference in salaries 
between the operators and the managers was unknown. The emphasis on individual and 
corporate performance pay was appropriate for a weak Uncertainty Avoidance culture, as 
measured for Singapore, and the seniority increments and corporate bonuses were in line 
with the Hodgetts and Luthans (1993b) compensation recommendations for a low 
Individualistic culture. 
In both subsidiaries, the industrial relations system had an important role in the design of 
the unionised staff compensation. The involvement was more formal at the Singaporean 
plant in that agreements were registered, but the Australian plant still negotiated with 
local representatives and exchanged letters of understanding with full-time union officials. 
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Through a deliberate policy of minimising the unions' role, Foodco Australia appeared to 
have more freedom in the design of its structures, whereas the Singapore plant had a 
structure which accorded more to the local norm of a collective agreement. 
With regard to the clerical employees in Foodco Australia and Foodco Singapore, the 
effect of employment law on compensation was similar to that of the operators. The 
minimum requirements of the Employment Act and the inclusion of the AWS provided 
the floor in the setting of individual contracts in Singapore. Clerical staff in Foodco 
Australia were paid via an informal three grade structure where the clerical award system 
formed the basic conditions in addition to equal pay and superannuation legislation. The 
state of the labour market, however, had a major effect on compensation paid. Foodco 
Singapore aimed for the top 25 per cent position in the market, and the Australian 
affiliate paid well over the minimum clerical award rates. National culture was not seen 
as a major determinant of compensation design in either subsidiary. The Hodgetts and 
Luthans (1993b) recommendations were not supported in general in Foodco Australia for 
clerical staff mainly because of the affiliate's lack of a pay-for-performance emphasis. By 
contrast, the propositions for compensations in a national culture like Singapore's were 
strongly supported by Foodco Singapore's pay designs. 
The impact of the industrial relations system on clerical compensation in both subsidiaries 
differed because clerical staff in Foodco Singapore were non-union, whereas Foodco 
Australia had signed site agreements in the form of an exchange of letters with union 
representatives. While the salary structures were still informal, the agreement meant that 
the subsidiary had to at least match or exceed state and federal award conditions. 
For the managerial compensation in Foodco Singapore and Foodco Australia, 
employment law in both countries had a similar modest impact on compensation design as 
staff were on individual contracts. The Singaporean and Australian companies paid 
compulsory CPF and superannuation contributions respectively and Foodco Australia had 
to observe state legislation such as long service leave as well as equal pay principles. The 
biggest impact had been FBT which caused a review of benefits in the Australian affiliate. 
Common Benefits for All Employees* 
Both Subsidiaries 
Examination leave 
Group personal accident scheme 
Hospitalisation leave 
Long service awards 
Long-term illness leave 
Maternity leave 
Paid annual leave 
Paid compassionate leave 
Paid paternity leave 
Paid public holidays 
Retrenchment benefit 
Share purchase 
Shift premium 
Sick leave 
Term life insurance scheme 
Uniforms/caps laundry service 
Union education leave 
in Common Managerial* Benefits in 
Both Subsidiaries 
Annual leave 
Compassionate leave 
Dental treatment allowance 
Hospital benefits 
Long service awards 
Long-term illness 
Maternity leave 
Share ownership provisions 
Sick leave 
Study leave if job related 
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The labour market dominated the level of pay as both subsidiaries worked hard to 
preserve external competitiveness through the study of economic indicators and use of 
surveys. The economy affected bonuses paid to Singaporean and Australian managers 
because of their link to sales and profits, although the Singaporean bonus was later 
associated with local performance. While interviewees did not associate managerial 
compensation design with dimensions of the national culture, the pay design in both 
subsidiaries supported the Hodgetts and Luthans (1993b) recommendations. 
Finally, the similar employee benefits offered in the two Foodco subsidiaries are shown in 
Table 8.10. 
Table 8.10 
Common Employee Benefits in Foodco Australia and Foodco Singapore 
Note: *Excludes expatriates 
As with the Oilco case studies, the provision of employee benefits in Foodco was a 
function of external factors such as legislation and internal factors such as company 
culture. The benefits unique to unionised employees in Foodco Australia were blood 
donor leave, first aid, protective clothing, footwear and gloves, jury service leave, 
lockers, and provision for a rest room for female employees. The death benefit was part 
of the superannuation scheme. The collective agreement for Foodco Singapore had 
provisions for transport allowance, marriage leave, compassionate grants, union officials' 
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one day holiday, death benefits, hospital and dental benefits and a union welfare insurance 
scheme. A Festive Loan/Advance was also permissible. 
Managerial benefits also seemed more generous in Singapore than in Australia and 
Foodco Singapore managers were entitled to specialist surgery assistance, paternity leave, 
life insurance, and funeral leave benefit. By contrast, the Australian counterparts enjoyed 
some mobile phones and extra provision of cars. 
The main difference between the two subsidiaries was again the provision of health, 
hospital and dental cover for the unionised staff. Because of the cost of running cars, 
transport allowances were paid, and as CPF is not a life insurance policy, Foodco 
Singapore insured confirmed employees under a Group Personal Accident and Term Life 
Insurance Scheme. Contributions to the Union's Welfare Insurance Scheme also ensured 
that employees were compensated for long-term disability. Australian superannuation 
provisions would usually cover such eventualities. The main conclusion was that both 
subsidiaries were paternalistic in culture and that this was reflected in the provision of 
benefits over and above the minimum needed to meet legislative and a 24 hour process 
operation requirements. 
Conclusion 
In using the Foodco case study for the development of an explanatory framework and set 
of propositions, and comparing this with the Oilco case of the previous chapter, a number 
of common features start to emerge. The first is that both subsidiaries of Foodco had 
more than one compensation system (seven in Foodco Australia and four in Foodco 
Singapore). The central guiding research question then becomes how the external 
environment may influence each of these systems. The second is that the effect of 
employment law on a subsidiary will depend on the range of law in a country and the 
discretion which a NINE has to use the law to its best advantage. Parts of the legislation 
in both countries and legally binding industrial awards in Australia provide minima which 
the affiliates have to observe. The MINE can decide to exceed the minima in order to 
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exclude unions, to be more competitive in the labour market or to be seen as a good, and 
perhaps paternalistic, employer. Employee benefits were an example in this case study. 
Other legislation may affect all compensation systems rather than just a few. Thus FBT 
in Foodco Australia caused the affiliate to review its benefits in the same way as that of 
Oilco. 
The macro economy again had more impact on the level of pay than the structure of the 
compensation systems. Both subsidiaries were active in establishing a preferred level of 
pay in the respective occupational labour markets. Foodco Australia did not always 
follow market trends, and, in its clerical compensation strategy, sometimes accented its 
paternalism rather than high pay. Incomes policies manifested in decisions and 
recommendations of the National Wages Council and the AIRC offer discretion to a 
MINE based in Singapore or Australia respectively to follow or ignore those decisions and 
recommendations. This discretion is reduced if an MINE is unionised because unions may 
use decisions or recommendations as levers in bargaining situations. 
Like Oilco, the design of compensation systems in Foodco could not be directly 
attributed to national culture. There is the difficulty of distinguishing national culture per 
se from other variables that might affect pay structure. This is particularly the case when 
a subsidiary becomes unionised and adopts the host country form of agreements (Foodco 
Singapore), as opposed to a HRM strategy of minimising the union role (Foodco 
Australia). While it could be argued that the effect of national culture may be more 
apparent in occupations at the upper levels of organisations where staff are not unionised, 
and where management has more discretion in design, the Hodgetts and Luthans (1993b) 
propositions were well supported in Foodco Singapore for non-managerial as well as 
managerial occupations — a similar outcome to that of Oilco Singapore. Significantly, 
the Hodgetts and Luthans propositions were not supported in the operating and clerical 
compensation systems of Oilco Australia and Foodco Australia, whereas the propositions 
were supported for the managerial compensation in the Australian units of both MNEs. 
Clearly, factors other than national culture must be more influential. 
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Common in both cases so far was the major impact of the industrial relations systems in 
compensation design. Industrial relations legislation indicates the rights of MNEs with 
regard to union recognition and the type of collective agreements permissible in the 
industrial relation system. The union structure also determines how many unions are 
likely to gain representation in a subsidiary and thus possibly the number of different 
compensation systems that will result. Like Oilco Singapore, Foodco Singapore could 
operate with one collective agreement. Foodco Australia, like Oilo Australia, had to deal 
with more complex industrial relations scenarios but adopted a strategy to minimise the 
external involvement of unions. The introduction of unions into a subsidiary has a 
marked effect on formalising the conditions of service, as can be seen in the Foodco 
Singapore case. 
As another external factor, the industry characteristics of the food sector had a direct 
effect on compensation design. Foodco Australia and Foodco Singapore were in a highly 
competitive seasonal business requiring manufacturing efficiency and high quality. This 
external environment affected the internal variables of competitive strategy, organisation 
and HR practices. Internal variables like the technology used in the two plants 
encouraged the use of pay-for-skill systems for operators as flexibility between machines 
was required. It may thus be that technology is a bigger influence on pay system 
convergence than is national culture. The high profile brand recognition of Foodco 
products arguably made the MINE aware of its reputation in the market place as an 
employer, although its paternalistic culture is also attributable to its founders. 
Table 8.8 showed that Foodco Australia and Foodco Singapore had a mixture of 
Algorithmic and Experiential pay patterns (Gomez-Mejia & Balldn, 1992). Foodco 
Singapore had more Experiential features than Foodco Australia for each of the three 
occupations analysed mainly because of the higher risk components and links to 
individual and business unit performance. No converging of the pay systems of the two 
subsidiaries seemed likely in the future, according to the interviews held. That there were 
differences between the subsidiaries shows that Foodco did not operate with universally 
similar cross-national pay systems. The European corporate head office adopted a 
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polycentric international orientation, whereas the Australian head office adopted both 
polycentric and ethnocentric approaches towards Foodco Singapore. The Singaporean 
affiliate had scope to negotiate its own collective agreements, while keeping the head 
office informed of progress. The approval of Singaporean managers' and expatriates' 
salaries, however, finally rested in Australia. Managerial bonuses were originally tied to 
Australian performance. Like Oilco, control of pay was more direct for the higher level 
staff As Foodco Singapore was a direct supplier to Australia, one might expect firm 
control over labour costs. However, the siting of the Regional Office alongside the 
Singaporean factory, and the linking of managerial bonuses to the Singaporean unit's 
performance, suggest that the Australian subsidiary national office was adopting a more 
autonomous approach towards its subsidiaries. 
The discussion of Oilco and Foodco so far therefore indicates that any explanatory 
framework of MINE subsidiary compensation needs to include the different international 
orientation of head office towards different elements of compensation, preference for 
standardisation or non-standardisation of professional and managerial compensation 
structures between subsidiaries, the propensity for head office control of expatriate and 
top managerial packages, the reflection of MINE corporate culture in compensation 
provided in affiliates, the delegation of authority to regional offices, the opting in or out 
of the formal industrial relations system, and a combination of internal and external 
environmental factors influencing subsidiary compensation. In addition, there has to be 
recognition that affiliates normally have more than one occupational pay system, and that 
the external environment may vary in its impact on each. The external environment is 
already demonstrating that its elements such as government ideology, legislation and 
industrial relation systems are intricately interlinked. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
THE BUILDO COMPANIES 
Buildo Australia 
Company Background of Buildo Autralia 
Buildo Australia was one of three medium-sized companies in a specialised building 
products business unit. It reported to the General Manager of the Building and 
Industrial Products Division in the huge steel sector of the MNE. Buildo Australia 
had manufacturing plants and regional offices in five mainland capital cities and an 
extensive network of regional sales offices throughout Australia. Its origins dated 
back to 1928 as a supplier of steel building products with several different owners 
over the years. From 1987 to 1988, an Australian conglomerate owned it for 12 
months, but it was then purchased by the corporate Buildo MINE in 1988. The link to 
the main MINE is shown in Figure 9.1. 
Figure 9.1 
Relationship of Buildo Australia to Corporate Buildo 
Corporate Buildo MNE 
Steel Business 
(with 8 divisions) 
Building and Industrial Products Division 
Specialised Building Products Group 
(3 companies recognised as one business unit) 
Buildo Australia 
(as one of 3 companies in this sub-group) 
The Building and Industrial Products Division was formed in February 1992. Buildo 
Australia was 100 per cent owned by the MINE Buildo and had no separate board of 
directors. For the purpose of this study, Buildo Australia was the only company 
studied, but the head office for the Specialised Building Products Group controlled 
Buildo Australia and two other companies. Buildo was considered part of the steel 
industry and linked its pay to the industry, but it was not a steel works. It had 59 sites 
around Australia which ranged from offices of 2-3 people to manufacturing sites with 
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200 people. Manufacturing sites were based in Queensland, New South Wales, 
Victoria, Western Australia and South Australia. The Queensland manufacturing site 
was selected for this study. 
Organisation of Buildo Australia 
The management structure for Buildo Australia in 1992 is provided in Figure 9.2. 
Figure 9.2 
Management Structure of Buildo Australia as at 1992 
General Manager 
Building and Industrial Products Division 
General Manager 
Special Building Products Group 
General Manager and 
Regional Manager 
Buildo Australia— General Managers 
of the other 2 
companies in the Group 
Other 4 Regional Managers 
During 1995, the senior management of the Special Building Products Group was 
reorganised and decreased to four regional managers who were responsible for all 
three companies of the Special Building Products Group. Some functional managers 
for the three companies were relocated to a combined headquarters in Sydney. Figure 
9.3 shows the management structure as at 1995. 
Figure 9.3 
Management Structure of Buildo Australia as at 1995 
General Manager 
Building and Industrial Products Division 
General Manager 
Special Building Products Group 
Regional General Manager for 3 coi1Lpanies-3 other Regional Managers 
Buildo Australia Managers at the plant 
(Quality, sales, finance and operations) 
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At head office were the functional managers responsible for the three companies in 
the Special Building Products Group, namely: Human Resources, Finance, Technical 
Operations, and Marketing. 
Figure 9.3 shows that a Regional General Manager had responsibility for Build° 
Australia and two other companies. The Human Resource Manager was based at the 
Group head office in Sydney and acted as a resource for the three companies in the 
business unit. The Regional Manager combined the management of the region in 
which the case study Buildo plant was based, with the management of the Buildo 
Australia plant. The organisation structure for the plant in Figure 9.4 depicts four 
senior managers, with the Operations Manager supervising dispatch, production, 
maintenance, and safety. His department included two leading hands for each shift 
and plant/machine employees. 
Figure 9.4 
Organisation Chart for Buildo Australia as at 1995 
Regional General Manager 
Buildo Australia Plant 
Business 	Sales Manager Finance Manager Operations Manager 
Improvement/ 
Qulity Manager 	 I 	I 
Administrative Administrative Despatch Production Maintenance Safety En neers/ 	and Clerical 	and Clerical 	Manager Supervisor Supervisor 	Coordinator Schedulers/ 
Quality Staff 	 I 	I 
Clerk 2 Leading Trades 
Hands per Staff 
Shift 
Plant and 
Machine 
Operators 
By the end of 1995, the workforce was 47 staff employees and 53 wages staff It 
consisted of managers, professionals, para-professionals, trades personnel, clerks, 
sales and service employees, leading hands and plant operators. The Buildo Australia 
plant was moving towards replacing leading hands with team leaders. Because of the 
predominance of males in the plant and mechanical area of production,. the percentage 
of females in Buildo was just under 15 per cent. The ethnic composition of the 
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workforce reflected the local population, which was mainly Australian with a small 
percentage of Asian employees. 
Production Technology of Buildo Australia 
Buildo Australia manufactured reinforcing products for concrete. The customers' 
specifications were translated by schedulers into a schedule of the sizes, lengths and 
shapes of the specified reinforcing material. The reinforcing schedules were then 
converted into cutting lists for processing in the factory. The company could handle 
any construction project no matter what the size, and also stocked a full range of 
reinforcing accessories. The major products were done on a made-to-order basis 
from engineering drawings. A range of standard sizes was produced, but non-
standard sizes were also manufactured on request. The main equipment used in the 
manufacturing operation was bending machines and mesh machines. The technology, 
apart from the advanced computer equipment, was not highly complex. Entry costs 
to the industry were low. Production workers carried materials to a machine, did the 
operation and returned the product to a distribution area. Materials handling was 
therefore the biggest item in measuring efficiency. The technology was unlikely to 
change in the future as the company was making materials to fit building projects. 
Labour costs only made up 10 per cent of total costs. Material costs were about 80 
per cent and 10 per cent was spent on the remaining overheads and operating costs. 
Buildo Australia had about 40 per cent of market share and was directly affected by 
the state and cycles of the building industry. The company worked in a national 
market, most of which was private building companies. Products were delivered 
direct to building sites and to distributors and retailers. Builders could also buy from 
the factory door. Production could range from long runs to a small order. 
Mission and Objectives of Buildo Australia 
Buildo Australia had a mission statement which was 'to be the recognised leader [in 
Special Building products] , to maximise return on investment ... ', and to place 
high priority on safety, customer service, innovation, quality of staff and continuous 
improvement in productivity. The corporate objective was to be the number one 
company in the industry by greater efficiency, low cost production and distribution, 
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and good customer service. It would do this by looking at other uses for its products 
and making other building products. 
The company worked on a seven-year projection and had annual business plans. 
These business plans cascaded down into each area. Included in the business plan 
were general objectives about staffing and plans for workplace reform. In terms of 
the market, the key factor was price as the products from competitors were very 
similar, but customer service could also differentiate a product. However, most big 
projects went out to tender from the builders to the manufacturers. Reliability was a 
factor, although if weather was inclement, builders did not necessarily want delivery 
on the date first suggested. 
HRM/IR Organisation of Buildo Australia 
General corporate Buildo MINE policies included a formal statement on HR_M. The 
executive interviewed stated that corporate Buildo MINE probably did not make much 
impact on the company, but there was a realisation that Buildo Australia was part of 
the corporate MINE operation. There was an emphasis on matching the skills to the 
technological requirements. A greater emphasis on people management was being 
seen in the Buildo MINE and senior management were expected to have good skills in 
this area. In terms of formal HRM objectives, the company had listed key HRM 
issues. These included the devolution of management responsibility and continuing 
emphasis on occupational health and safety. Each manager had performance goals 
that included occupational health and safety standards. HRM objectives were usually 
part of the business plan. 
HR.M procedures in the Buildo Australia operation were both formal and informal. 
The corporate MINE imposed some formal review requirements on the company (e.g. 
career histories for each employee). In 1992, the company was installing a human 
resource management (information) system; recruiting and training were done on an 
ad hoc basis and the location of the company created problems in organising training. 
The management/employee relations were good but at that time, the salary system 
was somewhat informal. As noted earlier, the Human Resource Manager was based 
in the Group Head Office located in Sydney away from the Buildo Australia factory. 
There was no HRM specialist in the Brisbane Buildo Australia factory. Leave 
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records, occupational health and safety issues, staff numbers and similar operational 
FIRM was performed by factory staff 
The specialist HR Manager in the head office for the three companies in the group 
was appointed in 1991. Prior to this, there was no FIRM specialist and the people 
management function was focused on the line manager; the specialist has no intention 
of changing this. The HR Manager provided advice, policy background, 'protection 
from corporate [Buildo NINE] policy', and a monitoring/coordinating role on pay and 
HRM systems. The special building products FIRM specialist had a 'dotted line' 
relationship to the steel HRM specialists, which was particularly necessary because of 
the common managerial pay systems across the steel sector. 
Unionisation of Buildo Australia 
Only wages employees were unionised, and Buildo Australia had a preference clause' 
in its award for union members. Staff employees were not unionised. The main union 
was the AWU-FIME Amalgamated Union 2 (AWU-FIME), although there were a few 
members of the Automotive, Food, Metals and Engineering Union (AFMEU). Union 
membership was not compulsory, although the company operated a check-off system. 
The factory had shop stewards, and committees were set up to assist in the 
implementation of restructured awards, but the plan at the time of the first interviews 
in 1992 was to negotiate an enterprise bargain which would eventually cover all 
employees on site with the objective of pulling wages and salary conditions together. 
Although there was no formal bargaining infrastructure in Buildo, the first enterprise 
agreement was achieved in 1993 and had been updated regularly by the end of 1995. 
By then, there was still no formal negotiating committee as the company had an 'anti-
committee' policy. Line managers were expected to make decisions and deal with 
grievances. The trade union might or might not get involved officially, and the Group 
Head Office Human Resources Manager only got involved in an issue if it was a major 
one e.g. a dismissal. Staff relations in the company were good, perhaps because of 
the small size of the operation. 
Apr 	clause in an award places an obligation on an employer to give preference to a union member over a non-union 
pason in selection of staff and can also apply in cases of retrenchment. Under recent legislation passed by the conservative 
Liberal/National Government, this practice is now illegal. 
2 The full name of the amalgamated unions was The Australian Workers' Union - Federation of Industrial. Manufacturing and 
Engineering Union. 
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Industrial Staff Compensation in Buildo Australia 
The compensation of the industrial employees in Buildo Australia could be analysed in 
two periods: pre- and post September 1992. The pay of the industrial employees on 
the Buildo Australia site studied had been dominated by the federal Metal Industry 
Award (1984) (AIRC Print F4869), an award that covered the operators and trades 
staff. Transport was not included under award coverage as this was contracted out by 
the company, as were special engineering services and office cleaning. The Buildo 
factory had been on its present site for more than 20 years as at 1992, and the policy 
of the previous company owners had always been to pay single-point award rates 
(with no over-award payments). Only the tradespersons were paid above the award 
in the state. This policy varied across the company sites in other states, as they 
usually had to pay above the award wages to attract and retain staff. The negotiations 
for revising the Metal Industry Award were left to employer associations, but the 
company seriously considered its own award because of the general nature of the 
federal Metal Award. When a change to the federal award was made, Buildo paid 
this, but restructuring of the award into 14 new classifications in 1989 created some 
difficulties. With the AIRC National Wage Case recommended A$10 plus 4 per cent 
rise in 1987, there were some efficiency changes, but these were of a fairly minor 
nature and did not affect work demarcation areas. According to the manager 
interviewed, the workforce had always operated on a flexible basis for many years. 
The Metal Industry Award (1984) is a comprehensive benchmark award in the 
Australian industrial relations system, and is used in a technical way to generate a 
'paper dispute' for a NWC hearing. Its 348 classifications were allocated to about 50 
different wage groups, which showed a base rate , per week and a weekly 
supplementary payment. The rates varied for each state, but, surprisingly, only by a 
few dollars per week. At the mid-point of the 50 pay rates were the machine 
operators for reinforcing products, bending machine operators, general machine 
operators and machine assistants. In the award, instrumentation and controls 
tradespeople gained the highest rates, followed by the fitter tradespeople. Other 
conditions of employment were stated in detail including termination of employment 
payments, annual leave, bereavement leave, boiling water at meal times, crib time 
(paid breaks), drinking water, payment during jury service, and provision of lockers. 
There were no annual increments or provisions for length of service. 
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Before September 1992, no incentives such as piecework or group bonuses were paid 
by Buildo Australia, and prior to the restructuring of the Metal Award in 1989, the 
company just used the relevant classifications. Now that the award has been 
restructured into 16 wage groups, only three levels of the Engineering Production 
Employee Classifications were used by Buildo Australia — C13 (82 per cent of the 
C10 Engineering Tradesperson Level 1 rate), C12 (87.4 per cent), and C11 (92.4 per 
cent). These single fixed rates commence at the entry basic grade (C13 Engineering 
Production Employee Level 2), where the selection criterion is basic literacy. Two 
other skills levels (C12 and C 11 Engineering Production Employee Levels 3 and 4) 
are then available. The operator position had a standard career path and any 
advancement beyond this had to be outside the organisation. On-job training was 
provided. Employees could be trained within one month and were trained to use a 
number of pieces of equipment. Shift allowances were paid according to the award. 
Leading hands were 'working leading hands' and received a percentage of the highest 
rate of pay of persons supervised depending on the number of people supervised. 
Staff worked a 371/2 hour week but this varied around the sites of the whole Buildo 
company. A two shift system operated and no overtime was worked in 1992; it was 
usually very carefully controlled. When the building industry was booming, overtime 
was used. Employees were paid weekly in cash at an hourly rate. Some casual staff 
were used because of the cyclical nature of the business, but there was limited use of 
part-time staff. 
The labour market for the plant was very flat in 1992. A good supply of tradespeople 
was available, and the Buildo factory had some long serving employees. However, 
when the economy boomed, the Buildo sites suffered high turnover. It was therefore 
necessary to pay above the award for tradespeople because the factory was in a highly 
industrialised area. Penalty rates were paid according to the award. 
During 1992, Buildo Australia negotiated an enterprise agreement under the AIRC 
National Wage Principles and legislation at that time. It was ratified by the unions in 
September 1992 and by the AlRC in January 1993 for a period of seven months. It 
applied to all the Buildo Australia sites in the state in which the plant was located, and 
was called a Performance Improvement Payment Scheme (PIPS) Award. The award 
covered all industrial staff and supplemented the Metal Industry Award. It did not 
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affect the Metal Award structure; the company still paid on the Metal Award and the 
classifications included in that. The new award stated that PIPS 'is a scheme which 
proposes quarterly payments in recognition of achievement of previously agreed 
targets of improved performance'. A TQM initiative had been running in the 
company since 1990 and the PIPS was aimed at reinforcing this. For the plant 
analysed, two Key Performance Indicators (KPI) were set, the first being the Variable 
Conversion Cost/Tonne produced, which included all compensation and overtime 
costs, the cost of freight inwards and outwards and the cost of scrap. The second 
KPI was Customer Service, based on the number of controllable credit notes and 
complaints. Benchmarks for KPI performances were set and then figures calculated 
for each quarter. The factory's performance was assessed quarterly and could be 
judged 'outstanding', 'good', 'adequate' or 'poor' according to its score on a 
performance target matrix of the two KPIs. A poor performance on both KPIs would 
not generate any bonus in a quarter, but a poor performance on one KPI combined 
with an outstanding performance on the second KPI would warrant a 3 per cent 
bonus of the gross wage for a quarter. An 'outstanding' performance on both KPIs 
would provide a 5.5 per cent bonus. 
A new PIPS agreement was made in 1994 and ratified by the AMC in March of that 
year. This was to remain in force until 31 May 1995. The PPS still had to be 
implemented in conjunction with the parent Metal Industry Award. The intention of 
the new award was 'to build on the gains made to date as part of the continual 
improvement'. The KPIs were increased to three: Direct Variable Costs/Tonne of 
product, Administration Costs and Absenteeism, with the four levels of performance 
and a quarterly bonus. Because of the extra performance in the factory, a 4 per cent 
rise was incorporated into the weekly wage, paid in two instalments. With an 
'outstanding' performance on the three ICPIs, a bonus of 6.5 per cent was possible. A 
'poor' performance would not generate any bonus. The PIPS agreement stated that 
both parties wished to continue the concept of the scheme after its expiry and would 
commence negotiations in the second year of its operation. 
Although beyond the cut-off date for the case, negotiations in 1995 resulted in a new 
enterprise agreement in March 1996, which lasted until December 1996. This was 
registered with the AIRC. While the agreement applied to the Buildo Special 
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Products companies, individual issues were decided for each plant. The purpose of 
this award was to improve productivity, costs and service by developing a more 
skilled and flexible workforce. The FIR Manger interviewed spoke of the need to 
start 'a cultural change process' and 'to get employees involved'. It was agreed that 
the parties would work together towards annualised salaries and a team structure. It 
was also agreed that a 'consultative mechanism' would be set up in the plant to 
discuss matters of efficiency, customer requirements, training and productivity, with 
meetings to occur as necessary. Hours of work were fixed at 38 hours per week and 
the minimum base rates of pay were fixed based on the C13 point of the Metal 
Industry Award for Trainees. C12 for Operators and C10 for Technicians. The new 
agreement was a minimum rates award and rises exceeded those of the Metal Industry 
Award. Skill requirements for each section were determined by the management, 
employees and union, after which the employee could continue to train for extra skills 
and be paid extra for them. The PIPS was retained with quarterly bonuses payable on 
achievement of Key Performance Indicators. 
In summary, the basis for pay for industrial staff up to 1992 was the job to be done, 
paid on the appropriate classification of the Metal Industry Award. There were no 
incentives, individual performance appraisal or gain-sharing schemes. When the 
federal Metal Award was restructured, and the classifications broadbanded, a new 
emphasis was placed on the skills and training needed for each pay-band and flexibility 
of working. After 1992, the Metal Award classification rates were supplemented by 
bonuses from a PIPS. The first enterprise agreement reflected the collective 
performance of the workforce rather than individual contribution, but the aim, said the 
interviewed manager, was to move towards 'treating people as individuals'. The 
1996 agreement included an individual supplement for skill. No financial recognition 
of seniority was made but a watch was given after 25 years service. Prizes were given 
for safety campaigns and reaching safety targets. The Metal Award was thus the basis 
of the pay system together with a combination of plant wide incentives and individual 
skill allowances for its industrial staff. External rates of pay were not a major issue 
for the company except in times of high turnover. 
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Staff Compensation in Buildo Australia 
Buildo Australia distinguished between managerial, staff and industrial employees. 
State managers were designated as management level and the level below this, staff 
As at 1992, the state Clerks' Award was used as the basis for compensation for some 
clerical jobs. The general philosophy for payment of staff employees was on 
individual performance and at the 75th percentile of the rates of competitors. 'But 
this position is only held for a short time as everyone raises salaries' suggested the 
manager. The objective was to attract and retain good quality employees. Staff jobs 
were graded within a six-grade structure. In 1992, there were no written definitions 
of the grades, but by the end of 1995, brief general descriptions of competencies and 
typical jobs at each level had been formalised. The company operated on a 
comparative basis with salary ranges. People moved through the range according to 
performance and experience. The salary range had a 'minimum and maximum point', 
with 100 per cent being the mid-point to indicate some competency in the position. 
The structure used the principles of Hay, but was not exactly identical, using the 
'know-how' factor only as the main criterion. A performance review was done for 
each member of staff at the end of the business year (at the end of May). This 
affected salary, and any amended salary started as from 1 December each year. The 
manager made a decision on salary, which was examined by the Human Resources 
Manager at Head Office. The lower end of the ranges usually moved up with AIRC 
National Wage Case (NWC) increases (if any) and salary market surveys. With the 
NWC now less significant in national pay rises, staff employees now got one major 
salary review per year. The review was based on performance and market surveys. 
Hay Consulting and the Canberra Management Conference surveys were used as 
indicators together with local labour market trends. 
Employees covering the Sales, Commercial, Production and Scheduling areas were 
• also included in the six-grade structure. With one common structure, everyone was 
seen as contributing equally and being rewarded equally. Negotiations on salary were 
conducted on a one-to-one basis. There was no staff association, so the industrial 
tribunals had no influence on the structure except for the past National Wage Case 
increases. After the enterprise agreement eventuated, the staff employees received the 
PIPS lump sums. There was no overtime or special allowances, as the company had a 
policy of not working overtime and operated on a 371/2 hour week. Despatch staff 
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and supervisors work on shift rosters and were paid 15 per cent afternoon shift 
allowance. Management and staff employees were paid monthly; the rest of Buildo 
staff were paid weekly. Very few of the workforce in the 'staff category were 
employed on a casual or part-time basis. 
In. summary, therefore, the company paid for the job and performance and not skills, 
but hoped to develop initiatives in this area. Performance was recognised by 
progression through the range and through grades. Performance rises might vary 
between 0-4 per cent. Other general rises were based on the cost of living. 
Additional income was received through plant performance on MPS. No allowance 
was made for seniority except for extra experience, which might be reflected in 
progression through grades. In 1992, pay for age was only a factor for a limited 
number of juniors under twenty-one (such as a receptionist and a junior schedulist). 
By the end of 1995, age-based pay had been removed. No extra income was given 
for obtaining educational qualifications. The staff were secretive about salaries, but 
did not have to sign any agreement to maintain secrecy. With Sales staff, there was a 
big branch network. No commission on sales was paid, but relevant sales people had 
cars provided. Branches had sales targets and everyone had performance goals. 
Managerial Compensation in Buildo Australia 
The Executive Group comprised the State Managers and their direct reports. The 
philosophy of the pay system was performance-based and a common system operated 
across the Buildo steel sector. A similar policy of maintaining salaries in the top 75th 
percentile of the market was adopted. This created a slight problem in that the steel 
sector was dominated by several major steel works rather than building and 
construction operations. The question therefore was which industry should be 
surveyed. According to the executive interviewed, 'this is not so much the money 
paid as much as the kind of car an executive should drive in comparison with similar 
executives in the building industry'. Pay was reviewed in December of each year 
based on labour market salary surveys. Up to 1992, expectations for salary rises 
based on inflation had been 8-9 per cent over the previous 15 years, but then declined 
to a 3-4 per cent increases because of the low inflation rates. 
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The compensation system and salary ranges were based on the Hay points formula. 
Staff moved through the range based on performance. The Hay system was used in 
Buildo because of the diversity of the company; it assisted managers to move across 
functions. Before 1985, Hay was common right across the corporate Buildo MNE, 
but each sector (e.g. petroleum and steel) had a different points range for specialists. 
The executives were subject to a performance appraisal and had objectives set for a 
review period. For the General Manager of the Special Building Products Group, an 
incentive scheme based on the performance of corporate Buildo MNE, the Special 
Building Products Group, the steel sector and individual performance was used. The 
General Manager could get 20 per cent of salary as a bonus. A 20 per cent kitty 
could be divided between the General Manager's direct reports based on their 
contribution. 
In summary, the basis for payment was therefore the job and performance. No credit 
was given for seniority. In 1992, the company was thinking about broadening of its 
career structures, but decided to stay with the Hay scheme for the time being as other 
job evaluation schemes appeared to be derived from this. No extra income was given 
for additional educational qualifications, but plant management did receive the PIPS 
lump sum quarterly. Employees were told their salary range but not their Hay points. 
Salaries were calculated separately from their points. The Hay scheme had therefore 
become 'somewhat mysterious'. No problem had been experienced with the scheme 
or with its assessment of females. The concept of careers was being reviewed as 
levels in the organisation declined. Buildo was encouraging more lateral movement to 
enable employees to gain broader experience. 
Employee Benefits in Buildo Australia 
Like other companies, Buildo Australia provided some employee benefits that were 
common to all employees, and others that were unique to one group only. Common 
benefits included: 
• annual leave 
• compassionate leave 
• death benefit 
• long service awards 
• long-term illness 
• maternity leave 
• paternity leave 
• retrenchment benefit 
367 
• sick leave. 
• study benefits 
• superannuation. 
The long-term sick leave provisions for staff and managerial staff were extended to all 
employees between 1992 and 1996. However, management and staff employees 
enjoyed educational and unpaid leave. A scheme for free health, surgical and dental 
treatment was provided for staff and managerial employees until 1995, but was 
withdrawn for new staff after that date because of a change in federal government 
legislation. By the end of 1995, staff could take a lump sum or pay to go into a 
contributory private medical scheme run by corporate Buildo. A company car was 
available for sales and managerial employees, and reimbursement was given for 
company travelling by staff and clerical employees. There was a tension between the 
Buildo policy and what the executives would like to have received compared with 
others in the building and construction industry. This particularly applied to cars, 
where Buildo policy did not match norms in the building industry. According to the 
manager, status symbols in the industry seemed to be very important. Some choice of 
car was available, or monetary equivalent, but the car policy was fairly tightly 
structured. 
The cost of superannuation for all staff was usually excluded from the package 
because of the complexity in calculating it. As at 1992, the total company and 
employee contribution for managerial staff was 16 per cent and 8 per cent for the 
wages employees. Because of the new federal legislation, the superannuation scheme 
was reviewed. The new scheme consisted of an accumulated sum fund for industrial 
staff and a defined benefit scheme for staff and management. There was pressure in 
the company to widen the choice of packages, but Build° Australia was generally seen 
as paternal, and it restricted the choice of packages. This compared with other 
companies in the industry which allowed people to have a major say in the packages 
obtained. In 1992, business allowances on a range of A$700 to A$5,000, depending 
on position, were offered to pay for club membership fees, but previous allowances 
for phone rental and entertainment were rolled into a monthly allowance because of 
Fringe Benefits Tax. Under the Metal Industry Award, a variety of additional 
allowances and benefits were negotiated for award staff such as shift and meal 
allowances, union educational leave, uniforms, acting allowances and call-back pay. 
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In 1992, about 70 per cent of the employees in the company owned shares in the 
corporate Buildo MNE. The degree of ownership varied according to department, 
and was between 50 and 100 per cent. 'This might have something to do with the 
trust in management across the plant', suggested a manager. All employees could use 
the Employee Share Scheme. This commenced in 1985, and staff could buy 1,000 
corporate Buildo MNE shares per annum with an interest free loan repayable over 20 
years. Dividends could be used to pay off a loan. The employee benefits by category 
are shown in Table 9.1 
Relationship of Buildo Australia to Corporate Head Office 
This case study differs from that of Oilco and Foodco, described earlier, in that the 
Buildo MNE is Australian owned. Nevertheless, there was little contact between the 
corporate Buildo MNE head office and Buildo Australia. There was more liaison 
with the steel sector head office, but this varied according to the level of the 
employee. The top management compensation system was common across the steel 
sector, but the management of staff and industrial employees was very much focused 
to the plant level, and reflected local labour market needs. According to a manager,' 
[Buildo Australia], as a strategy, tries to keep away from the steel sector as a comparison 
because they pay much more than the reinforcing side of the business. 
The main link with the corporate head office on compensation occurred through the 
company-wide superannuation scheme, staff health and insurance, and the employee 
share plan. 
The Profile of Buildo Australia Compensation 
Three occupational groups were selected for comparison with Buildo Singapore and 
Tables 9.2 to 9.4 show Buildo Australia's profile for the rewards of industrial, clerical 
and managerial staff using the Gomez-Mejia and Balkin (1992) Algorithmic and 
Experiential compensation patterns. The use of the federal Metal Industry Award 
prior to its restructuring, meant that the Buildo Australia industrial 
staff (Table 9.2) were paid according to their jobs. The restructured award had more 
emphasis on skills and flexibility. A portion of the employees' compensation was now 
at risk as a result of the enterprise agreement, although the reward for 
accomplishment was short-term (quarterly) rather than long-term. account The 
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Em lo ee Benefits Profile for Build° Australia as at 1995 
Industrial/ 
Blue Collar 
Unskilled 	Skilled 
Clerical/ 
Admin 
Sales/ 
Technical 
Professional/ 
Management 
Board 
Acting allowance 
Annual leave / .1 ../ I V 
Attendance allowance 
Benefit for overseas assignments 
Business entertainment expenses I 
Cellular phones (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) 
Co-operative shares 
Compassionate leave / 	. 
Death benefit  
Dental treatment I I ./ 
Early retirement schemes , 
External/social recreational club 
membership 
./ 
Festive loan/advance 
Fixed monthly transport 
allowance 
Free medical treatment/medicine /(2) /(2)  
Funeral leave benefit 
Hospital ward benefit 
Housing loan (3) (3) 
Housing renovation loan 
Laundry benefit 
Long service award .1 .1 .1 1 
Long-term illness / V V 1 / 
Machine allowance 
Marriage leave 
Maternity leave J V J V V 
Meal allowance ./ J 
Medically board-out benefit 
Other loans 
Paternity leave / ../ 1 ./ V 
Personal insurance 
Provision of car 
Reimbursement for use of own 
car on company business 
1 1 
Retrenchment benefit V V i J V 
Service benefit 
Shift allowance ../ I 
Sick leave J V V 1 V 
Specialist surgical fee / V V 
Study leave/benefit V J V 1 V 
Superannuation (Australia) 1 V V V V 
Transport benefit/allowance/ 
reimbursement 
Uniform ./ V 
Union day leave 
Union education leave 1 J 
Unpaid leave 1 .1 1 
Voluntary resignation benefit 
Notes: 
(1) According to job. (2) Non-contributory. (3) On relocation only. 
Table 9.2 
Summary Profile of Algorithmic (A) and Experiential (E) Compensation Patterns of Industrial Staff Compensation 
in Buildco-Australia and Build° Singapore as at 1995 
Bui!do Australia Industrial Staff Buildo Singapore Industrial Staff 
Compensation Feature A or E Compensation Feature A or E 
(a) Basis for Pay 
Skill 
Performance 
Individual & aggregate 
Short-term 
Moderate 
Not applicable 
Internal consistency 
Benefits vary across company 
Outcomes (KPIs)(5) 
E 
E 
E 
A 
A (1) 
- 
NE (2) 
A 
E 
Skill 
Length of service and performance 
Individual and aggregate 
Short-term 
High 
Not applicable 
Internal consistency 
Benefits vary across company 
Outcomes 
4 .IL
L
I<
C
4.1
 i <
<
4.1 
Unit of analysis 
Criteria for pay increases 
Level of performance measurement 
Time orientation 
Risk sharing 
Strategic focus 
Equity concern 
Reward distribution 
Type of control 
(b) Design Issues 
Not known 
Not known 
Moderate 
Low future potential/ higher immediate payoffs 
Multiple rewards 
Pecuniary 
- 
- 
A (1) 
A (3) 
E 
E 
Above market rates 
Not known 
High 
Low future potential/ higher immediate payoffs 
Multiple rewards 
Pecuniary 
<
 
Salary market policy 
Benefits market policy 
Incentives in pay mix 
Total compensation 
Reinforcement schedule 
Reward emphasis 
(c) Administrative Framework 
Decentralised to plant 
High (agreement) 
Participative 
General rules applied case by case 
E 
E 
E 
E (4) 
Decentralised to plant 
High 
Participative 
Strict rules 
Li.“1
1
4.1
-:t 
Decision making 
Pay disclosure 
Governance structure 
Nature of pay policies 
TOTAL A = 5 
E = 10 
A/E = 1 
U/K=2(6) 
N/A= 1 (7) 
TOTAL A = 6 
E = 10 
A/E = 1 
U/K=1 (6) 
N/A= 1 (7) 
Notes: (1) The maximum pay at risk was 6.5 per cent. (2) The company had a formal structure for internal consistency, but external rates were taken 
into consideration. (3) An employee share ownership scheme was available (4) The flexibility was in the assessment of each employee's 
skill. (5) Key performance indicators.(6) U/K=UnIcnown (7) N/A=Not applicable 
Table 9.3 
Summary Profile of Algorithmic (A) and Experiential (E) Compensation Patterns of Clerical Staff Compensation 
in Buildo Australia and Buildo Singapore as at 1995 
Buildo Australia Clerical Staff Buildo Singapore Clerical Staff 
Compensation Feature A or E Compensation Feature A or E 
(a) Basis for Pay 
Job 
Annual review and performance 
Individual and aggregate 
Short-term 
Moderate 
Not applicable 
Internal and external 
Benefits vary across company 
Individual P.A. 
w
 
¢
 	
<
 
Job 
Mainly tenure 
Individual and aggregate 
Short-term 
High 
Not applicable 
Market driven 
Vary across the company 
Not applicable 
Unit of analysis 
Criteria for pay increases 
Level of performance measurement 
Time orientation 
Risk sharing 
Strategic focus 
Equity concern 
Reward distribution 
Type of control 
(b) Design Issues 
Above market 
Not known 
Moderate 
Low future potential/ higher immediate payoffs 
Annual 
Pecuniary 
A 
- 
A (1) 
A (2)  
A 
E 
Above 'market' rates 
Not known 
High 
Low future potential/ higher immediate payoffs 
Annual 
Pecuniary 
77, 
Salary market policy 
Benefits market policy 
Incentives in pay mix 
Total compensation 
Reinforcement schedule 
Reward emphasis 
(c) Administrative Framework 
Decentralised 
Low 
Authoritarian 
Bureaucratic 
E 
A 
A 
A (3) 
Decentralised to plant 
Low 
Authoritarian 
Case by case 
<  < 
Decision making 
Pay disclosure 
Governance structure 
Nature of pay policies 
TOTAL 
A=ll 
E = 4 
A/E=2 
N/A=1 (6) 
U/K=1 (5)  
TOTAL 
A=9 
E = 7 
U/K=1 (5) 
Notes: (1) The maximum pay at risk was 6.5 per cent. (2) An employee share ownership scheme was available.(3) There was flexibility to move 
people through the range at different speeds. (4) For example, 4'/,months bonus in 1992.(5) U/K=Unknown (6) N/A= Not applicable 
Table 9.4 
Summary Profile of Algorithmic (A) and Experiential (E) Compensation Patterns of Managerial Staff Compensation 
in Buildo Australia and Buildo Singapore as at 1995 
Buildo Australia Managerial Staff Buildo Singapore Managerial Staff 
Compensation Feature A or E Compensation Feature A or E 
(a) Basis for Pay 
Job 
Overall review plus performance 
Individual and aggregate 
Short-term 
High 
Group performance 
Internal and external 
Benefits vary across country 
Outcomes 
:., 
¢
  ¢
 w
 ¢
 4
1
 A
  ¢
  w
  
Job 
Performance 
Individual 
Short-term 
High 
Business unit (subsidiary) 
External market 
Benefits vary across company 
Outcomes (KPIs) (4) 
 
Unit of analysis 
Criteria for pay increases 
Level of performance measurement 
Time orientation 
Risk sharing 
• Strategic focus 
Equity concern 
Reward distribution 
Type of control 
(b)Design Issues 
Above market 
Not known 
High 
Low future potential /higher immediate payoffs 
Low frequency 
Pecunia 
A 
E (2) 
A (I) 
A 
E 
Above market 	' 
High 
Low future potential/ higher immediate payoffs 
Annual 
Pecuniary  
¢
 
Salary market policy 
Benefits market policy 
Incentives in pay mix 
Total compensation 
Reinforcement schedule 
Reward em•hasis 
(c) Administrative Framework 
Centralised 
Low 
Authoritarian 
Bureaucratic 
A 
A 
A y 
¢
 ¢
 ¢
 14 
Decision making 
Pay disclosure 
Governance structure 
Nature of pay policies 
TOTAL 
A = 10 
E =6 
A/E = 2 
U/K= 1 (3) 
TOTAL 
A = 10 
E =8 
U/K= 1 (3) 
Notes: 
(1) An employee share purchase scheme was available. (2) By Australian standards (3) U/K= Unknown 
(4) Key Performance Indicators 
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general picture is a compensation system which moved from an Algorithmic to a more 
Experiential one. 
Although the system was informal, the staff employees (Table 9.3) were primarily 
paid on the job they did, although individual performance could affect the annual 
increment. The annual salary had individual and aggregate performance elements, as 
the staff employees received the same bonus as the industrial employees based on the 
KPIs. In general, the system thus seemed to be more heavily weighted towards an 
Algorithmic system. Finally, the compensation for senior executives (Table 9.4) was 
based on Hay system evaluations of job size but the final reward depended on 
contribution to the organisation. The level of performance measurement was 
individual, business unit, and corporate based. The executive compensation fell more 
towards an Algorithmic profile with its initial focus on job size, but significant 
incentives gave it strong Experiential features as well. 
Buildo Australia Compensation and the External Environment 
In assessing the effect of the external environment, legislation was seen by the Buildo 
Australia Group head office HR Managers as having a major impact on pay systems. 
She continued: 
The minimum wage of the awards is a constraint, but the FBT had a huge impact when it first 
came in. Giving managers cars became an effective way of paying people — so was the 
medical scheme. To encourage people to move, you could give them a low interest housing 
loan. It was attractive until FBT. However, it is often cheaper to pay FBT and in the end, 
very few policies have probably changed dramatically. But views on these things change. 
Superannuation used to be seen as paternalistic. It's now seen as social requirement. The 
federal government is putting a lot of pressure on pension funds to ensure that their structures 
fit the legislation. 
New corporate legislation on shares distribution in compensation packages affected 
directors and had to be considered. Buildo was seen as a very paternalistic company, 
and long-service awards and generous superannuation funds were used to encourage 
long-term employment. This was now changing. 
The economy affected the level of wages and salaries to be paid. As the HR Manager 
put it: 
When we get booms, we get high turnover. In New South Wales, we have to pay above the 
award, because the factory is in a highly industrialised area. 
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In times of high inflation, AIRC NWC and Consumer Price Index (inflation) rises 
would flow on directly. In addition to levels of employment, the HR Manager said 
that: 
The ability to pay is important. Buildo is often seen as being profitable, but some parts of the 
business might not be doing well. Some employees have difficulty in understanding this. 
As far as government influence and incomes policies were concerned, the HR 
Manager suggested that: 
There has been pluses and minuses in the [ALP/ACTU] Accord The plus was that there has 
been some predictability about pay in the future. 
However, industrial employees tended to be considered first and then performance 
salary for staff calculated. In recent years, the top-end of the scale had moved more 
although there had been some thought given to holding back a manager's pay if 
industrial employees were not getting rises. She continued: 
With the [AIRC NWC] Structural Efficiency Principles, industrial employees had to justify 
their pay increase, but staff did not have to do anything. The philosophy of the Accord's 
social agenda probably therefore had more impact than the actual amounts awarded in wage 
cases [NWCs]. 
On the changing attitude towards education in industry, the HR Manager stated that: 
There's a trend towards paying for skill in restructured awards for industrial employees. 
We've tried to run a restructuring model for staff employees, but found this difficult. 
The company's view was that they paid people for what they did rather than how they 
did it. This was a difficult area, however, and from a sociological viewpoint, the 
executive thought that the Australian ethic was to make people equal, which led to 
mediocrity. To pay a person a big reward based on performance would not be well 
received, particularly by a work group. By comparison, the United States had steeper 
salary lines. Australian lines were flatter, but more cars were provided. There were 
therefore strong feelings about how much management was earning, and this was 
linked to respect for authority. Buildo was now accepting that money was no longer 
the only motivator. For some staff it was, but the larger MNE was stressing 
recognition as a motivator as well. 
From another perspective on national culture, Table 9.5 shows the extent to which the 
Hodgetts and Luthans (1993b) recommendations for pay systems for the Hofstede 
(1980) cultural dimensions for Australia were supported by the Buildo Australia 
compensation systems. There was slightly more conformity with the 
recommendations in the clerical and managerial pay systems than in the industrial 
Table 9.5 
The Hodgetts and Luthans (H&L) Recommendations for Compensation in Australia as Reflected by Buildo Australia 
AUSTRALIA 
Hofstede Dimension 
Index 
H&L Recommended 
Compensation 
Industrial Staff 
Compensation 
Clerical Staff 
Compensation 
Managerial 
Compensation 
I. Moderately low Power 
Distance 
• Low salary gaps between lowest 
and highest paid 
• Low benefits gaps 
• Gain-sharing 
• Profit-sharing 
Yes within award. Across 
company unknown 
No — different across company 
Yes 
No 
Unknown 
No — different across company 
Yes 
No 
Unknown 
No 
No 
Yes 
2. High Individualism • Individual performance based 
• External/equity competitiveness 
• Short-term achievement 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
3. Moderately high 
Masculinity 
• Few family benefits 
• Gender pay differences 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
4. Moderately weak 
Uncertainty Avoidance 
• Emphasis on performance 
• Sharing of risks associated with 
MNE's success or failure 
• Competitive salaries to avoid 
poaching of staff 
• Decentralised pay policies 
Yes 
No 
Partly 
Yes(3) 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes(3) 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No(4) 
Supported Y (Yes) 
Not Supported N (No) 
Y = 7 
N = 5 
Partly = 1 
Y = 8 
N = 4 
Unknown= 1 
Y = 8 
N = 4 
Unknown=1 
Notes: (1) Some benefits were common across the whole corporate MNE. (2) There was some discretion for final individual pay, but job evaluation existed. 
(3) Taken to mean decentralisation within Buildo Australia, and not within the whole MNE. (4) Centralised job evaluation and bonus system within the steel sector of 
the MNE 
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system. The PIPs plant-wide incentives (arguably a form of gain-sharing) for 
industrial and clerical employees follow the recommendations for a moderately low 
Power Distance, but profit-sharing was only available to management, who, in turn, 
had superior employee benefits. The emphasis on individual performance for the 
clerical and managerial staff was appropriate for the high Individualism and the 
moderately weak Uncertainty Avoidance of Australia (Hofstede, 1980). Buildo 
Australia had few additional family benefits (appropriate for the moderately high 
Masculinity). On the other hand, the emphasis on performance did support the 
recommendations for the moderately high Uncertainty Avoidance dimension in 
Australia, as found by Hofstede (1980). 
With industrial relations environment, the Buildo Australia manager argued that the 
AIRC NWCs had previously had a major impact on wage rises. The company only 
paid award wages. The industrial tribunals therefore set their pay scales. However, 
the Industrial Relations Acts of 1988 and 1994 had given Buildo the opportunity to 
supplement the Metal Award with a formal enterprise agreement introducing the 
PIPS. Unions were seen as a fairly strong constraint. For example, the HR Manager 
said that: 
If we decided to pay employees on a monthly basis rather than fortnightly, this might be 
difficult. It is always the attitude that something had to be traded off to justify this, even if the 
employees agreed. 
Being in the heart of the metal industry and recognising unions, Buildo had no option 
but to use the Metal Award as the basis of its compensation for industrial staff The 
view of the executive was that the company was trying to 'stop telling people how to 
think'. Buildo was ceasing to be paternalistic and was now allowing people to 
choose. While employment with Buildo was previously perceived as 'cradle to grave 
, there was now more flexibility in the system'. On the benefits side, items like 
child-care were still a difficult issue for the company. Buildo did not want to take the 
initiative and be first in the industry for new benefits such as child-care. 
For a fuller explanation of Buildo Australia compensation design, the pressures of the 
reinforcing products industry should be included. The market was a domestic one 
linked to the business cycles of the construction industry. The technology was not 
fast-changing, but material costs were high, and competition was strong. Products 
could be tailor-made for a particular construction. The implications of the reinforcing 
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industry for the internal environment were that Buildo Australia's size warranted 
some formality in pay design. There was no use of overseas expatriate staff in the 
plant and the affiliate was self-contained in terms of shopfloor compensation systems. 
There were more pay linkages for senior management to compensation in the steel 
division of the corporate MNE Buildo to facilitate movement between functions. The 
emphasis was on the flexibility of labour and the encouraging of shop-floor skills, as 
well as gaining competitive advantage by a concentration on costs and service through 
the Performance Improvement Payment System. The changes in compensation were 
part of a program of HR approaches and cultural change. The nature of the business 
determined the skill profile and the type of awards used in compensation design. It 
also determined which unions had formal coverage rights for representation in Buildo 
Australia. 
Summing up, the compensation systems for Buildo Australia could be seen as a 
combination of a history of following awards, a new desire to design systems to suit 
local circumstances, and an acceptance of the control systems of the steel sector head 
office at the top end. The company was fortunate that because of its specialist nature, 
it only had one union to deal with and so had historically only used the Metal 
Industry Award as the basis for industrial pay. The change in legislation and AIRC 
decisions had opened up the opportunity for an enterprise agreement to supplement 
this. 
Buildo Singapore 
Company Background of Buildo Singapore 
Buildo Singapore reported to the International Division of the corporate Buildo MNE 
through the Regional Manager for South-East Asia, a relationship which had operated 
since February 1992. Prior to this, it reported to one of Buildo's domestic divisions. 
Buildo Singapore was originally the result of an amalgamation of two British 
companies in 1952. On 1 July 1991, 50 per cent of the shares were taken up by 
Buildo Australia. At the time of this study, Buildo Singapore was thus half owned by 
a UK group and half by Buildo Australia. Each had four directors on the independent 
board. There was a shareholders' representative of the British group on the board as 
well, and one shareholders' representative from Buildo. The Managing Director 
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(MD) was an Australian expatriate from Buildo and was an International Division 
employee. The previous MD was on loan from another Australian company and was 
paid on local, rather than expatriate, rates. The management responsibility for the 
company rested with the British group, but the British realised that Asia was growing 
quickly, and placed a representative in Singapore. The Buildo International Division 
was regionalised. Buildo Singapore was 'looked after' by the South East Asia 
regional office, but the MD reported to the UK group. According to the manager 
interviewed, 'this arrangement is fairly complicated' in that the Singaporean MD also 
reported to a Buildo person in Singapore. However, the fact that the representative 
was based in Singapore rather than in Australia was perceived to be useful. 
The Buildo Singapore link with the corporate Buildo was somewhat unusual for the 
MNE, as it usually preferred to manage its operations with 100 per cent ownership. 
This had not had a major impact on the business as most of its raw materials did not 
come from Australia. However, the entry of the Buildo MNE into the company had 
helped expansion into Asia, because of Buildo's greater presence in the region. 
Buildo Singapore had a wholly owned subsidiary in Hong Kong. The 39 Hong Kong 
staff reported to the Singaporean Managing Director, as did another subsidiary, 
incorporated in June 1993 in Vietnam, which commenced production in March 1994. 
Two other companies competed with Buildo in Singapore, but it held 50 per cent of 
the market. The main market was Singapore, with a small percentage exported. The 
potential market was increasing, although it varied according to the state of the 
building and construction industry. The biggest change in the affiliate between 1992 
and 1995 was the greater emphasis on planning. The company devised a business 
plan which was dynamic. From this, it set goals and then reviewed the performance 
of departments. In the past, strategic business plans were 'one-off affairs that were 
ignored once written. The compensation systems were not yet part of the business 
plans, and there was no formal individual performance appraisal system. 
Departmental heads did their own assessment of their employees. 
Organisation of Buildo Singapore 
In 1992, Buildo Singapore had 229 staff, with 171 in the factory and 58 in 
administration. Its organisation structure is shown in Figure 9.5. 
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I Managing Director 
I  
I 	I 	I 	I 
General 	Works Manager 	Financial Controller Marketing 
Manager 	(Dept Staff 15 	(Dept Staff 12) 	Manager 
Hong Kong 	works Staff  171) (Staff 25) 
I 	 I 
Purchasing 	Sales 
Computer Sales/Production 
Personnel 	Engineering 
Accounts Technical Scheduling 
The Production Division of the Works Manager's Department was the largest, and 
included day and night foremen. In terms of skill levels, the technical and sales 
divisions employed engineering and draftspersons. Their job was to take drawings 
from the construction companies and to determine the wire mesh sizes required. The 
Works Manager was a mechanical engineer; the Marketing Manager (later Director) 
and Financial Controller were also very experienced and qualified Singaporeans. The 
shop floor staff were unskilled or semi-skilled and were trained in-house. Males 
consisted of about 70 per cent of the staff at Buildo Singapore. The office staff were 
mainly female. There were very few staff younger than 20 years of age and about 5 
per cent older than 50. 
By 1995, Buildo Singapore had grown considerably. The Works Manager's 
Department by then had 231 operatives and 19 office staff The Marketing Manager 
had become a director with an increased establishment of 29 staff. New expatriate 
Development and Product Managers, and a new HR Executive had joined the 
managerial team. 
Production Technology of Buildo Singapore 
The main product of Buildo Singapore was welded wire mesh sheets to reinforce 
concrete on construction sites with sizes manufactured to order. This was 95 per cent 
of the business. A smaller secondary product was welded galvanised mesh for 
industrial and commercial use. In 1992, the technology of the company was changing 
with the purchase of special machinery with computerised programs to produce tailor 
Figure 9.5 
Organisational Structure for Buildo Singapore as at 1992 
Board of 4 Buildo Directors (incl. M.D.) 
and 4 UK Directors and 2 shareholders' 
representatives 
Industrial 
Engineering 
Planning 
Production 
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made sizes. The production process started with mild steel wire rod in coils 
(purchased from a Singaporean company), drawing the wire down to size and then 
hardening it. The mesh was manufactured and then delivered to construction sites by 
a contracting delivery firm. Buildo was having to adjust to Just—in-Time methods in 
the construction industry. The computerised machines did not change the skills 
needed by the operators, as they mainly affected the systems. 
Mission and Objectives of Buildo Singapore 
The objectives of Buildo Singapore were to increase sales and remain the largest 
supplier in Asia. This was not easy, as there were ten suppliers of mesh in Malaysia 
which could import product into Singapore without tariffs. Exporting into Malaysia, 
however, incurred a 40 per cent tariff Apart from sales, service and innovation were 
other key goals. Buildo was therefore attempting to improve the 'tailor made' 
process of production, improve its service and its production planning to provide a 
bigger variety of heavy meshes on time. 
HRM/IR Organisation of Buildo Singapore 
Up to August 1995, the company was still not unionised, and the personnel policies 
resulted in high retention of staff The employees showed no motivation to join a 
union. Main conditions of service were included in an employees' handbook. The 
MD set the rules for general personnel policy. Until 1992, the HRM fimction was 
under the control of the Financial Controller and a personnel clerk did the 
administration. Between them, they handled recruitment, selection, staffing, training 
and pay. The previous MD stated that the corporate Buildo MNE had no influence 
on HRM systems in Singapore, but that this could change if he was replaced by a 
Buildo person. He was currently on loan to Buildo from another Australian company 
and returned to Australia in 1992. When the personnel clerk resigned, the new MD 
upgraded the position to 'FIR Executive' and employed a person who had had training 
in HRM. She had also undertaken formal courses with Build° N4NE in Australia in 
staff selection. 
All new operator employees had to work for a month on probation and were then 
confirmed. Staff employees had three months' probation. 	On confirmation, 
employees were entitled to sick pay, life insurance, and medical insurance. Buildo 
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referred to a staff (office) and factory (workers) distinction. There were many factory 
workers with more than 30 years of service. The additional employees were recruited 
from Malaysia, because no more Singaporeans were available. For these foreign 
workers, the company had to pay a levy of $S300 per month to the government plus a 
normal monthly salary. Buildo had to pay S$450 per month per foreign worker if 
foreigners consisted of more than 40 per cent of the total workforce. The CPF levy 
was not payable to or by these employees by the company if they were short-term. 
Although foreign workers were on the pay scales, they did not progress up the scales 
as far as the local staff because they were mainly temporary employees, and the pay 
structure was mainly built on length of service. In 1992, the retirement age was 55 
years, but employees were allowed to continue unofficially until age 60. By 1995, this 
had been officially increased to 60 years. 
Industrial Staff Compensation of Buildo Singapore 
In Buildo Singapore, four different compensation systems were operating: the 
expatriate, the management, the sales/technical/clerical, and the industrial. The 
industrial staff were paid on one of four grades (R4 being the lowest through to R1, 
the highest). R4 covered the machine assistants, whose main role was to carry 
materials. R3 was for fork lift drivers, R2, machine operators and R1, leading hands 
and fabrication machine operators. Daily rates were increased after one month's 
service and then for every subsequent year of service. The pay matrix showed that 
after 20 years, this could result in about 50 per cent extra pay per day. 
Base pay was paid fortnightly as was a productivity bonus, calculated for each 
department hourly, using standards and standard times for production. The 
productivity bonus worked out at approximately 50 per cent of base pay. For 
example, in 1992, a new factory employee (R4) would start at S$20.03 per day, but 
make an additional S$10 bonus per day. More senior staff could gain an additional 55 
per cent of base pay. 'The bonus is definitely an incentive. They like bonuses and 
understand how they work', said the MD. Employees would cover each other during 
breaks to ensure the production levels did not drop. 
In the factory, the company had certain standards for certain types of mesh. For 
example, Buildo paid a much higher percentage of total pay for high levels of work. 
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To illustrate, in 1992, the basic rate might be S$21.03 per day for a 65 per cent 
performance. This would be the lowest rate for a machine assistant under the grade 
for RG1 after three months' service. For a 65 per cent performance per hour (about 
average for the factory), the person would earn another $1.64 per hour incentive 
making a total of S$13.12 incentive per day plus travelling allowance, plus shift 
allowance. 
Factory staff also received the AWS (13th month). In some companies, this was paid 
at Chinese New Year. In Buildo, it was paid at Christmas. The fourth element of the 
pay package was a corporate bonus based on operating profit to all staff with more 
than one year's service. This usually consisted of about 2 per cent of profit before tax 
for the factory employees and 21/2 per cent for the office. The difference was because 
office staff were not paid overtime. The amounts were divided among employees. In 
1991 and 1992, factory employees were paid 4 months' bonus. The lead operators 
assessed all their subordinates, and if a person was contributing very well and was 
making a number of suggestions, they might receive an additional special bonus. 
The normal working hours for the Buildo factory employees were an 8-hour day for 
44 hours per week, but they could work a full day on Saturday every fortnight. 
Overtime was paid at time-and-a-half. Sundays double time and public holidays, triple 
time. Employees could work more than 73 hours per week with agreement of the 
government. The company was obliged to work an average of 70 hours per week 
because of the shortage of labour. Staff worked 2 x 12 hour shifts per day, with 8 
hour shifts on Saturday and Sundays. The view of the company was that employees 
liked overtime 'and would probably leave or get a second job' if overtime was cut. If 
the company experienced peak demand, 12 hour shifts might be worked on Sundays 
for 3-4 weeks. In 1991, the company was working a 7 day week for the whole year. 
The reason for the Buildo pay system for industrial staff was that in the early 1980s, 
pay increases were very high. Singapore experienced a recession in 1985, so no wage 
increases were paid in 1986 and 1987. Buildo adhered to the NWC guidelines and did 
its own survey of its catchment area in Singapore. If it found its wages were below 
market rate, it would increase the bonus element. The Buildo policy would be to 
increase base rate by 5-6 per cent and put the rest into the profit-share element. The 
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company paid its industrial staff a travelling allowance per day, the amount depending 
on zones in which employees lived. Shift allowances ($8 per shift) were paid, and 
holidays varied according to length of service. The commencing figure was 11 days 
rising to 15 days, with some long-serving employees receiving 20 days. 
As at 1995, the company was still using four grades, with rates calculated on a daily 
basis. The basis for compensation was still a base rate of which about 60 per cent was 
for salary and 40 per cent for production bonus. The system was reviewed regularly, 
especially if new technology was involved. The review of the production bonus was 
carried out by industrial engineers and a committee of employees to ensure fairness. 
The pay curve for the production bonus was very progressive and the employees 
could make a lot of money if they worked hard to exceed the standards. The AWS 
and the profit-share elements still applied. Buildo only paid one month of AWS (13th 
month), but the profit-share could be considerable. In 1993, 51/2 months salary was 
given as a bonus on average. The 8-hour day and 44-hour week also still operated. 
Overtime was still 11/2 times pay, with Sundays double time, but work on public 
holidays had been reduced to double time pay from triple. The company used 2 x 12 
hour shifts when demand was high, and overtime was organised on Saturdays and 
Sundays if necessary. 
The main thrust of the system was skill level, performance and market level. A 
movement from one grade to the next depended on service, training and competence. 
Commitment to the company was encouraged through possible deductions from the 
profit-share bonus for absence during the year. 
Clerical and Administrative Compensation of Buildo Singapore 
The clerical and administrative staff were paid on an individually negotiated salary 
basis. There was no formal structure or job evaluation, but the basis of pay was 
initially the job. The going market rate was therefore a major influence on pay. 
Compensation was reviewed annually based on length of service, increased 
responsibility and competence. The 40 or so clerical/administration people were paid 
at different rates. They worked 8.15 am — 5 pm for 5 days per week (no Saturdays), 
with a pay system of a base rate, AWS (13th month) and end-of-year bonus based on 
operating profit. In 1992, this was 41/2 months' pay. No productivity bonus was paid. 
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Overtime compensation was payable up to a pre-determined level of salary. 
However, the company could take into account the amount of overtime worked for 
no pay when assessing the end-of-year bonus for an individual. Holidays started at 14 
days rising to 20 with length of service. Uniforms were provided for female office 
staff A bus was provided to and from the local Mass Rapid Transit Station. 
The 'going rate' and length of service were the main considerations in salary decisions 
of more senior administrative employees. As a guide, in 1992, a qualified accountant 
would earn around S$3,000 per month, a credit controller (chasing payment for 
invoices) around S$2.550 per month and a secretary to a manager about S$2,260 per 
month. 
Sales and Technical Compensation of Buildo Singapore 
Sales staff were judged to have more responsibility than clerical staff, were therefore 
paid more and had salaries which rose faster. After a few years' experience, they 
were expected to be able to prepare a construction site program. Both sales and 
technical staff were paid on individually negotiated salaries at the going market rate 
based on the job to be done. There was no formal structure of job evaluation. Both 
types of staff got a base rate plus AWS and a bonus based on operating profit 
expressed in 'x' months pay. This might be adjusted by the amount of sick leave 
taken, but for staff was usually around 5-6 per cent of their pay. Overtime was 
worked and paid for when necessary. Consultants' surveys were used to ensure pay 
levels were in line with the market. 
There was no change in the basis of pay between 1992 and 1995 for Buildo 
employees. The bonuses based on operating profit were in the order of 5-6 per cent 
of profit in 1994 and 1995. The MD considered that this kept the salaries in line with 
market averages. The percentage bonus was translated into months of pay. Buildo 
budgeted for the expected profit and, if this was exceeded, the bonus curve went up 
very steeply. As the employees understood this, the MD believed this was very 
motivating. 
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Managerial Compensation of Buildo Singapore 
The management team was a combination of expatriates and local managers. The 
expatriates' (including the MD's) and three executives' salaries (Works Manager, 
Financial Controller and Marketing Director) were approved by the Buildo Singapore 
board. The other local managers' packages were negotiated individually with the 
Buildo Singapore MD. The local managers were paid on an individually negotiated 
salary at the market rate for the job to be done. Buildo Singapore at one stage used a 
major personnel consultancy to develop a structure and to do a survey of 35 
companies, but it found this to be unsatisfactory. The company thus did its own 
survey and also used the Singapore National Employers' Federation surveys of 
executive salaries as a guide. At the time of the first interviews, to prevent turnover, 
the company aimed to pay above the market average (percentile not disclosed by 
author by request) and provide a base salary (no overtime), the AWS and a bonus 
related to profit which could be of up to 6 months maximum. Cars were also 
purchased for senior managers. In 1992, the Works Manager, Marketing Manager 
and Financial Controller were on salaries which well exceeded S$100,000 per year. 
Salaries were kept confidential, but employees no doubt discussed them with each 
other, according to the interviewed manager. 
By 1995, the Managing Director said that surveys were still used to assist in 
determining the compensation for the four executives in the company (MD, Works 
Manager, Financial Controller and Marketing Director). The basis of pay was still the 
a basic sum plus the AWS and car, but the calculation of the bonus had changed since 
1992. Previously the bonus had been geared to profit, but the link was amended to 
individual key performance indicators (KPIs) which were set by the Managing 
Director. Each executive had different indicators. For example, the Works Manager 
had a KPI which covered lost time injuries and another which covered the delivery of 
the product. There was a matrix which attributed the company profit to the KPIs for 
each manager. The norm for bonus in 1995 was about 3 months' salary. The local 
executives were reviewed in January of each year. The MD's salary was reviewed by 
corporate Buildo MNE on 1 December each year. 
386 
Employee Benefits of Buildo Singapore 
Many employee benefits were common across the Buildo Singapore workforce and a 
number were unique to staff employees and board members. The common benefits 
were: 
*Annual leave 
'Compassionate leave 
*Death benefit 
•Hospital cover 
•Life insurance 
•Matemity leave 
*Medical benefit 
•Sick leave 
*Specialist surgical fees. 
Uniforms were provided to the operators, clerical, and technical staffs. Shift 
allowances and meal allowances were given to industrial employees only. Study 
leave, long service awards and funeral leave benefits were available to all non-board 
employees. Cars were provided to some managerial and executive board members, 
together with entertainment allowances, while lower-level staff could claim 
reimbursement for car use for business. There was no change in the benefits policy up 
to August 1995. The full profile is shown in Table 9.6. 
Relationship of Buildo Singapore to Corporate Head Office 
In 1992, the then Managing Director stated that the role of the corporate Buildo 
MINE in running the Singapore affiliate was 'minute'. He explained: 
There are one or two board meetings per year, and [corporate] Buildo likes to know what is 
going on through monthly reports. If [Buildo] want any changes, they would go through the 
British directors. 
However, the Singaporean Financial Controller had close links with the corporate 
Buildo MINE Finance Office. A corporate Buildo MINE manager agreed that the 
Singapore subsidiary was managed autonomously, but that there were some Buildo 
MINE policies that the corporate CEO in Australia liked implemented, such as high 
standards of occupational health and safety and concern for the environment. The 
former Managing Director, even though he was an Australian on loan from another 
Australian company, was deemed a locally hired person, so his salary was determined 
by the Buildo Singapore board, and he was paid as a local and not as an expatriate. 
His replacement was an Australian expatriate from the International Division of 
Buildo MNE whose package was fixed by the corporate head office of Buildo MNE 
in Australia and its South-East Asian regional office in conjunction with the Buildo 
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Table 9.6 
Employee Benefits Profile for Buildo Singapore as at 1995 
Industrial/ 
Blue Collar 
Unskilled 	Skilled 
Clerical/ 
Admin 
Sales/ 
Technical 
Professional/ 
Management 
Board 
Acting allowance J I 
Annual leave V V V I V J 
Attendance allowance 
Benefit for overseas assignments 
Business entertainment expenses J V J 
Cellular phones ./ 1 
Co-operative shares 
Compassionate leave J V I ./ V J 
Death benefit J V V I V V 
Dental treatment 
Early retirement schemes 
External/social recreational club 
membership 
J 
Festive loan/advance ../ J ../ ../ V 
Fixed monthly transport 
allowance 
I 
Free medical treatment/medicine I J 1 J ../ ../ 
Funeral leave benefit 1 V V I V 
Hospital ward benefit V 1 1 J V I 
Housing loan 
Housing renovation loan 
Insurance  
Laundry benefit 
Long service award 1 V J I V 
Long-term illness 
Machine allowance 
Marriage leave 
Maternity leave I 1 V I V J 
Meal allowance 1 I 
Medically board-out benefit 
Other loans 
Paternity leave 
Provision of car V I 
Reimbursement for use of own 
car on company business 
.1 V 
Retirement benefit (>CPF) 
[Singapore] 
Retrenchment benefit 
Service benefit 1 V V J J 
Shift allowance ./ V 
Sick leave 1 J 1 I 1 1 
Specialist surgical fee V V V I 
Study leave/benefit ./ 1 I I V 
reimbursement 
Transport benefit/allowance/  
Uniform V 1 I I 
Union day leave 
Union education leave 
Unpaid leave 
Voluntary resignation benefit 
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Singapore Board. A recommendation was made to the Regional Manager who 
considered the consistency of packages for his staff and the level of the market. In the 
Australian corporate Buildo head office, there was a simple grade system to record 
the numbers of staff operating at high levels of the company overseas. Stated the 
MD: 
There is no involvement by [corporate Buildo MNE] in the running of [Build° Singapore] 
except that [Buildo MNE] will look at the executive pay to ensure that that it fits into their 
systems. 
The local Buildo Singapore board, however, gave the final approval for the executive 
pay. The affiliate MD spoke of his preference for running the company in an 
autonomous way, but had to tolerate 'the seagulls' visit' from Australia and the UK 
twice a year. 
The Profile for Buildo Singapore Compensation 
Three occupational groups were chosen for comparison between Buildo Australia and 
Buildo Singapore. The Gomez-Mejia and Balldn (1992) Algorithmic and Experiential 
profiles for the industrial, clerical (staff) and managerial compensation in Buildo 
Singapore were shown in Tables 9.2 to 9.4. The operatives in Buildo Singapore 
(Table 9.2) were paid for the skill and could progress through the grades according to 
the machines they could operate. The total performance of the operative team was 
rewarded with productivity bonuses, but there was also strong emphasis on length of 
service which was assumed to be linked with skill. In general, therefore, while there 
were some important Algorithmic elements in the compensation system, the 
operatives' wage scheme was mainly Experiential in focus. 
The staff compensation (Table 9.3) was mainly job-based with increases being mainly 
based on tenure. The level of performance measurement was individual and aggregate 
(through the distribution of operating profits), and the time orientation was short-
term. By contrast with the operatives, the staff compensation tended to have more 
Algorithmic features and a more informal approach. 
The top management compensation (Table 9.4) was initially job based with KPIs 
demonstrating the need to contribute. This moved the focus to individual 
performance against pre-set standards. The risk element in the pay could be high and 
the strategic focus was on the subsidiary only. The compensation pattern for the top 
'I 00 
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management was more a balance between Algorithmic and Experiential aspects with 
the Algorithmic features slightly more dominant. 
Buildo Singapore Compensation and the External Environment 
Moving now to the external environment of Buildo Singapore, the perception of the 
MD in 1992 to the effect of legislation on the design of compensation systems was 
similar to that of the Singaporean interviewees in all the cases so far discussed in that 
legal requirements had to be observed. Employment legislation was quoted as 
affecting the CPF contributions, holidays, public holidays, sick leave, workers' 
compensation and other areas covered by the provisions of the Employment Act. He 
continued: 
A company has to advise the government about the earnings of staff and the civil service has 
the power to check the pay records of employees and the rates and numbers of foreign 
employees employed. 
The growth of the economy and the tightness of the labour market were perceived as 
big problems because of their inflationary effects. 
We can only put Malaysian workers in the factories—not Thais. Office workers are a 
problem too because their starting salaries are so inflated. 
The nature of the labour market had more significance for levels of pay than for 
structure although the NWC guidelines were taken into account in designing pay 
systems and fixing levels because 'we have to be careful as a foreign owned 
company', said the MD. Nevertheless, the labour market was 'the main driving force 
in pay policy along with the NWC'. 
According to the Managing Director in 1995, the compensation philosophy was to 
'pay better than average to retain staff'. Buildo Singapore used a personnel 
consultant to assess staff pay in relation to the labour market, and to benchmark and 
evaluate jobs from time to time. If a job were found to be out line with the labour 
market, the rates would be increased to prevent labour turnover. All salaries and 
wages (except for those of the four executives) were reviewed on 1 July of each year. 
On another theme, the MD considered the NWC recommendations 'strange' in that 
Singapore was conscious about its costs in relation to the other NICs. A meeting of 
the Singapore National Employers' Federation,. National Trade Union Council and 
government representatives had tried to sell the idea that because Consumer Price 
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Index had gone up by 2.5 per cent, and productivity by 2.8 per cent, then pay rises 
should be restricted to 5 per cent. However, civil service employees were awarded 
5.5 per cent by the government, so Buildo increased its rates by the same percentage. 
On Singaporean culture, he stated: 
We don't do anything differently in Singapore, but the workers on the shop floor will do 
dirtier work than in Australia. We have had only one back injury in 5 years and no workers' 
compensation injury claims. Women lift mesh here, which they wouldn't do in Australia. 
Attitude to attending work is greater in Singapore. People are trying to better themselves. 
There is a bigger range of pay from shop floor to management, but if you don't work, you 
don't get paid. 
The replacement MD in 1995 also reflected on the attitude of employees to money 
and motivation. He said 'everything is the dollar here; the staff like incentives'. He 
recounted the anecdote of the long-service award being a choice of a watch or a gold 
bar. Employees usually preferred gold bars but did not want them inscribed with their 
names as they could be resold immediately afterwards. He refused to comply with 
their requests. 
Table 9.7 shows how closely the Hodgetts and Luthans (1993b) recommendations for 
compensation for the cultural dimensions for Singapore, as found by Hofstede (1980), 
were supported in the compensation schemes of Buildo Singapore. With the 
industrial staff compensation, there is a reasonably close conformity with the 
Hodgetts and Luthans recommendations. The structure was very hierarchical, with a 
wide dispersion of rates, and was thus suitable for a high Power Distance culture. 
The bonuses were departmental or plant-wide and were apt for the low Individualism 
culture of Singapore (Hofstede, 1980). Length of service was suitably dominant, 
although the emphasis on performance was very strong as well — appropriate for 
weak Uncertainty Avoidance. The following of the clerical compensation of the 
recommendations was not quite so strong, as there was no clear hierarchical pay 
structure recommended for a high Power Distance society With the focus more on 
individual rather than group incentives for the managerial employees, the pay 
recommendations for the Singaporean culture were only partly observed. It could be 
argued that the need to make the managers individually accountable for contribution 
to profits overrode the need to conform entirely to cultural fit. 
Table 9.7 
The Hodgetts and Luthans (H&L) Recommendations for Compensation in Singapore as Reflected by Buildo Singapore 
SINGAPORE 
Hofstede Dimension 
Index 
H&L Recommended 
Compensation 
Industrial Staff 
Compensation 
Clerical & Admin Staff 
Compensation 
Managerial 
Compensation 
1. High Power Distances • Hierarchical compensation 
strategy 
• Pay and benefits tied to 
place in structure 
• Large salary gaps between 
lowest and highest paid 
Yes 
Yes for company 
Yes 
Not for this category 
Yes for company 
Unknown for clerical pay 
No 
Yes 
Unknown for managers, but 
Yes for company 
2. Low Individualism • Group compensation plans 
• Seniority-based pay 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
3. Moderately low Masculinity • Many family benefit 
• Quality of worklife emphasis 
• No gender pay differences 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
4. Weak Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
• Emphasis on performance 
• Sharing of risks associated 
with MNE's success or failure 
• Competitive salaries to 
avoid poaching of staff 
• Decentralised pay policies 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No(I) 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Now 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Now 
Supported Y (Yes) 
Not Supported N (No) 
Y = 9 
N = 3 
Y = 7 
N = 4 
Unknown = 1 
Y = 6 
N = 6 
Unknown = 1 
Note: (1) Taken to meand decentralisation within Buildo Singapore rather than within the whole MNE 
Medium-sized 
Batch manufacturing 
Relatively simple machine technology 
No plant HR specialist 
Unionised shop-floor staff 
Medium-sized 
Batch manufacturing 
Relatively simple machine technology 
Plant HR specialist 
Non-union plant 
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Arguably some other external and internal environmental elements also affected the 
design of pay in Buildo Singapore. The subsidiary operated within the South East 
Asian region in highly competitive markets, some of which had tariff barriers. 
Product demand depended on the state of the construction industry. The technology 
of both Buildo Australia and Buildo Singapore, which was not fast-changing, was 
similar as both affiliates were batch producers. Paying for skill and on the number of 
machines that could be operated was a major factor in the pay design for the 
operators, and with about 170 staff in the factory, some formalisation of 
compensation systems incorporating performance and length of service was necessary. 
Bonuses for meeting production targets were in force for both operators and some 
managers. 
Differences and Similarities in Buildo Australia and Buildo Singapore 
Compensation 
Table 9.8 summarises the main similarities and differences in the compensation for 
Buildo Australia and Buildo Singapore. 
Table 9.8 
Comparison of Compensation Systems in Buildo Australia and Buildo 
Singapore 
Buildo Australia 	 Buildo Singapore 
General Organisational Factors 
Gener al Compensation Features 
Hay grades for senior staff 
	
Individually negotiated senior salaries 
Six grade structure for staff positions 	No structure for staff positions 
Enterprise agreement for shop-floor Management determined structure  
Industrial Compensation 
Experiential (5A*; 10E*; 1 A/E;2 unknown; 
1 not applicable) 
Skill-based pay supplementing award 
Plant-wide performance bonus 
AIRC ratified enterprise agreement 
No recognition for length of service 
3 award classifications for minimum salaries 
used 
H&L** recommendations? 7 yes;5 no; 1 partly 
Experiential (6A*;10E*;1A/E; 1 unknown; 
1 not applicable) 
Progression based on skill 
Department, AWS, and corporate bonus 
No collective agreement 
Annual increments for service 
4 grade structure and ranges 
H&L** recommendations? 9 yes;3 no 
Algorithmic (11A*; 4E*; 2 NE; 1 unknown; 
I not applicable) 
Job-based using modified job evaluation system 
Individual performance and overall pay review 
6 grade structure with salary ranges 
Share of plant-wide bonus based on shopfloor 
KPIs**** 
H&L** recommendations? 8 yes;4 no; 1 
unknown. 
Marginally Algorithmic (9A*;7 E*; 1 
unknown;2 not applicable) 
Job-based in relation to market rates 
Annual review based mainly on service 
No structure 
End of year bonus based on company profit 
H&L** recommendations? 7 yes; 4 no; 1 
unknown 
Algorithmic (10 A*; 6 E*; 2A/E; 1 unknown) 
Job-based with overall salary review 
Hay job evaluated structure 
Individual performance appraisal against 
objectives 
Share of plant-wide bonus ba cftd on !CPIs for 
shop-floor 
H&L**recommendations? 8 yes; 3 no; 1 
unknown. 
Marginally Algorithmic (10 A*; 8 E*; 
1 unknown) 
Mainly job-based against market rates 
Individual negotiation and no structure 
Individual performance appraisal against 
individual ICPIs 
Share of company profit based on individual 
performance 
H&L**recommendations? 6 yes; 6 no; 1 
unknown. 
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Clerical Compensation 
Managerial Compensation*** 
Notes:* A is Algorithmic. E is Experiential. A/E is Algorithmic/Experiential. As used in the Gomez-Melia and Balkin (1992:61) 
Summary Profile of Experiential and Algorithmic Compensation Patterns. ** H&L is Hodgetts and Luthans (1993b)** H&L is 
Hodgetts and Luthans (1993b) *** Excludes expatriate staff ****Key Performance Indicators 
Included in Table 9.8 are the total number of Algorithmic and Experiential features 
for each of the compensation systems in Buildo Australia and Singapore extracted 
from Tables 9.2, 9.3 and 9.4. As in the previous two chapters, to ensure a more 
overall valid comparison of the Algorithmic (A) and Experiential (E) patterns in the 
affiliates, the comparison can be restricted to only those common compensation 
features for which data were available and applicable in both subsidiaries. The results 
are shown in Table 9.9. 
Table 9.9 
Total of Algorithmic (A) and Experiential (E) Compensation Features for 
Buildo Australia and Buildo Singapore as at 1995 — Selected Common Features 
Only 
Number of Algorithmic(A)/Experiential(E) Features 
Buildo Australia Buildo Singapore 
Industrial 5A 10 E 1 A/E 5A 10 E 1 A/E 
Clerical 11 A 3E 2 AJE 9A 7E 0 A/E 
Managerial 10 A 6E 2 A/E 10 A 8E 0 A/E 
Restricting the Algorithmic and Experiential classifications only to those selected 
common features for which data were obtainable and applicable for both affiliates, 
Common Benefits for all Occupations 
in Both Subsidiaries 
Annual leave 
Compassionate leave 
Death benefit 
Long service award 
Maternity leave 
Sick leave 
Study leave/benefit 
CPF or superannuation 
Benefits Unique to Buildo Singapore 
Acting allowance 
Festive loan/advance (all staff) 
Free medical treatment/medicine (industrial) 
Funeral leave benefit (all staff) 
Hospital ward benefit (all staff) 
Life insurance (all staff) 
Service benefit (all staff) 
Specialist surgical fee (industrial) 
Transport allowance (all staff) 
Uniform (clerical/admin., sales/tech) 
Additional Common Benefits for 
Industrial Employees Only in Both 
Subsidiaries 
Meal allowance 
Shift allowance 
Uniforms 
Additional Common Benefits for 
ClericaUAdmin, Sales/Tech and 
Professional/Managerial* Only in 
Both Subsidiaries 
Free medical treatment /medicine 
Company car (for sales and managerial only) 
Additional Common Benefits for 
Management* Only in Both 
Subsidiaries 
Business entertainment expenses 
Benefits Unique to Buildo Australia 
Dental treatment (clerical/admin., sales/tech.., 
Professional/managerial*) 
Long-term illness (industrial) 
Paternity leave (all staff) 
Retrenchment benefit (all staff) 
Union education leave (industrial) ) 
Unpaid leave (clerical/admin., sales/tech., and 
Professional /managerial*) 
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Table 9.9 indicates predominantly Algorithmic compensation patterns for the clerical 
and managerial pay systems in Buildo Australia, and marginally Algorithmic profiles 
for the same staff in Buildo Singapore. The compensation patterns for industrial 
employees in Australia and Singapore were both Experiential. The overall patterns 
for all three compensation systems for both affiliates given in Table 9.8 are therefore 
similar to those in Table 9.9 and will be re-examined in a later chapter. As noted 
earlier, this is not say each pair of compensation elements taken individually was the 
same in both subsidiaries. The differences and similarities between the employer 
benefits of Buildo Australia and Buildo Singapore are shown in Table 9.10. 
Table 9.10 
Common and Unique Benefits in Buildo Australia and Buildo Singapore 
Notes:* Excludes expatriates 
In relation to the research questions of this study, some differences in compensation 
design between the two affiliates can arguably be attributed to differences in the 
respective external environments. For the operating staff; the Employment Act 
specified minima for Buildo Singapore, and the Metal Industry Award did the same 
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for Buildo Australia. The Singaporean affiliate had to pay the Annual Wage 
Supplement (13th month), but could design any system it pleased. The Australian 
company was constrained by the Metal Industry Award for some conditions, but once 
the industrial relations climate and legislation changed and encouraged enterprise 
agreements, Buildo took advantage of this. 
The state of the economy and the labour market had more effect on levels of pay than 
on the operators' compensation structure. This was particularly the case in the tight 
labour market for unskilled and semi-skilled staff in Singapore at that time. In boom 
situations in Australia, Buildo Australia had the option of paying more than award 
wages if necessary to attract staff Decisions of the NWC (in Singapore) and the 
AIRC NWC (in Australia)—decisions that are largely based on economic data—
affected both affiliates. The ARC still determined the award pay and conditions in 
the Metal Industry Award which Buildo Australia implemented. The Australian 
Government's Accord with the unions introduced more certainty of future pay rises 
for Buildo Australia. The NWC in Singapore no longer recommended quantum 
amounts, so the company used the civil service as its guide_ However, it followed the 
recommendations of the NWC in making its pay system more flexible since the mid-
1980s. 
In relation to national culture and the operators' compensation, neither subsidiary 
opted for individual incentive schemes. In Singapore, one could argue that this fitted 
in more easily with the cultural avoidance of 'loss of face'. In Australia, this may 
have been more to do with Australian union movement's reluctance to support 
individual incentive schemes. 
We have seen that an argument can be put to link the operators' compensation to the 
Hofstede (1980) dimensions for national culture for Australia and Singapore. The 
wide range of pay in Buildo Singapore suited the high Power Distance in Singapore, 
as suggested by Hofstede (1980). The flatter compensation structure in Australia, 
based around the pay of the tradesperson, and the gain-sharing PIPS conformed with 
the Hodgetts and Luthans (1993b) recommendations for Australia's moderately lower 
Power Distance, but not with the high Individualism of Australian culture (Hofstede, 
1980). The long length of service scales met the needs of low Individualism in 
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Singapore, and the new reliance on plant-wide performance in Buildo Australia met 
the suggestions for a moderately weak Uncertainty Avoidance culture. Neither 
subsidiary had family-friendly employee benefits, which was more in tune with the 
moderately high Masculinity score for Australia than the moderately low score for 
Singapore. As posited before, it was doubtful whether the differences in the pay 
systems could be attributed directly to culture alone, as it was obvious that unions, 
custom and practice and legislation were all significant influences. 
One key difference between the two plants was that because the Australian site was 
unionised, the affiliate's compensation design becomes subject to union and tribunal 
ratification. Its enterprise incentive agreement (PEPS) was its own design negotiated 
with the unions. Buildo Singapore could stipulate its own structures to employees. 
Turning to staff pay systems, as both subsidiaries were non-unionised, they had more 
choice in compensation design. The legal environment was influential again through 
the minimum conditions of service set by the Employment Act in Singapore, the 
relevant awards in Australia, and the superannuation and CPF laws. The labour 
market was important to both subsidiaries in determining level of pay, but did not 
affect the structure. Both affiliates noted the conclusions of their respective NWC, 
and the composition of the compensation in Singapore followed the requests for more 
flexibility in the system. Buildo Australia's salary ranges were compared to market 
rates. In Buildo Singapore, clerical and administrative employees were rewarded 
more on length of service as well as market rates. 
Culturally, the weak Uncertainty Avoidance in Singapore found by Hofstede (1980) 
could arguably be reflected in the performance emphasis for staff employees; and the 
low Individualism in the seniority and plant-wide bonus for the staff In Australia, pay 
was linked to individual performance, which conformed to high Individualism and 
moderately weak Uncertainty Avoidance. The Hodgetts and Luthans (1993b) 
propositions for compensation design were partially supported for all three 
occupational levels studied in Buildo Australia, and for the industrial and clerical and 
administrative employees in Buildo Singapore. An equal number of pay features both 
conformed and failed to conform with the Hodgetts and Luthans (1993b) propositions 
for Singapore's culture. 
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The main difference in the managerial systems was that the staff in Buildo Australia 
were integrated into the national Hay job evaluation framework with the basis for pay 
being job size and performance. Pay-for-performance for managers was common in 
both affiliates, but there was no job evaluation in Singapore, and the market rates 
dominated. The external environment's other influence was the legislation requiring 
deductions (e.g. the CPF in Singapore, and the FBT and superannuation in the 
Australian affiliate). The labour market set the standard for general pay levels in both 
countries. 
Finally, we noted that many employee benefits for the operators in Buildo Australia 
were contained in the Metal Industry Award. The plant had to observe these as it was 
unionised, but had now moved away from the award as the main basis for payment. 
For all other staff, the company policy decided the benefits. In Singapore, apart from 
the requirements of the Employment Act, Buildo Singapore could determine its own 
benefits policy. For all staff, the common benefits in both affiliates were annual leave, 
compassionate leave, death benefit, long service awards, maternity leave, sick leave, 
study leave/benefit and either CPF contributions or superannuation. The unique 
benefits received by the Buildo Singapore employees were the result of the different 
health systems between the two countries. Buildo Australia had provision for long-
term illness and (previously free, but now contributory) health and dental insurance 
for its staff employees, while the Singaporean plant covered health and hospital needs 
for its staff employees as well. Provision of car and mobile phones seemed on a 
similar scale for managers in both companies. The Australian affiliate's employees 
had the opportunity to purchase Buildo MNE shares; the Singaporean plant 
employees did not have the same opportunity. 
It was mentioned earlier that Buildo Australia and Singapore produced very similar 
products and both were medium-sized plants. Nevertheless, some internal differences 
had a large impact on their compensation systems. The first was that by its 
geography, Buildo Australia had closer reporting relationships to the Building and 
Industrial Products Division of the steel business and was 100 per cent owned by the 
Australian corporate Buildo MNE. This meant that the corporate MNE applied some 
common FIRM policies to its subsidiary in Australia. By contrast, as Buildo 
Singapore was only 50 per cent Australian owned, the other partner had some say in 
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the salaries of executives. The other difference was the unionisation of the Australian 
site which immediately meant that management had to work with the award and 
industrial tribunal system. 
As noted earlier, there was more involvement from head office in both plants in the 
compensation of managers than for lower level employees. Buildo Australia's steel 
sector head had an ethnocentric orientation to managerial pay structures in Australia, 
but the corporate MNE head office only sought standardisation of superannuation, 
health insurance and employee share plans. For Buildo Singapore, the Buildo 
corporate MNE head office controlled the Australian expatriate's compensation 
through its international Division in conjunction with the regional office and local 
board, but was polycentric in orientation in relation to the rest of the managerial staff 
and the non-managerial employee compensation. 
Conclusion 
After three case studies, some replication of findings is occurring that will assist in 
developing an explanatory framework and set of propositions. The first finding is that 
each of the subsidiaries analysed so far had more than one separate compensation 
system. Buildo Australia had three compensation systems and Buildo Singapore had 
four systems. Second, despite operating in the same macro environments, the pay 
systems varied within the same country as well as between countries, as was the case 
in Buildo. This would suggest that the external environment is not the sole 
determinant of compensation and that management in a host or home country can use 
some discretion in the design of its systems. Thus in Buildo Australia, the operators 
were subject to a type of indexed gain-sharing system whereas Oilco Australia and 
Foodco Australia had skill-based structures without incentives. Similarly, in 
Singapore, Oilco Singapore and Foodco Singapore had operators' structures 
incorporated in collective agreements while Buildo Singapore had its own non-union 
design. Applying the Gomez-Mejia and Balkin (1992) Algorithmic and Experiential 
pay patterns to display clusters of pay decisions, within Oilco Australia, Foodco 
Australia and Buildo Australia, Algorithmic pay patterns dominated compared with 
more mixed profiles across the respective Singaporean affiliates. 
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From the findings, it has also emerged that each element of the external environment 
may affect each feature of compensation in different ways. Some external elements 
may allow no discretion to affiliate management whereas others may allow wide 
scope. An example is the legislation for the CPF in Singapore and FBT in Australia 
which imposes mandatory payments on the employer. In contrast, legislation or 
awards stipulating minimum conditions may allow the subsidiary to exceed these 
standards if it so desires. The third pattern emanating is that it is usually the structure 
and level of managerial compensation (as opposed to other occupational categories) 
where the discretion of the affiliate may be curbed by the involvement of the 
corporate MNE head office (like the Oilco managerial structures), the divisional head 
office (Buildo Australia steel division) and/or regional head office (Foodco Singapore 
and Buildo Singapore). The involvement ranges from administering expatriate pay 
systems, to imposing a particular structure or approving levels of individuals' pay. 
This is due to the international orientation of the head office and preference for 
standardisation and replication of pay systems. All cases display MNE integration and 
differentiation of pay systems with high degrees of affiliate autonomy for non-
managerial compensation. 
In relation to the initial research questions in Chapter 4, it is apparent that, as 
mentioned above, legislation can provide a constraint on the subsidiary, but changes in 
industrial relations laws may also provide an opportunity for an affiliate to pursue a 
different compensation system as was the case in Oilco Australia and Buildo 
Australia. The macroeconomic environment has an influence on the product market 
for an MINE, but in relation to compensation design, the interviewees discussed the 
impact of the labour markets on levels of pay and the extent to which they would 
implement recommendations, principles and decisions of National Wages Council 
(Singapore) and the AIRC National Wages Cases (Australia) in pay levels and 
structures. Recognised unions in the affiliates also used these recommendations in 
their negotiating strategy (Foodco Singapore). With expatriates excluded, a 
subsidiary interacts with a set of local and national labour markets for its staff, and has 
to adopt strategies to attract and retain host country employees. Expatriates in Oilco 
Singapore and Australia, Foodco Singapore and Buildo Singapore only appeared 
affected by host country taxation laws and by the cost of living in the host country as 
these affected their allowances. 
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From the three cases, national culture could not explain all differences in 
compensation design in the affiliates. Interviewed Buildo managers had difficulty in 
making a direct link between national culture and compensation design and tended to 
speak in more general terms. However, the testing of the Hodgetts and Luthans 
(1993b) propositions for compensation in countries with particular cultural 
dimensions (Hofstede, 1980) shows that the support from the three case findings so 
far has been very uneven. This would suggest that other variables are more significant 
although this is not to say that the other external variables, such as the industrial 
relations systems, are not affected by national culture as well. 
More conclusive as a determinant was the industrial relation systems of the two 
countries. Buildo Australia and Oilco Australia recognised unions and were therefore 
subject to awards and negotiated agreements that were ratified by the AlitC. By 
bargaining with unions, an industrial tribunal will assess the agreement against local 
host country rules, which will mean that MINE agreements will bear similarities to 
locally owned companies. Non-recognition of unions means that the MNE has 
theoretically more scope to design an agreement that may be more suited to 
facilitating its business goals, possibly the case for Buildo Singapore. 
The three cases so far have shown differences in employee benefits provided by the 
affiliates but have also indicated a high degree of similarity of provision. The 
differences can be attributed to differences in public health cover, leave legislation and 
national standard of conditions established by test cases by unions in Australia, as is 
the situation on Buildo. Organisational culture of the MNEs is arguably reflected in 
the high number of similar benefits in the respective affiliates of the same MINE. 
Finally, characteristics of an industry have been shown to be another important 
external variable for an MINE affiliate, and these, in turn, may affect internal variables 
such as competitive strategy and HR policies. The competitive nature of the 
construction supplies industry meant that there was a strong focus in Buildo Australia 
and Buildo Singapore on achieving production deadlines, minimising costs and 
offering good service. These factors were included in incentive targets and standards. 
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The case studies so far have revealed the interaction of a number of the elements of 
the external environment, particularly legal and industrial relations (both countries), 
government and union structure (Singapore), economy and formal incomes policies 
(both countries). Moreover, internal variables possibly interact with external ones in 
MNE subsidiary compensation design. The size of the subsidiary may be correlated 
with the degree of formality in the pay systems. The redesign of compensation system 
may also be part of an overall change in HRM strategy and practices as was the 
situation in Oilco Australia. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
THE METALCO COMPANIES 
Metalco Australia 
Company Background of Metalco Australia 
Metalco Australia was a remotely situated smelting plant in the metals industry, the 
plant being one of three smelters around Australasia belonging to a metals processing 
and manufacturing company. Two-thirds of the shares in the processing company 
were owned by corporate MNE Metalco, which, in turn, recently merged with a 
major British mining MINE. The remaining one-third balance of shares was owned by 
financial institutions and the general public. The processing company had its own 
board, but corporate Metalco MINE had two directors sitting on it to provide the 
managerial link. The head offices of the metal processing company and the corporate 
Metalco MINE head were located in Melbourne. The company had four business units 
with a high degree of autonomy, and the smelting plant selected for study was part of 
one of these business units. Figure 10.1 shows the relationship. 
Figure 10.1 
Corporate MNE Metalco Relationship to Plant for Study 
Main Australian MNE with own board (corporate MNE Metalco), now merged with British MNE 
Metal processing and manufacturing company with own board 
(67 per owned by Australian MNE) 
Company divided into four operating business units 
1 
One business unit with 3 processing plants 
Selected processing plant for study (Metalco Australia) 
The smelter was built in 1955 and the corporate MNE Metalco bought it in 1961. It 
could produce more 120,000 tonnes of metal per year, an output that was then 
converted into a range of semi-finished goods at the metal company's other plants. In 
1994, output was trimmed to 90,000 tonnes per annum. The annual value of 
Metalco's products varied according to the prices on the London Metal Exchange, 
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and were also influenced by the mix of products, demand, and to a lesser extent, by 
fluctuations in exchange rates. 
Organisation of Metalco Australia 
Corporate MINE Metalco companies had a common structure of seven levels 
including the corporate MINE Managing Director (MD)/CEO. For its compensation 
system, the MNE allocated staff to one of 7 pay strata as follows: 
• Stratum 7- Corporate MNE Metalco MD/CEO. 
• Stratum 6- Corporate Group Executives in the corporate MNE head office 
who acted as a college with each responsible for a group of business units. 
• Stratum 5 - Managing Directors of business units. (There were 4 business 
units in the metal processing company) 
• Stratum 4 - General Managers who would usually manage an operating site. 
• Stratum 3 - Managers of Mutual Recognition Units (MRUs) or Principal Advisers. 
• Stratum 2- Superintendents. 
• Stratum 1- Supervisors, Clerical Staff, Tradespersons and Operators. 
Strata 1-5 were distinguished by the complexity and decision time span of the job. 
Each business unit had common strata. The theory of the Mutual Recognition Units 
(MRUs) was that the manager 'was able to recognise all the people in that unit', said 
a corporate MINE manager. The organisational structure for Metalco Australia was as 
follows: 
• Stratum 7- Corporate MNE Metalco MD/CEO, who was also chairman of the 
metal processing company 
• Stratum 6 - Group Executive responsible for group of business units including the metal 
processing company 
• Stratum 5 - Managing Director of Business Unit 
• Stratum 4 - General Manager, Metalco Australia plant 
• Stratum 3 - Managers of MRUs/Principal Advisers on the site 
• Stratum 2 - Superintendents of operational areas and specialists in staff roles 
• Stratum 1 - Some supervisors (although they were being phased out) and all award-
covered or equivalent individually contracted employees such as tradespersons, operators 
or clerical staff. 
The superintendents would eventually be the first line managers, as supervisors did 
not have the right to 'hire and fire'. At the end of 1992, the Metalco Australia plant 
had about 840 employees (500 operators, 100 mechanical and electrical 
tradespersons, 150 technical and service staff, 60 superintendents and supervisory, 20 
clerical and administrative and 12 managerial staff). By 1995, this number had 
declined to about 650 employees, of which about 440 were tradespersons and 
operators. The site did not employ sales and marketing staff, as these were 
centralised in the processing company's head office. The shopfloor was 
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predominantly male. There were only about 12 part-time staff; but casual personnel 
were used in service roles, and there was heavy use of contractors for maintenance 
and project work. 
The Metalco Australia operating process was divided into three MRUs (departments). 
In addition, there were support and service MRUs such as personnel, site services, 
administrative services (including finance), data processing, environmental health and 
safety and engineering services. An updating of technology in some areas of the plant 
in the late 1980s enabled the management to introduce a team and team leader 
structure which reported to superintendents, the supervisor role having been phased 
out in those areas. The site did not have a separate corporate philosophy, but the 
corporate MNE's culture would 'pervade into this', according to a General Manager. 
While Metalco Australia had its own TQM program, it was not very competitive by 
world standards. 
Production Technology of Metalco Australia 
The smelting process had three main stages: manufacture of product, conversion of 
one product to another and alloying and casting. The technology consisted of baking 
furnaces, potrooms to convert products into molten metal, and casting molten metal 
into solid forms such as ingots, billets and bars. It was thus very capital intensive, 
although not so intensive as mining. Two-thirds of the plant's output was sold in Asia 
and one-third in Europe. As mentioned earlier, the smelter was originally built in 
1955, and was taken over by Metalco in 1961. The upgrading of the current 
technology requires an investment exceeding A$400 million. 
Mission and Objectives of Metalco Australia 
As a mining company in the main, the Australian/British conglomerate MINE saw itself 
as a 'price taker', so its focus was on efficiency of operations, continuous 
improvement, new investment opportunities, and building 'enduring partnerships' 
with the people in the areas in which it operated. The corporate MNE Metalco goals 
included 'serving its customers better than its competitors ... , being world class in all 
its businesses and creating wealth which allows it to grow and provide satisfactory 
return for its shareholders'. It emphasised continuous improvement, safety, employee 
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involvement, single staff (i.e. white collar) status for each operating site and 
innovation. The Metalco Australia plant's main objective was generating the 
maximum possible amount of value-added products at the least cost. Quality and 
reliability of supply were also important. Unfortunately, the Metalco Australia plant 
had a somewhat 'brittle' industrial relations climate up to the early 1990s, with 
entrenched work practices and a high level of lost time injuries. The manager 
interviewed attributed the 'macho' culture partly to the uncertainty about the future of 
the plant. If operators went on strike in the past, there was an agreement to let the 
technical and managerial staff run the plant. Otherwise, it would have taken three 
months to resume operations. 
HFtM/IR Organisation of Metalco Australia 
In the Metalco Australia business plan, human resources were not highlighted as a 
separate fimction, tut some business unit objectives are of a human resource type', 
said a manager. Although the personnel philosophy was not in writing, FIRM policies 
at the plant were formally documented 'to ensure fair treatment'. Corporate MINE 
Metalco set MINE-wide organisation principles, but the manager continued that it was 
'a fine point as to whether Managing Directors (MD) have freedom to develop their 
own systems within the [Corporate MINE Metaleo] principles. [The MINE] may 
express principles but the MDs may have to "operationalise" them'. While the work 
of Elliott Jacques (1961) had influenced the company to structure on a 'strata' basis, 
corporate MINE Metalco did not use the 'time span of discretion' as the basis of job 
evaluation system for individual jobs. The MD of the metal processing company, of 
which the Metalco Australia plant was a part, was on the group executive of the 
MINE. He was advised of MINE-wide issues, according to another manager, and 
would have to abide by corporate MINE policies. 
Industrial relations in corporate MINE Metalco were driven by the individual 
companies. Each MD had the autonomy to set the industrial relations strategy for 
his/her own company, although an employee relations strategy document from 
corporate MNE Head Office discussed the principles of Freedom of Association, 
Employment Contracts, EEO and Occupational Health and Safety. The broad 
compensation system for the MINE was laid down by its head office, but the MD of 
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the processing company and his team were involved in the salary and performance 
guidelines for the individual business units and their plants. While the head office of 
the processing company had assisted greatly with the negotiation of enterprise 
flexibility agreements in Metalco Australia, the ultimate accountability was with the 
site's General Manager. 
There were only four corporate Australian MINE head office advisers, specialising in 
compensation, employee relations, employee policy and planning, and superannuation. 
The employee relations skills were with the business unit management, which was not 
required to get advice from corporate head office. Each operating company had to 
develop its own HRM policies and practices to suit its own circumstances. The FIRM 
department of the headquarters of the metal processing company had four HRM/TR 
specialists in areas that included payroll, occupational health and safety, as well as 
employee relations. The Personnel Department at the Metalco Australia plant for 
study consisted of a Principal Personnel Adviser paid at Stratum 3, three people in 
Stratum 2 (1 each in employee relations, training and staffing) and two people in 
Stratum 1. The personnel unit was not large, and the MRUs had their own training 
people. Much of the personnel function had been delegated to the line managers. 
There were consultative committees for training, but not for negotiations over the pay 
systems. Past changes in the award had been negotiated between the trade union 
officials and the Stratum 2 Employee Relations staff. A HRM strategy for award staff 
was developed for the Metalco Australia plant in the early 1990s, its main thrust being 
to minimise the third party (trade union) role. The philosophy of the corporate MINE 
was that it was management's right to design systems and to work directly with the 
employees. 
Because of the pressures on cost cutting, Metalco Australia had to change its attitude 
towards work practices. There used to be a system of minimum manning, which 
could be misused to inflate total wages available to operators. When operators 
reported in sick, others would cover their absence with overtime, but 
'institutionalised' overtime decreased in recent years. The smelter worked 
continuously, 24 hours per day, 7 days per week. The working week for shift 
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operating staff was originally 7.00 am to 3.00 pm, 3.00 pm to 11.00 pm and 11.00 pm 
to 7.00 am on a 40 hours per week basis. Day operating employees worked 38 hours 
per week. From August 1994, the site moved to 12-hour shifts and 40-hour weeks 
for day workers and 42-hour weeks for shiftworkers. Day staff and management 
nominally worked between the hours of 8.00 am and 5.00 pm but 'put in whatever 
hours are necessary', said the site ER manager. There was an expectation that people 
would work overtime without being paid extra. 
Unionisation of Metalco Australia 
At the beginning of the 1990s, union membership of the blue collar and clerical staff at 
the Metalco Australia site was about 90 per cent, but the plant changed its attitude 
towards unions and ceased the check-off system for one union in 1991 and for two 
others in 1992. The three main unions — the then called Federation of Industrial, 
Manufacturing and Engineering Employees (FIMEE), Electrical Trades Union, and 
Metal and Engineering Workers' Union — applied to the AIRC to have a union 
preference clause inserted into the enterprise award in 1992, but this was rejected by 
the AlRC on the grounds that it would make HR_M too bureaucratic. Preference to 
unionists in selection, termination, promotion, training, annual leave and overtime also 
did not sit well with a competency-based pay system. Membership of unions became 
voluntary, and decreased to an estimated 25 per cent by 1995. The major trade union 
recognised for industrial staff was the (now called) Australian Workers' Union–FIME 
Amalgamated Union which covered 80 per cent of industrial employees. Two other 
Unions — the (now called) CEEEIPPASUA l and AFMEU2 — covered the remaining 
20 per cent. There were a few staff in the Australian Municipal, Administrative, 
Clerical and Services Union (AMACSU) (formerly Federated Clerks' Union of 
Australia). Shop stewards negotiated the awards and were involved in their 
restructuring. The negotiations occurred with one union at a time because the AWU-
FIME moved faster than other unions in the restructuring process. The smelting 
industry has traditionally had enterprise agreements, and shop stewards were 
recognised for negotiation purposes, but according to the executive interviewed, were 
becoming less so. Because of the move to staff status (individual contracts) for the 
1 CEEEIPPASUA stands for the Communication, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied 
Services Union of Australia. 
2 
AFMEU is the Automotive, Food, Metals and Engineering Union 
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operators and maintenance employees, there was no longer any formal negotiating 
. machinery. 
In 1992, Metalco Australia changed its industrial relations strategy and in attempting 
to develop an enterprise agreement, proposed that it be negotiated at the plant 
between employee representatives and management, with union representatives 
excluded from discussions. Not surprisingly, this suggestion was rejected by the 
unions After the 1993 cut-off date, Metalco Australia did offer major rises to the 
industrial employees in May 1995 if they agreed to sign individual staff contracts, 
which had the effect of excluding union involvement in determining their conditions. 
All but twelve employees signed the contracts, (a figure which had declined to two by 
September, 1996). The Industrial Relations Manager in the head office of the metal 
processing company was not aware of how many employees at Metalco Australia had 
remained in unions. There was only one union (AWU—FIME) delegate on the site. 
An Overview of the Compensation Systems in Metalco Australia 
The compensation system of Metalco Australia matched the 7-strata structure of the 
corporate Metalco MINE system. Stratum 1, which originally contained award-level 
staff, had a flexible range. The cut-off point between Strata 1 (award level) and 2 
(Superintendents) was left up to the business unit Managing Director. The 
compensation for Strata 3-7 across the corporate MINE Metalco was set by the 
corporate head office in Australia. Strata 2, 3 and 4 had two pay ranges in each, 
called A and B, which overlapped, with A being the lower. There was no overlap of 
salary between strata, and no common job evaluation scheme in the corporate MINE. 
If a new job was created, it was not immediately obvious what the pay should be, 
according to an executive interviewed. For a new managerial job, the manager once 
removed (Managing Director or General Manager) decided the appropriate stratum. 
For example, if a new Departmental Manager position was established, the Managing 
Director would have to decide if Stratum 3 pay was appropriate. If the position was 
lower than Departmental Manager level, then the General Manager would decide. 
The strata salary ranges were quite wide. Differences between strata and differences 
in work were quite easy to determine, but the pay bands within the strata were more 
difficult to handle. 
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At lower levels of the salary structure, there was more divergence in salaries. Stratum 
3 employees were deemed staff of a business unit, and their pay bands were 
determined by the corporate MNE Metalco. Selection and appointment to a pay band 
was a decision of the local manager and his or her superior, but Strata 4 and 5 were 
corporate head office decisions. Progression through the pay band was a decision of 
the business unit, but promotion beyond Stratum 3 had to be a corporate MNE head 
office decision. 
Guidelines from corporate MINE Metalco provided that all jobs should be in band A 
(the lower band of the strata) unless there were good reasons for choosing the upper 
level. Big operating roles usually went in band B; service and staff positions were 
usually placed in band A. The basis for decisions was the complexity of the work, and 
the dollar and immediacy of impact of decisions. For a new management position, 
(for example a 3B role), the new incumbent would probably have started at the 
bottom of the range and progressed through at a rate that reflected personal 
effectiveness. The company used five years as a benchmark for reasonable 
contribution and progression from the bottom to the top of the grade. A person who 
had significant experience could start higher up the band. The philosophy was, 
therefore, to pay for the role and not the person, but there was flexibility. It was 
possible to pay more than the job was worth to meet market demands and the 
appropriate person for the job. For Stratum 3 and upwards, corporate MINE Metalco 
Head Office decided the boundaries of strata based on the Consumer Price Index, 
average weekly earnings movements, and the perceived pay patterns in other 
companies. 
The boundaries of the strata were announced once a year after compensation data 
exchanges at the national Canberra Conference of Australian HRM specialists and the 
Mining Industry Conference. However, the corporate MNE HR representatives 
found it difficult to compare strata rates with other companies as the system was so 
different from 'normal' salary structures. The strata boundaries were decided by the 
corporate MINE Board executive committee. In addition to movements in average 
weekly earnings, global compensation trends and the company's capacity to pay were 
considered. There was some difficulty if some companies in the MNE group were 
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doing badly and some doing well. Because of the common structure, boundaries had 
to be set to accommodate all the companies, despite their performance. While the 
executive committee of the MNE set the general compensation increase in the strata 
structure, extra pay for merit was a local decision. The main compensation system 
was, therefore, largely centrally driven and imposed across the country. An MD of a 
group of business units could set Stratum 1 wage levels, but had to be careful not to 
compress supervisors' and superintendents' compensation relativities. In the last 
fifteen years, the major change had been to minimise the number of strata. The 
removal of overlapping boundaries was another major change. Prior to the strata 
system, the salary structure was basically a Hay system. 
Industrial Staff Compensation in Metalco Australia 
The pay philosophy for industrial staff moved from paying for the job/classification by 
way of a site federal award to paying for skill and performance on individual contracts 
against a backdrop of AIRC WC principles and a change in HRM strategy. Since 
the introduction of the strata structure, the operators and tradespersons had been paid 
in the Stratum 1 range. 
A 	From the time of the smelter's opening in 1955 until 1977, compensation for the 
industrial (blue collar) employees on the Metalco site had been determined by a 
succession of unregistered agreements. A site agreement was eventually registered 
with the AMC in 1977, and after many variations, was consolidated into another site 
federal award with 11 unions in 1983. This was a paid rates award (i.e. actual 
entitlements rather than minima) for the period commencing 1 April 1982. The award 
contained 62 fixed pay points covering nearly 120 different classifications or job titles. 
Leading hands received additional allowances according to the number of staff they 
supervised. Unapprenticed junior male employees from 16 to 18 years were rewarded 
according to age. Apprentices were paid a percentage of the tradesperson's rate for 
each year of apprenticeship. Special allowances were provided for working in 
confined spaces, and for high, hot and wet work sites. A service payment was made, 
and amounts ranged from 6 to 84 months pay according to length of service. The 
award spelt out the various types of leave provisions, overtime, shiftwork, and 
protective clothing conditions. 
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From 1983 to 1986, the rates in the award rose in line with the NWC indexation 
(inflation) decisions of the AMC and again in 1988 for progress on reforming work 
practices. By 1990, Metalco and the unions were still appearing before the AlRC for 
increases under NWC principles. The structure of the compensation was still based 
on more than 40 different fixed pay points and more than 60 job titles. Leading hands 
still received an allowance according to the number of staff supervised, and various 
increments were paid for service of more than six months. After conflict over new 
structures, the AIRC decided to arbitrate on the wage structure, and created a five-
level skill-based structure for smelter tradespeople. This was followed shortly 
afterwards by a five pay-level, skill-based structure for smelter operators. Length of 
service and A$8.50 per week tool allowances were absorbed into the new base rates. 
A matrix of skills was negotiated at the plant, and staff were given additional pay for 
extra skills. Special rates for dirty, wet, confined, high and hot work sites still 
prevailed in December 1991, and Metalco still had to negotiate with 10 unions. 
At the beginning of 1991, the company introduced an Overtime Incentive Scheme (to 
discourage the working of overtime) and a Performance Payment System for award 
staff A sum of about A$500 was given to employees as a bonus, depending on the 
number of points achieved in a performance appraisal system. Superintendents made 
decisions about the allocation of money based on criteria which were translated into 
points and then into money. Strictly speaking, these schemes, which continued to 
apply until May 1994, were in conflict with the paid rates nature of the site award and 
were subject to discussion by the AMC later. 
The AIRC NWC increase of April 1991 was passed on to the operators and trades 
people in January 1992, and allowances were also raised. In early 1992, the unions 
approached Metalco Australia about the negotiation of a certified enterprise 
agreement under the legislation existing at the time. However, the company 
management wished to negotiate directly with employees rather than with union 
officials, have a non-union agreement with the option of moving award employees on 
to staff (individual contract) conditions. As at 1993, Metalco Australia had not 
achieved this. 
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Clerical Compensation in Metalco Australia 
The clerical salaries for the Metalco Australia site were determined individually and 
were not based on job evaluation. In 1985, a federal clerical award was registered 
with the AlRC for all clerical staff in the metal processing company (including its head 
office) of which the plant for this study was one of its operating units. This award 
placed all clerical jobs into four grades, with Grade 1 being the highest and Grade 4 
the lowest. Grades 1 to 3 had salary ranges but no annual increments shown. Grade 
4, the commencing grade, had annual increments for the first 4 years of service plus 3 
possible salaries (Column A, B or C) according to job. For example, at Metalco 
Australia, a Filing Clerk would be paid on 4A, a Typist/Clerk on 4B and a 
Stenographer on 4C. An Accounts Clerk would be remunerated on Grade 3, a Key 
Punch Supervisor on Grade 2, and a Secretarial Supervisor on Grade 1. A pay-for-
age scale was included for employees aged 16 to 20. 
From 1985 to 1990, the salary levels were increased in line with the ALRC NWC 
recommendations. With the advent of the AIRC NWC 1987 Restructuring and 
Efficiency Principle, by which the AMC would only award pay increases if the parties 
to the award had agreed measures to improve efficiency at workplaces (e.g. multi-
slcilling, retraining, broad-banding and reduction of demarcation (jurisdictional) 
barriers), negotiations between the metal processing company and the former 
Federated Clerks' Union started at each processing site including Metalco Australia. 
The gains obtained by the company included replacing salary payment by cheque with 
electronic funds transfer into bank accounts, abolition of tea breaks, reduction of 
overtime, increased flexibility, and reduction in staffing levels. These met the AIRC 
NWC criteria in March 1988 and salary increases were awarded. The structure 
remained unchanged until 1990 and was enhanced by AIRC NWC recommended 
increases. 
In a March 1990 decision, the metal processing company and the (then) Federated 
Clerks' Union agreed to begin talks on award modernisation. By December 1990, the 
union had indicated that 'it was prepared to discuss all matters raised by employers 
and employees in an enterprise' with a view to encouraging enterprise agreements. In 
July 1992, the hours of work for clerical staff were 38 per week. Time off in lieu of 
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paid overtime could be granted where work was done outside normal working hours. 
Allowances were paid for shift work, and annual leave was 4 weeks after 12 months' 
service. There was also a push towards paying for skills. Metalco Australia 
introduced a training skills matrix, so secretarial staff could have a career path into 
administrative or computing jobs. The matrix identified particular skill levels and was 
unique to the Metalco Australia plant. Extra skills could be obtained on or off job 
through a Technical and Further Education college or in-house training. 
As at 1993, the original job-based 4-grade salary structure with a length of service 
provision for Grade 4 still operated. The classifications were determined by the AIRC 
and survived for a long period, while the levels were regularly raised in line with 
NWC recommendations. 
Administrative and Technical Compensation in Metalco Australia 
The Metalco Australia administrative and technical employees were allocated to 
operating or non-operating Mutual Recognition Units (MRUs). Engineers were in 
operating MRUs and included chemists, metallurgists, electrical engineers, materials 
engineers and some mechanical engineers. All these staff were employed under the 
corporate MNE Metalco compensation structure. Many of these employees were 
graduates who started as Stratum 1 and then moved to Stratum 2 over two or three 
years irrespective of their role, although this was constrained by the number of 
vacancies available. There was no fixed establishment in the company, and the 
number of graduates appointed was decided by the Managing Director and Site 
Manager. 
Staff were subject to a Personal Effectiveness Review and were given special training 
to give them experience in a number of roles over a two- or three-year period. In the 
operating areas, supervisors were in Stratum 1 and were paid more than the operators 
and tradespersons. There was no overtime pay or performance bonus at this level, 
although performance was recognised in the salary review. Some were on shift, but 
most graduates were day workers. No profit-sharing or gain-sharing plans applied. 
The philosophy of pay was, therefore, consistent with the corporate MINE Metalco 
compensation system. In some areas of management, the MINE provided guidelines 
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that local management could adapt for compensation determination. 	Local 
management could not change them radically because the system was centrally 
controlled. There was a potential under the group system to pay a premium over and 
above the grade, but this was separately recorded so that it did not roll into the rate 
for that job. Seniority reflected increasing experience and the ability to do more, but 
was not officially recognised with length-of-service increments. 
The administrative and technical employees were subject to the same appraisal 
process as that for the industrial and clerical employees. The Personal Effectiveness 
Review (PER) system was common in the metal processing company, and there was a 
right of appeal to the supervisor's manager. However, 'the PER's implementation 
was "patchy' across corporate MINE Metalco, said a manager. The system was fairly 
unstructured. The manager made decisions about salaries of subordinates within the 
strata and took a range of factors into account. In the Metalco Autralia plant, there 
was a 0-100 scale (performance assessment). A score of '30' was the limit of low 
acceptable performance, with '85' being a very good performance. A score of '85' to 
'100' would be considered outstanding. There was a mathematical formula to 
translate this score into a dollar change in salary. This was the 'first cut' in order to 
ensure managers were comparing like with like. The managers put up their lists 
together to show scores so that they could discuss comparability. In a sense, they 
were comparing 'apples and pears', stated a manager, and so the managerial meeting 
was a moderating process. In addition to the assessment factor, there was the general 
review of the levels of the strata, which were held at the corporate MNE head office. 
The performance appraisal (PA) score and the PER were related to the task 
assignment and business plan. Each person had major tasks through the year outlined 
and the extent to which objectives were achieved was reflected in the PA score. The 
way the work was done was really the basis for the PER. In other words, the PA 
score was the end point and the PER looked at the means. That, in theory, was the 
way it should have worked. 
In summary, for the administrative and technical staff, the size of the job determined 
the stratum for the pay range, while progression through the pay range depended on 
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merit and performance. The general level of the compensation system was decided at 
the corporate MINE head office. 
Managerial Compensation in Metalco Australia 
The corporate MINE compensation system of seven major strata which governed the 
managerial salary structure has already been discussed above. Under this system, 
plant general managers and principal advisers were on salaries in Strata 4 and 3 
respectively. There was no overlapping in the strata. In 2, 3 and 4, there were two 
pay bands — `A'(lower) and 'BV(higher) — which did overlap. 'A' was a range for 
support staff and 'B' was for operating or people management roles. The Metalco 
Australia General Manager in Stratum 4 was paid in the 'B' range as he was in charge 
of the whole operation. In Stratum 3, the 'A' range covered support and service roles 
such as personnel, administration and site services. Band 'B' in Stratum 3 was the 
basis of the pay for managers of the pot room, carbon and casting (i.e. the operating 
managers). A similar distinction applied in Stratum 2. The pay differentials were 
important, and have been preserved. There was no pay-for-performance other than 
for merit for Strata 3 and 4. 
Strata 3 and 4 staff were subject to the Personal Effective Review which was a form 
of pay-for-performance. The manager was judged not only on the quantitative 
output, but also on the way he or she went about the work (i.e. the process). The 
Business Planning process was completed in October each year. The context was set 
by Strata 6 and 7 staff The critical tasks for General Managers and Managing 
Directors were collected together in the business unit plans. This was also done for 
Stratum 2 and 3 (including the 1-111M staff) at the sites. The tasks were supposed to 
be written in terms of quality, quantity, resources and time although as one executive 
put it, 'what can you say about "x" tonnes?' The MINE was trying to encourage the 
writing of tasks in terms of systems identification and improvement instead of 
quantitative outcome measures. For example, if one wanted to increase the quality 
and purity of a metal, there should have been emphasis on the process which affected 
the purity. The pay for individuals in Strata 3 and 4 was secret. 
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The Stratum 4 employees were employed by a corporate MNE Metalco Services 
company. As mentioned earlier. Strata 3, 2 and 1 employees were employed by the 
business unit. This was important, because the Stratum 4 contract stated that an 
employee was assigned to a particular business unit and that the assignment could be 
changed at any time (e.g. an executive committee might have re-assigned someone to 
a different company). The employee had to accept this assignment or resign. If 
resignation occurred, no retrenchment benefit was paid. In other words, corporate 
staff had to go where they were sent. For employees on Strata 3, 2 and 1, their 
contracts nominated the business unit as their employer and these units had different 
practices for redundancy. If another role was offered to an employee and this was 
refused, the distinction between resignation or redundancy varied. This area was 
more confused. 
In summary, managerial compensation at Metalco Australia had to conform to the 
structure of the corporate MINE Metalco. The type of job determined the stratum in 
which it was placed, and its minimum and maximum pay ranges. Progression through 
the stratum was dependent on performance while the general level of the whole 
stratum structure was adjusted annually in line with market rates and the capacity of 
the MNE to pay. 
Employee Benefits in Metalco Australia 
The common benefits for all levels of staff at the Metalco Australia site were as 
follows: 
• Annual leave 
• Compassionate leave 
• Early retirement provision 
• Funeral leave 
• Maternity leave 
• Paternity leave 
• Provision of uniforms/overalls and other clothes 
• Public holidays 
• Reimbursement for business related travel 
• Retrenchment benefit 
• Share ownership 
• Sick leave 
• Study leave/benefit 
• Superannuation. 
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Under the site agreement for the industrial (unionised blue-collar) employees, 
additional benefits included in the award as at 1993 were: (1) Meals supplied or 
money given in lieu after working overtime, (2) Sick leave of 114 hours per year 
accumulating to a maximum of 65 weeks, and (3) Laundry allowance. In 1992, under 
the federal award for the Metalco Australia clerical staff, benefits in addition to the 
common list above included make-up pay for jury service, accumulated sick leave and 
adoption leave. 
Those on staff conditions were presumed to pay their own premiums for private 
medical cover. The corporate Metalco MINE then contributed to a scheme for 
supplementing the medical benefits of this cover for their employees and their families. 
Staff conditions also included membership of the corporate MINE superannuation 
scheme which had a life insurance element. In 1993, managers were entitled to long-
term illness leave at management discretion, personal life insurance (which was given 
to clerical and technical staff as well), housing loans, cars and business entertainment 
expenses. The Strata 3 and 4 employees received the appropriate car for their 
stratum. Managers in Stratum 3 got telephone rental paid, whereas the General 
Manager (in 4) had all his telephone rent and bills paid. Staff in Stratum 3 and below 
had little choice in their benefits except that Stratum 3 employees could chose the 
type of company car they desired. With Strata 4 staff, there was some choice of 
benefits, as the corporate MINE Metalco uses the total cost of employment as the way 
of calculating the manager's package. 
There were two forms of share-ownership schemes for staff Stratum 4 employees 
had access to the corporate MINE Metalco Executive Corporate Shareplan which had 
more options and no forced saving element. The rest of the staff had the option of 
purchasing shares at a set price and being members of the corporate MINE Group 
Employee Share Plan. They could divert some of their salary into an account which 
was used to buy these shares (i.e. a forced saving concept). There was no profit-
sharing scheme. 
The possibility of salary sacrifice for extra benefits in the company was emerging, but 
was on hold in 1992. Its implementation depended on whether or not the federal 
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government changed the tax rules, which might have affected the difference between 
company and personal levels of taxation. Salary sacrifice was applied to the provision 
for child-care for all staff. If staff were paying for child-care, they could ask Metalco 
to pay the fees from pre-tax salary. However, this was only tax efficient if someone 
was earning more than A$35,000 a year (in 1992). The benefits profile by employee 
category is shown in Table 10.1 from which it can be seen that several benefits were 
unique to management. 
Relationship of Metalco Australia to Corporate Head Office 
It will be recalled that the Metalco Australia operating unit was part of a metal 
processing company which had its head office in Melbourne, as did the headquarters 
of the corporate MINE Metalco. As noted earlier, the corporate MNE headquarters 
was thinly staffed and contained only four HRM/employee relations advisers for the 
whole MNE. They acted as internal consultants for the MNE sites in Australia and 
the United States, but the Managing Directors of the local business units ultimately 
made the final decisions. The corporate head office was involved in the general salary 
levels of the strata and senior appointment salaries. The plant ER manager confirmed 
that the site was fairly autonomous in its HRMAR and but that there was 'a heavy 
corporate influence on site'. The plant's management let corporate MINE head office 
know 'what is going on' and 'we get support from [corporate MINE Metalco] head 
office because of the size of the decisions'. The plant sent representatives to appear 
at the AIRC and could draw on 'resource support' from the corporate MINE and 
metal processing company head offices. The plant could manage its industrial 
relations in its own way, but it had to be consistent with the principles of the MNE. 
While compensation increases for staff needed metal processing company head office 
approval, the plant could decide increments for Stratum 1 staff on its own. The 
corporate MINE Metalco Superannuation Scheme and corporate medical benefits 
were administered from head office. The processing company group executive set the 
context for individual salary increases based on the performance of the plant. 
Information on salaries for smelters was collected by the processing company head 
office FIRM staff They monitored systems on the company's sites to get a consistent 
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Table 10.1 
Employee Benefits Profile for Metalco Australia as at 1993 
Industrial/ 
Blue Collar 
Unskilled 	Skilled 
Clerical/ 
Adtnin 
Sales/ 
Technical 
Professional/ 
Management 
Board 
Acting allowance 
Annual leave ../ ,/ I V V 
Attendance allowance 
Business entertainment expenses V V 
Cellular phones 
Co-operative shares V V V 
Compassionate leave I V I I V 
Dental treatment 
Early retirement schemes I V I V 1 
External/social recreational club 
membership 
Festive loan/advance 
Fixed monthly transport allowance 
Free medical treatment/medicine 
Funeral leave benefit if V V if V 
Hospital ward benefit (1) (1) (1) 
Housing loan V 
Housing renovation loan 
Laundry benefit 
Life insurance V V I 
Long service award I I V 
Long-term illness (2) (2) V 
Machine allowance 
Marriage leave 
Maternity leave I V V V V 
Meal allowance V I 
Medically board-out benefit 
Other loans V 
Paternity leave I I I V V 
Provision of car V V 
Reimbursement for use of own car 
on company business 
I V 
Retrenchment benefit V V I V V 
Service benefit 
Shift allowance V if 
Sick leave I I V V I 
Specialist surgical fee 
Study leave/benefit V V V V V 
Superannuation (Australia) if V I I V 
Transport benefit/allowance,/ 
reimbursement 
/(3) V (3) I (4) /(4) V (4) 
Uniform V V V V V 
Union day leave 
Union education leave 
Unpaid leave if I V 
Voluntary resignation benefit V V V V V 
Notes: 
(1) Some assistance with medical costs, but private medical insurance assumed. (2) Management discretion. 
(3) In some cases. (4) For business-related travel. 
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group approach. This included obtaining consistency on salary packaging, car policy 
and home loans. 
The Profile of Meta!co Australia Compensation 
In order to provide a comparison with Metalco Singapore, four occupational groups 
were selected, so Tables 10.2-10.5 show Metalco Australia's profile for the rewards 
of industrial, clerical, administrative/technical and managerial employees using the 
Gomez-Mejia and Balkin (1992) terminology of Algorithmic and Experiential 
compensation patterns. The industrial staff (Table 10.2) were originally paid for the 
job classification, then skill. The pay system had a short-term orientation, but some of 
the compensation was at risk on a small scale depending on individual performance. 
In summary, the industrial employee compensation showed a tendency towards 
Algorithmic features. 
A similar pattern emerged for the clerical employees (Table 10.3), who were paid by 
the metal processing company award on a job basis, with a salary range for grades 1— 
3. The criteria for pay progression within the range was performance and more 
recently on skill. The system was based on individual performance and was short-
term in focus. The existence of a metal processing company award ensured internal 
consistency. The clerical system thus showed stronger Algorithmic features than 
Experiential. 
The Metalco Australia administrative and technical compensation (Table 10.4) was 
essentially job-based within the corporate MNE Metalco strata system. Increases 
were a combination of strata rises and merit rises. The performance appraisal was 
individual, and the compensation short-term in perspective. In general, the 
administrative and technical pay system had a more Algorithmic than Experiential 
profile, with a high degree of centralisation of strata. 
The Metalco Australia compensation profile for managerial staff (Table 10.5) was, 
also, in general, an Algorithmic one. The compensation was essentially job—based 
with rises through merit and general increases in the pay strata. There was individual 
assessment, with a mixture of time orientations, low risk-taking and a plant focus. 
Table 10.2 
Summary Profile of Algorithmic (A), and Experiential (E) Compensation Patterns of Industrial Staff Compensation 
for Metalco Australia and Metalco Singapore as at 1993 
Metalco Australia Industrial Staff Metaleo Singapore Industrial Staff 
Compensation Feature A or E Compensation Feature A or E 
(a) Basis for Pay 
Skill - based 
A$500 performance bonus 
Individual PA (2) 
Annual PA 
Low - bonus only 
Not applicable 
Formal structure 
Differences in benefits 
Points PA and evaluation of skill 
E 
A/E (I) 
A 
A 
A 
- 
A 
A (3) 
A 
Job - based (5) 
Length of service for first 5 years 
Not applicable 
Annual company bonus 
Potential loss of annual company 	bonus 
Not applicable 
Matrix used plus market level 
Minor differences in benefits 
No PA-not applicable  
Unknown - but at least market rates 
Unknown - but at least market rates 
Profit sharing, but low percentage 
Low future potential/ higher immediate pay offs 
Annual rises and bonuses 
Mainly pecuniary(6) 
<
 <
 	
¢ 	
<  ¢ < 
Unit of analysis 
Criteria for pay increases 
Level of performance measurement 
Time orientation 
Risk sharing 
Strategic focus 
Equity concern 
Reward distribution 
Type of control 
(b) Design Issues 
Unknown 
Unknown 
Low 
Low future potential/higher immediate payoffs 
NWC increases and annual merit awards 
Mainly pecuniary 
,
 , ¢
 ¢ ¢ 
Salary market policy 
Benefits market policy 
Incentives in pay mix 
Total compensation 
Reinforcement schedule 
Reward emphasis 
(c) Administrative Framework 
Plant agreement 
High - public AIRC document 
Union participation (4) 
Formalised in awards 
Own system (7) 
Low - individual salaries 
Non-union 
Scope for individual variation 
< <  
Decision making 
Pay disclosure 
Governance structure 
Nature of pay policies 
TOTAL A = 10 
E = 5 
A/E=1 
N/A=1 (8) 
UnIcnown=2 
TOTAL A = 9 
E = 4 
A/E= 1 
N/A=3 (8) 
Unknown=2 
Notes: (1) Pay increases were also given by National Wage Case awards. (2) PA is performance appraisal (3) These differences had been largely eliminated by 1996 because 
of the move to staff contracts. (4) Until move to staff status. (5) Pay was mainly based on job with market rate being important as well. (6) The General Manager did, however, 
refer to quality of life issues to retain staff. (7) Arguably this could be Algorithmic as the Regional Managing Director had to approve profit sharing levels. (8) Not applicable 
Table 10.3 
Summary Profile of Algorithmic (A) and Experiential (E) Compensation Patterns of Clerical Staff Compensation 
in Metalco Australia and Metalco Singapore as at 1993 
Metaleo Australia Clerical Staff Meta!co Singapore Clerical/Administrative Staff 
Compensation Feature A or E Compensation Feature A or E 
(a) Basis for Pay 
Job classification 
PA merit and NWC increases (1) 
Individual PA 
Annual PA 
No risk element 
Not applicable 
Business unit award structure 
Differences in benefits (3) 
Points PA 
<
  
<
 
Job classification (2) 
Tenure — no PA 
Not applicable 
Annual overall bonus and review 
Potential loss of annual company bonus 
Not applicable 
Mainly market driven 
Minor differences in benefits 
No PA 
< 	
LLI 	
<
 
Unit of analysis 
Criteria for pay increases 
Level of performance measurement 
Time orientation 
Risk sharing 
Strategic focus 
Equity concern 
Reward distribution 
Type of control 
(b) Design Issues 
Unknown 
Unknown 
None 
Low future potential/higher immediate payoffs 
Mainly merit and NWC increases only 
Pecuniary 
, Above market rates 
Unknown 
Profit sharing, but low percentage 	• 
Low future potential/higher immediate pay offs 
Annual rises and bonuses 
Mainly pecuniary 
< 	
< 
Salary market policy 
Benefits market policy 
Incentives in pay mix 
Total compensation 
Reinforcement schedule 
Reward emphasis
- 
(c) Administrative Framework 
Centralised company award 
High — public AIRC document 
Union participation 
Bureaucratic 
Own system (4) 
Low 
Non-union 
Case by Case 
1.1.) 	
<
  Lia 
Decision making 
Pay disclosure 
Governance structure 
Nature of pay policies 
TOTAL A = 12 
E = 3 
A/E=1 
U1K=2(5) 
N/A=1 (6) 
TOTAL A = 10 
E = 5 
U/K=1 (5) 
N/A=3 (6) 
Notes: (1) The introduction of staff status by 1996 had changed this more to skill and performance (2) Without formal systems and job descriptions, it 
could be argued that employees were paid for skills possessed as well. (3) The introduction of staff status in 1996 had reduced these differences in benefits 
markedly. (4) Arguably this could be Algorithmic as the Regional Managing Director had to approve profit sharing levels.(5) Unknown (6) Not applicable 
Table 10.4 
Summary Profile of Algorithmic (A) and Experiential (E) Compensation Patterns of Administrative, Technical and Sales Staff 
in Metalco Australia and Metalco Singapore as at 1993 
Metalco Australia Administrative and Technical Staff Metalco Australia Sales/ Technical Staff" ) 
Compensation Feature A or E Compensation Feature A or E 
(a) Basis for Pay 
Job placed in strata 
Adjustment of strata plus merit increase 
Individual performance appraisal 
Short-term 
Low — merit increase only 
Not applicable 
Formal structure 
Some extra benefits for managers 
Points performance appraisal system 
Job classification (2) 
Tenure — no performance appraisal 
Not applicable 
Annual overall bonus and review 
Potential loss of annual company bonus 
Not applicable 
Mainly market driven 
Only minor differences in benefits 
No performance appraisal 
<t
<
 . <
L1.1
 .
 w
w
 i 
Unit of analysis 
Criteria for pay increases 
Level of performance measurement 
Time orientation 
Risk sharing 
Strategic focus 
Equity concern 
Reward distribution 
Type of control 
(b)Design Issues 
Unknown, but external comparability is important 
Unknown, but external comparability is important 
None 
Low future potential/higher immediate payoffs 
Mainly merit and strata rises only 
Mainly pecuniary 
.
 . <
 < <  w 
Unknown 
Unknown 
Profit sharing, but low percentage 
Low future potential/ higher immediate pay offs 
Annual rises and bonuses 
Mainly pecuniary 
.
 
Salary market policy 
Benefits market policy 
Incentives in pay mix 
Total compensation 
Reinforcement schedule 
Reward emphasis 
(c) Administrative Framework 
Strata is central 
Individual pay confidential, but stratum known 
Centrally driven 
Formal strata 
<
  <
4
 <4 
Own system (3) 
Low 
Non-union 
Case by Case 
w
 <
 <  w
 
Decision making 
Pay disclosure 
Governance structure 
Nature of pay policies 
TOTAL A = 13 
A/E = 2 
N/A= 1 (4) 
WK=2(5) 
E = 1  
TOTAL A = 8 
E = 6 
U/K=2(5) 
Notes: (1) These classifications do not exactly match those in Metalco Australia. (2) Without formal systems and job descriptions, it could be argued that employees 
were paid for skills possessed as well. (3) Arguably this could be Algorithmic as the Regional Managing Director had to approve profit sharing levels.(4) Not applicable (5)Unknown 
Table 10.5 
Summary Profile of Algorithmic (A) and Experiential (E) Compensation Patterns of Managerial Staff 
in Metalco Australia and Metalco Singapore as at 1993 
Meta!co Australia Managerial Staff Metaleo Singapore Managerial Staff (1) 
Compensation Feature A or E Compensation Feature A or E 
(a) Basis for Pay 
Job in strata 
Adjustment of strata plus merit rise 
Individual performance appraisal 
Annual, and long term through shares for stratum 4 
Low — merit increase only 
Plant performance colours objectives 
Formal structure 
Some extra benefits for managers 
Individual objectives set in quantifiable form 
¢ 	
¢  
Job - based (2) 
Rises depended on performance and market 
Individual informal performance appraisal 
Annual review 
Loss of company bonus only 
Company/Business Unit performance 
Some relativities, but mainly market driven 
Managers received extra benefits 
Informal performance appraisal 
¢
w
¢
¢
w
w
 w
¢
w 
Unit of analysis 
Criteria for pay increases 
Level of performance measurement 
Time orientation 
Risk sharing 
Strategic focus 
Equity concern 
Reward distribution 
Type of control 
(b) Design Issues 
Unknown, but external comparability is important 
Unknown, but external comparability is important 
Merit rises only 
Low future potential/higher immediate payoffs 
Mainly merit and strata rises 
Mainly pecuniary 
, 	
< ¢
 
Unknown, but market worth important 
Unknown 
Profit sharing, but low percentage 
Low future potential/higher immediate payoffs 
Annual rises 
Mainly pecuniary 
<
 <
 ¢
 
Salary market policy 
Benefits market policy 
Incentives in pay mix 
Total compensation 
Reinforcement schedule 
Reward emphasis 
(c) Administrative Framework 
Centralised Strata 
Individual pay confidential; strata known 
Centrally driven 
Formal strata 
¢
 ¢
 
Own system (3) 
Confidential 
Non-union and regional input 
Flexible 
<  ¢
  
Decision making 
Pay disclosure 
Governance structure 
Nature of pay policies 
TOTAL A = 11 
A/E = 3 
E= 3 
U/K=2(4) 
TOTAL A = 9 
E = 8 
U/K=2(4) 
Notes: 
(1) Local managers (i.e. non-expatriate) only. (2) Without formal systems and job descriptions, it could be argued that employees were paid for skills possessed as well. 
(3) Arguably this could be Algorithmic as the Regional Managing Director had to approve profit sharing levels. (4) Unknown 
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Managers received different benefits from the rest of the workforce, an infrequent 
reinforcement schedule, and low risk compensation. The decision making on pay was 
very centralised within a formal structure. 
Metalco Australia Compensation and the External Environment 
Turning now to the influence of the external environment on compensation design at 
Metalco Australia and the law in particular, the corporate NINE Metalco 
Remuneration Manager emphasised that there was a clear corporate policy to observe 
any laws that applied to the company, but that these were a minimal standard only. 
She continued: 
I do not see the minimum wages in awards as a problem for us. The industry pays above the 
minimum, so it is not a driving force... On EEO, we have a conscious and publicly stated 
philosophy... It applies to both men and women, but we think it should apply to reducing 
closed shops... Each person should have an equal opportunity irrespective of union 
membership... We have pay equity for men and women for jobs we assume are of equal 
weight, but we don't have a highly analytical job evaluation scheme at managerial levels... 
We use salary sacrifice options to reduce income tax, but the company does not go out of its 
way to be clever because the law may change... Legislation on shares is an influence... There 
are a couple of share schemes... The first issue came in the 1988 crash. Employees bought a 
lot of shares and sold at a profit... But it depends on the way people understand the options... 
The business units in [Metalco] vary in the amount of share ownership. 
By comparison, the corporate Remuneration Manager said of other areas of law: 
Legislation on superannuation clearly is an influence... Also if we change to individual 
contracts, we'll have to change people from award 'super' to the [Metalco] Employees' 
Fund....FBT is a big thing for us.. There was a real issue in WA [Western Australia] with 
remote locations... Company housing was subject to FBT... The company tried to get the 
government to relieve this.... Therefore, it was a big thing... Salary sacrifice might be used to 
provide benefits.... One view is that we cash out all benefits and leave it to them to choose, as 
opposed to a philosophy of the company providing more and more.... Our philosophy is more 
towards individualism rather than paternalism. 
The Employee Relations Manager of the Metalco Processing Company agreed that 
the difference between personal income tax and FBT affected salary packaging, but 
the company watched what its competitors were offering. It observed the trend of the 
labour markets. Share ownership had been important to the MINE Metalco group and 
employees participated in the Metalco share schemes. While salary packaging had 
became less cost effective through FBT, general salaries were still performance-driven 
at work places. The social security system in Australia was not an influence or 
constraint on the compensation system, but the legislation on superannuation certainly 
was. Metalco had to observe the legislation on this as far as company contributions 
were concerned. 
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In relation to the effect of the economy on pay design, the view of the two corporate 
managers interviewed was that the company was competing in world markets, so the 
growth rates in Japan and the United States were very important. The Australian 
exchange rate and commodity prices affected Metalco in the international markets. 
They were therefore concerned about government policy and the tight inflationary 
policy. While these factors did not directly influence pay design, the need for extra 
productivity and maximising use of technology could be reflected in compensation 
decisions. As the Corporate Employee Relations Manager put it: 
We operate in world markets.. .The cost curve is very important.. .You must improve 3 per 
cent a year on costs to stay still in world markets. 
Pay levels in the macro Australian economy affected the level of pay in the higher 
positions (above stratum 2) of the Metalco strata system. According to the Corporate 
Remuneration Manager, 
The economic adjustment is decided by [corporate] head office... We lay out the strata 
boundaries... They are decided by the Board and based on average weekly earnings, global 
movements we pick up from the Canberra Conference, perceived pay patterns in other 
companies and our capacity to pay... 
The local economy also had a direct effect on the Metalco Australia plant if not 
directly on pay design. The Metalco Australia Employee Relations Manager 
continued: 
We are the largest employers in the state so we therefore have a disproportionate influence on 
the state government... We have lively debates with the government about renewing 
investment here... But it all hinges on the price of power... We use a third of the hydro 
power output of the state... With this as part of our costs, we do not pay less than the award, 
but there has been systematic attack on extras that have built up over time, such as abuse of 
overtime... We have gone through an early retirement program, and high levels of 
unemployment mean that you can be selective with recruiting people. 
On the effects of national culture on Metalco Australia compensation, the Corporate 
Remuneration Manager said: 
Australian culture has a greater commitment to equality than the American culture... The 
gap between the shopfloor and CEO [pay] might be 1:20 here, but possibly 1:85 over there... 
The difference between shopfloor and CEO is therefore very steep in the US, and very flat 
here... It's consistent with the Australian heritage and antagonism...convicts...police...It 
may affect values... It also shows up with Australian views on free enterprise... Australians 
are naive on this...It's the norm in the USA.. .Americans are used to wide divergence.. .of 
wages and pay. It's not just the industrial staff; at the Canberra Conference [where the 
mining industry representatives share salary trend information]. comparable worth is the 
driving concept at those gatherings... 
On Australian team culture, she continued: 
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We don't have natural work teams, but there are shift crews in the Pot Room. When 
something goes wrong.. .when something drops into the pot... then the guys work together. 
When things are quiet, they are more individualistic... Because of the Pot Room danger, 
there is a macho culture. In the carbon/anode production department and metal casing house, 
work is individlinlly done, but they are moving towards a team-based organisation. 
Table 10.6 shows the extent to which the Hodgetts and Luthans (1993b) 
recommendations for 'appropriate' pay systems for Hofstede's (1980) cultural 
dimensions of Australia are reflected in the Metalco Australia compensation systems. 
Table 10.6 indicates that only about half the recommendations listed in all four 
employee categories of Metalco Australia were supported. The award structures for 
the industrial and clerical staff did not have large salary gaps between lowest and 
highest paid, which would be appropriate for moderately low Power Distance in 
Australia. The relativities of the old industrial staff award with 62 pay points were 
fairly narrow. The gap between the lowest paid operator in 1988 (A$338.90 per 
week) and the best paid tradesperson (Electrician-Special Class) (A$405.40 per week) 
was only A$60.50 per week. 
In considering the clerical staff, a similar pattern emerged. The original grade 
structure showed a 1992 salary of A$17,777 per annum at the lowest level to 
A$23,778 at the top. The salaries of top management were unknown, so it was not 
possible to establish the gap between highest and lowest paid in the plant, but 
employee benefits differed for management and Metalco did not use gain-sharing or 
profit-sharing. The correlation with the recommendations for high Individualism was 
strong in one respect, as the company , placed emphasis on individual pay-for-
performance, reviewed on an annual basis. But the reliance on the AlRC NWC wage 
increases only for industrial and clerical employees suggested the alignment with the 
local labour market rates was not paramount. Metalco Australia had few additional 
family-friendly employee benefits, although it did practise equal pay principles. For a 
moderately weak Uncertainty Avoidance dimension found by Hofstede (1980), 
Hodgetts and Luthans (1993b) recommend an emphasis on performance and a sharing 
of risks. The plant followed the former recommendation, but not the latter one. The 
compensation for the four industrial, clerical, administrative/technical, and managerial 
groups was thus only marginally supportive of all the recommendations for the 
Australian national culture. 
Table 10.6 
The Hodgetts and Luthans (H&L) Recommendations for Compensation 
for Australia as Reflected in Metalco Australia as at 1993 
Australia Metalco Australia 
Hofstede Dimension 
Index 
H&L Recommended 
Compensation 
Industrial Staff Compensation Clerical Staff Compensation Administrative and 
Technical Compensation 
Managerial 
Compensation 
1. Moderately low 
Power Distance 
• Low salary gaps between lowest 
and highest paid 
• Low benefits gaps 
• Gain-sharing 	- 
• Profit-sharing 
Yes - in award (I) 
Yes - in award 0) 
No 
No 
Yes - in award (I) 
Yes - in award (I) 
No 
No 
Pay unknown 
No 
No 
No 
Pay unknown 
No 
No 
No 
2. High Individualism • Individual performance-based 
• External equity/competitiveness 
• Emphasis on short-term 
achievements 
Partly through merit pay 
No — NWC increases only 
Yes — performance review 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
3. Moderately high 
Masculinity 
• Few family benefits 
• Gender pay differences 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
4. Moderately weak 
Uncertainty Avoidance 
• Emphasis on performance 
• Sharing of risks associated with 
MNE's success or failure 
• Competitive salaries to avoid 
poaching of staff 
• Decentralised pay policies 
Yes 
No 
No 
yes(2) 
Yes 
No 
No 
No(3) 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No(" 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No(4) 
Supported Y (Yes) 
Not Supported N (No) 
Y = 6 
N = 6 
Partly Y= 1 
Y = 6 
N = 7 
Y = 6 
N = 6 
UnIcnown=1 
Y = 6 
N = 6 
Unknown=1 
Note:(1) No details were available about the gap between award and managerial staff. (2) Taken to mean decentralised to the plant (3) Paid under an award wh . ch applied to the whole 
processing company (4) Centralised strata compensation system for the whole MNE 
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While national culture might have had only modest influence on the design of the 
compensation system, one major factor dominating the design process was the impact 
of the industrial relation systems and the union presence on the site. MNE Metalco 
managers observed that the company preferred legislation that allowed employees the 
right not to join unions and the negotiation of individual contracts. The Accord 
between the Labor Government and the ACTU had been seen as an impedient to their 
HRM strategy, but they did not use this as an excuse not to reform work practices 
and pay systems. Clearly the Metalco Australia HRM strategy had brought 
confrontation with the unions to a head. The Corporate Remuneration Manager 
stated: 
Union structures on the site are an irritation... When we are negotiating changes to awards 
and restructuring, the craft unions tend to stand aside from the operating unions. The craft 
unions were against the restructuring package. [Metalco's] attitude is that trade unions and 
industrial tribunals are third parties. We therefore try to minimise the impact of the third 
party between employer and employee 
The union density in the plant was thus 'an influence' as it set the tone for union and 
shopfloor attitudes towards terms and conditions. Relations at the collective level had 
not been as effective as the company would have liked. There had been some gains, 
but the elimination of overtime and changing behaviour which maximised overtime 
had been hardest in the Pot Room. Direct relations with employees on an individual 
level were good. 
Metalco Australia used the award system and recognised unions as part of its earlier 
HRM strategy, and therefore had to operate under the conditions and rules of the 
AMC. Although it had operated a plant agreement with the industrial employees for 
many years and had used the metal processing award for the clerical staff; the desired 
move to individual contracts created the problem of deciding how this strategy could 
be accommodated within the legislation and practice of the ARC. The award pay 
levels were closely linked to AIRC NWC increases, and changes in award structures 
had to be approved by the AlRC. The Metalco philosophy had always been that 
employee relations arrangements should reflect the needs of employees and 
management at a particular work site, rather than following national or industry-wide 
standards, and that minimum award standards could be exceeded at an enterprise if 
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work practices permitted greater efficiency. The Employee Relations Manager of the 
Metalco Australia site expanded on the influence of the external industrial system: 
We have had individual site awards from the 1970s, about the same time as the vehicle 
industry... We got indexation in 1975 so the development of company awards as an 
autonomous basis for workplace was constrained... Then we got the Accord, but the 
framework for an enterprise agreement [EA] was there. From 1986-87, the autonomy to use 
EAs was more available as central constraints went to allow EAs. Therefore, Metalco was 
well placed to take advantage of this... Geography helped the enterprise focus.. .We had to be 
self-sufficient.. .Even under centralised wage negotiations, we have done enterprise 
agreements.. .We've had our own award since the late 1960s.. .The framework constrained 
this till the second half of the 1980s. Our award at [Metalco Australia] was not all that 
different from the federal awards.. .There were large numbers of classifications.. .We hadn't 
been through restructuring like now. 
Finally, the characteristics of the industry in which Metalco Australia was operating 
had an influence on the HRM/IR strategy in the plant. Its products competed on 
world markets and were sensitive to world metal prices. This put greater emphasis on 
costs and pay systems under the subsidiary's direct control that permitted flexible use 
of labour. Internal factors such as the technology determined the skill composition 
and thus the type of pay systems. The size of the plant also necessitated formal shop-
floor agreements and structures permitted through the industrial relations system. To 
become more competitive, however, the nature of the industry needed accompanying 
heavy capital investment. As the Plant Employee Relations Manager put it: 
The pressure for change at the end of the day is competitiveness and contribution to 
shareholder wealth.. .The plant was built in the 50s... We are outdated.. .The focus is whether 
we can still make money and are worth redevelopment. 
Metalco Singapore 
Company Background of Metalco Singapore 
Metalco Singapore was formed in 1982 as a result of a merger of an engineering and 
manufacturing company, and became a wholly owned subsidiary of a regional Asian 
holding company (with head office in Singapore) in 1986 which was, in turn, wholly 
owned by the corporate MNE Metalco. Metalco Singapore operated as a separate 
business unit of the MNE and was bought in 1986 and sold in April 1993. The study 
of its compensation system is up to the time of sale. 
The Metalco Singapore factory was situated on the western side of the island and was 
controlled by the board of the Asian holding company. The head of the Metalco 
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Singapore plant was a British expatriate General Manager who reported to the 
Managing Director of the Asian company. The company provided a diverse range of 
technical support services and designed and manufactured products for the protection 
of metals in different environments. As well as the production function, the company 
had in-house quality assurance facilities and laboratories. It marketed its products in a 
geographical spread from Pakistan to New Zealand. The customers were oil and gas 
producers, marine transporters and contractors. The products were used in oil 
refineries, power stations, in off-shore or below ground facilities, ships and anywhere 
else where corrosion might occur. Metalco Singapore only had one site in Singapore 
and had several competitors on the island. The company had sales representatives in 
Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia. 
Organisation of Metalco Singapore 
In 1993, Metalco Singapore employed 45 staff. Apart from the (British expatriate) 
General Manager, there were 4 other managers, 3 engineers and technicians, 7 
administrative/clerical staff; 4 production/maintenance supervisors, 19 production 
workers and 7 sales employees of whom 3 were based in Thailand. Korea and 
Indonesia. The subsidiary employed 2 other expatriates — one Welsh and the other 
Scottish. The organisation chart is shown in Figure 10.2. From Figure 10.2, it can be 
noted that the biggest department was the production function headed by a 
Production Superintendent. Beneath him were the four foremen/supervisors and 19 
production workers (consisting of 4 tradespeople and 15 unskilled). The other main 
departments were engineering, sales and finance and administration. 
Production Technology of Metalco Singapore 
Metalco Singapore offered engineering services and a range of cathodic protection 
products. After inspecting a client's corrosion problem, quotations were given, a 
design drawn up, protective equipment manufactured and installed and subsequently 
inspected. The products used consisted of zinc, aluminium and magnesium protectors 
that were tailor-made according to the method of application of the cathodic 
protection, the electricity power supply, and the project to be protected such as above 
or below ground pipes. The work centred around the use of a foundry that required a 
predominantly unskilled workforce. 
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Figure 10.2 
Organisation Chart for Metaleo Singapore as at 1993 
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Metaleo Asia 
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Head Officc Singapore 
Metalco Singapore 
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I 	 I 	 I 
Production 	Finance Thailand 
I 	
& Admin 
I 	
Malaysia 
Indonesia 
Production 	F & A (1 Sr Engr 
Superintendent 	Manager 	1 Sales Engr 
F.Secretary 	
1 Area Rep 
I  1 Secretary) 4 Supervisors/ 	Assistant 
Foremen 	Accountant 
Engineering 
Dept 
Technical 
Manager 
Snr Engr 
Engineer 
Sales Dept 	Quality Dept 
Sales 
Manager 
I—Secretary Sr Engr —Technician 
Sales Engineer 
Estimator 
19 Production 
Workers 
2 Accounts 
Shipping Assistants 
Mission and Objectives of Metalco Singapore 
The Asian holding company did not intervene in the operations of Metalco Singapore 
to a great extent as the holding firm was mainly a trading concern. The main 
objectives of the Metalco subsidiary were growth, cutting costs to be competitive and 
improving quality. Metalco was going through a change programme in the early 
1990s to implement the ISO 9000 series of quality standards which it achieved by the 
end of 1992. The plant competed on price, quality and service, the emphasis 
depending on which sector of the market it was trading in. 
HRMAR Organisation of Metalco Singapore 
Metalco Singapore had some written HRM policies on hours of work and allowances 
which were an extension of conditions of the Asian holding company. The implied 
policy, according to the General Manager, was that: 
We look after our people and by Singaporean standards, we have good conditions. Because of 
the tight labour market, we have to do things to keep staff. We have to use things other than 
money, such as the quality of life ... [and] keeping the foundry clean. 
The holding company based in Singapore 'participated' with Metalco Singapore 
rather than being 'intrusive' in HRM and the Finance and Administration Manager 
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looked after employee relations, labour costs, training and the payroll functions. 
BRM procedures were developed by the General Manager in conjunction with the 
holding company's Managing Director (MD). The management team at the Metalco 
plant also has some input into the HRM policies and compensation system. The 
General Manager then made recommendations to the MD of the Asian holding 
company. The General Manager stated that he would have liked Metalco Singapore 
to follow the Metalco Australia culture and be seen as a 'blue chip company'. They 
did not promote themselves as a 'cheap organisation', preferring to be seen as an 
employer with a strong social responsibility. Metalco therefore paid medical benefits 
to employees and their families. 
In the company, the office staff were mainly Singaporean Chinese. Ages ranged from 
the mid-20s to 50 years. In the foundry, ages ranged from mid-30s to more than 50 
years, and the nationalities were 50 per cent Singaporean Chinese, 30 per cent Malay 
and 20 per cent Indian. Over half of the employees had worked for Metalco 
Singapore for more than five years by 1993, and four had more than 10 years' service. 
The remainder had been appointed as the company grew, and turnover was low. The 
retirement age was 55 years (prior to new legislation raising it to 60). 
Labour costs were about 10 per cent of total operating costs, as materials were the 
most expensive component of production. In 1992, overtime comprised of 17 per 
cent of the salary bill in the foundry. Overtime was controlled by the plant 
management, but at that time, it was seeking as many labour hours as possible. The 
subsidiary was not a member of an employer association, and tended to look at similar 
industries in Singapore to compare its compensation levels. The company was not 
unionised, as there had been no demand from the employees for union representation. 
Grievances were processed by the supervisors. 
Industrial Staff Compensation in Metalco Singapore 
Compared with Metalco Australia, the Metalco Singapore company was less than a 
tenth of its size. Its smallness was reflected in the informal compensation systems 
which operated, and the emphasis on individual contracts. The pay system for 
foundry and trades employees at Metalco Singapore had four components. The first 
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was an annual length of service increment for each year of service for the first five 
years. New employees would be paid a 'market rate' depending on the job and annual 
increments were set down in an informal matrix. Secondly, the base rates for 
everyone were reviewed annually with 'the market rate' being the guide. The NWC 
guidelines were normally followed closely except that in 1991, the company did not 
use the guidelines and made bigger adjustments to salary levels because levels had 
become 'out of step'. The third component of compensation was the '13th month' 
Annual Wage Supplement (AWS) which the company paid in December each year. 
The final component was a flexible January bonus which was paid to everyone in the 
company except the expatriate General Manager, and consisted of a share of the 
profits according to salary. 
The foundry workers were paid monthly. The company voluntarily shared that in 
November 1992, the basic salary was S$700 to S$800 per month. Foundry 
supervisors received S$1450 to S$1800 per month. The trades staff were paid S$859 
to S$1250 per month. All industrial employees received the same bonus. There were 
no individual incentives or performance appraisal. The package included a shift 
allowance which varied according to shift, a transport allowance, and a meal 
allowance. Free uniforms were issued and overtime was paid. Taxis home were 
provided for employees on the night shift. The obtaining of additional educational or 
technical qualifications would not affect pay, but could facilitate a career move. 
Metalco would financially assist studies provided they were relevant and could be 
used by the company. The foundry employees worked a 44 hour week on 3 shifts, the 
first from 7 am to 4 pm, the second from 4 pm to 12 midnight, and the third from 
midnight to 7 am. 
The main basis of the compensation system was payment for the job (not skill or age), 
and increments for length of service of up to 5 years. The general level of pay was 
reviewed annually, and a 13th month bonus and profit-share bonus given. Industrial 
employees' pay was kept confidential, but was probably disclosed to each other 
informally. 
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Clerical and Administrative Compensation in Metalco Singapore 
The clerical and administrative employees at Metalco Singapore were paid on an 
individually negotiated basis with the market level and size of the job being the main 
criteria. The package was based on three elements: a base salary reviewed annually 
(with the lower paid also receiving overtime pay), the 13th month (AWS), and a share 
of the profits according to salary. Working hours were 44 per week. No length of 
service increments or meal allowances were offered. A daily transport allowance was 
given, as car ownership is restricted in Singapore. The staff were paid monthly and 
commenced with 14 days' holiday, rising to 20 days with length of service. The size 
of the job and market levels were thus the main determinants of the system with the 
General Manager noting that Metalco had to pay more than the market rate to attract 
staff to the company because of its small size and location. A secretary in 1992 
earned about S$2,500 per month, although the final salary might depend on the labour 
market for particular skills. The pay was for the job, irrespective of educational 
qualifications attained. There was no formal performance appraisal system. 
Sales and Technical Compensation in Metalco Singapore 
The sales and technical employees were generally graduates, but in the tight labour 
market, Metalco Singapore found it difficult to find and retain graduates with 
experience at the compensation level it wished to pay. The compensation package 
usually consisted of a base salary reviewed annually, the 13th month (AWS) and a 
share of the profits. No meal or transport allowance was paid, but employees could 
claim reimbursement for business travel costs. There was no formal performance 
appraisal system. 
Managerial Compensation in Metalco Singapore 
The expatriate managers were paid on home-based and host-based country 
international compensation packages. The General Manager of Metalco Singapore 
(originally a British expatriate) was transferred to an Australian home-based package 
in 1987, and to the Metalco Australian Stratum 4 salary and benefits, plus allowances 
for local conditions and local labour market levels. Some of these allowances were 
approved by the MD of the Asian holding company in Singapore. In brief, an 
expatriate balance sheet approach was used for him. The other two expatriates were 
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on host-based packages of Singaporean local salaries which were negotiated with 
fixed term contracts set by Metalco Singapore, plus international supplements. 
The other local managers' pay and conditions were individually negotiated, with a 
package consisting of a base rate, the AWS (13th month) and a share of the profits. 
Although individually negotiated, the General Manager stated that the final salary had 
to 'fit in with other salaries to preserve relativities'. Increases in the base rate 
depended on performance and the market level necessary to retain them. No choice 
of package was given, and the performance appraisal was done informally by the 
General Manager. The varying experience of the five managers resulted in a wide 
range of salaries and so were kept confidential to the individual. The basis of their 
pay was thus the value of the job, individual skills, and individual negotiation of 
market worth. 
The annual profit bonus for all employees (expressed in months of salary) was 
introduced in the late 1980s. The General Manager spoke of the problems this bonus 
created when the company was not making money, and the bonus was reduced 
accordingly. All employees also had the option of purchasing shares in Metalco 
Australia, a scheme that was introduced in 1987. About five employees participated, 
one of whom was on the shop floor. The lack of interest was attributed to the 
cultural preference for short-term gains. 
Employee Benefits in Metalco Singapore 
Some of the employee benefits for Metalco Singapore staff have already been referred 
to. The common benefits for all levels of employee included: 
• Annual dinner and dance 
• Annual leave 
• Compassionate leave 
• Education assistance (from Skills Development Fund) 
• Free medical treatment/medicine for employee and family 
• Hospital ward benefit for employee and family 
• Long-term illness 
• Maternity leave 
• Retrenchment benefit 
• Sick leave 
• Specialist surgical fees for employee and family. 
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Uniforms, shift allowance, meal allowance, acting allowances, and a festive loan 
advance were provided for the industrial employees. Daily transport allowances were 
given to the industrial and clerical employees. Sales, technical and managerial staff 
had free life insurance and were provided with cars or reimbursed for the use of their 
own cars on company business. Business entertainment expenses were available to 
sales, technical and managerial employees. Telephone installation costs and calls were 
reimbursed for managers. The corporate Metalco MNE in Australia employee share 
option scheme, as was noted earlier, was only taken up in a minor way. The Metalco 
Singapore employee benefits profile as at 1993 is shown in Table 11.7 below. 
Relationship of Metalco Singapore to Corporate Head Office 
As mentioned above, the Managing Director of the Asian holding company which 
owned Metalco Singapore had some involvement in general HRM policy. Hiring of 
all staff and senior staff salaries had to be approved by him, based on proposals from 
the subsidiary. The annual profit-share bonus also had to be approved by the 
Managing Director. The Metalco Singapore General Manager would have a review 
meeting with the Managing Director and agree on the salary levels for the plant. The 
company aimed for a general compensation level in the upper half of the labour 
market. The only influence of the head office of the corporate Metalco MINE in 
Australia on the Singapore affiliate's compensation was through the salary package of 
the General Manager himself. His package benefits and salary grade were determined 
by the MINE. Some local allowances were agreed with the MD of the holding 
company in the Stratum 4 range. 
The Profile of Metalco Singapore Compensation 
The Gomez-Mejia and Balkin (1992) Algorithmic and Experiential profiles for 
compensation of four occupational groups for Metalco Singapore were shown in 
Tables 10.2 to 10.5. The industrial staff (Table 10.2) were mainly paid on job and 
length of service. There was no formal performance appraisal, but there was some 
pay at risk depending on the subsidiary's performance. While the compensation 
system had several Experiential components, the general profile of industrial staff 
compensation was closer to an Algorithmic profile. 
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Table 10.7 
Em lo ee Benefits Profile for Metalco Singapore as at 1993 
Industrial/ 
Blue Collar 
Unskilled 	Skilled 
Clerical/ 
Adrnin 
Sales/ 
Technical 
Professional/ 
Management 
Board 
Acting allowance  
Annual leave ,./ ,/ I if ../ 
Attendance allowance 
Business entertainment expenses if  
Cellular phones 
Co-operative shares 
Compassionate leave V if if J 
Dental treatment 
Early retirement schemes 
ExternaUsocial recreational club 
membership 
Festive loan/advance if V 
Fixed monthly transport allowance 
Free medical treatment/medicine if 1 if if ,/ 
Funeral leave benefit 
Hospital ward benefit  
Housing loan 
Housingrenovation loan 
Laundry benefit 
Life insurance V / 
Long service award 
Long-term illness if if if V if 
Machine allowance 
Marriage leave 
Maternity leave 1 1 if 1 1 
Meal allowance / 
Medically board-out benefit 
Other loans 
Paternity leave 
Provision of car V ,/ 
Reimbursement for use of own car 
on company business 
if J 
Retirement benefit (>CPF) 
[Singapore] 
Retrenchment benefit if V V I ../ 
Service benefit 
Shift allowance I V 
Sick leave if V J V if 
Specialist surgical fee if I V if / 
Study leave/benefit 
Transport benefit/allowance/ 
reimbursement 
V / I 
Uniform if if 
Union day leave 
Union education leave 
Unpaid leave 
Voluntary resignation benefit 
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The components for the clerical, administrative, sales, and technical employees 
(Tables 10.3 and 10.4) were very similar, with an individually negotiated salary, the 
• Annual Wage Supplement (13th month), and company bonus. The basis of pay was 
thus the job. Seniority did not play a formal role in pay, but compensation would rise 
over time with length of service. The profit bonus was dependent on the business unit 
success, although this was an annual payment rather being than long-term. The 
compensation for these occupations was also weighted towards an Algorithmic rather 
than an Experiential profile. 
The profile for the management employees (Table 10.5) reflected a stronger 
individual performance element. There was an informal performance appraisal 
scheme. The risk was possible loss of profit-share, and the compensation was very 
market-driven. The rises were annual, and the whole system was flexible. The 
general profile was an almost even balance of Algorithmic and Experiential factors. 
Metalco Singapore and the External Environment 
Referring to the research question on the influence of the external environment on the 
compensation at Metalco Singapore, the General Manager did not perceive the 
legislation as having a major influence on pay system designs. The various clauses of 
the Employment Act had to be observed, and the company paid the CPF like everyone 
else. He continued: 
We have not had any legal issue in the employment of people. The CPF rate varies, but we 
pay it.. .If the environment changes, we would look at it and see if we need to adapt. The 
Singaporean income tax levels are very low, especially for the average production employee 
who may be earning about $12,000 a year.. .We are more affected by the health legislation 
and strict environmental controls on effluent and things like that. 
Although the level of taxation thus had not been a big factor in pay and benefits 
design, the tightness of the economy, however, had been important in setting general 
and individual levels of pay. The General Manager observed that: 
Singapore has a very tight labour market.. .Therefore we have to do things to keep 
people.. .The foundry has to be kept clean... We have to use things other than money.. .quality 
of life things.. .We are looking at non-cash attractions. Economic growth affects the Ministry 
of Labour and the issue of foreign workers... The levy may have an impact on the sort of 
people you can employ. There is a monthly levy... [Metalco Singapore] has 12 [foreign 
employees] in this category in the foundry.. .on the shop floor... Singaporeans don't like to 
work in dirty industries. 
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The company was non-union, but it did carefiffly note the decisions of the National 
Wages Council and the rises awarded to the Singaporean Civil Service. Metalco had 
introduced the profit bonus to give more flexibility in line with the NWC, and used 
capacity to pay as a factor in rises, rather than automatically passing on the increases 
given by the government to its Civil Service. 
With regard to the Singaporean work culture, the General Manager perceived that: 
There is an expectation that I will be authoritarian.. .This may be a function of the education 
system and Confucianism.. .People are educated, but they are not used to making 
decisions.. .Perhaps it's the political culture as well.. .Therefore, I make more independent 
decisions and get sucked into work which could be done by my subordinates.. .1 think 
individual incentives would be difficult to install here because people are aware of what each 
other gets, so individual salaries would become even more visible. 
The other reason for delaying this idea was that a backward-sloping labour supply 
curve might apply when people judged that they had earned enough for that month 
and then go absent from work. The General Manager elaborated that: 
Comparing the UK on starting up here, productivity was low, but wages were low as well. 
Therefore, we tried to introduce incentives, but the Malays did not turn up on the last day. 
They had earned enough.. .They had enough TVs and the family was catered for.. .Therefore, 
individual incentives may be problematic... Over time this may change, of course. However, 
the work ethic is strong, and money is highly valued — perhaps more than the quality of life. 
Money is the most important thing here. The bonus is viewed very seriously but with a 
flexible system, you can keep the base pay low, and pay more when possible... The work ethic 
is strong, but this may be a myth.. .It may be a response to authoritarianism.. .If you leave 
people alone, performance may decrease. 
The Metaleo Singapore compensation compared to the Hodgetts and Luthans 
(1993b) recommendations for pay systems for Singapore culture, derived from the 
Hofstede (1980) dimensions, is provided in Table 10.8 below. Like the profile for 
Metalco Australia, there was no perfect agreement with the Hogetts and Luthans 
(1993b) recommendations. The best 'fit' was with the compensation of the industrial 
staff, with lesser conformity from the clerical/administrative, sales/technical, and 
managerial occupations. The initial increments for length of service for the operating 
and trades personnel might have reflected the high Power Distance culture initially 
(Hofstede, 1980), as might the difference in employee benefits between industrial 
employees and the management. Apart from this, no data were available to compare 
the salary gap between lowest and highest paid across the plant. The lack of 
individual incentives for the industrial staff and the same profit-sharing component 
were appropriate for the low Individualism in Singapore, as suggested by Hofstede 
Table 10.8 
The Hodgetts and Luthans (H&L) Recommendations for 
Compensation in Singapore as reflected in Metalco Singapore as at 1993 
Singapore Metaleo Singapore 
Hofstede Dimension 
Index 
H&L Recommended 
Compensation 
Industrial Staff 
Compensation 
Clerical & Admin Staff 
Compensation 
Sales and Technical 
Compensation 
Managerial 
Compensation 
1. High Power Distance • Hierarchical compensation 
strategy 
• Pay and benefits tied to 
place in structure 
• Large salary gaps between 
lowest and highest paid 
Yes - first 5 years 
Yes for pay and benefits 
Unknown 
No 
Informal hierarchy for 
pay. Benefits hierarchy 
Unknown 
No 
Informal hierarchy for 
pay. Benefits hierarchy 
Unknown 
No 
Informal hierarchy for 
pay and unique benefits 
Unknown 
2. Low Individualism • Group compensation plans 
• Seniority based pay 
Yes - profit share 
Yes — first 5 years only 
Yes - profit share 
No 
Yes - profit share 
No 
Yes - profit share 
No 
3. Moderately low 
Masculinity 
• Many family benefits 
• Quality of worklife 
emphasis 
• No gender pay differences 
No 
Partly 
Yes 
No 
Partly 
Yes 
No 
Partly 
Yes 
No 
Partly 
Yes 
4. Weak Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
• Emphasis on performance 
• Sharing of risks associated 
with MNE's success or 
failure 
• Competitive salaries to 
avoid poaching of staff 
• Decentralised pay policies 
No — not formally 
Yes - profit share 
Yes 
No (I) 
No — not formally 
Yes - profit share 
Yes 
NO ) 
No — not formally 
Yes - profit share 
Yes 
No(I) 
Yes 
Yes - profit share 
Yes 
No 
Supported Y (Yes) 
Not Supported N (No) 
Y =7 Unknown = 1 
N = 3 	Partly = 1 
Y =5 Unknown = 1 
N = 5 	Partly = 1 
Y =5 Unknown = 1 
N = 5 Partly = 1 
Y =6 Unknown = 1 
N = 4 Partly = 1 
Notes: (1) Taken to mean decentralisation within Metalco Singapore, but pay policies were decentralised to the subsidiary in the context of the whole MNE 
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(1980). With Hofstede's weak Uncertainty Avoidance factor for Singapore, Hodgetts 
and Luthans (1993b) recommended that local employees should share some of the 
risks associated with the company's success or failure. This occurred in Metalco 
Singapore, where the industrial employees' bonus depended on the annual profits of 
the affiliate. 
As discussed earlier, the clerical, technical, sales and managerial staff salaries were 
individually negotiated. No data on the salary gap between highest and lowest paid 
were provided, so no comment is possible on this. However, the employee benefits 
did vary by position, with the senior management having extra benefits. Arguably, the 
acceptability of this might be explained by Hofstede's (1980) finding of a high Power 
Distance in Singapore. The dependence of profit-share on the subsidiary's success 
supported the Hodgetts and Luthans (1993b) recommendations for a weak 
Uncertainty Avoidance factor, and the group profit-sharing was appropriate for a low 
Individualism dimension. The subsidiary did not offer high levels of family-friendly 
benefits, but the General Manager did refer to attempts to improve the quality of 
worklife, which conforms with suggested practice in a moderately low Masculinity 
national culture (Hodgetts & Luthans, 1993b). 
Metalco Singapore was part of the corrosion control industrial sector and had six 
competitors in Singapore. The competition had arguably some impact on its pay 
levels, but not on its compensation design strategy. Internally, the small size of the 
company enabled it to run an informal system that was directly affected by the 
tightness of the labour market and employment legislation. The only external 
corporate MNE Metalco intervention was the salary package of the expatriate GM 
and the approval necessary for salary levels and profit distribution from the Managing 
Director of the Asian holding company in Singapore. Thus the corporate head office 
orientation was ethnocentric for the GM, but polycentric for the compensation design 
of the remaining staff. 
Large Plant 
Operator/trades workers dominant (67% of 
staff) 
Flat structure for size of plant 
Unions recognised initially 
Metal process production 
Cost, efficiency and quality goals 
Small plant 
Production workers less dominant (42% of 
stall) 
Moderately flat structure of company 
Non-union site 
Service and metal unit production 
Growth cost, quality and service goals  
Algorithmic (10 A*;5 E*; A/E=1, 2 unknown; 
I not applicable) 
Skill-based 
No job evaluation 
Low risk 
NWC rises and AIRC agreements 
No seniority pay 
Formal performance appraisal 
No dependence on profits 
H&L** recommendations? 6 yes;6 no; 1 Partly 
Yes 
Algorithmic (9 A*;4 E*; I A/E; 2 unknown; 3 
not applicable) 
Job-based 
No job evaluation 
Medium risk 
NWC noted only. No tribunal involved 
Some seniority pay for first 5 years 
No performance appraisal 
Some dependence on profits 
H&L** recommendations? 7 yes;3 no; 1 Partly 
yes; 1 Unknown. 
Algorithmic (12 A*;3 E*; A/E=1, 2 unknown; 
I not applicable) 
Job-based in a grade pay band 
No job evaluation 
No risk 
NWC and merit rises 
No seniority pay except for one grade 
Formal performance appraisal 
No dependence on profits 
H&L** recommendation? 6 yes; 7 no 
Algorithmic (10 A*; 5E*; 'unknown; 3 not 
applicable) 
Job-based and market level fixed point 
No job evaluation 
Bonus and profit-share at risk 
Annual rises and bonuses 
No seniority pay 
No performance appraisal 
Some dependence on profits 
H&L** recommendations? 5 yes; 5 no; 1 
Partly yes; 1 Unknown  
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Differences and Similarities in Metalco Australia and MetaIco Singapore 
Compensation 
The main differences and similarities of compensation systems in Metalco Australia 
and Metalco Singapore are summarised in Table 10.9. 
Table 10.9 
Comparison of Compensation Systems in 
Metalco Australia and Metalco Singapore as at 1993 
Metalco Australia 	 Metalco Singapore 
General Organisational Features 
General Compensation Features 
MNE strata system applies to all 
	
Only GM on a stratum salary 
Former site agreement for industrial staff 	No site agreements 
Industrial Compensation 
Clerical Compensation 
Administrative and Technical 
	
Sales and Technical 
Algorithmic (13 A*; 1E*;2 NE; 
2 unknown; 1 not applicable) 
Job-based salary in strata pay range 
No job evaluation 
Low risk 
Merit and annual strata review rises 
Marginally Algorithmic (8 A*; 6 E*; 
2 unknown; 3 not applicable) 
Job-based single point 
No job evaluation 
Bonus and profit-share at risk 
Annual bonuses and profit-share 
No seniority pay 
Formal performance appraisal 
No dependence on profits 
H&L** recommendation? 6 yes; 6 no; 
1 unknown. 
No seniority pay 
No formal performance appraisal 
Some dependence on profits 
H&L** recommendation? 5 yes;5 no; 1 Partly 
yes; 1 unknown. 
Algorithmic (11 A*;3 A/E*; 3 E*; 
2 unknown) 
Job-based in strata pay band 
No job evaluation 
Low risk 
Merit and review of strata rises 
No seniority pay 
Formal performance appraisal 
No dependence on profits 
H&L** recommendation? 6 yes; 6 no; 
1 Unknown 
Balance of A/E* (9 A*; 8 E*; 2 unknown) 
Job-based fixed point 
No job evaluation 
Bonuses and profit-share at risk 
Annual bonuses and profit-share 
No seniority pay 
Informal performance appraisal 
Some dependence on profits 
H&L** recommendation? 6 yes; 4 no; 1 Partly 
yes; 1 Unknown.. 
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Administrative and Technical 
	
Sales and Technical 
Managerial Compensation*** 
Notes:* A is Algorithmic. E is Experiential. A/E is Algorithmic/Experiential ** H&L is 
Hodgetts and Luthans (1993b) ***Excludes the Metalco Singapore expatriate General 
Manager who was on the strata expatriate conditions. 
Included in Table 10.9 is the total number of Algorithmic and Experiential features for 
each of the compensation systems in Metalco Australia and Singapore extracted from 
Tables 10.2, 10.3, 10.4 and 10.5. To ensure a more overall valid comparison of the 
Algorithmic (A) and Experiential (E) patterns in the affiliates, the comparison can be 
restricted to only those common compensation features for which data were available 
and applicable in both subsidiaries. The results are shown in Table 10.10. 
Table 10.10 
Total of Algorithmic (A) and Experiential (E) Compensation Features for 
Metalco Australia and Oilco Singapore as at 1993 — Selected Common Features 
Only 
Number of Algorithmic(A)/Experiential(E) Features 
Metalco Australia Metaleo Singapore 	. 
Industrial 
Clerical 
Admin./Tech/Sales 
Managerial 
8 A 	5 E 	1 A/E 
10 A 	3E 	1 A/E 
11A 	1E 	2A/E 
11 A 	3 E 	3A/E 
9 A 	4 E 	1 A/E 
9A 	5E 	0 A/E 
8A 	6E 	0 A/E 
9 A 	8 E 	0 ATE 
Restricting the Algorithmic and Experiential classifications only to those selected 
common features for which data were available and applicable, Table 10.10 indicates 
predominantly general Algorithmic profiles for the industrial, clerical, administrative, 
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technical, sales and managerial pay systems in Metalco Australia. There were general 
Algorithmic profiles for industrial and clerical staff in Metalco Singapore, but 
marginally Algorithmic and balanced Algorithmic and Experiential features for the 
administrative, technical and sales, and managerial employees respectively. All 
general profiles for compensation systems for both affiliates given in Table 10.9 are 
therefore similar to those in Table 10.10 and will be used for further discussion in a 
later chapter. 
In discussing the compensation of both subsidiaries together, to some extent, it could 
be argued that the external environment had a significant effect on industrial 
employee compensation. Despite the major differences in the internal factors, 
Metalco Singapore had to observe the provisions of the Employment Act and paid the 
13th month (AWS). The decisions of the MRC NWC and Singaporean NWC also 
appear to have had a major impact on the design of the pay systems. In the Australian 
subsidiary, the initial site award was based on the traditional classification system and 
pay for job. Rises from the AIRC NWC were automatically passed to the operators 
and trades staff. As the rules of the AIRC changed, Metalco Australia attempted to 
revise its compensation accordingly. By comparison, the Singaporean affiliate 
introduced profit-sharing as a result of the flexibility recommendations of the 
Singaporean NWC. 
The state of the Singaporean and Australian economies did not influence the structure 
of compensation, but did have a direct impact on the general pay levels in Singapore 
and Australia. In Australia, the influence of the economy was also reflected through 
the rises awarded by the AIRC, as well as through the annual review of strata levels. 
Culturally, it was noted that the length of service increments and lack of individual 
incentives in Singapore could be appropriate for the high Power Distance and low 
Individualism culture, and that the low salary gaps between highest and lowest paid in 
the industrial awards of Metalco Australia were suitable for the low Power Distance. 
In the Australian subsidiary, the emphasis on individual performance reviews suited 
the high Individualism and moderately weak Uncertainty Avoidance culture, as 
suggested by Hofstede (1980). Nevertheless, the general impression is that the 
Singaporean subsidiary followed the traditions of the labour market, whereas Metalco 
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Australia had to work within the constraints of the union presence in the plant and the 
formalities that the AMC brought to pay design. 
Some similar arguments about the role of the external environment on clerical 
compensation in the two subsidiaries can be made. With clerical unions recognised on 
the Australian plant, the metal processing company had negotiated an award that 
covered all the clerical staff on all its sites. Pay rises were decided by the ATRC 
NWC. As the AlRC changed the National Wage Principles, the company changed its 
approach. The Singaporean subsidiary followed the Employment Act, gave the 13th 
month (AWS) and became more 'flexible' with profit-sharing. Its general rises 
reflected the quantum of the NWC up to the mid-1980s and then the increases given 
by government to the Singaporean Civil Service. It was noted that the clerical 
compensation systems for both Metalco Australia or Singapore did not totally support 
the Hodgetts and Luthans (1993b) recommendations for the Hofstede (1980) 
dimensions for the respective countries. 
In terms of the impact of the external environment on the compensation systems of 
the administrative, sales, technical and managerial staff in both Metalco Australia 
and Metalco Singapore, legislation did not have a direct effect on pay design except 
for the effect of Fringe Benefits Tax (FBT) and superannuation legislation in the 
Australian plant. In Singapore, the senior staff should have been rewarded on 
conditions at least as high as those of the Employment Act (although this technically 
did not apply to them) to preserve relativities. The 13th month (AWS) bonus was 
given to all staff. Both companies took measures to ensure that their salaries were 
externally competitive, but the state of the economy did not affect the design of the 
pay structure. The amount of the profit-share in Singapore might have been affected 
by the success of the company, which indirectly depended on the state of the Asian 
economies. 
In Metalco Singapore, the decisions of the NWC did have an influence on the general 
review of pay levels and the increased flexibility of the system. In Metalco Australia, 
the AIRC NWC decisions had no direct significance on the design of senior employee 
compensation. As the employees were not unionised, the industrial tribunals had no 
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influence on the system. Culturally, we noted before that for the administrative, sales, 
technical and managerial staff in both Metalco Australia and Metalco Singapore, the 
support for the Hodgetts and Luthans (1993b) pay propositions was inconclusive. 
The main conclusion on the administrative, technical, sales and managerial 
compensation of the two subsidiaries is that size and external environment were major 
determining influences on the general compensation system. Metalco Australia did 
not have any choice but to participate in the corporate MINE Metalco system, and 
while there was some local adaptation at lower levels of the strata, pay ranges were 
determined centrally. The form of performance appraisal and progression through the 
range was a plant management decision. By comparison, Metalco Singapore had 
more freedom to negotiate individual contracts, but observed the need to pay the 13th 
month (AWS), and was encouraged to introduce the profit-sharing element in line 
with Singaporean practice. 
Moving to the similarities and differences of employee benefits in Metalco Australia 
and Metalco Singapore, Table 10.11 shows the comparison of the two subsidiaries. 
The legislation of both countries had an effect on the range of benefits, with the major 
difference being in health cover. Being larger, one would have expected that Metalco 
Australia would have a wider range of benefits, many of which (for the clerical, 
operative and trades employees) were originally included in their awards. The FBT 
affected the Australian affiliate at more senior levels in that the cost of benefits were 
included in the cost of a manager's package. Apart from this, both subsidiaries gave 
their managers additional benefits in the form of cars and business expenses. Metalco 
Singapore would have had to meet any requirements of the CPF and Employment 
Act, but apart from this, could determine its own benefits. By contrast, the general 
level of benefits in federal AJRC awards would have set a floor for the MINE Metalco 
Australia benefits. The corporate MNE Metalco, and the metal processing company 
of which the plant studied was a part, also appeared to have some influence in 
standardising the level of benefits for executives. 
Finally, we noted that the role of the corporate MNE head office was different for 
each subsidiary. The one link was the application of the strata system to the salary 
Metalco Australia 
Adoption leave for clerical staff 
Funeral leave 
Housing loans for senior staff. 
Long service awards for clerical and above 
Paternity leave for all staff 
Reimbursement for jury service 
Study leave 
Supplement to private health insurance 
Metalco Singapore 
Festive loan advance to industrial staff 
Free medical insurance for staff and family 
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Table 10.11 
Common and Unique Benefits in Metaleo Australia and Metalc° Singapore 
Common Employee Benefits for All Staff in both Meta!co Subsidiaries* 
Compassionate leave 
Retrenchment benefit 
Annual leave 
Maternity leave 
Sick leave 
Common Benefits in Both Subsidiaries for Certain Staff* 
Business entertainment for managers 
Cars 
Life insurance 
Long-term illness 
Meal allowance for industrial staff 
Shift allowance 
Uniforms 
Benefits Unique to Each Subsidiary* 
Note 'Excludes the expatriate General Manager who was on strata expatriate conditions 
and conditions of the General Manager at Metalco Singapore. The small IR staff 
numbers at the corporate MINE Melbourne head office naturally meant that there was 
a low level of intervention from head office. However, the setting of the higher strata 
salaries and some conditions such as superannuation and employee shares was done 
by corporate MINE head office. The head office of the metal processing company also 
ensured that there was consistency of conditions within the business unit, and that the 
context for the review of salaries at Metalco Australia was established. The trend of a 
large MINE exerting control through world-wide job/pay grades applies, the rationale 
being the easier mobility of executives between business units and compensation 
equity. 
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Conclusion 
As Metalco is the fourth case study in the thesis, further reinforcement of previous 
findings is occurring to assist in the development of an explanatory framework and 
propositions relating the external environment to the compensation design in MNE 
subsidiaries. Like all previous cases, Metalco Australia and Metalco Singapore both 
had more than one compensation system. The research issue then becomes whether 
the external environment influences the design of each occupational compensation 
system in the same way. It is obvious that this is not the case and so general 
comments about the influence of the environment are unlikely to be an adequate 
explanation. The impact of the industrial relations system on the unionised and non-
unionised workforces in Metalco Australia provides a simple example. The need for a 
subsidiary to operate in a range of occupational labour markets, each with different 
features, is another. The second finding that is common in all of the cases except 
Oilco is that the pattern of occupational compensation systems, categorised by 
whether they are Algorithmic or Experiential, may vary within a subsidiary; this was 
the case in Metalco Singapore. The reason for this may be due to internal or external 
environmental factors, or both. 
The Gomez-Mejia and Balkin (1992) Algorithmic and Experiential compensation 
patterns for each subsidiary studied so far also show that the compensation profile for 
each occupation may vary between affiliates of the same MINE, as was the case for the 
Metalco MINE. This would suggest that a MINE may operate with a variety of pay 
systems that are not identical to those used in the home country. Again, the reason 
for this may be due to internal or external factors in the affiliates. Any similarity 
between the occupational compensation systems in the affiliates in one country might 
then suggest that the external environment is more significant than internal factors in 
pay design, or that there may be one type of compensation that is more effective for a 
particular occupation. Thus the unit of analysis (basis of pay) for operators/industrial 
and managerial staff in all four Australian subsidiaries (including Metalco Australia) 
has been Experiential. However, while the unit of analysis for managerial pay has 
been Algorithmic for managerial employees in all the Singaporean affiliates so far, the 
patterns in the other occupations are more diverse. 
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One of the significant internal factors emerging from all the cases is the international 
orientation and preference for standardisation of the MNE head office towards 
compensation design. This has varied in the cases discussed so far, but is most 
evident in the compensation of PCN and TCN expatriates and HCN managers. In 
Metalco Singapore, the General Manager's position was assessed as a head office 
stratum level. For non-expatriate and non-managerial home country employees, all 
MINE head offices so far have adopted a polycentric orientation toward compensation 
design. Apart from an MINE head office role in pay, in three of the four cases, the 
regional office has played a function in providing approval of, or advice on, 
compensation structures, increases or bonuses. The regional office therefore needs 
including in a complete explanatory framework. 
With regard to the four research questions posed at the beginning of the thesis, the 
Metalco interviews suggested that employment law consisted of elements that forced 
compliance and a review of compensation practice. However, where the law or 
awards expressed minima, then the affiliate had the option of exceeding these. The 
reason may be labour market pressures or attempts to influence performance. In 
addition, changes in Australian legislation provided opportunities for all MNEs to 
develop new pay practices, although, according to their HRM/IR philosophy or 
overall strategy, the affiliates could attempt to operate outside (or test) the legislative 
frameworks on occasions with particular compensation systems. Foodco Australia 
and, more recently, Metalco Australia are examples here. They are also examples of 
subsidiaries trying to influence the external environment. National government policy 
on industrial relations is reflected in its industrial legislation, which, in turn, may 
constrain or provide new opportunities for compensation design, as was evident in all 
Australian cases. Moreover, if governments only provide basic health cover, the onus 
for health insurance may be placed on to the employer, as was apparent in the 
Singaporean cases. 
From the cases, it is also evident that the state of the economy may have more effect 
on the level of compensation than on the structure, although the Metalco case 
indicated that the labour market (as one feature of the economy) needed to be sub-
divided according to occupation when analysing its influence. In Metalco Australia, 
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guidelines for managerial pay levels were set by the MINE head office based on 
general level of earnings in the economy and competitors' rates, whereas pay for 
industrial and clerical staff was much more geared to the local labour market, which 
had high unemployment. In contrast, the Singaporean labour market was tight for all 
occupations. The role of National Wage Council recommendations and the AIRC 
NWC recommendations in the Metalco subsidiaries also varied and depended on 
whether the occupation was unionised or not. In Singapore, the subsidiaries have 
noted NWC recommendations, but then have had some discretion in the extent of 
their application. Affiliates with unionised workforces in Australia usually passed on 
increases from the AIRC. The exception has been Foodco Australia, which had 
informal site union agreements. 
In none of the cases so far have the managers interviewed argued that national culture 
was the main determinant of compensation design in their subsidiaries. Most 
comments were on a very general level and did not distinguish between occupations. 
In the Metalco case, the Australian manager talked of an Australian dislike of big 
differences between maximum and minimum compensation levels while the 
Singaporean manager spoke of the motivating effects of incentives. The propositions 
of Luthans and Hodgetts (1993b) for Australia and Singapore have been tested in 
each of the four cases. For the Australian affiliates, the results are mixed and only in 
Buildo Australia were the propositions marginally supported for all three occupations 
shown. The case findings from the Singaporean units were more supportive of the 
propositions across most occupations. This result might suggest that managers take 
more note of the national cultural factors in compensation decisions in Singapore. 
In Metalco Australia, we noted the strong influence of the Australian industrial 
relations system on compensation design of the unionised workforce and how the 
subsidiary attempted to achieve local control of its pay systems despite the constraints 
of the industrial relations system. In all other cases so far, the MINE has had to deal 
with the local industrial relations system thus showing that a subsidiary has to adapt to 
actions of local unions, tribunals, custom and practice. Nevertheless, management has 
a certain amount of choice in its industrial practices. 
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In addition to the four research questions, the characteristics of an industry have also 
been touched on as an external factor influencing compensation design. With the 
exception of Foodco Singapore whose semi-processed product was sent to Australia 
for further processing, all subsidiaries were in very competitive industries. This places 
pressure on management to design compensation to maximise efficiency and limit 
labour costs. This was evident in Metalco Australia. The type of MINE has also 
shown the interlinkages necessary for the affiliates with the rest of the MINE. 
Compensation linkages have normally been at senior management and expatriate 
levels only. 
We have argued that any adequate explanatory framework will have to include the 
influence of internal factors as well as external ones on affiliate compensation. 
Technology of the unit determines the skill profile and so the types of pay systems 
needed. Larger subsidiaries have had more formal compensation systems, and grading 
structures have reinforced organisational structures in several of the units. Higher 
level staff have been subject to performance review with links to compensation; lower 
level staff have faced assessment procedures for promotion on skill-based pay 
systems. Thus subsidiary pay systems are integrated with other local Hit policies and 
practices. Other internal variables that might affect the impact of the external 
environment on compensation are the organisational cultures of the MNEs which may 
encourage sharing of gains rather than risks, and/or the amount spent on employee 
benefits. The percentage of labour costs of total operating costs may also affect the 
pay levels and benefits. With a number of collective agreements made in the case 
MNEs, one might assume that employee acceptance of the conditions of the 
agreements is another moderating factor. These preferences may, in turn, be 
influenced by national cultural features. Also apparent in each of the four cases so far 
was a combination of integration and differentiation mechanisms in the MNEs for the 
control of compensation design and level. Autonomy of affiliates was higher for non-
managerial pay. The variety of these linkages must be part of any explanation of the 
impact of the external environment as well. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
THE HIGH TECH COMPANIES 
High Tech Australia 
Company Background of High Tech Australia 
The corporate MINE High Tech Australia with its Melbourne head office was founded 
by its Executive Chairman and Managing Director (MD) in 1974. It was a specialist 
designer, manufacturer, and supplier of data communications equipment and services. 
In 1975, it set up regional headquarters in Hong Kong (responsible for China, Hong 
Kong and Taiwan) and New Zealand and, by the following year, had achieved sales of 
A$1m. By 1981, sales were A$10m and the first Australian manufacturing factory 
was established. The Singapore subsidiary for this study started in 1984 and the 
Asian Regional Headquarters was transferred from Hong Kong to Singapore in 1994. 
The Singaporean regional office was located in the main business district and not 
alongside High Tech Singapore. By 1985 the total MNE's group sales were A$48m. 
The company went public, and set up a base in Malaysia. A second factory was built 
near the corporate MNE head office in Melbourne in 1986 and a software 
development group was commenced. By 1990, the Group had set up a subsidiary to 
manage its business in China, and by 1991, was exporting into Europe. High Tech 
sales declined during the late 1980s recession, but the Annual Report of 1995 
reported a turnover of A$193.8M and a profit before tax of A$6.6M as at 30 June 
1995. 
Being a high technology company, it was not surprising that the range of products of 
the High Tech MNE changed dramatically over time. In 1974, the company sold only 
modems; in 1992, it concentrated on voice and data solutions, and bigger, more 
complex and expensive manufacturing and R and D. In Australia, High Tech had 10 
per cent of the market share compared with 7 per cent in Asia. The company 
competed on quality, service and the technical excellence of its products, the latter 
becoming more important in recent times. Its ability to put large networks together 
was a special characteristic. Systems integrators were starting to emerge as a 'one- 
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stop shop' where a customer wanted a complete information technology solution — 
the hardware and the network. High Tech customers in Australia were mainly large 
corporations, major financial institutions, state and federal government departments 
and Telstra. Customers in Asia included Telecoms, major computer vendors, airlines, 
banks, financial institutions and government bodies. 
Organisation of High Tech Australia 
An extract of the High Tech group organisation chart is shown in Figure 11.1. 
Figure 11.1 
Extract of High Tech Group Organisation Chart as at 1995 
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From an operational aspect, the MINE High Tech corporate Group was divided into 
four strategic business units (Australia, New Zealand, International Trading Entities 
and Asia). In turn, these interacted with three strategic resource units (marketing, 
manufacturing and R and D) and finance and administration. According to the 
Company Secretary, the finance and administration function in Australia 'had a dotted 
line to Singapore'. The Group Board had four Executive Directors including the 
founder/principal shareholder and three non-executive directors. The top 
management of the Group was comprised of the Chairman/MD, the MD of High Tech 
Australia, the MD of the Asian operations, the Director of Technology and the 
Company Secretary/Chief Financial Executive. According to the Company Secretary, 
'there [was] no particular philosophy on hierarchy'. 
In 1995, there were about 300 staff based in High Tech Australia. There were sales, 
service and branch offices in five Australian capital cities with staff numbers ranging 
from 20-40, and R and D and manufacturing centred in Melbourne alongside the head 
Cells of Lading Hands, 
R & D, Production, 
Engineering, and 
Purchasing Staff 
Production Nanager 
Cell Managers 
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office. Manufacturing employees in the factory declined from 120 to 39 from 1991— 
95 as a result of TQM and material requirement planning initiatives. The corporate 
MNE head office had 16 staff as at 1995. 
The structure of the manufacturing unit in 1995 in High Tech Australia is illustrated in 
Figure 11.2. 
Figure 11.2 
Structure of High Tech Australia Manufacturing Unit as at 1995 
Manufacturing Manager 
Supplies, Logistics 
and Finance Manager 
Clerical Staff 
The R and D department of 23 people adjoining the corporate MINE head office was 
managed by a Chief R and D Manager. R and D staff were divided into hardware and 
software groups, each headed by a supervisor. People performing the sales/marketing 
function (performed by about 130 people in 1995) included pre-sales service staff, 
who were systems people advising on technical solutions, and marketing employees, 
each of whom focused on a customer set. Sales and Service Supervisors reported 
directly to their local Branch Managers who, in turn, reported to the Group MD. The 
branches acted as separate business units. The company tended to recruit from 
competitors, staff usually having a computing or electrical background with business 
experience. 
High Tech Australia had a workforce that was mainly Australian and of English 
background. Because of the location of the factory, there were very few employees 
of Asian or mid-European descent. Most assembly staff were in the age range 20-40 
years and predominantly female. All engineers were male, with one exception. The 
retirement age for men was 65 and 60 for women, although noone was approaching 
retirement age at the time of the interviews. Only six part-time staff were employed in 
High Tech Australia and casual staff were used only at peak times. Very little 
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overtime was worked in the company, except for customer service employees on 24- 
hour standby. 
Production Technology of High Tech Australia 
High Tech was not capital intensive, but the nature of the technology required highly 
innovative people in research and development and network design. This was likely 
to remain the trend. The manufacturing was mainly repetitive and assembly 
operations required low levels of skills. Boards were assembled and tested. 
Operatives could be trained in a week, although there was an emphasis on multi-
skilled, self-directed work teams/cells. A third of the operators were being trained for 
formal engineering production certificates. With automatic board manufacturing by 
robots, operators ran and changed programs before final assembly and testing, with 
greater levels of skills being needed for the testing stage. Some hand soldering was 
done, but most assemblies were performed by machines. 
Mission and Objectives of High Tech Australia 
High Tech Australia's mission was: 
to provide our customers with the best range of communication networking products and 
solutions available in the world. Our philosophy is to excel in satisfying our customers' 
needs: our priority is to achieve our customers' objectives; our commitment is to quality and 
performance. 
Since its founding in 1974, according to a recent High Tech Australia Annual Report, 
the company 'has pursued a business philosophy of seeking diversity in its operations 
whilst remaining within its key area of expertise in data communications'. The 
diversity was in (1) geography, technology, products developed in-house or supplied 
from outside, and (2) potential markets. The challenge was to protect the company 
against changes in technology, markets or economic conditions in a number of 
sectors. This resulted in more than 430 of its 750 staff being based overseas by 1995 
— mainly in Asia and more than 40 per cent of the company's business coming from 
that region. The Asian market was serviced from offices in Hong Kong, Singapore, 
Thailand, China (PRC) and Malaysia, and through agents or distributors in other 
Asian countries. A presence in Latin America was established in 1995. 
High Tech overcame language and cultural issues in Asia by hiring skilled local staff in 
each region: more than 95 per cent of High Tech's staff in Asia were locals. On the 
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production supply side, it combined its own in-house production with overseas 
suppliers to provide a complete data communications product range. Almost half of 
its sales revenue was from its own in-house production. The corporate objectives 
included sales and marketing targets, a profit return, a market share for their owned 
designed products, R and D plans and financial objectives (decreased costs, free cash 
per annum and return on net assets). However, the strategy 'was very operational', 
rather than long term. One executive said, 'We have still to address: "Where are we 
going"?'. 
HRMAR Organisation of High Tech Australia 
Although the corporate High Tech MNE Group had one mission statement, it had 
two centres of power — Asia and Australia — and different cultures operated in each. 
High Tech Australia had no formally documented corporate philosophy towards 
employees. It could be described as 'soft and friendly', according to one executive. 
'The R and D high technology people need latitude to do the job. People join us 
because they like the environment and tend to stay a long time.' The company had a 
formal business plan and prepared strategy papers two or three times a year. These 
papers examined market changes, especially in Australia. Trends were not so rapid in 
Asia and so it was easier to predict events (a company view which had no doubt 
changed by 1999). There was a three-year rolling financial plan and an annual budget 
with forecasts updated monthly. There was not much emphasis on people in these 
plans as they tended to concentrate on markets and financial goals. The owners did 
not influence the style of management to a great degree as, although he owned 50.4 
per cent of it, the founder of the company only had 'a passive influence', said a 
manager. High Tech Australia had a TQM program, was focused on internal and 
external customers, and had key performance indicators (KPIs) which were measured 
monthly to show cost, speed and quality. The company needed these quality ratings 
to get government business. 
The Company Secretary originally ran the benefits and superannuation (pensions) of 
the human resource management function as well as the payroll and executive review 
functions. After the High Tech Group appointed a Group Human Resources Manager 
to the MNE head office in 1995, he retained only the payroll side. The new Group 
HR Manager began to formulate policies for High Tech Australia that will be 
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extended to cover all High Tech operations. They included senior managerial 
compensation across the group and succession and relocation policies. Career 
development was only practised for the senior executives at annual review, and not 
much attention was paid to career development for the middle and lower levels. 
There were no all-encompassing HRM goals, but the company was always looking to 
decrease overheads and people input, particularly through the TQM philosophy, 
which emphasised multi-skilling. Labour costs formed about 30 per cent of total 
manufacturing costs in High Tech Australia. The Australian operation had a policy on 
car ownership and temporary disability insurance, but many of the FIRM procedures 
and policies were informal. There were no policies or formal procedures on hiring or 
promotions. Senior executive compensation was determined by a Remuneration 
Committee of the board that controlled the compensation of all the MDs in Australia, 
the Americas and Asia, the Director of Technology and their direct reports. 
Unionisation of High Tech Australia 
Union presence in High Tech Australia was not strong, with 'a few' employees in the 
manufacturing area being members of the Australian Municipal, Administrative, 
Clerical and Services Union in 1995 (AMACSU), according to one manager. They 
had elected one shop steward/delegate, and the production manager included the 
steward in discussions. For the manufacturing plant, the company had formed a Joint 
Consultative Committee, which met weekly and consisted of three management and 
five employee representatives elected by staff. Minutes of these meetings were sent to 
the appropriate full-time union official. Topics discussed included working hours, 
flexi-days, leave, conditions and pay. Over the period 1992-94, this committee 
negotiated a new enterprise agreement for the manufacturing industrial employees and 
continuously monitored the ongoing implementation of the agreement. 
Industrial Staff Compensation in High Tech Australia 
The basis for pay of the industrial staff in the manufacturing plant of High Tech 
Australia was the federal 1972 Business Equipment Industry (Technical Services) 
Award (AIRC Print No.C3745), to which High Tech and companies such as IBM and 
Honeywell were respondents and the AMACSU a party. The High Tech production 
area alongside head office had about 60 employees, with about 30 assemblers and 
testers, 7 in stores and materials handling, 11 in maintenance, and the remainder in 
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finance and administration in 1992. The company used the classifications in the 
Business Equipment Industry award, the 1978 classifications in order of compensation 
being: 
1. Customer Engineers (7 levels) 
2. Business Equipment Technicians (3 levels) 
3. Routine Maintenance Service Persons 
4. General Hands 
5. Testers 
6. Assemblers 
7. Checkers 
8. Storemen 
9. Juniors. 
Summarised job descriptions were provided for each classification in the award. The 
classifications set a fixed weekly rate for jobs other than the Customer Engineer and 
Business Equipment Technicians, those two being paid according to quoted annual 
salaries. Junior staff had minimum weekly rates quoted for ages 16-18. For example, 
in 1978, there were seven rates for Customer Service Engineers, ranging from 
A$8,282 per annum to A$11,159 per annum. Business Equipment Engineers had 
three rates (A$8,565, A$9,140 and A$9,761 per annum), and an assembler, tester, 
and checker could earn A$133.60 per week. The award allowed for over-award 
payments, a 40-hour week, shift allowances, meal allowances after 2 hours of 
overtime, and sick leave. Leading Hands received an additional A$6.50 or A$13 per 
week according to the number of employees supervised. 
As this was a federal award, changes to the wage rates and allowances had been 
approved over the years by the AIRC in line with the National Wage Case principles. 
In addition, because the industry was fast-changing, the classifications were amended 
to reflect this and were then implemented by High Tech Australia. In December 
1989, the Business Equipment Industry (Technical Service) Award 1978 was revised 
to conform with the AIRC Structural Efficiency Principle (AMC Print J0769). The 
restructured award created six levels of jobs related to the business equipment 
industry, with each level including a range of positions from the original award. Level 
2, for illustration, covered Customer Engineer B and C, and Business Technician 1 
and 2. The award stated that the parties accepted that the descriptions of job 
functions would be more broadly based, that the new classifications would recognise 
generic skills and knowledge, and that employees were expected to perform a wider 
range of work, 'including work which [was] incidental or peripheral to their main 
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tasks or functions' (AIRC Print J0769:2). This was not a major restructuring of the 
award, because the seven classifications of customer engineer and the four for 
business equipment technician were still present in the award in July 1992 (AIRC 
Print K3673). 
In December 1993, there was a major change to the award with all individual job 
classifications being replaced by the general categories Technician (Level 1-4) and 
Technical (Levels 5-6)(AlRC Print 0361). This revised award included the original 
general hands and assemblers, testers and checkers, who were placed in a new Level 6 
technical employee classification. The award described the duties for each 
classification rather than the skills required. This structure was still operating in 1995, 
with the wage rates being updated through the AIRC. 1-figh Tech Australia was a 
respondent to the award, and the Australian Chamber of Manufactures (its employer 
association) conducted the negotiations and advocacy. All allowances were paid 
according to the award. There was no shift work, although the High Tech Australia 
had introduced flexible starting and finishing times for the required 8-hour day. 
Supervisors had to maintain control, but there was a clock card system in operation. 
While very little overtime was undertaken, additional hours would be worked if there 
was a large order to fulfil. 
Annual leave was in accordance with the award, and there was no bonus incentive or 
gain-sharing scheme. The basis for pay was, therefore, the job. Extra qualifications 
and length of service would not result in extra pay, although test and repair staff could 
be moved to a higher level of pay with the gaining of higher skills. Supervisors 
monitored performance, but performance was not linked to pay. The High Tech 
Australia site did not employ anyone under 18 in this category, and every industrial 
staff member was on the same over-award rate of an extra 2 per cent — a long-
standing company policy. 
At the time of the first interviews in 1992, the High Tech Australia manufacturing 
base was considering an enterprise agreement. The intention was to have this ratified 
by the AJRC. To negotiate a local agreement, the site had a joint 
consultative/negotiating committee of employer and union representatives 
(AMACSU), assisted by consultants. The proposal for such an agreement had arisen 
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because of TQM, which resulted in a decrease in costs and greater production from a 
smaller workforce. The company goal was to have an enterprise agreement linking 
manufacturing achievement to performance indicators, which could serve as the basis 
for a 6-monthly bonus system. 
High Tech Australia eventually reached agreement with the AMACSU for a single 
business enterprise agreement certified by the AJRC in August 1994 for a period of 
two years to July 1996. The agreement's main aim was 'to reduce lead times, 
improve productivity, and achieve labour flexibility'. The agreement had to be read 
and interpreted in conjunction with the Business Industry (Technical Services) Award, 
although the enterprise agreement takes precedence in the event of an inconsistency. 
It had several clauses on measures to achieve gains in efficiency — such as a flexible 
organisational structure to underpin the new classification system, and flexible work 
practices between all work stations subject to employee competence. Hours of work 
were 38 per week for day workers and shiftworkers, although the expectation was 
40.5 hours per week over a 9-day fortnight for day employees. Other provisions in 
the agreement covered paid training programmes, redundancy pay, counselling, 
discipline, and a 'no extra claims' undertaking for the life of the agreement. 
The heart of the bargain was the new classification structure, which had two levels of 
technical employees (Levels 6 [lower] and 5) and two levels of more highly paid 
technicians (4[lower] and 3) with a fixed annual salary for each. Level 6 was the new 
entry grade and, after training, it was expected that most staff would work at Level 5 
after demonstrated competence. To progress beyond this, employees had to gain 
further competencies. 
By 1995, the numbers of direct manufacturing employees had declined to 39, a 
cellular manufacturing system having been introduced. The cells set their own targets, 
had their own meetings, and had control of sourcing of materials. They had their own 
R and D personnel, production engineer and purchasing officer. Cell managers were 
appointed on salary staff conditions, reporting to the Production Manager. Leading 
Hands in the cells were selected on the basis of experience and length of service, and 
their salaries were individually negotiated and set above the Business Equipment 
Award levels. Leading Hands had Rostered Days Off and the same hours as 
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Operators, but with the new enterprise agreement, the Leading Hands were paid 
A$12 per week extra on top of their appropriate skill level pay. They could progress 
in compensation by attaining more competencies. The federal Business Equipment 
Award was used as a guide for conditions of service. In 1995, the production staff 
were given one week's bonus pay based on profits. In addition, High Tech Australia 
was working on cell cash incentives, which would be over and above the enterprise 
agreement rates. 
Clerical and Administrative Compensation in High Tech Australia 
The compensation policy for clerical staff was an individually negotiated package. 
Australia-wide, there were about 50 employees in the clerical/administrative category 
in High Tech in 1992. There was no formal job evaluation, but informal schemes 
evolved, with the various state clerical awards acting as the basis for clerical 
compensation. Under Australian industrial law, if a company is not a formal 
respondent to a federal or state award, it will automatically be bound by the 
provisions of the relevant state award. The Victorian State Clerical and 
Administrative Award negotiated by the former Federated Clerks' Union (now the 
AMASCU) is used as an example here to show how High Tech Australia worked with 
a state award. 
The Victorian Clerical and Administrative Award dates back to 1913. At the time of 
High Tech's commencement in 1974, clerical staff in the state were paid on three 
classifications: (1) those who filed and sorted paper, (2) general clerks (e.g. copy 
typists, switchboard operators, and machine operators), and (3) stenographers, audio-
typists, tele-typists, punch-card operators and accounting ledger clerks. A set weekly 
wage for each grade was awarded, and a separate rate given for males and females, 
and those aged 16-20 (see Victorian ERC Print 11800/74). This structure persisted 
throughout the 1980s, and the salaries in the determinations were updated as a result 
of AIRC NWC decisions at federal level. 
In 1990, the Victorian Clerical and Administrative Employees' Award was 
restructured to reflect a skills base rather than a job base (Victorian ERC Print 
76637/91). Seven pay grades were introduced, and skills were defined for each 
grade. These included technical and secretarial skills, enterprise/industry knowledge, 
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information handling, business/financial knowledge required, training and 
qualifications, and supervisory and specialists skills. Different weekly salaries were 
awarded in the first three grades for length of service up to 12 months. In January 
1994, the seven grade-structure was reduced to six by the Victorian industrial 
tribunal, with fixed-point salaries for the skills listed for each grade (Victorian ERC 
Case 93/0831). 
Although the Victorian Clerical and Administrative Award was first restructured in 
1990, at the time of the first interviews in 1992, High Tech Australia had not assessed 
its impact. The revised award had clearly defined levels of skill, and so the company 
had to fit people into the new definitions of the award. High Tech Australia was not a 
direct respondent to the Victorian State Clerical and Administrative Award, and relied 
on the ACM (Australian Chamber of Manufactures) to do the negotiating at the 
tribunal, but the company observed any changes in the award. In practice, High Tech 
Australia paid about 20 per cent over the award to obtain satisfactory staff, but no 
incentive pay, performances bonuses or special allowances were made. The 
company's hours of work were 35 per week although the award recommended 38. 
There was no shift work and very little overtime except at high peak times. 
Compensation was paid monthly and leave was in accordance with the award. There 
was no gain-sharing scheme. 
By 1995, all clerical employees in High Tech Australia had individual contracts with 
above-award rates. The salary levels were market- and performance-based, and there 
was a review of performance every July at which performance criteria were set. 
Guidelines for recommended maximum amounts for merit increases linked to 
performance were given to supervisors. Neither seniority nor qualifications would 
generate extra pay because, according to the company, they might not make any 
impact on the job performance. Actual earnings of clerical staff were kept secret, but 
there was no requirement for staff to sign a confidentiality document. This part of the 
salary system applied to junior clerical staff, clerical supervisors and junior 
administrative managers. 
For clerical staff in other states across the company, the various state clerical awards 
also formed the minimum levels for payment. High Tech Australia management 
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stated that most compensation paid was above the award and in line with the going 
rates in the labour market established by consultants' and agencies' surveys. 
Sales and Technical Service Compensation in High Tech Australia 
In 1992, the salaries for staff in sales roles reporting to Branch Managers nationally 
were individually negotiated. Sales employees had a pay package of a base salary plus 
commission, and usually operated with their own cars and travel expenses reimbursed. 
Base salaries were reviewed every June against data from salary surveys of other 
companies. Because there was a sales force conference in July of each year, salaries 
had to be fixed before then. There were targets for commission, which was originally 
paid on billings. If sales people exceeded the targets set by the Branch Managers, the 
percentage increased. The difference in hardness and softness of markets was taken 
into account and so with a soft market, the commission was less. This system had 
evolved over the years, had been decided at the top of the organisation, and was seen 
as the best scheme the company had had so far. At least, in the words of one 
executive, High Tech Australia had received the fewest number of 'grumbles' about 
It. 
By 1995, the commission in the compensation scheme had changed to a gross margin 
basis (revenue minus cost of goods sold) with set targets, and constituted more than 
half of the total package, compared with about one-third previously. Sales staff 
received no overtime and worked a nominal 9-to-5 day, but had to be flexible because 
of the nature of the job. The other conditions of service were prescribed in the State 
Commercial Travellers' Award relevant to each state except for Victoria, where state 
awards had been phased out after 1993. All state awards are different, but High Tech 
Australia gave superannuation, annual leave and long service leave in accordance with 
the awards while other conditions were company policy. 
The compensation for sales staff in branches can be compared with that for staff in 
technical customer support. Prior to 1992, the basis of compensation for the 
customer service personnel had been a rate for the job, which was individually 
negotiated within a set structure. The steps in the progression were: (1) bench 
engineers, (2) service engineers, (3) senior service engineers, and (4) technical 
assistance. The fixed salary for each of these levels was approximately 20 per cent 
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above the federal Business Equipment Industry (Technical Service) Award rate. The 
over-award payment recognised the rates operating in the market and the fact that 
employees specialised in particular areas. The conditions for service staff were based 
on the Business Equipment Industry Award. 
After 1992, the basis for compensation for the customer service personnel in High 
Tech Australia working across Australia was changed to a fixed salary plus variable 
component based on performance. The variable part was based on customer 
satisfaction and efficiency criteria. The technicians' respective supervisors assessed 
each category and the employee could respond to the assessment. There were 
brackets of increases which could be used and there was a cap on these. Staff were 
paid well above the rates of the federal Business Equipment Industry (Technical 
Service) Award, had a company car and were paid overtime. 
The fixed pay component for the customer service personnel in 1995 was based on a 
new career structure developed for them by High Tech Australia. Under the new 
scheme, staff started as bench technicians — probably with a Technical Certificate in 
Technology/Electronics. The next stage was customer service engineer 
(unsupervised). The third was senior customer engineer (supervisor of three or four 
people). In the fourth, the systems engineer (software) had to have an Associate 
Diploma in Electronics. Prior to 1992, salaries for service staff were set according to 
the job and there was little difference between employees, although they were still 
paid more than the Award. They received overtime, and under the Award provisions 
they were on standby once a month by rotation. Standby included being available 
from 5 pm to 9 pm in the evenings and all weekend to provide a 24-hour coverage for 
customers. By 1995, the base compensation was thus a mixture of job and skills plus 
a performance element. 
Research Compensation in High Tech Australia 
There were originally about 60 employees in High Tech Australia in the Research and 
Development area in 1992. By 1995, this had declined to about 23, with the staff 
centralised on the head office site. Their compensation packages were negotiated 
with the R and D Manager individually and were based mainly on market forces. 
There was no particular philosophy of pay, and no job evaluation, performance bonus 
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or salary structure. It was a very flexible system, with no paid overtime. Team 
leaders were appointed for group research, based on their competence. They had 
progressed from junior positions and some had moved into other areas in the 
company. R and D staff could work at home or on site; there were no strict rules. 
Their annual leave was a standard package like other salaried employees in High 
Tech. According to one executive, 
The main difficulty with the R and D staff was trying to get the stuff done on time, as speed 
and costs were the crucial factors in R and D rather than how much R and D was ahead of the 
market. 
The basis of R and D pay was therefore competitive rates and payment for skill. The 
pay was secret, and research employees did not discuss their respective salaries. 
There were no performance indicators in this area, but in 1995, senior management 
was looking at this. 
Managerial Compensation in High Tech Australia 
The management levels were divided into two groups for analysis: (1) Senior 
Managers such as the Managing Director (MD), Company Secretary/Chief Financial 
Executive, and Manufacturing Manager, and (2) Middle Management. A 
Remuneration Committee of the board based at the corporate High Tech MINE head 
office in Australia decided the compensation for all directors, and the MDs of 
Australia, the Americas and Asia, the Director of Technology, and their direct reports. 
Advice was provided to the committee by the Group HR Manager. The non-
executive directors received an annual fixed fee for their services recommended by the 
board to shareholders. The compensation packages for the Chairman, and MDs for 
Australia, the Americas and for Asia were based on the achievement of pre-set targets 
on key financial and non-financial key performance indicators (KPIs) such as return 
on investment, inventory held, and amount of debt. They received a fixed sum plus a 
bonus based on the KPIs. All CEOs were on a similar package 'so they could be 
shifted around the company' stated the Company Secretary. 
The Manufacturing Manager's position was not job-evaluated. The fixed sum was 80 
per cent of his total package with a variable component of 20 per cent based on 
performance factors such individual objectives, profit and productivity. The fixed 
component was based on the cost of living and the non-variable part of the job. It also 
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included superannuation and some flexibility to chose benefits within a total cost. No 
recognition for length of service was given, although the job would be paid more if it 
expanded in scope. 
Equal ranking executives in different functions were paid differently because of 
market forces. The compensation for executives was secret apart from the company 
law disclosure requirements. The publicly available 1995 Annual Report for the 
corporate MNE lists the four executive directors as receiving compensation between 
A$300,000 and A$639,999 per annum. The executive jobs were reviewed annually 
and benclunarked against other companies through an industrial association's bi-
annual compensation publication. The High Tech Australia Manufacturing Manager's 
performance was assessed annually, and his package was reviewed by his superior. 
Goals were reset for the following year and confirmed in writing. The manager 
received a share of the profits after tax. Similarly, the MD (Asia) was paid a 
percentage of the Asian region profits. 
For middle managers' compensation, such as that for the Branch Managers and Sales 
and Service managers (who reported to Branch Managers), no formal job evaluation 
was used prior to 1995, and the packages had fixed and variable components. The 
variable-factor compensation was usually based on profit targets and objectives to be 
achieved. The objectives, which were linked to the business plan of the company, 
were set individually for each member of staff Senior management reviewed progress 
against the objectives. A flat bonus sum was available and the manager would know 
in advance what amount it was likely to be. A percentage of the amount available 
was given if objectives were only partly achieved. A maximum bonus of perhaps 
A$10,000 was possible. 
Some basic conditions applied across High Tech Australia for middle managers. They 
included an expectation of flexible hours and no paid overtime. There were some 
bonuses for specialists that were applied ad hoc for outstanding performance. Staff 
were reviewed annually, but there was no formal performance appraisal system. It 
consisted of a 'discussion' only, according to an executive. In previous years, reviews 
may not have occurred at all, and a staff member might have just received an increase. 
468 
This changed in 1995 with the new Group HR Manager, who introduced a formal 
middle management job evaluation system for the Group MD's direct reports and 
below in High Tech Australia. The scheme was based on a consultant's 
recommendations, although at the 1996 interviews the company was reluctant to 
provide details about how well this was working. However, the packages again 
consisted of fixed and variable components based on negotiated individual objectives, 
with the variable part usually being lower in more junior positions. A salary budget 
was fixed for each department, and senior management could decide what percentage 
to make variable for each manager. The Branch Managers' 1995 compensation 
consisted of an evaluated base salary, a variable part based on individual objectives, 
and a profit component based on the outcome of the branch budget. 
Employee Benefits in High Tech Australia 
The basic employee benefits for lower-level staff in High Tech Australia were 
incorporated in federal and state awards. For example, common employee benefits of 
the Business Equipment Industry (Technical Service) 1972 Award, the Clerical and 
Administrative Employees Award of Victoria and the Commercial Travellers and 
Market Researchers' Award of Victoria were: 
• Accident make-up pay 
• Adoption leave 
• Amenities (first aid, washing) 
• Annual leave 
• Compassionate leave 
• Jury service make-up pay 
• Maternity leave 
• Motor vehicle allowances 
• Overtime 
• Public holidays 
• Sick leave 
• Superannuation (pension) 
• Travelling and board on business. 
Each of the awards had slight variations. Salespeople had an extra provision for loss 
of personal items while working away from the home base, but had no shiftwork 
provision. The Business Equipment Industry Award had a requirement for Technical 
Service personnel to be on standby duty on a regular basis in case of a customer 
callout. The clerical staff were entitled to advanced notification about the 
introduction of technological change, rest periods, uniform allowances, floor covering 
when standing on concrete, and security cover for young employees making deposits 
for the company in a bank. Under the new High Tech Australia enterprise agreement 
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for the manufacturing employees which supplemented the federal Business Equipment 
Industry (Technical Service) Award, time off in lieu of overtime and redundancy pay 
were added. 
The High Tech Australia company commenced paying for superannuation for 
industrial staff and customer service technicians in October 1986. In 1989, industrial 
tribunals recommended superannuation for clerical employees, so High Tech Australia 
contributed sums for them to the same fund as for industrial staff and the customer 
service engineers. Sales staff were covered by superannuation by 1990. The 
remaining staff of High Tech were covered by the company's own superannuation 
scheme. All these initiatives conformed with the 1992 Superannuation Guarantee 
legislation, which made an employer's contribution of four per cent compulsory in 
1992, rising to nine per cent by 2003. In 1995, High Tech Australia was paying six 
per cent of salary for all employees. 
Employee benefits varied according to employee category. The managers in High 
Tech Australia had defined benefits packages including a share purchase plan, and 
could take out an operating lease on a car from a limited list of motor vehicles. If 
they wished to 'salary sacrifice' for a more expensive vehicle (i.e. pay the extra 
expense out of pre-taxed gross salary), the lease was placed in their name so that if 
they resigned, 'the car went with them', said the Company Secretary. Salespeople, 
service technicians and higher-paid administrators also had the choice of leasing a car 
on a salary sacrifice basis or receiving a car allowance for use of their own vehicle. 
The Fringe Benefits Tax (FBT) caused a substantial narrowing of benefits for 
executives. 
The standard profile of the employee benefits to enable a comparison with those in 
Singapore is shown in Table 11.1. From this, it can be noted that the common 
benefits across all grades were compassionate leave, long term/disability leave, 
retrenchment benefit, study leave/benefit, disability insurance, long service certificate 
(non-financial), annual leave, family leave, social club, and reimbursement for use of 
own transport on company business. In addition, similar public holiday leave and 
superannuation were offered to all staff. 
470 
Table 11.1 
file r Hi h Tech Australia as at 1995 
Industrial/ 
Blue Collar 
Unskilled 	Skilled 
Clerical/ 
Admin 
Sales/ 
Technical 
Professional/ 
Management 
Board 
Acting allowance 
Annual leave 1 I 1 I 1 I 
Attendance allowance 1 1 
Business entertairunent expenses  
Cellular phones 1 (1) i 1 1 
Co-operative shares I I 
Compassionate leave 1 I 1 I I I 
Death benefit 
Dental treatment 
Early retirement schemes 
External/social recreational club 
membership 
1 (2) 1 (2) 1 (2) V (2) 1 (2) V (2) 
Festive loan/advance 
Fixed monthly transport allowance 
Free medical treatment/medicine 
Funeral leave benefit 1 (3) V (3) 1(3) 1(3) 1 (3) 1(3) 
Hospital ward benefit (4) (4) 
Housing loan 
Housing renovation loan 
Insurance 1 (5) V (5) V (5) 1 (5) V (5) 1 (5) 
Laundry benefit 1 1 
Long service award 1 1 1 1 I 1 
Long-term illness 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Machine allowance 1 V 
Marriage leave 
Maternity leave 1 (6) if (6) 1 (6) 1 (6) 1 (6) V (6) 
Meal allowance V (7) 1 (7) 
Medically board-out benefit 1 (8) 1 (8) 1 (8) 1 (8) V (8) 1 (8) 
Other loans 
Paternity leave V (6) 1 (6) V (6) 1 (6) 1 (6) 1 (6) 
Provision of car 1 (9) 1 1 1 
Reimbursement for use of own car 
on company business 
I I 1 V 1 1 
Retirement benefit (>CPF) 
[Singapore] 
Retrenchment benefit 1 (10) 1(10) 1(10) 1(10) 1(10) 1 (10) 
Service benefit 
Shift allowance 1 1 
Sick leave I J I i I I 
Specialist surgical fee 
Study leave benefit 1 1 1 I 1 1 
Superannuation (Australia) 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Transport benefit/allowanceJ 
reimbursement 
1 (11) 1(11) 1(11) 1(11) 1(11) 1 (11) 
Uniform V 1 
Union day leave 
Union education leave I 1 
Unpaid leave V (8) 1 (8) 
Voluntary resignation benefit 
Notes: 
(1) Some (2) Run by staff (3) Leave only (4) Prior to FBT, was part of package (5) Disability only (6) Family leave for males. 
(7) For overtime working (8) Discretionary (9) Salary sacrifice basis (10) Based on Australian Industrial Relations Commission 
rules (11) Reimbursement only. 
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Role of High Tech Australia Corporate Head Office 
As the Australian parent, the corporate MINE High Tech centralised the compensation 
decisions at head office for the employees working in High Tech Australia. Decisions 
on bonuses on performance were to some extent delegated to senior management. 
The packages for the MDs for the Group (Australia, the Americas and Asia) and their 
immediate reports plus the non-executive directors were all approved by the corporate 
MINE Board's Remuneration Committee, with recommendations coming from the 
chair, and more recently in conjunction with the Group Human Resource Manager. 
Compensation systems for the remainder of the Australian staff were recommended by 
the senior line management and agreed formerly with the Company Secretary and then 
with the Group Human Resource Manager. The enterprise agreement for the 
manufacturing staff was negotiated mainly by the Manufacturing Manager who used 
an employer association and a consultant to assist with the negotiations. 
The Profile of High Tech Australia Compensation 
Tables 11.2 to 11.7 show High Tech Australia's profile for the rewards of industrial, 
clerical, sales, technical, research, and middle and senior managerial staffs using the 
Gomez-Mejia and Balldn (1992) concepts of Algorithmic and Experiential 
compensation patterns. The profile for the High Tech Australia industrial staff is 
provided in Table 11.2. The original use of the federal Business Equipment Industry 
(Technical Services) Award meant that High Tech Australia's industrial 
manufacturing staff were originally paid by job classification, but with the enterprise 
agreement, the basis became predominantly skill. However, in general, the industrial 
compensation was Algorithmic. By comparison, the clerical compensation (Table 
11.3) had even more Algorithmic features. It had a structure that was loosely tied to 
the states' clerical awards, which were originally job-based and, more recently, skill-
based. On the other hand, the sales staff (Table 11.4) were paid on performance, with 
general annual reviews, short-term targets, and commission playing an important part 
of the compensation package. The compensation was generally balanced between 
Algorithmic and Experiential factors. 
The technical service employees (Table 11.5) were similarly paid on performance 
with short-term criteria, although High Tech Australia set up a structure based on job 
skill and qualifications for base pay. Their whole compensation was mainly 
Compensation Feature A or E 
TOTAL . A = 9 
E = 5 
Unknown = 2 
N/A=3 (6) 
High Tech Australia Industrial Staff 
(a)Basis for Pay 
Unit of analysis 
Criteria for pay increases 
Level of performance measurement 
Time orientation 
Risk sharing 
Strategic focus 
Equity concern 
Reward distribution 
Type of control 
Skill based 
Skill progression & NWC increases 
None - not applicable 
Not applicable 
Low 
Not applicable 
Formal structure 
Differences in benefits 
Assessment of skills 
A (2) 
A 
A 
A 
A 
(b)Design Issues 
Salary market policy 
Benefits market policy 
Incentives in pay mix 
Total compensation 
Reinforcement schedule 
Reward emphasis 
Unknown 
Unknown 
None 
Low future potential/ higher immediate payoffs (3) 
NWC increases in Enterprise Agreement 
Mainly pecuniary  
- 
A 4  
A 
A 
(c)Administrative Framework 
Decision making 
Pay disclosure 
Governance structure 
Nature of pay policies 
EA for manufacturing only 
High: public AIRC (5) document 
Union participation 
Formalised in awards A 
Table 11.2 
Summary Profile of Algorithmic (A) and Experiential (E) Compensation Patterns of 
Industrial Staff Compensation in High Tech Australia (1) as at 1995 
Notes: (1) There were no industrial staff in High Tech Singapore. (2) Rises were available through skill 
progression or by overall increases in enterprise agreement rates through National Wage Case (NWC) 
decisions.(3) The Enterprise Agreement for 3 years did not allow extra claims for compensation increases 
unless they were consistent with NWC decisions (4) Bonuses have been given to all industrial employees 
based on overall performance in manufacturing. (5) Australian Industrial Relations Commision (6) Not 
applicable 
Table 11.3 
Summary Profile of Algorithmic (A) and Experiential (E) Compensation Patterns of Clerical Staff Compensation 
in High Tech Australia and High Tech Singapore as at 1995 
High Tech Australia Clerical Staff High Tech Singapore Clerical Staff 
Compensation Feature A or E Compensation Feature A or E 
(a) Basis for Pay 
Skill/individual negotiation 
Performance 
Individual performance appraisal (PA) 
Short-term (annual) 
Low- merit increase only 
Not applicable 
Individual salary/market driven 
Different employee benefits 
Informal performance appraisal 
--, 
7.:  Skill/individual negotiation 
Performance 
Individual PA and aggregate 
Short-term (annual) 
Loss of bonus 
Not applicable 
Individual salary/market driven 
Different employee benefits for 
executives 
Formal PA (behaviour) 
R
 w
w
w
¢
w
.
 w
 ¢
 ¢ 
Unit of analysis 
Criteria for pay increases 
Level of performance measurement 
Time orientation 
Risk sharing 
Strategic focus 
Equity concern 
Reward distribution 
Type of control 
(b) Design Issues 
Unknown 
Unknown 
Base, salary is important 
Low future potential/higher imediate payoffs 
Mainly on merit and market rates 
Pecuniary 
Unknown 
Unknown 
Bonus varies each year 
Low future potential/higher immediate 
Annual review & twice yearly bonus 
Pecuniary 
I
I
 	
¢
  ¢
  w
 
Salary market policy 
Benefits market policy 
Incentives in pay mix 
Total compensation 
Reinforcement schedule 
Reward emphasis 
(c) Administrative Framework 
Central control by H.R. Manager 
Low 
Non-union 
Case by case 
<4 ¢  ¢
 w 
Decentralised 
Low 
Non-union 
Case by case 
w
 ¢  ¢
 w 
Decision making 
Pay disclosure 
Governance structure 
Nature of pay policies 
TOTAL A= 11 
E = 5 
U/K=2 (3) 
N/A= 1 (4) 
TOTAL A = 7 
E = 8 
A/E = 1 
U/K=2 (3) 
N/A = 1(4) 
Notes:(1) The company paid above the award levels for each skill based classification of the states' awards.(2) More compensation is given for formal 
qualifications. This is equated here with skill (3) Unknown (4) Not applicable 
Table 11.4 
Summary Profile of Algorithmic (A) and Experiential (E) Compensation Patterns of Sales Staff Compensation in 
High Tech Australia and High Tech Singapore as at 1995 
High Tech Australia Sales Staff High Tech Singapore Sales Staff 
Compensation Feature A or E Compensation Feature A or E 
(a) Basis for Pay 
Job 
Performance and annual review of base rate 
Individual 
Short-term 
Loss of commission 
Not applicable 
Base rate - market driven 
Differences in benefits 
Commission based on sales 
d
d
d
d
i.
1
1
 w
d
[1.1 
Job 
Performance/sales 
Not applicable 
Short-term 
Loss of commission 
Not applicable 
Individual salary/market driven 
Few different employee benefits for executives 
Commission based on sales 
d
r
a
l u
<
L
4
 .w
w
w
 
Unit of analysis 
Criteria for pay increases 
Level of performance measurement 
Time orientation 
Risk sharing 
Strategic focus 
Equity concern 
Reward distribution 
Type of control 
(b) Design Issues 
Unknown 
Unknown 
High 
Low future potential/higher immediate payoffs 
Commission paid regularly 
Pecuniary mainly 
,
f4
d
ci“
LI 
Unknown 
Unknown 
High 
Low future potential/higher immediate payoffs 
Regular commission 
Pecuniary 
Salary market policy 
Benefits market policy 
Incentives in pay mix 
Total compensation 
Reinforcement schedule 
Reward emphasis 
(c) Administrative Framework 
National scheme but commission is locally 
driven 
Low 
No union 
National pay system, but individual 
commission system 
d
d
  
Decentralised 
Low 
Non-union 
Case by case 
d
<
u.3 
Decision Making 
Pay disclosure 
Governance structure 
Nature of pay policies 
TOTAL 
A = 7 
E =6 
A/E = 3 
U/K=2(2) 
N/A= 1 (3) 
TOTAL 
A = 5 
E = 10 
U/K=2(2) 
N/A=2(3) 
Notes: (1) Without formal job classification systems, it could be argued that employees were paid for skills possessed as well. (2) Unknown (3) Not applicable 
NE 
A 
A 
Table 11.5 
Summary Profile of Algorithmic (A) and Experiential (E) Compensation Patterns of Technical Service Staff Compensation for 
High Tech Australia and High Tech Singapore as at 1995 
High Tech Australia Technical Service Staff High Tech Singapore Technical Service Staff 
A or E A or E Compensation Feature Compensation Feature 
(a)Basis for Pay 
Unit of analysis 
Criteria for pay increases 
Level of performance measurement 
Time orientation 
Risk sharing 
Strategic focus 
Equity concern 
Reward distribution 
Type of control 
Mixture of job and skills 
Performance 
Individual 
Short-term 
Unknown 
Not applicable 
Structure plus above award 
Different benefits for senior staff 
Customer feedback and other measures 
Job 
Performance 
Individual PA and aggregate 
Short-term (annual) 
Loss of bonus 
Not applicable 
Individual salary/market driven 
Different employee benefits for executives 
Formal performance appraisal (behaviour) 
A 2 
A 
A 
A 
A 
A 
A 
(b)Design Issues  
Salary market policy 
Benefits market policy 
Incentives in pay mix 
Total compensation 
Reinforcement schedule 
Reward emphasis 
Unknown 
Unknown 
Base salary is important 
Low future potential/higher immediate payoffs 
Annual incentives 
Pecuniary 
Unknown 
Unknown 
Bonus varies each year 
Low future potential/higher immediate payoffs 
Annual review and twice yearly bonus 
Pecuniary  
A/E 
A 
A 
A 
A 
A 
(c)Administrative Framework 
Decision making 
Pay disclosure 
Governance structure 
Nature of pay policies 
Structure decided centrally 
Low 
Non-union 
Case by case incentive 
Decentralised 
Low 
Non-union 
Case by case  
A 
A 
TOTAL 
A = 8 
E = 7 
A/E = 1 
U/K=2(3) 
N/A= 1 (4) 
TOTAL 
A = 9 
E = 4 
A/E = 2 
U/K=3 (3) 
N/A= 1 (4) 
Notes:(1) The structure had skills and performance elements (2) Without forma job classification systems, it could be argued that employees were paid for 
skills possessed. (4) Unknown (5) Not applicable 
Table 11.6 
Summary Profile of Algorithmic (A) and Experiential (E) Compensation Patterns of Research 
Staff Compensation in High Tech Australia as at 1995 (1) 
High Tech Australia Research Staff 
Compensation Feature A or E 
(a) Basis for Pay 
Skills 
Tenure 
None-not applicable 
Short-term 
No risk element 
Not applicable 
Mainly market driven 
Different benefits 
No appraisal-not appicable 
<
 .<<
  
Unit of analysis 
Criteria for pay increases 
Level of performance measurement 
Time orientation 
Risk sharing 
Strategic focus 
Equity concern 
Reward distribution 
Type of control 
(b)Design Issues 
Not known 
Not known 
None 
Low future potential/higher immediate payoffs 
Annual review 
Pecuniary 
<  < < 
Salary market policy 
Benefits market policy 
Incentives in pay mix 
Total compensation 
Reinforcement schedule 
Reward emphasis 
(c) Administrative Framework 
Central policy 
Low 
Non-union 
Case by case 
< <  
Decision making 
Pay disclosure 
Governance structure 
Nature of pay policies 
TOTAL A = 10 
E = 4 
U/K=2(2) 
N/A=3 (3) 
Notes:(1) There were no research staff in High Tech Singapore (2) Unknown (3) Not applicable 
Table 11.7 
Summary Profile of Algorithmic (A) and Experiential (E) Compensation Patterns of Management Staff Compensation in 
High Tech Australia and High Tech Singapore as at 1995 
High Tech Australia Management Staff High Tech Singapore Management Staff 
Compensation Feature A or E Compensation Feature  
Job 
Performance 
Individual 
Short-term 
High variable component 
Business unit 
Market and objectives driven 
Few special rewards for executives 
Objective measures 
•et 	
tz..“4
 	
fa.1 L11 
(a)Basis for Pay 
Job 
Strong performance element 
Individual and aggregate 
Short-term 
High variable component 
Business unit/regional focus 
Comparable pay relationships 
Special rewards for executives 
Objective measures 
<
w
w
<
w
w
<
<
w 
Unit of analysis 
Criteria for pay increases 
Level of performance measurement 
Time orientation 
Risk sharing 
Strategic focus 
Equity concern 
Reward distribution 
Type of control 
(b)Design Issues 
Not known (I) 
Not known (1) 
Incentives important 
Low future potential/higher immediate payoffs 
Annual 
Pecuniary 
Not known 
Not known 
High incentives 
Low future potential/higher immediate payoffs 
Mainly annual (4) 
Pecuniary 
< 
Salary market policy 
Benefits market policy 
Incentives in pay mix 
Total compensation 
Reinforcement schedule 
Reward emphasis 
(c) Administrative Framework 
Centralised pay policy 
Low for indivival salaries 
Some choice of benefits 
General rules, but case by case 
<
 d
 
Decentralised to subsidiary and regional office 
Low 
Determined by company 
Mainly case by case 
<  
Decision making 
Pay disclosure 
Governance structure 
Nature of pay policies 
TOTAL 
A = 8 
E =9 
U/K=2 (5) 
TOTAL 
A = 7 
E = 10 
U/K=2(5) 
Notes: (1) Salaries and benefits are, however, bench marked against industry standards. (2) The incentives components are annual, but a share purchase option was 
available.(3) Although the managerial objectives are individually set, it could be argued that they relate directly to business unit performance. (4) Service Manager 
received quarterly bonus (5) Unknown 
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Algorithmic as was that of the research staff (Table 11.6) who had annually reviewed 
individual salaries based on their skills without incentives. The compensation for the 
senior management (Table 11.7) was centralised through the Remuneration 
Committee of the board. It was mainly based on job and performance, with individual 
and aggregate criteria. The senior managerial compensation in High Tech Australia 
was a balance of Experiential and Algorithmic features. 
Using the Gomez-Mejia and Balldn (1992:61) profile of compensation patterns, it was 
evident that High Tech Australia had a variety of patterns. The lack of awards at the 
higher levels of the organisation seemed to have given the company more choice and 
flexibility. It had also considered the various behaviours it wanted to encourage 
among the different occupations and then attempted to design a compensation system 
to facilitate them. 
High Tech Australia Compensation and the External Environment 
Taking the four research questions as the starting point for analysing the effects of the 
external environment on High Tech Australia's compensation systems, in the first 
interviews with the Company Secretary, he was of the opinion that the legislative 
framework was constraining to some extent, in that the company was conscious that it 
could not pay less than state and federal award rates. He continued: 
Equal pay laws are not a problem because we have a wage for a position irrespective of sex. 
FBT had a major impact because there was a lot of reorganisation of certain allowances on its 
introduction. Before the company was floated in 1985, everyone was a contractor. There 
were no cars or anything. Then they became employees and we introduced cars after FBT 
came in because it was competitive practice for certain jobs. Then we introduced temporary 
disability, which was not affected by FBT ...Health is affected though.. .No-one will salary 
sacrifice for super [superannuation] except for one or two. 'Super' is optional so people prefer 
the cash. Even the production employees prefer the four per cent in cash. 
The Company Secretary then referred to superannuation as a national industrial issue 
and its inclusion in awards. He went on: 
In October 1986, the production and the customer service people went into 'super'. The 
tribunal said that the money could go into one fund_ Then in 1987, the clerical employees 
were awarded 'super' and went into the same fund.. .The sales staff got it in 1990, but they 
are paid so much more than the award... They got three per cent. Now four per cent applies to 
everyone up to 80K... With the people who did not get 'super', their money goes into the 
company [High Tech] fund... The employees think superannuation is government guaranteed 
and can't go bust.. .For us, it is just an add-on.. an extra cost... it did not affect the 
structure.. .The October '86 'super' for the production people was in lieu of a four per cent 
pay increase at the time anyway. 
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In a later interview, the Company Secretary said of the national superannuation 
legislation and the FBT: 
We comply. We have some on salary sacrifice, and the enterprise agreement people have an 
ACTU industrial fund. Everyone else is in the [High Tech] fund.. .about 200 in this ...We 
have followed the percentages of the legislation. With the FBT changes, salary packaging 
ceased. School fees went back to base salary on a tax adjusted basis. There's only one benefit 
left - cars.. .This is the policy for Australia only. The only people who get cars in Asia are the 
CEOs. 
The impact of the state of the economy had a major effect on the level of pay in High 
Tech Australia. The Company Secretary observed at the initial interviews: 
We have been holding pay and structures up to 1st July 1992 for three years. At one stage, we 
decreased pay to keep people.. .Anyone 30k and above.. .We could not touch those on less 
than 30K ...We had a pay cut for six months... We don't adjust non-award salaries with the 
CPI ... With higher unemployment, it's easier to get cheaper and good quality people, 
especially finance staff.. .This may not apply in R&D though... 
Increases granted by the industrial tribunals for the production staff were passed on to 
High Tech employees. Any relevant principles of the AlRC NWC were also 
followed, including the requirements for an enterprise agreement. Several years later, 
the Company Secretary stated: 
Increases now are quite modest compared with five or six years ago. Everyone's getting more 
modest increases. Compare that with Asia.. .Executives are paid two to three times more in 
Singapore and Hong Kong than here.. .The cost of living is very high...In Malaysia, they are 
on 25 or 50 per cent of Australian rates. 
With regard to the effect of the Australian national culture on pay design, he did not 
perceive many features of Australian society that would constrain him in the design of 
compensation systems. He went on: 
The Taiwan employees always want shares, but the philosophy of the company [High Tech 
Australia] is not to use incentives where this might damage performance or increase risk 
taking I don't have a big variable component in my pay because I might take risks with 
investments to increase profits. The Sales and Marketing employees are more money 
motivated.. .They'll walk over broken glass for extra earnings. We have 20/80 variable/fixed 
for senior managers, and incentives for sales, but incentives are not used at lower levels. 
The Company Secretary, at a later interview, indicated that; 
Australian managers and subordinates have small pay gaps... Scandinavia is the same... is just 
how life is... In Brazil, the CEO and two levels down, the gap is extremely wide. 
On incentives, he commented: 
I think executive options are the right way for performance... We have rules about the limits 
per year. Asia got share options with the shares at ten cents ...They're now worth a dollar 
eight. 
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Taking pay and culture further, Table 11.8 shows the extent to which the Hodgetts 
and Luthans (1993b) recommendations for compensation for the cultural dimensions 
found in Australia by Hofstede (1980) are reflected in the High Tech Australia 
compensation systems. There were varying degrees of conformity and non-
conformity with the recommendations between the six pay systems. The small range 
of classifications and skills for the industrial employees was appropriate for the low 
Power Distance of the Australian culture, but without salary data for the rest of the 
organisation (except for the directors), it was not possible to conclude whether the 
gap in income between the lowest and highest paid was great. High Tech did, 
however, differentiate between employee benefits for various categories of staff No 
gain-sharing or profit plans applied across the workforce, although the senior 
executives did benefit from the latter. 
The emphasis on individual performance was uneven across the occupations, and 
while the company used external rates' indicators to set salary levels for most 
employee groups, any pay rises for the industrial employees were dependent on the 
recommendations of the AIRC NWC rather than the local labour market levels. In 
general, however, there was a high degree of support for the Hodgetts and Luthans 
(1993b) recommendations for a high Individualistic national culture. High Tech 
Australia had few family-friendly employee benefits beyond the mandatory ones, so 
conformed to the moderately high Masculinity dimensions of Australia (Hofstede, 
1980). There was little sharing of the financial risks in the company (except at 
managerial levels), normally recommended for a moderately weak Uncertainty 
Avoidance culture, although there was an emphasis on performance in four 
occupations out of six. All this suggests that with several compensation systems in an 
organisation, other internal and external factors may override the influence of national 
culture across them all, so that the fit with the culture may vary. 
The influence of the industrial relations system on subsidiary design was the fourth 
research question. According to the Company Secretary: 
Trade unions have little influence.., it's only on the production floor.. .They are becoming 
more vocal as people get laid off. They like to be consulted.. .But they're only a minor irritant 
as there are only 18 members and are included in the consultative mechanisms even though 
they only have small numbers... But we followed the Accord and the '87 adjustments and the 
restructuring principles in '88. 
Table 11.8 
The Hodgetts and Luthans (H&L) Recommendations for Compensation in Australia as Reflected in High Tech Australia 
AUSTRALIA 
Hofstede 
Dimension Index 
H&L Recommended 
Compensation 
Industrial Staff 
Compensation 
Clerical Staff 
Compensation 
Sales Staff 
Compensation 
Technical Staff 
Compensation 
Research Staff 
Compensation 
Managerial 
Staff 
Compensation 
1.Moderately low 
Power Distance 
'Low salary gaps between 
lowest and highest paid 
.Low benefits gaps 
'Gain-sharing 
'Profit-sharing• 
Yes, within award, 
but company range 
unknown 
No 
No 
No 
Unknown 
No 
No 
No 
Unknown 
No 
No 
No 
Unknown 
No 
No 
No 
Unknown 
No 
No 
No 
Unknown 
No 
No 
Yes 
2. High 
Individualism 
"Individual performance based 
'External equity/ 
competitiveness 
'Emphasis on short-term 
achievement 
No 
No (1) 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
3. Moderately high 
Masculinity 
'Few family benefits 
'Gender pay differences 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
4. Moderately weak 
Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
'Emphasis on performance 
'Sharing of risks associated 
with MNE's success or failure 
'Competitive salaries to avoid 
poaching of staff 
-Decentralised pay policies (2) 
No 
No 
No (I) 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Supported Y (Yes) 
Not Supported N (No) 
Unknown 
Y = 3 
N= 10 
Y = 6 
N = 6 
Unknown = 1 
Y = 6 
N = 6 
Unknown = 1 
Y = 6 
N = 6 
Unknown = 1 
Y = 3 
N = 9 
Unknown = 1 
Y = 8 
N = 4 
Unknown = 1 
Notes:(I) Increases were limited to rises recommended in the AIRC National Wage Cases (2) Taken to mean decentralised within the company High Tech Australia 
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At later interviews, the Company Secretary perceived: 
With the Commission and National Wage Cases, the only area which impacts is 
manufacturing.. .There's no enterprise agreement for the rest of the company.. .just individual 
contracts... That's the way we do business.. .We are not then fighting the bureaucratic IR 
process. 
Another external feature that affected High Tech Australia was the nature of the 
industry of which it formed part. High Tech had global and regional features and had 
managed its multicountry operations without a specialist HR function until recently. 
The competition was strong, and speed to market was essential for its fast-changing 
customer systems needs. In addition, changing markets and economic conditions put 
pressure on the ways work was organised in High Tech Australia, which included a 
reduction in the manufacturing workforce and the introduction of cross-functional 
teams. Skill-based pay accompanied these developments. While the manufacturing 
function had a formal enterprise agreement, the MNE was not so big in Australia that 
individual salary setting in several occupational groups was not possible. Technology 
was also an internal environmental feature affecting the skill profile needed, 
particularly research staff With different behaviours needed, High Tech Australia had 
seven different compensation systems. 
Summing up, High Tech Australia was a fairly young, medium-sized company. Its 
compensation profile gives the impression of flexibility with various systems being 
used for different occupations. From the interviews, High Tech seemed to be in a 
compensation development phase, looking for appropriate incentives to get the 
desired behaviour. 
High Tech Singapore 
Company Background of High Tech Singapore 
High Tech Singapore was a sales and service subsidiary of the corporate MINE High 
Tech, which commenced business in 1984 with four employees. In 1992, it had 22 
staff and, at that time, had moderate competition in data communications, but faced 
considerable competition on the personal computing networking aspect of the 
business. By August 1995, the number of employees had risen to 32. It was 
registered as a private company. The board for High Tech Singapore included the 
local CEO and three Australians. High Tech Singapore mainly reported to High Tech 
Asia which was a publicly listed company with a regional headquarters in Singapore. 
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High Tech Singapore was 100 per cent owned by High Tech Asia which, in turn, was 
56.25 per cent owned by the corporate High Tech MINE. In the year ending 30 June 
1995, High Tech Asia made a profit of US$6.2m. High Tech Singapore had only one 
work site in Singapore. No manufacturing was done there as it was all carried out in 
Australia or Taiwan. 
Organisation of High Tech Singapore 
In 1992, the High Tech Singapore reporting relationship was mainly to the Hong 
Kong head office. According to the Singaporean executive interviewed, 
the immediate boss [was] in Hong Kong, but there [was] a dotted line back from the Hong 
Kong Directors in various departments to the respective heads in [High Tech] Singapore. 
However, since the creation of a new regional office for High Tech Asia in Singapore, 
the High Tech Singapore CEO now reported to the Managing Director at the 
Singapore regional office. The regional office determined the affiliate CEO's salary. 
The two establishments were not on the same site. The High Tech Singapore's 
Finance and Administration Manager had most contact with the regional office in 
Singapore, but had occasional contact with the corporate MINE High Tech finance 
function for financial reporting. 
High Tech Singapore's 1995 structure (almost unchanged from 1992) is shown in 
Figure 11.3. The major change, apart from the increase in staff numbers from 1992— 
95, was the introduction of a Marketing Manager. The function was originally 
undertaken by the CEO who was an expatriate Australian. High Tech Singapore did 
Figure 11.3 
Organisation Structure of High Tech Singapore as at 1995 
MD 
 
As 
(Regional Office) 
Co 
High Tech 
Singapore 
1 	I I 	I 	I 
Sales Marketing Manager 	Service Manager 	Finance and 
(Managed by 	(role previously done by 	 Administration 
the CEO) CEO) 	 Manager 
I 	I 1 	I 
1 0 Sales 2 Pre-Sales 	 10 Service 7 Office Staff 
Persons 	 Support Staff 
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not employ any unskilled foreign workers, but had three foreign professionals in 1995 
— one from India and two from Hong Kong. No government levy was payable for 
these professionals. The rest of the workforce consisted of Chinese Singaporeans, 
with an age range of 20-44 years. In 1995, about 10 per cent of the employees had 
more than 5 years' service. They were 20 males and 12 females in the affiliate. The 
Finance and Administration Manager was the only female manager. The retirement 
age was 60 (previously 55, prior to legislative change). 
Mission and Objectives of High Tech Singapore 
Although High Tech Singapore did not have its own mission statement, it saw itself as 
being fairly autonomous in structure and methods. Said the CEO, 
We would talk to Hong Kong about major changes, but not Australia. Australian 
headquarters sometimes gives us instructions on finance, but we were told to follow the 
Singapore patterns. 
The major objective of the subsidiary was growth by expansion into other areas. The 
company was judged to be competitive on price and quality, and believed it gave good 
service through well-trained sales staff. By 1995, quality accreditation was an 
important goal for all the High Tech South East Asian companies. Singapore, Hong 
Kong and Malaysia had all achieved ISO 9002 certification for quality, but this had 
not had any impact on the compensation systems. 
HRNI/Ht Organisation in High Tech Singapore 
High Tech Singapore had a business plan and a budget for the year that covered 
personnel costs, products, capitalisation plans and sales. The HRIvI philosophy was 
stated to be to 'provide a good working environment and benefits to keep staff 
happy'. The company paid according to qualifications and experience at market rates. 
Employee benefits were standard for everyone, but more benefits might have been 
offered to more experienced staff to retain them. High Tech tried to provide as much 
training as possible for new graduates and to retain experienced employees. 
Applicants for jobs were asked for their present and expected salary, and whether they 
would take less. After the interview, the compensation package was decided. The 
company had no salary structure; the essence was individual negotiation. Newcomers 
were placed on three months' probation and then confirmed if satisfactory. Salaries 
were reviewed annually in July. Because of its size, High Tech Singapore had no 
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consultative committee. If an individual had a grievance, he or she would go to the 
immediate supervisor or ultimately to the CEO. 
As far as the formalisation of the HR function was concerned, High Tech Singapore 
had a book of office procedures that was updated regularly. This covered salaries, 
leave, overtime and procedures for making quotations for business. The Finance and 
Administration Manager did the HRM administrative work, and the line managers did 
the selection interviews. The subsidiary was not unionised. 
There was no shiftwork in the company. The official working week was 8.30 am to 
5.30 pm five days per week, but in 1995, most employees were working about 10 
hours per day. No overtime was paid except to the receptionist and service 
personnel. The junior service engineers were allowed to claim overtime for service 
calls because they were on a low basic wage. All staff were full-time, and casuals 
were only used when needed, particularly during holiday time in the administration 
office. Most staff in the administration office worked from 8 am to 6.30 pm and did 
not claim overtime unless they were asked to work extra hours on a Saturday. 
Clerical Compensation in High Tech Singapore 
Being a small company, the compensation systems in High Tech Singapore were 
relatively simple compared with those of High Tech Australia. High Tech Singapore 
clerical staff were paid an individually negotiated base salary that was reviewed every 
July in line with Consumer Price Index. The NV/C guidelines were taken into 
account, but the salary was based on the number of hours the employee worked, and 
their work output. They were formally appraised each year. Hours of work were 40 
per week. Clerical staff were eligible for overtime, though did not claim it, preferring 
to receive a bonus instead. Pay was monthly, and in addition to the base rate, the 
AWS (13th month) supplement was paid in December. Any extra bonus was 
determined on the financial results at the end of the financial year (June) and 
individual performance. If budget was met, the clerical staff would get a bonus of 'so 
many months' or a percentage of salary which was paid twice per year. In June 1992, 
they got half a month's salary, but sometimes, no bonus was paid. Owing to the 
market pressures, the company had to ensure that its pay rates were competitive. The 
Singaporean Civil Service received three months' bonus at the end of 1992 and this 
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set the standard for industry. The Civil Service bonus was considered a benchmark by 
the staff 
No extra compensation was given for length of service. For a clerical employee with 
a diploma, the starting salary might be S$1000 per month, while a graduate might be 
offered S$2000 per month. Each clerical employee was appraised annually by the 
Finance and Administration Manager. It was discussed openly with the employee, 
and the ratings explained. Staff could write their own comments on the form, which 
was then passed on to the CEO, who approved any recommendation. 
Marketing Compensation in High Tech Singapore 
The support staff for marketing were paid in the same way as for clerical staff; namely 
a base salary, AWS and bonuses based on company and individual performance. The 
professional marketing employees had no fixed starting salary, and their compensation 
was based on experience, qualifications and market rates. They did not receive the 
13th month supplement, but had their salaries reviewed each July and could be 
awarded a bonus based on individual and company performance. The package was 
decided by the affiliate's CEO. 
Service Compensation in High Tech Singapore 
The service manager negotiated salaries with recruits to his department and he, in 
turn, sought the CEO's final approval. Service staff in High Tech Singapore installed 
the systems and attended to breakdowns and problems. They were paid on the same 
basis as for the clerical employees, namely a base salary, AWS supplement in 
December, and bonuses based on the company and individual performance. 
Sales Compensation in High Tech Singapore 
The High Tech Singapore sales staff received a base salary, but no AWS bonus. 
Instead, they received a bonus expressed as a percentage of salary based on a pre-
determined sales quota. There was no restriction on the sales that could be made. 
When the quota was met, the sales people would receive a base increase of between 2 
and 5 per cent. Once they sold above quota, they could double the commission based 
on the gross profit from the sale. According to the executive interviewed, the 
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intention of the CEO was to make the salespersons 'aware of the profit on the sale 
and not to reduce price just to obtain a sale'. 
Managerial Compensation in High Tech Singapore 
In 1992, High Tech Singapore had three managers (the Country Manager 
[Singaporean CEO], Service Manager and Finance and Administration Manager) who 
received a base salary, the AWS bonus, and a performance bonus based on the 
Singaporean company performance. The performance bonuses were based on the 
quarterly results. Usually the Service Manager and Finance and Administrative 
Manager got between 20 and 30 per cent of their basic pay as bonus. If targets were 
not met, no bonus pay was given. 
By 1995, there were four staff on separate managerial packages — the Service 
Manager, the Marketing Manager, the Finance and Administration Manager and the 
CEO. The Service Manager was the only staff member with individually set 
objectives as at 1992. This was because he had to generate his own revenue to cover 
his department's costs. His objectives were agreed by the CEO. His package was 
therefore a base salary plus the AWS (13th month) plus a percentage of salary bonus 
if objectives were exceeded. This bonus was paid quarterly. By 1995, all four 
managers had objectives set for them. The High Tech Singapore CEO assessed the 
package of the Finance and Administration Manager in conjunction with the Finance 
Director of the High Tech Asia regional office in Singapore. The Finance and 
Administration Manager was paid a base rate plus the AWS (13th month), and mid-
year bonus in 1992. By 1995, objectives were set for her that had a fixed bonus 
attached set to them. The Service Manager continued to have set objectives and had 
compensation reviewed by the affiliate's CEO and the regional Customer Service 
Director. Similarly, the Marketing Manager was reviewed by the High Tech 
Singapore CEO and the regional Marketing Director. If sales targets were met, the 
managers could receive a 20 per cent bonus. If qualitative objectives were achieved 
as well, another 10 per cent would be added. 
In 1992, the CEO's compensation package was determined by Hong Kong head 
office (High Tech Asia), but by 1995, the Singapore regional office took over this 
responsibility. His compensation was performance-based. He received 3 per cent of 
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salary if the sales objectives were met and another 20 per cent on meeting the 
qualitative objectives that were set for him. The corporate MNE High Tech executive 
interviewed stated that although the Singaporean CEO's compensation was reviewed 
in Asia, this was `grandfathered' by the corporate MINE Chairman in Australia. 
With regard to the compensation for all employees, no profit-sharing scheme was 
provided. Compensation was confidential, but employees might 'talk among 
themselves', according to a manager. There was a strong emphasis on performance in 
the determination of the base salary and bonuses. A formal appraisal (traits based) 
scheme operated, and seniority was acknowledged by a company gift after 5 years' 
service. To assess its general levels of salary in relation to the labour market, the 
subsidiary used the survey data from the Singapore National Employers' Federation 
(SNEF). However, the company was not a member of the SNEF and or any other 
employer association. Company staff looked at newspaper advertisements and used 
consultants to search for new staff when needed. The consultants would indicate the 
appropriate salary range. No changes in pay structures were planned for the future. 
Employee Benefits in High Tech Singapore 
In High Tech Singapore, there were common employee benefits for all grades of 
employees. These were: 
• Annual leave (with extra after 5 years service to maximum of 20 days) 
• Compassionate leave (usually 3 days) 
• Death benefit 
• Dental treatment subsidies 
• Educational reimbursement for relevant programmes 
• Festive loan/advance 
• Fixed allowance for optical problems 
• Free medical treatment and drugs 
• Hospital ward benefit 
• Long service award 
• Marriage leave 
• Maternity leave 
• Meal allowance, where appropriate 
• Paid sick leave 
• Personal insurance (multiple of salary) 
• Reimbursement of business entertainment expenses 
• Specialists surgical fee 
• Unpaid leave. 
Only High Tech Singapore's CEO was provided with a car and a contribution 
towards housing costs. The clerical, administrative, and technical employees received 
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a fixed monthly transport allowance, while the sales and service personnel were 
reimbursed for the use of their own vehicles. The CEO was allowed a budget for club 
memberships and he, together with the sales and service staff and other managers, had 
the use of mobile telephones. An employees' social club that arranged bowling, 
tennis, golf and entertainment functions, started in 1992. The complete list of benefits 
is provided in Table 11.9. 
Relationship of High Tech Singapore to Corporate Head Office 
As mentioned earlier, the compensation for the CEO for Asia was finally decided by 
the MNE's Board Remuneration Committee. Apart from this, even though there 
were three Australians on its board, the corporate MINE head office did not become 
involved in the compensation design for the Singaporean local staff. Nor (prior to 
1995) did the High Tech (Asia) Hong Kong regional office have a role in determining 
the non-management salary levels in High Tech Singapore, as these were set locally. 
Only the Singaporean CEO's salary was approved by Hong Kong, as this office would 
decide all Asian country managers' salaries. It was anticipated in 1992 that the Hong 
Kong headquarters would eventually divide into two: North and South Asia with 
Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand forming part of the southern group. There was a 
plan for a Manager or Regional Director in Malaysia to control this group. He or she 
would negotiate pay for the relevant country managers only. The salaries for the rest 
of the staff were the responsibility of the country manager. No manufacturing was 
carried out in Hong Kong, but it was responsible for sourcing suppliers from Taiwan 
and other countries. 
With the reorganisation in 1995 and the transfer of the regional office of High Tech 
(Asia) to Singapore, this regional office now determined the salary package of the 
Singaporean subsidiary's CEO. Compensation and salary changes of other staff had 
now to be approved by the financial and other directors in the Singapore regional 
office. This meant that the corporate MINE High Tech had little involvement in 
compensation at subsidiary level except at the managerial levels as discussed above. 
This was confirmed by the corporate MINE High Tech Company Secretary, who said 
'Australia does not interfere with the Singaporean structures at all'. In 1992, the 
Asian companies were administered by Hong Kong. The Hong Kong Chief 
Administrative Officer travelled a lot to Singapore and Kuala Lumpur. He might have 
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Table 11.9 
Employee Benefits Profile for High Tech Singapore as at 1995 
Industrial/ 
Blue Collar 
Unskilled 	Skilled 
Clerical/ 
Admin 
Sales/ 
Technical 
Professionall 
Management 
Board 
Acting allowance NO STAFF IN 
Annual leave THESE CATEGORIES 1 J 1 
Attendance allowance 
Business entertainment expenses I I 1 
Cellular phones V I 
Co-operative shares 
Compassionate leave I V 1 
Death benefit V V 1 
Dental treatment  
Early retirement schemes 
External/social recreational club 
membership 
Festive loan/advance V I 1 
Fixed monthly transport allowance I V 
Free medical treatment/medicine I I I 
Funeral leave benefit 
Hospital ward benefit 1 V 1 
Housing loan 
Housing renovation loan 
Laundry benefit 
Life insurance V V 1 
Long service award V V I 
Long-term illness V V 1 
Machine allowance 
Marriage leave I I 1 
Maternity leave I I 1 
Meal allowance V I 
Medically board-out benefit 
Other loans 
Paternity leave 
Provision of car 1(1) 
Reimbursement for use of own car 
on company business 
V 
Retirement benefit (>CPF) 
[Singapore] 
Retrenchment benefit I V 1 
Service benefit 
Shift allowance 
Sick leave I V 1 
Specialist surgical fee V V 1 
Study leave/benefit 1 (2) " (2) 1(2) 
Transport benefit/allowance/ 
reimbursement 
V ./ 1 
Uniform 
Union day leave 
Union education leave 	• 
Unpaid leave I it 1 
Voluntary resignation benefit 
Notes: 
(1) CEO only. (2) Relevant to job. 
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imposed some relativities in compensation during these visits, but it was 
acknowledged that there were very different labour markets in each country. The 
salary rates in Hong Kong, for example, were very high, whereas the levels in 
Thailand were very low. The scene was therefore hard to regulate centrally. The 
Singaporean CEO likewise suggested that: 
The main control from the [Australian] Head Office is through reports and budgets. It is not 
interested in pay systems and only requires declarations when necessary for Australian Stock 
Exchange purposes. 
The Profile of High Tech Singapore Compensation 
The Gomez-Mejia and Balkin (1992:61) Experiential and Algorithmic Compensation 
Patterns for High Tech Singapore were shown in Tables 11.3 to 11.5, and 11.7. The 
High Tech Singapore clerical and technical service staff (Tables 11.3 and 11.5) were 
paid on the same basis on an individual contract, mainly on skills (for clerical staff) 
and job (for the technical staff). However, in general, both the High Tech Singapore 
technical service and clerical compensation systems were a balance of Algorithmic and 
Experiential features. 
The sales employees (Table 11.4) differed by being paid a base rate and commission. 
Their package, therefore, had a strong emphasis on performance, a short-term 
orientation, and a risk element. The profile thus had more Experiential characteristics 
than Algorithmic ones. Finally, management (Table 11.7) was paid by base salary 
and a bonus based on objectives. While some compensation would be for the job size, 
the criteria for increases were mainly performance leading to a stronger Experiential 
pattern for management salaries. 
High Tech Singapore Compensation and the External Environment 
In assessing the four questions on the effect of the external environment on 
compensation design in order, neither the High Tech Singapore CEO or the Finance 
and Administrative Manager perceived any main constraint on compensation design 
from legislation in Singapore. The provisions of the Employment Act set a 
benchmark, but there was no equal pay legislation or limits on ceilings. The CEO 
continued: 
The Employment Act does not say how much to pay... what level. Equal pay is not an issue... 
With income tax. when we think about a salary structure. we don't take this into account. In 
larger companies, say with a factory, they have to follow the Employment Act and the NWC 
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guidelines closely, but in smaller companies, it is more the company policy, rather than the 
national policy that predominates. 
By contrast, the Singaporean economy and the tight labour market were problematic. 
The CEO stated: 
We have to be creative to keep and attract people. The policy is to have certain guidelines 
followed by all [High Tech] companies. For example, one individual wanted guaranteed 
commission. Therefore, we had to adapt to get him. He became the best salesman. 
Therefore, we had to adapt to the tight labour market to keep him. It's not necessarily the 
amount of money. Car parking fees can be important to some people. 
The Finance and Administrative Manager agreed that: 
The tight labour market affects the quality of staff. We have to pay premium salaries even for 
inexperienced and average performers. ..most of them are young. 
The salary market rates were reviewed regularly to ensure that salaries in High Tech 
were competitive, because, according to the Financial and Administrative manager, it 
was very easy to fall behind. The market was seen as very important. With the 
Singapore incomes policy and NWC recommendations, neither High Tech managers 
considered the NWC recommendations to have much impact on the company. The 
view was that the affiliate had to adhere to market pressures and pay the AWS (13th 
month) to some categories as it was expected. According to the Finance and 
Administrative Manager, 
If the Government is giving three months' bonus at the end of the year, this sets the standard 
and is considered a benchmark for industry ...It's also seen by the staff; but they know they are 
better off in the private sector. 
Annual reviews were mainly based on market movements as well as performance. In 
1992, the annual rises were about 7 per cent. She then added: 
But if a person was productive, then we would give him or her 10 or 11 per cent. 
With the Singaporean focus on a skilled workforce, the two managers were asked 
about the cultural attitude towards education and its effect on the company. The 
High Tech Singapore CEO stated that: 
People pick up paper qualifications but it's up to the company to take advantage of an 
individual's work in getting it. You have to take advantage of the extra skills, and if there is 
no recognition, a person will leave in a tight labour market. If an employee can be 
compensated for a cost of a course, they may stay. A qualification is not enough to demand 
more money... say an MBA... At lower levels, there may be more pressure to give salary 
increases for qualifications.. .a girl clerk with [General Certificate of Education] '0' 
[Ordinary] levels would get about [S]S850 per month. If she does a secretarial course, she 
may want $950 per month. This is significant to them... the amount. 
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The Finance and Administrative Manager disagreed to an extent in that she did not 
see any direct link of pay to qualifications, but noted that more qualified people were 
'more marketable'. 
With Singapore culture generally and its attitude towards money, the CEO initially 
compared Singapore with Australia. 
In this [Singaporean] culture, it is not accepted that a person does not work Unlike Australia, 
they do not wait around for the 'right job'. In Singapore, this would not be accepted. If an 
engineering graduate could not find an engineering job, then he[or she] might go into a pizza 
operation or a lowly technical job in a manufacturing environment. They then better 
themselves. The culture is that you must work. You are a contributor to the family. You are 
not privileged just because you have a piece of paper — you have an obligation to pay your 
parents back. All adolescents will stay with parents until they are married They may stay 
with parents after they are married.. .is common.. .until they can afford to have their own 
apartment.. .There is an obligation to parents.. 
According to the Finance and Administration Manager, 
The Chinese are more responsive to bonuses and incentives than the Malays. The Malays will 
not stretch for extra bonuses... [Singaporean] children must look after their parents... Children 
are an investment. Therefore they must repay their parents and look after them, but 
Singapore is becoming more Westernised...children are not an investment. 
The CEO continued that 'companies which are Chinese prefer to work with Chinese 
rather than Malays or Malay Muslims. Malays had a more 9-5 mentality'. There 
were no Malays working at High Tech Singapore. On another aspect of national 
culture, the CEO did not perceive any definite trend towards an independent or team 
culture in Singapore. 
The High Tech Singapore compensation, compared against the Hodgetts and Luthans 
(1993b) recommendations for pay in Singapore for the cultural dimensions as found 
by Hofstede (1980), is shown in Table 11.10 below. Because of the lack of data on 
the actual salaries paid, it was not possible to conclude whether the range between 
lowest paid and the highest in the company conformed to the high Power Distance in 
Singapore (Hofstede, 1980). However, managers were paid on a different system and 
had different employee benefits although the pay hierarchy was not formalised. The 
emphasis on individual performance in the company also did not 'fit' Singapore's low 
Individualism (Hofstede, 1980). There were some group incentives, but pay for 
length of service was not acknowledged. The 'cultural match' was stronger for the 
weak Uncertainty Avoidance in Singapore where Hodgetts and Luthans (1993b) 
recommended that the compensation strategy should be more linked to performance, 
Table 11.10 
The Hodgetts and Luthans (H&L) Recommendations for Compensation in Singapore as Reflected in High Tech Singapore 
Hofstede Dimension 
Index 
H&L Recommended 
Compensation 
Clerical & Admin Staff 
Compensation 
Marketing (Prof) 
Compensation 
Service Staff 
Compensation 
Sales 
Compensation 
Managerial 
Compensation 
1. High Power Distances 'Hierarchical compensation 
strategy 
.Pay and benefits tied to 
place in structure 
'Large salary gaps between 
lowest and highest paid 
No - not formal 
Yes for pay and benefits 
in company 
Unknown 
No - not formal 
Yes 
Unknown 
No - not formal 
Yes 
Unknown 
No - not formal 
Yes 
Unknown 
No - not formal 
Yes 
Unknown 
2. Low 
Individualism 
'Group compensation plans 
'Seniority based pay 
Partly yes, but individual 
PA (I) too 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
3. Moderately low 
Masculinity 
'Many family benefits 
'Quality of worldife emphasis 
"No gender pay differences 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
4. Weak Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
'Emphasis on performance 
'Sharing of risks associated 
with MNE's success or 
failure 
'Competitive salaries to 
avoid poaching of staff 
'Decentralised pay policies (4) 
Yes 
Yes, profit share 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No(2) 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes(3) 
Yes 
No 
Supported Y (Yes) 
Not Supported N (No) 
Partly Yes(PY) 
Unknown 
Y = 5 
N = 5 
PY = 1 
Unknown = 1 
Y = 6 
N = 5 
Unknown = 1 
Y = 6 
N = 5 
Unknown = 1 
Y = 4 
N = 7 
Unknown = 1 
Y = 5 
N = 6 
Unknown = 1 
Notes: (1) PA is an abbreviation for performance appraisal.(2) Did not receive AWS group bonus (3) Did not receive AWS group bonus, but individual objectives were closely 
linked to the success of the subsidiary (4) Taken to mean decentralised within the High Tech Singapore subsidiary 
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and that the local management should share in the risks associated with the success or 
failure of the affiliate. On the other hand, the moderately low Masculinity of the 
Singaporean culture was not well reflected in the pay systems of High Tech Singapore 
in that there were few family-friendly employee benefits, and little overt evidence of 
an emphasis on quality of worklife issues. In general, there was not full support for 
Hodgetts and Luthans (1993b) recommendations in any of the five compensation 
systems studied. 
Regarding other external variables affecting compensation, like its parent, High Tech 
Singapore was regionally focused and was subject to varying degrees of competition 
according to product and changing technology. The internal organisation, work roles 
and compensation systems of the subsidiary were flexible and adaptable, as might be 
expected in such a small operation. 
Differences and Similarities in High Tech Australia and High Tech Singapore 
Compensation 
The main differences and similarities of compensation systems in High Tech Australia 
and High Tech Singapore are shown in Table 11.11. 
Table 11.11 
Comparison of Compensation Systems in 
High Tech Australia and High Tech Singapore 
High Tech Australia 	 High Tech Singapore 
General Organisational Features 
Medium sized 
	 Small 
Batch assembly manufacturing 
	 Service and sales only 
FIR Specialist at head office No HR specialist 
Unionised in some areas 	 Non-unionised 
General Compensation Features 
Heavy emphasis on individually set salaries 	Heavy emphasis on individually set salaries 
Underpinning by awards for some jobs 	No underpinning mechanism 
Plant enterprise agreement for manufacturing 	No collective agreements 
Recent job evaluation for middle management No use of job evaluation  
Industrial Compensation 
Algorithmic (9A*; 5E*; 
2 unknown; 3 not applicable) 
AlRC ratified enterprise agreement 
Skill-based structure 
Share of profits bonus 
General rises in line with AIRC NWC 
decisions 
H&L** recommendations 3 yes; 10 no  
No industrial staff employed in High Tech 
Singapore 
Algorithmic (11A*; 5E*; 2 unknown; 1 not 
applicable) 
Skill and individual negotiation basis 
Informal system (above award rates) 
Underpinned by awards 
Merit increases linked to performance 
appraisal 
No recognition for length of service 
No share of profits bonus 
H&L** recommendations? 6 yes; 6 no; 1 
unknown 
Balance of Algorithmic and Experiential 
(7A*;8E* 1 A/E*; 2unlcnown; 1 not applicable) 
Skill and individual negotiation 
Informal system 
No underpinning mechanism 
Performance appraisal linked to annual review 
No recognition for length of service 
AWS plus share of profits 
H&L** recommendations?5yes; 5 no; I partly 
yes; 1 unknown  
Balance of Algorithmic and Experiential 
(7A*;6E* 3 A/E*; 2 unknown; 1 not 
applicable) 
Job and individual negotiation 
Base salary and commission for meeting sales 
targets 
Performance pay and annual review of base 
H&L** recommendations? 6 yes; 6 no; 1 
unknown 
Experiential (5A*; 10E*; 2unknown; 2 not 
applicable) 
Job and individual negotiation 
Base salary and percentage for sales quota 
Performance pay and annual review of base 
H&L** recommendations?4yes; 7 no; 
1 unknown 
Algorithmic (9A*; 4E*; 2A/E*; 3 unknown; 1 
not applicable) 
Mixture of job and skills basis 
Clear career progression 
Individual performance element 
Structure underpinned by award 
H&L** recommendations? 6 yes; 6 no; 1 
unknown. 
Balance of Algorithmic and Experiential 
(8A*; 7E; 1A/E*; 2unknown; I not applicable) 
Job-based, but arguably combined with skill 
No clear career progression 
Individual and company bonus 
No underpinning by legal standard 
H&L** recommendations?6yes; 5 no; 
1 unknown. 
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High Tech Australia 	 High Tech Singapore 
Clerical Compensation 
Sales Staff Compensation 
Technical Service Staff Compensation 
Research Staff Compensation 
Algorithmic (10A*; 4E*; 2 unknown; 3 not 
applicable) 
Individually negotiated packages based on skill 
No performance evaluation 
Progression mainly on length of service 
No variable pay 
No salary structure 
H&L** recommendations? 3 yes; 9 no; 1 
unknown 
No research staff employed in High Tech 
Singapore 
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High Tech Australia 	 High Tech Singapore 
Managerial Staff Compensation*** 
Balance of Algorithmic and Experiential Experiential (7A*; 10E*; 2 unknown) 
(8M; 9E*; 2 unknown) 
Job-based system with formal evaluation after Job-based system, but no evaluation 
1995 for middle managers 
No formal performance appraisal, but review Formal performance appraisal against targets 
against objectives 
Annual review of base salaries against market No regular review of base salary 
rates or inflation 
Potentially high individual and profit-share Potentially high individual bonuses 
bonuses for some 
Comparable pay arrangement 	 Market and objectives driven 
Centralised to head office Regional office and subsidiary driven 
H&L** recommendations? 8 yes; 4 no; 	H&L** recommendations? 5 yes; 6 no; 
1 unknown 	 1 unknown. 
Notes:* A is Algorithmic. E is Experiential. A/E is Algorithmic/Experiential. As used in the 
Gomez-Mejia and Balkin (1992:61) Summary Profile of Experiential and Algorithmic Compensation 
Patems. 
** H&L is Hodgetts and Luthans (1993b) *** Excludes High Tech Australia non-executive directors 
Table 11.11 indicates is the total number of Algorithmic and Experiential elements for 
each of the compensation systems in High Tech Australia and Singapore extracted 
from Tables 11.2-11.7. To ensure a more overall valid comparison of the 
Algorithmic (A) and Experiential (E) patterns in the Australian and Singaporean 
operations, the comparison can be restricted to only those common compensation 
elements for which data were available and applicable in both subsidiaries. The results 
are shown in Table 11.12. 
Table 11.12 
Total of Algorithmic (A) and Experiential (E) Compensation Features for High 
Tech Australia and High Tech Singapore as at 1995 — Selected Common 
Elements Only  
Number of Algorithmic(A)/Experiential(E) Features 
High Tech Australia High Tech Singapore 
Clerical 
Sales 
Technical 
Managerial 
11 A 	5 E 	0 A/E 
6A 	6E 	3 A/E 
9A 	4E 	2A/E 
8 A 	9E 	0 A/E 
7 A 	8 E 	1 A/E 
5A 	10 E 	0 A/E 
8A 	7E 	0 AJE 
7 A 	10 E 	0 A/E 
Restricting the Algorithmic and Experiential classifications only to those selected 
common features for which data were available and applicable, Table 11.12 shows 
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that there were overall Algorithmic compensation profiles for the clerical and 
technical service staff in High Tech Australia, and a balance of Algorithmic and 
Experiential elements for the sales and managerial employees in High Tech Australia, 
and the clerical and technical service staff in High Tech Singapore. The profile for 
sales employees and managers in High Tech Singapore was Experiential. All general 
profiles for compensation systems for High Tech Australia and High Tech Singapore 
given in Table 11.12 are therefore similar to those in Table 11.11 and will be referred 
to again later in the study. 
In the context of the four research questions relating to the effect of external 
environmental factors on subsidiary compensation design, like the other companies 
discussed so far, both High Tech Australia and High Tech Singapore observed the 
local legal environment requirements in which they operated. In the Australian 
company's case, according to the manager interviewed, it was always conscious of the 
award system. Equal pay was built into its pay systems; employee benefits had to be 
adapted to account for Fringe Benefits Tax and superannuation legislation, and its 
incorporation into awards forced the unit to include this in its compensation packages 
as well. High Tech Singapore was similarly conscious of the provisions of the 
Employment Act, which provided the minima for its conditions for the lower paid 
staff It also followed the custom of paying the AWS (13th month) bonus to the 
majority of its staff. 
The economic environment did not affect compensation design in either company in 
direct terms. Again, the great difference in the tightness of the labour markets was 
evident. Both subsidiaries made efforts to ensure that their rates were in line with the 
markets, but during the recession, High Tech Australia reduced upper level salaries 
for survival purposes. Both had flexible systems that could adapt easily to market 
levels, and neither paid increases directly linked to the Consumer Price Index (CPI). 
However, the reactions of High Tech Australia and High Tech Singapore to the 
decisions of the AIRC NWC recommendations and the Singaporean NWC guidelines 
varied. In Australia, the company had to decide its policy about the compensation for 
lower-level employees who came within the ambit of union representation and award 
coverage. High Tech Australia recognised a union in the manufacturing Emotion and 
became a party to the relevant federal award. Having decided on this course, it had 
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no choice but to follow this agreement and pay AIRC NWC increases, but it 
supplemented the rates with over-award payments in any case. 
The compensation systems for High Tech Singapore were not constrained in the same 
way, and the system was based more on individual negotiation, with rises based on 
CPI, individual and business unit performance as well as labour market levels. 
Nevertheless, the Singaporean affiliate was following the NWC request to maintain a 
certain proportion of variable pay in the general packages in case of economic 
downturns. Both companies were thus similar in keeping their structures flexible, 
with rises determined by their own local policies. 
Neither High Tech Australia nor High Tech Singapore had a specialised HRM 
function up to 1995. Administration of compensation was split between several roles. 
Both units were similar in having several different pay systems, but both appeared to 
share a culture of pay-for-performance, especially at more senior levels and for sales 
roles, and no financial recognition for length of service. Neither was planning to 
move to any formal job evaluation system as at 1995, but since then, High Tech 
Australia had introduced job evaluation for its middle managerial staff. 
The interviewees from High Tech Australia and High Tech Singapore did not cite 
national culture as having a direct effect on general compensation design, although 
they noted national differences with regard to the effect of pay on motivation and the 
size of differences in compensation between occupational levels. The lack of data on 
compensation levels did not allow any conclusion to be drawn on Power Distance in 
either society. However, the use of incentives for some jobs in the Australian 
company conformed with recommendations for compensation in a high Individualism 
and a moderately weak Uncertainty Avoidance culture (Hofstede, 1980). While the 
compensation in High Tech Singapore had features that conformed with the 
recommended profile of Hodgetts and Luthans (1993b), the individual pay-for-
performance for some occupations did not sit well with low Individualism, but was 
appropriate for weak Uncertainty Avoidance. In neither High Tech Australia nor 
High Tech Singapore was there a wide range of family-friendly benefits. It could thus 
be argued that the need to generate certain behaviour through the pay system was 
again more dominant than conformity to the national culture in general. 
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The other difference between the Singaporean affiliate and the Australian 
manufacturing plant alongside the High Tech head office was the effect of the 
respective industrial relations systems. A union was recognised in Australia for the 
purpose of negotiating an enterprise agreement for technicians, which led to a more 
skill-based compensation structure. This enterprise agreement severed the direct link 
with national industrial award rises. The agreement was still subject to the final 
approval of the federal industrial tribunal, and the compensation design was in line 
with the national recommendations for skill-based pay systems. For other 
occupations in the Australian operation such as clerks and salespeople, the state 
awards automatically set the minimum conditions which it had to meet. Industrial 
tribunal decisions affecting the rates and structures of each state award were noted by 
High Tech Australia, but the company paid above these award rates for clerical, sales 
and service personnel, and had designed its own supplementary systems for sales and 
service employees. 
High Tech Singapore was owned by High Tech (Asia), and the regional office had a 
bigger role in compensation determination than did the MINE head office. One factor 
in common, however, was the interest of the High Tech head office in the approval of 
top managerial compensation by the Remuneration Committee. There was more 
involvement by the Australian head office in the structure of compensation for other 
employees in Australia, whereas the Singaporean staff below Director level appeared 
of little concern to the head office Company Secretary/Chief Financial Officer. Thus 
the head office had a more ethnocentric orientation towards director remuneration, 
but a more regiocentric and polycentric orientation approach towards other 
compensation systems. 
In comparing the employee benefits for the clerical, service, sales and managerial staff, 
the following benefits were common to these categories of staff in both High Tech 
Australia and High Tech Singapore: 
• Annual leave 
• Business entertainment expenses 
• Compassionate leave 
• CPF (in Singapore) and superannuation (in Australia) 
• Life or disability insurance 
• Long service awards 
• Long-term illness cover 
• Maternity leave 
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• Meal allowances (overtime) 
• Provision of cars (for senior staff) 
• Public holidays 
• Reimbursement for use of own car 
• Retrenchment benefit 
• Sick leave 
• Study leave/benefit 
• Transport allowances/reimbursement 
• Unpaid leave (usually case by case). 
The differences were mainly the result of the different health systems in Singapore. 
High Tech Singapore paid the premiums for hospital, surgeon's fees, medical, -optical 
and dental cover for all levels of its staff, and had a provision for Festive Loans — a 
common employee benefit in Singapore. Having some industrial employees, High 
Tech Australia issued uniforms to staff and paid for their laundering. Paternity leave 
was available and a social club established. The awards underpinning the clerical and 
sales employees in Australia also had adoption leave, amenities, and jury service 
make-up pay entitlements. In both organisations, there were unique benefits for 
senior management. Only the CEO in Singapore was entitled to a car, and only the 
senior managers in the Australian head office and plant had access to company shares. 
In comparing the employee benefits, High Tech Australia was subject to more 
external regulation for lower-level staff in that federal and state awards were used to 
set the basic levels of benefit. However, it had more freedom at higher levels. In 
Singapore, apart from the requirements of the Employment Act, the company could 
have determined its own benefits in the light of external conditions. Both units 
offered different benefits at various levels of their organisations. The differences were 
the result of the local environment, especially national health services. There did not 
appear to be any major involvement of the corporate MINE High Tech in the design of 
benefit packages of the Singaporean affiliate. 
Conclusion 
In analysing this final case study in relation to the others so far described, it is evident 
that there is replication of findings over the five cases. Like the other cases, High 
Tech Australia and High Tech Singapore had more than one compensation system. 
The systems varied mainly by occupation, but could also vary by individual. The 
external environment affected each occupational reward in different ways. Some 
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environmental elements left management little choice in compensation design — 
others permitted much more discretion. 
Taking the four research questions in turn, employment rules, regulations and awards 
had an impact across all compensation systems or affected selected occupations only. 
Legislation like equal pay, superannuation, FBT and CPF was in the first category in 
High Tech; award rates and industrial relations legislation were in the second. 
Governments' policies are implemented through legislation and High Tech Australia 
reacted to changes in Australian laws on the permitted outcomes of collective 
bargaining and AIRC recommendations by adopting new compensation approaches 
for its technicians in a similar fashion to that of Oilco Australia and Buildo Australia. 
In addition, the movement to a skill-based structure facilitated the development of a 
team-based production system. The change of the industrial external environment 
clearly changed the technical compensation system. High Tech Australia's pay 
exceeded any minima of the award system, and High Tech Singapore observed relvant 
provisions of the Employment Act — choices made by all case study companies 
because of occupational labour market pressures. Australian Government FBT and 
superannuation legislation caused all Australian subsidiaries and companies to review 
their employee benefits, and in all Singaporean cases (including High Tech 
Singapore), the Singaporean Government's national health policy affected the 
employer's provision of health benefits. Thus the impact of legislation is a function of 
its range and applicability. 
Like the other cases, the state of the national economy was more influential in the 
level of pay rather the actual design. The general labour market is affected by the rate 
of inflation, economic growth and of unemployment. High Tech Australia was unique 
in the five Australian cases in adopting a deliberate strategy of salary reduction for a 
period because of its lack of capacity to maintain the then existing levels. Apart from 
this, occupational levels were determined in line with AIRC increases, labour market 
rates, AIRC NWC rises (in some cases), and, more recently, individual performance. 
The occupational labour market rates were also major factors in the setting of pay 
levels in the Singaporean affiliates, including High Tech Singapore. However, above 
average pay or employee benefit provision may also be part of a strategy to appear 
paternalistic or to exclude unions. 
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The role of government in economic management is reflected in fiscal, monetary and 
welfare policies, and evident in the supply of labour through population, immigration, 
use of foreign workers and education policies. Apart from the FBI and CPF already 
mentioned, fiscal and monetary policies did not appear to play a major role in MINE 
subsidiary compensation design in all case study companies including High Tech, 
except where expatriate compensation packages took host country income tax into 
account, or where consideration was given to 'salary sacrifice' schemes to minimise 
tax for executives in Australia. High Tech Singapore employed professional foreign 
labour without a government levy, but although Foodco Singapore, Buildo Singapore, 
and Metalco Singapore utilised less skilled staff and thus lower pay scales, benefits 
were partially offset by foreign labour levies. Intertwined with economic management 
is the role of industrial tribunals, AIRC National Wage Cases and the National Wages 
Council whose recommendations are partly based on the state of the macro economy. 
However, it is obvious that the MNEs could accept or reject the recommendations 
according to overall compensation strategy. High Tech Australia granted increases 
awarded by the AlRC to lower level staff and followed its principles for an enterprise 
agreement. High Tech Singapore did not consider the NWC recommendations to 
have much impact on the company. 
Like the other case studies, no manager in the High Tech company and subsidiary 
stated specifically that national culture and religion were taken into account when 
compensation was designed. Comments on national differences were made, especially 
on differences in international pay levels and intra-subsidiary relativities, but it is 
perhaps not surprising that a complex concept like national culture could not be 
immediately related to elements of a compensation system by interviewees. Arguably 
the emphasis on performance pay for top managerial positions in High Tech was more 
to do with High Tech's internal culture, and the differences in salaries between 
Australia, Singapore and Hong Kong more to do with labour market comparisons as 
well as possible national cultural differences. The testing of the Hodgetts and Luthans 
(1993b) recommendations for compensation design in High Tech Australia and High 
Tech Singapore was again inconclusive. Only the compensation for the High Tech 
Australia managerial employees followed the recommendations to a significant 
degree. There was, in fact, more conformity of all Australian case companies' 
managerial systems with the recommendations than with other occupations. Only for 
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the operating and industrial staff of all Singaporean subsidiaries did all compensation 
systems uniformly support the Hodgetts and Luthans recommendations for the 
Hofstede (1980) dimensions of Singaporean culture. For the other occupations of the 
Singaporean affiliates, the results were more mixed. 
Only High Tech Australia had unionised employees and so the company had a 
collective agreement. Like the other unionised workforces of the case study 
companies, once the MINE recognises unions, the local industrial awards, rules and 
industrial tribunals procedures applied. However, union influence was confined to 
only those who were subject to collective agreements in both countries, but these 
MINE agreements were similar to agreements of other locally owned Australian or 
Singaporean companies, and did not contain any features overtly transferred from the 
MINE head office. 
The High Tech company and affiliate benefit profiles were similar to those of the 
other case MINE subsidiaries in that there were many common employee benefits 
between the two countries. The subsidiaries had some discretion in the benefits 
offered, but may be constrained by the corporate culture of the MINE and award 
system in Australia and Employment Act in Singapore. The effect of the different 
health systems was again apparent in its influence on benefit provision. As in the 
other MNEs, there were differences in the benefits given to different levels of 
employee. 
In the other case studies, we have acknowledged that industrial characteristics like 
type of business, competition, and rate of change could put pressure on internal 
variables including the compensation systems. The nature of work in High Tech 
Australia influenced its occupational structure and the number of pay systems. The 
development of team approaches to manufacturing was arguably a response to the 
need for cost reduction, speed to customer and upslcilling of the workforce. 
The role of the MINE corporate head office in compensation design has varied in each 
case. The High Tech case differs in that the parent head office and manufacturing 
facility were used for comparison with the sales and service affiliate in Singapore. 
However, the similarity with some other cases was the greater involvement of the 
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High Tech head office in the development of performance indicators for, and approval 
of, top managers' local and expatriate compensation across the world. Nevertheless, 
High Tech had no cross-national salary structure like that of Oilco and Metalco. The 
head office therefore had a both ethnocentric and polycentric approach to 
compensation design. Like Foodco Singapore, Buildo Singapore and Metalco 
Singapore, the regional office was given certain responsibility for approval of, or 
advice on, compensation for certain staff. This delegation may be a function of the 
location and size of the human resource function as it was only in recent years that 
that High Tech Australia had a full-time professional Human Resources Manager. 
High Tech Singapore had a high degree of autonomy as the main linkage with head 
office was through financial controls. The corporate MNE High Tech therefore 
displayed both integration and differentiation with a high degree of adaptation to local 
conditions. In an explanation of the effect of the external environment on MNE pay 
systems, the role of the corporate, regional, and national offices needs inclusion. 
Finally, using the Gomez-Mejia and Balkin (1992) Experiential and Algorithmic 
Compensation Patterns, apart from Oilco, no pairs of subsidiaries and companies in 
Australia and Singapore had similar patterns. In general, all Singaporean pay systems 
had more Experiential features than did all Australian-based operations. This suggests 
that there may be national environmental features that affect all pay systems in the 
same way and that MNEs are prepared to adapt their compensation to these. 
However, there were intra-subsidiary variations as well, which suggests that the 
external environment is not the sole determinant of compensation design and that 
management in a host or home country has a range of discretion for design. 
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CHAPTER TWELVE 
FINDINGS FROM THE CASE STUDIES 
Overview of the Thesis 
The overall focus for the thesis has been to investigate the influence of attributes of the 
external environment on the compensation system of an MNE subsidiary. It sought to do 
this by first examining the literature on the strategic links with, and external influences on, 
compensation in domestic organisations in Chapter 2, and the research on MNE 
compensation in Chapter 3. Chapters 5 and 6 considered features of the Singaporean and 
Australian national economies and societies where the MNE subsidiaries and companies 
of the case studies were based, and then described the compensation systems of the five 
pairs of MNE affiliates and companies. Similarities and differences in the respective 
compensation systems were found, and the conclusions of each case study chapter 
showed replication of findings about the extent to which compensation design could be 
attributed to the external environment. As inter-unit linkages were seen as a SIHRM 
issue in the Schuler, Dowling and De Cieri (1993) integrative framework of STEIRM, the 
roles of MNE regional and head offices were also commented on in relation to the 
integration and differentiation of compensation systems across an MNE. 
The Guiding Research Questions 
The central guiding research question for consideration in the thesis was 'How does the 
external environment of an MNE subsidiary influence the design of its 
compensation system?' Flowing from this, four initial research questions were: 
• How does employment legislation affect the compensation design of an MNE 
subsidiary? 
• How does the economy affect the compensation design of an MNE subsidiary? 
• How does national culture affect the compensation design of an MNE 
subsidiary? 
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• How does the industrial relations system affect the compensation design of an 
MNE subsidiary? 
It was acknowledged early in the thesis that the attributes of an organisation's external 
environment are largely interdependent, but that they can be separated for simplicity 
(Jackson & Schuler, 1995). The elements of the environment chosen for study can also 
be criticised for their 'heuristic' rather than 'systematic' character (Pieper, 1990a:20). It 
was accepted that it is 'impossible to rigorously determine the impact of each variable and 
its interaction with others' (Frenkel, 1993:8), and it is difficult to control variables in 
cross-cultural research (De Cieri & Dowling, 1995), although this has not prevented 
writers from attributing trends in compensation systems to major changes in the external 
environment (Schuster & Zingheim, 1992). 
Literature relevant to the research question was reviewed in Chapters 2 and 3 from which 
it was first recognised that an MNE subsidiary was an open system and therefore subject 
to external influences. In fact, this has long been the accepted position for general BRM 
policy and practice, although this is not to deny the importance of internal factors as well 
(Jackson & Schuler, 1995). According to the framework of Schuler, Dowling and De 
Cieri (1993), compared with a domestic organisation, the MNE generates unique 
conceptual and theoretical issues in its management of the external environment. First, 
the environments for the MNE are likely to be more diverse and the competition 
international and possibly global. MNEs have their business units spread geographically 
so that the management challenge is to manage globally and locally at the same time to 
meet the strategic needs of the business (p.719). The other unique element of the MNE 
is the importance of the inter-unit linkages to coordinate the diffused affiliates. Each of 
these subsidiaries has to operate within its own local environment and is thus subject to 
the host country's 'laws, politics, culture, economy and society' while being mindful of 
the competitive strategy of the subsidiary and the whole MINE (p.723). But is this a 
simple interaction? It could be argued that the extent of the impact of the local 
environment on the affiliate would depend on the degree of autonomy from the MNE 
head office and the international HRM orientation of the corporate parent (pp. 729 & 
749). Consideration of the role of the MINE head office in subsidiary compensation 
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design was therefore included in this study because strategic 1HRM functions are affected 
by the head office orientation towards IHRM, the resources devoted to the operation of 
HRM in the MINE, and the organisation and location of the FIRM function (p.724). Thus 
the fifth research question was: 
• How does the MNE head office international orientation affect the choice of 
compensation design of an MNE subsidiary? 
The compensation of an MNE was posited by Schuler, Dowling and De Cieri (1993:725) 
to be one of the SIHRM policies and practices which is 'most relevant to the strategic 
needs of the business'. To that end, it was noted that an MINE might, as part of its THRM 
strategy, attempt to change aspects of the external environment in which it is operating 
rather than merely react to them. Alternatively, it may attempt to minimise or avoid the 
effects of the external environment on its compensation practices if they are preventing 
the MINE parent and/or affiliate from designing their preferred compensation systems. 
Nevertheless, the impact of the endogenous factors, in addition to the exogenous, should 
not be neglected for their impact on MNE inter-unit linkages, internal operations, and 
SIHRM functions, policies and practices. 
This research project takes the stance that elements of the external environment may 
affect the compensation of various occupations in the MINE subsidiary in different ways 
and to different degrees, with the result that the number of choices available to the 
affiliate and parent MINE management for compensation design may vary. To speak in 
terms of a single MINE subsidiary compensation system may thus be inappropriate as a 
unit may have several compensation systems. The number of compensation practices in 
the case study companies is therefore identified first, followed by an analysis of the type 
of each compensation system used according to the Gomez-Mejia and Balkin (1992) 
Experiential and Algorithmic Compensation Patterns. This leads to a summary of the 
amount of discretion that an MINE may have in compensation design and a comparison of 
the total employee benefits in the case companies. 
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The Number of Compensation Systems in the Case Study Companies 
One initial difficulty in assessing how the external environment influences the 
compensation system of the MNE subsidiary is to recognise that the affiliate may have 
more than one reward system, and that the environment may impact on each one 
differently. Indeed, from the case studies, it was apparent that the number of separate 
systems could equal the main occupational clusters such as: 
• PCN director/local HCN board member 
• Non-executive local HCN director 
• Short-term PCN or TCN expatriate manager 
• Long-term PCN or TCN expatriate manager 
• HCN Managers 
• HCN Administrative/clerical 
• HCN Technical 
• HCN Sales 
• HCN Supervision 
• HCN industrial/blue-collar 
Management then has a choice of each element of the compensation system for each level 
of employee — a myriad of decisions. The number of separate occupational systems in 
the case studies companies (where pay structures, mix and/or employee benefits varied) is 
shown in Table 12.1. 
Table 12.1 indicates the complexity of the overall compensation system in each affiliate 
and company. Why a subsidiary and/or MNE corporate management decides on a set 
number and composition of pay systems is open to conjecture as there is little research on 
why organisations chose a particular number and base them on skill, job or external 
market rates (Gerhart, Milkovich & Murray, 1992). From the literature, it has been 
suggested that compensation strategy can be determined by a composition of corporate, 
business unit and functional organisational strategies, plus internal and external 
environmental factors (Milkovich, 1988). However, the organisational strategies have 
been 'postulated to be the primary determinant' of a compensation strategy (p.274), with 
research having concentrated on the link of diversification, life cycles, business unit 
strategies and BR strategy to compensation (pp.274-9). Internal variables affecting 
composition decisions could include the type of organisation, the handling of the internal 
labour market, size, profitability and the labour cost/total cost ratio (p.274). In contrast, 
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Table 12.1 
Number of Different Compensation Systems in the Case Study Companies 
Australia  
Oilco Australia: 11 Systems  
Head Office 
(1) Expatriates (including some directors) 
(2) Directors/letter grades (excludes external 
non-executive directors and expatriates) 
(3) Senior Management (Hay)* 
(4) Management/professional/ 
administrative/clerical (Hay)* 
Refinery 
(2) Senior Manager (Letter grade) 
(3) Senior Management (Hay)* 
(5) Clerical 
(6) Laboratory 
(7) Operators 
(8) Maintenance 
(9) Transport (Common with Terminal) 
Terminal 
(3) Senior Management (Hay)* 
(4) Clerks (Hay) 
(10) Maintenance 
(9) Transport (Common with Refinery) 
(11) Storemen and Packers 
Foodco Australia: 7 Systems 
Manufacturing Plant 
(1) Professional and Managerial (Managerial 
bonus) 
(2) Professional and Managerial (Members of 
staff - no bonus) 
(3) Supervisors 
(4) Operators 
(5) Trades and metals 
(6) Stores 
(7) Clerical 
Buildo Australia: 3 Systems 
Manufacturing Plant 
(1) Senior staff (Hay) 
(2) Staff (Hay) 
(3) Plant operators and trades 
Metalco Australia: 4 Systems 
Manufacturing Plant (as at 1993) 
(1) General Manager (Stratum 4) 
(2) Professional and managerial 
(3) Clerical 
(4) Industrial (blue-collar) 
Singapore 
°Hu) Singapore:4 Systems 
Head Office, Refinery and Terminal 
(1) Expatriates (including some directors) 
(2) Directors (excluding expatriates) 
(3) Management/professional (Hay) 
(4) Bargainable staff in collective agreement 
Foodco Singapore: 4 Systems  
Manufacturing Plant 
(1) Expatriates 
(2) Local management 
(3) Individual contracts for non-union non-
management staff 
(4) Collective agreement for process and 
trades employees 
Buildo Singapore: 4 Systems 
Manufacturing Plant 
(1) Expatriate and senior executives 
(2) Other Management 
(3) Sales/technical/clerical 
(4) Industrial (blue-collar) 
Metalco Singapore: 4 Systems 
Manufacturing Plant (as at 1993) 
(1) Expatriates (including GM) 
(2) Local managers/Sales/Technical/ 
(Individual contracts) 
(3) Clerical/Administrative (Individual 
contracts) 
(4) Industrial staff 
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Table 12.1 
Number of Different Compensation Systems in the Case Study Companies 
(Continued) 
High Tech Australia: 7 Systems ** 
	
High Tech Singapore: 4 Systems 
Head Office and Australian Operations 	Sales and Service 
(1)Senior Management 	 (1) CEO package 
(2) Middle management (2) Managers 
(3) Research 
	
(3) Sales 
(4) Technical (4) Clerical/marketing/service 
(5) Sales 
(6) Clerical 
(7) Industrial (Blue-collar) 
Note: * While the senior management and other managerial/professional/administrative and clerical staff 
had their job grade based on the same Hay job evaluation system, the benefits for the senior managers 
and above differed. **High Tech Australia is a company rather than subsidiary. 
external factors affecting choice include the effect of unions, legislation, industry 
characteristics, product and labour market pressures (p.274). 
Other reasons for different numbers of systems may include (1) the organisational culture 
and values, (2) designing various career ladders (Milkovich & Newman, 1996), (3) the 
need to attract and retain particular types of staff (Gerhart, Nfilkovich & Murray, 1992), 
(4) the attempt to reinforce, change or send a signal about selected role behaviours 
required for competitive strategies (Schuler & Jackson, 1987), (5) the support for a team 
structure (Gross, 1995), (6) the copying of other similar organisations (Milkovich & 
Newman, 1996), (7) the acceptance and preferences of employees (e.g. choice of 
benefits), (8) technology and work requirements, (9) special compensation for strategic 
employee groups such as salespeople and executives, and (10) the nature of the 
workforce (Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992). Of course, not all of these factors may have 
equal influence on pay mix of each system. 
In a study of six Australian companies, Boxall (1992) found that the main HRM policies 
and practices were typically segmented between management and non-management 
labour, a custom common in the United States in the provision of fringe benefits — at 
least in the 1980s (Lawler, 1981). Other main demarcations may be due to legislation. 
For example, Milkovich and Newman (1999) list the exempted occupations to the 
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minimum wage and overtime provisions of the US Fair Labor Standards Act (p.545) — 
again encouraging more than one system. Rather than having several systems, some 
companies such as IBM have had a single 'all-salary' workforce for many years, but the 
effect of this on organisational effectiveness has not always been clear (Lawler, 1981). 
The link between pay system and performance may not just be one way, of course. 
Milkovich and Newman (1999) argue that employee behaviour and organisational 
performance may cause changes in compensation systems as well as being the result of 
them (p.42). 
Some of these variables can now be applied to the case study companies in this thesis 
while recognising that they cannot be a full causal explanation for the number of 
compensation systems in the subsidiaries. Taking Oilco first, both Oilco Australia and 
Oilco Singapore were large subsidiaries with capital intensive process production, strong 
FIRM functions and recognised unions. The main difference was the number of unions 
and collective agreements in each affiliate. The corporate Oilco MNE parent had decided 
that senior and middle management would use the Hay job evaluation system in both 
subsidiaries, although this was used for a greater range of staff in Oilco Australia. The 
recognition of unions immediately divided the workforce into unionised and non-
unionised and restricted the compensation options for unionised staff in both affiliates. 
Oilco Australia, in its desire to decentralise compensation of its non-Hay evaluated 
employees to the enterprise, had to deal with individual occupational unions, and 
negotiate five non-management pay systems for the refinery and terminal. This was part 
of a FIRM strategy to gain more flexibility and a greater concentration on payment for 
skills, and was made possible by legislative change and the decisions of the Australian 
Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC). By comparison, Oilco Singapore had only one 
broad-ranging collective agreement which had existed since the 1960s and was very much 
based on the job classifications. For the locations studied, Oilco Australia had eleven 
different compensation systems compared with four in Oilco Singapore. 
The number of compensation systems in Foodco Australia (seven) also exceeded those in 
its Singaporean counterpart (four). Although it was a much bigger operation, this was 
again mainly due to the award and union structure in Australia. In the Australian unit, 
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professional and managerial pay was centralised, whereas non-management compensation 
was a series of enterprise agreements and informal salary systems, most of which were 
underpinned by various awards. The strategy for the operators was to pay for skill and 
generally minimise the union role by informal site agreements. By contrast, Foodco 
Singapore had one collective agreement for process and trades staff with the other 
employees on individual contracts. With the Buildo MNE, Buildo Australia's 
compensation was more formally structured than in Singapore, especially at middle and 
managerial levels through the application of Hay job evaluation principles. It only had 
one Metal Industry Award as the foundation for its skill-based pay and one enterprise 
incentive agreement that generated a bonus for the shopfloor and 'staff employees. In 
total, it had three compensation systems. On the other hand, Buildo Singapore was non-
union, but had a formal structure for the blue-collar employees. The essence of pay 
design for the remaining staff was the individual contract. Including the expatriates, it 
operated with four different pay systems. 
Metalco Australia was considerably larger than Metalco Singapore in 1993 and had more 
formalised compensation systems at all levels with its centralised strata system in which it 
had no option but to participate. The plant agreements at lower levels were the result of 
its recognition of unions for blue-collar and clerical employees although all occupations 
eventually were integrated into the strata system of the corporate MNE. Only the 
General Manager in Metalco Singapore had his level established through the common 
strata system. Blue-collar employees (who were not unionised) had unique features in 
their pay system, but the rest of the staff were on individual contracts. Both affiliates had 
four systems, although one of these was for an expatriate in Metalco Singapore. 
Size, unionisation and a greater variety of occupations were the main differences between 
High Tech Australia and High Tech Singapore. The Australian company used the award 
system and eventually its own enterprise agreement as the basis for its grading of its 
industrial staff, clerical awards as a basis for individual negotiation, base salary and 
commission for sales people, the award as the basis for service staff, individual 
negotiation for research personnel, and a variety of pay-for-performance schemes for 
middle and senior management. The company thus arguably used changes in legislation 
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and the award system to change the focus of blue-collar employees towards skill 
enhancement. As High Tech Singapore was essentially a sales and service operation, the 
range of staff was smaller. It was not unionised and so the individual contract was the 
main compensation basis. Special groups such as the sales team and management had 
unique incentive components. In total, High Tech Australia had seven pay systems and 
the Singaporean affiliate four. 
Leaving aside organisation strategies as the main causal factor for the number of 
compensation systems in a subsidiary, a number of other generalisations could be made 
about the case study affiliates. The type of MINE and THRM approach of the parent may 
determine whether and how many expatriates there are in a subsidiary, what role they 
play and how they will be compensated. There were expatriates present in Oilco 
Australia, Oilco Singapore, Foodco Singapore, Buildo Singapore, and Metalco 
Singapore. This produces an extra compensation system to be managed in the affiliate. 
Further, an ethnocentric SIHRM approach (Schuler, Dowling & De Cieri, 1993) or 
exportive SIHRM orientation (Taylor, Beechler & Napier, 1996) towards a part of the 
overall compensation system will create an extra system and was evident in the two Oilco 
subsidiaries and in Metalco Singapore. A subsidiary's variety of occupations usually 
resulted in more compensation systems, but not necessarily. More important might have 
been a desire to have everyone employed by individual contracts, or the availability of 
collective agreements for a range of occupations negotiated with a single union (Oilco 
Singapore and Foodco Singapore). 
Separate compensation for strategic employee groups (Gomez-Mejia & Balldn, 1992) 
will increase the number of systems and was introduced in several subsidiaries such as 
Foodco Australia and Foodco Singapore (managerial bonuses), and in High Tech 
Singapore (salespeople). There was an attempt to focus pay on skill enhancement in 
blue-collar roles in Oilco Australia, Foodco Australia, Foodco Singapore and the High 
Tech Australia company, and some choice of employee benefits at the top levels of Oilco 
Australia and High Tech Australia. Finally, the presence of unions in both the Australian 
and Singaporean compensation systems had a major impact on pay design. This was 
more dramatic in Australia, where the occupational and general union structures with 
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their accompanying awards make a multi-system inevitable. Further research could assess 
the corporate effectiveness implications of having high numbers of separate compensation 
systems, especially for a unionised workforce. Prima facie, if a company only has to 
negotiate one broad-based collective agreement compared with several agreements, the 
savings in negotiating time alone could be very large. 
The Types of Compensation Systems in the Case Study Companies 
In assessing the influence of the external environment on subsidiary compensation, the 
different number of separate systems is not the only complication. It became apparent 
from the case studies that the basis, design issues and administrative framework for 
compensation (Gomez-Mejia & Balldn, 1992) could also vary between occupations 
within one affiliate as well as between the subsidiaries. Each unit did not necessarily have 
a uniform compensation system across all occupations. If special groups need to have 
specific employee characteristics, obviously one might expect differences anyway. This 
variation in occupational compensation practice was shown by using the Gomez-Mejia 
and Balldn (1992:61) Summary Profile of Experiential and Algorithmic Compensation 
Patterns (with the 'Superior Dependency' basis omitted). The question then is whether 
the external environment may have a different effect on each level of the organisation, 
and whether the principles on which the pay has been designed have more been influenced 
by endogenous or exogenous factors or both equally. Whether a compensation system in 
the case study companies had an overall Algorithmic and Experiential pattern is shown in 
Table 12.2. The general pattern is a combination of the basis for pay, design issues and 
administrative framework. It has not been produced for every pay system in the 
subsidiary and company, but only for the main ones selected for comparison. 
Table 12.2 shows that there were differences in Algorithmic and Experiential profiles for 
the compensation systems within a subsidiary and between subsidiaries. Those affiliates 
with intra-subsidiary compensation differences, in general, were: 
• Build° Australia 
• Foodco Singapore 
• Build° Singapore 
• Metalco Singapore 
• High Tech Singapore 
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Table 12.2 
Summary Profile of Algorithmic (A) and Experiential (E) Patterns in the 
Compensation of the Case Study Companies 
Company/Occupation Algorithmic,* 
Experiential,* 
Company/Occupation Algorithmic,* 
Experiential,* 
Oilco Australia Oilco Singapore 
Operating Algorithmic Operating Algorithmic 
Clerical Algorithmic Clerical Algorithmic 
Managerial** Algorithmic Managerial** Algorithmic 
Foodco Australia Foodco Singapore 
Operating Algorithmic Operating Experiential 
Clerical Algorithmic Clerical Balance of A/E 
Managerial Algorithmic Managerial** Marginally Algor. 
Buildo Australia Buildo Singapore 
Industrial (Blue-collar) Experiential Industrial (Blue-collar) Experiential 
Clerical Algorithmic Clerical Marginally Algor. 
Managerial Algorithmic Managerial** Marginally Algor. 
Metalco Australia Metalco Singapore 
Industrial (blue-collar) Algorithmic Industrial Algorithmic 
Clerical Algorithmic Clerical/Admin. Algorithmic 
Administrative and Algorithmic Sales and Technical*** Marginally Algor. 
Technical*** 
Managerial Algorithmic Managerial** Balance of A/E 
High Tech Australia"" High Tech Singapore 
Clerical Algorithmic Clerical Balance of A/E 
Sales Balance of A/E. Sales Experiential 
Technical Service Algorithmic Technical Service Balance of A/E 
Managerial Balance of A/E Managerial Experiential 
Note: The stated general compensation pattern for each subsidiary's occupation is based on those 
common compensation elements in each pair of MNE subsidiaries for which data were available 
and applicable in both. *A=Algorittunic; E=Experiential.** Excludes expatriates. 
*** Occupations do not match precisely as there was no sales function in Metalco Australia 
**** High Tech Australia is a parent company rather than subsidiary 
As a parent company rather than a subsidiary, High Tech Australia is omitted from the 
list, but it too had intra-company differences. Those subsidiaries where the pay systems 
were, in general, all similar within the unit were: 
• Oilco Australia 
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• Foodco Australia 
• Metalco Australia 
• Oilco Singapore 
Having already discussed the possible variables for determining compensation design 
including supporting corporate and business strategies, differences within the subsidiaries 
should not be surprising especially if separate systems are designed for (1) different 
unions and awards, (2) strategic employee groups because different behaviours and 
employee characteristics are required, or (3) compliance with the parent MNE which 
wishes to replicate some structures in affiliates. There was only one Singaporean 
subsidiary with the same profiles for all occupations listed (Oilco), and three Australian 
— Oilco Australia, Foodco Australia and Metalco Australia. There were three Australian 
and four Singaporean affiliates where there was a mixture of Algorithmic and Experiential 
compensation profiles for occupations within the subsidiary. 
If we now compare the occupational compensation of some selected jobs between the 
Australian and Singaporean subsidiaries and companies using the Algorithmic and 
Experiential patterns based on the results in Table 12.2, no overall pattern of similarities 
and differences emerges, as Table 12.3 depicts. According to Table 12.3, using the 
Algorithmic and Experiential patterns, there is no symmetry between the two sets of 
affiliates and companies for all MNEs. For some occupations, the profile is similar; for 
others, it is different. Only in one MINE (Oilco) were all the selected pay systems 
completely similar in profile between the subsidiaries and companies in the same MINE in 
Australia and Singapore. In Foodco and High Tech, all compensation systems assessed 
on the Algorithmic and Experiential dimensions in Australia and Singapore were different 
from each other. It has to be acknowledged that all characteristics of pay including its 
basis, design issues and administrative framework are reduced to a single Algorithmic or 
Experiential profile letter for an occupational group in the tables, and that there are 
several features for which data were unknown, thus opening up the possibility that further 
investigation might have pushed a balance of Algorithmic or Experiential features one 
way or the other. However, although this may thus be an over-generalised portrayal 
glossing over important detail, it does suggest that either internal or external factors or 
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Table 12.3 
Similarities and Differences in Algorithmic and Experiential Compensation Profile 
for Occupations in the Case Study MNE Subsidiaries and Companies 
Company/Occupation 	Whether Compensation is 
Similar or Different in Australian 
and Singaporean Subsidiaries.  
of the Same MNE  
Oileo Australia/Singapore 
Operating 	 Similar 
Clerical Similar 
Managerial 	 Similar 
Foodco Australia/Singapore 
Operating 	 Different 
Clerical Different 
Managerial 	 Marginally Different 
Buildo Australia/Singapore 
Industrial (Blue-Collar) 	 Similar 
Clerical 	 Marginally Different 
Managerial Marginally Different 
Metalco Australia/Singapore 
Industrial (Blue-Collar) 	 Similar 
Clerical/Admin* 	 Similar 
Admin/Sales/Technical* 	 Marginally Different 
Managerial 	 Different 
High Tech Australia**/Singapore 
Clerical 	 Different 
Sales Different 
Technical Service 	 Different 
Managerial 	 Different 
Notes: *'This was a comparison of Clerical in Metalco Australia with Clerical/Administrative in Metalco 
Singapore. Administrative and Technical in Metalco Australia were compared with Sales and Technical 
in Metalco Singapore, so they are not precise matches.** High Tech Australia is a parent MNE 
both, are impacting on subsidiary compensation to different degrees at different levels. 
Alternatively, it may also suggest that there are different levels of managerial discretion in 
choosing compensation design in both countries and/or that the parent MNE is not 
replicating and transferring similar compensation practices to all units for all occupations. 
To process the data from Table 12.2 and the case studies further, similarities in the 
compensation profile for similar occupations in the same country may suggest whether 
the nature of the occupation is more significant than other internal and external variables. 
This is shown in Table 12.4. While the number of MNEs studied is small, Table 12.4 
reveals that industrial/operating staff compensation was a mixture of Algorithmic and 
Experiential schemes in both the Australian and Singaporean subsidiaries and companies. 
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Table 12.4 
Algorithmic* or Experiential* Profile by Occupation in Australian and 
Singaporean Subsidiaries and Companies 
Company/ 	Operating Clerical/ Admin/ 	Sales 	Tech./ Managerial 
Occupation Or 	Admin. 	Tech Tech. 
Industrial Servic 
C 
Australia 
Oilco Aus 	A 	A 
Foodco Aus A A 
Buildo Aus 	E 	A 
Metalco Aus A A 
High Tech Au+ 	A 	A 
A 
A 
A 
A 	 A 
A/E 	A 	A/E 
Singapore 
Oilco Sing 	A 	A 	 A 
Foocico Sing E A/E MargA** 
Builo Sing 	E 	MargA** 	 MargA** 
Metalco Sing A A 	MargA*** 	 A/E 
High Tech S. 	- 	A/E E 	A/E 	E 
Notes: *Algorithmic and Experiential are denoted by A and E. A/E means a balance of the two patterns. 
**Mg means Marginally ***Administrative and Technical in Metalco Australia were compared with 
Sales and Technical in Metalco Singapore, so they are not precise matches. The stated general 
compensation pattern for each subsidiary's occupation is based on those common compensation elements 
in each pair of MNE subsidiaries and companies for which data were available and applicable in both. 
+ High Tech Australia is a parent MNE rather than subsidiary. 
Clerical compensation across all units in Australia was Algorithmic whereas the 
Singaporean profiles were more dissimilar. At the managerial level, of all the subsidiaries 
and companies, there was only one clear Experiential system, although five others were a 
balance (or near balance) of both Algorithmic and Experiential features. The pattern for 
all Australian affiliate and company compensation was more Algorithmic compared with 
a more diverse profile in Singapore. As argued earlier, single general profiles conceal 
variations in detail, so Appendices 12.1 and 12.2 list the basis for pay, design issues and 
administrative framework for the selected pay systems, based on the Gomez-Mejia and 
Ballcin (1992) Summary Profiles. By doing this, the reasons for the inter-subsidiary 
differences become more apparent. 
Summary Profiles of the Compensation in the Australian Case Companies 
Appendix 12.1 shows that the compensation pattern for the Unit of Analysis for 
operating/industrial employees in all Australian subsidiaries/companies was Experiential 
due to the move to skill-based schemes in awards. This compared with a totally job- 
C 1 (1 
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based Algorithmic pattern for the managerial systems in all affiliates and companies, 
clerical systems also being mainly job-based. Tenure and performance as criteria for pay 
increases was not always clear across the Australian units, there being skill and annual 
reviews for operating staff, annual reviews and performance rises for clerical, and a 
mixture of performance and overall reviews for managers in Australia. Appraise of 
industrial staff was unusual in the Australian affiliates and more common for clerical staff, 
although not necessarily tied to pay rises. At managerial level, all Australian affiliates and 
companies had individual appraisal linked to compensation rises or bonuses — an 
Experiential feature. As might be expected, there was more emphasis on aggregate as 
well as individual performance for managerial staff giving a more Experiential profile. 
Almost without exception, all Australian affiliate and company compensation operated on 
a short-term time frame. Apart from the offering of company shares, all reviews and 
objectives for pay purposes were set on an annual cycle. The pay at risk was higher for 
the Australian managerial staff, where rewards could be based on objectives reached and 
contingent on corporate performance. Only in one company was the risk moderate, the 
loss being a merit increase only. Two of the Australian affiliates — Oilco Australia (A), 
and Foodco (A) — used corporate measures as criteria for pay decisions for senior 
management, while Buildo (A), Metalco (A) and High Tech (A) were more geared 
towards the business unit. Three of the Australian subsidiaries had pay systems based on 
a hierarchy but with the general grade structure linked to the pay levels of the labour 
market (an Algorithmic/Experiential pattern). In all Australian affiliates and companies 
studied, the employee benefits packages varied according to rank, and the hierarchical job 
evaluation systems in almost all companies meant that the operating/industrial, clerical 
and managerial systems were all Algorithmic. The Type of Control exercised (behaviour 
or outcome) varied in the operating/industrial and clerical categories. By comparison, the 
control for managers was all outcome-based (Experiential). 
Appendix 12.1 also indicates the differences in the Design Issues (Gomez-Mejia and 
Balkin, 1992) of the Australian compensation systems. Because of the agreement on 
confidentiality, compensation data were not sought, but several Australian subsidiaries 
and companies talked of trying to achieve above-market pay levels, and some volunteered 
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pay data. Most affiliates were unaware of a definite benefits policy on the position they 
aspired to in relation to the market, so data were not available on this either. As stated 
earlier, the amount of variable pay was a small proportion of total compensation at lower 
levels in the Australian subsidiaries and companies, whereas the element of risk was 
higher for managerial staff (Experiential). However, the percentages within the 
managerial cohort varied, being low in Foodco (A) and Metalco (A). In all the Australian 
affiliates and companies studied, the stance of providing high immediate payoffs with low 
future potential was taken (Algorithmic). Similarly, the Reinforcement Schedule for the 
Australian affiliates and companies was almost all Algorithmic in that fewer rewards were 
paid at a low frequency. 
In the third group of Compensation Profile features — Administrative Framework — the 
first issue is whether pay is centralised or decentralised. Centralisation versus 
decentralisation 'refers to the degree to which pay decisions and approval procedures are 
tightly controlled by corporate headquarters or delegated to various plants, divisions, and 
other subunits within the firm' (Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992:53). Like the strategic 
focus discussed earlier, centralisation is interpreted in this study as the degree to which all 
pay policies and decisions in the subsidiary were controlled by the national head office, 
and not the corporate head office of the whole MNE e.g. in Europe or the United States. 
Where the MNE was Australian owned, the corporate and national headquarters are the 
same (e.g. Buildo, Metalco and High Tech). In the degree of centralisation of 
compensation, the size of the company was arguably important as the pay for the 
operating/industrial staff in all affiliates was mainly decentralised (Experiential), clerical 
evenly split between centralised and decentralised, and managerial compensation very 
centralised (Algorithmic). Pay disclosure tended to be more open at the lower levels of 
the subsidiaries and companies (Experiential), especially where agreements registered 
with the AMC were publicly available. 
The Governance Structure of the compensation systems in the Australian subsidiaries and 
companies was more participative at lower levels where unions were part of the 
negotiated agreements (Experiential) compared with the more autocratic design of 
managerial pay (Algorithmic). The use of enterprise agreements registered with an 
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industrial tribunal, the use of awards for main conditions, and job evaluation for non-
industrial staff resulted in documentation on compensation procedures, as illustrated by 
Oilco (A) and Metalco (A). The degree of flexibility might vary between job levels, 
however, as skill-based systems give management the discretion to assess employees 
individually (Experiential) (e.g. Buildo Australia's operators). While deciding the size of 
individual managerial bonuses on merit involved some discretion in most cases, in 
companies like Oilco (A), Foodco (A), Buildo (A) and Metalco (A), this had to be done 
within constraints laid down from central administrations. 
Summary Profiles of the Compensation in the Singaporean Case Companies 
The features of the Gomez-Mejia and Balldn (1992) compensation patterns for the 
Singaporean affiliates are recorded in Appendix 12.2. Compared with the Australian 
affiliates and companies, there were more overall Experiential profiles in Singaporean 
units or a balance of Algorithmic and Experiential features. Like their Australian 
counterparts, no Singaporean subsidiary conformed completely to either an Algorithmic 
or Experiential pattern. The Basis of Pay (Unit of Analysis) differed across all units. 
However, pay for the majority of clerical and all managerial positions was initially based 
on job size (Algorithmic). Compared with Australian staff, a major difference in the 
criteria for pay increases for the Singaporean industrial and clerical employees was a 
greater reliance on length of service. Formal performance appraisal for industrial and 
clerical staff was not widespread. For managers, the criteria for pay increases were more 
performance-based. 
An examination of the level of performance measurement (individual or individual plus 
aggregate) in the Singaporean subsidiaries showed that formal individual appraisal with 
pay linkages to performance was rare. However, all levels of staff for all subsidiaries 
received bonuses and/or an Annual Wage Supplement (AWS) dependent on company 
performance, although three affiliates took individual performance of managers into 
account as well. Like the Australian systems, all compensation systems were short-term 
in orientation (Algorithmic); the setting of objectives and the review of pay were usually 
on an annual basis. By comparison, the risk sharing of employees in Singapore was much 
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higher, with most bonuses and AWS contingent on subsidiary performance (Experiential). 
This was to be expected from the advocacy for greater flexibility of pay systems by the 
National Wages Council and the Singaporean Government. 
The affiliate performance rather than the corporate MINE success was the Strategic Focus 
for managerial rewards (Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992). With the tight labour market in 
Singapore, it was anticipated that the compensation of affiliates would be based more on 
labour market rates rather than internal consistency principles, especially if the 
subsidiaries were small and without formal salary structures. Oilco Singapore (S), 
Foodco (S), and Buildo (S) had formal structures for particular occupational groups 
while Metalco (S) had a more informal structure for its industrial employees; 
nevertheless, all subsidiaries reviewed external pay rates regularly. The remaining pay 
schemes studied were individually based and used the market as the main determinant of 
base salary level (Experiential). However, at managerial levels, it was uniform practice to 
link pay to outcomes rather than behaviour. 
Like the study of the Australian subsidiaries and companies, no data were sought on pay 
levels of the Singaporean affiliates apart from that which was publicly available. Further, 
no material was available on whether the range of benefits for each affiliate was above or 
below the market average. Nevertheless, data on the pay mix in the affiliates were 
available and, compared with the Australian counterparts, showed a higher proportion of 
variable pay. 
All the Singaporean MNE affiliates emphasised the immediate paying of bonuses and 
merit pay, an Algorithmic feature, rather than using 'high future potential' (deferred 
payment plans) in their Total Compensation (Gomez-Mejia & Balldn, 1992: 61). 
Employee share-holding was not on a large scale for those companies where this was 
possible. Like most of the Australian units, the Reinforcement Schedule for most 
Singaporean subsidiaries was annual, mainly because, as its name implies, the AWS is 
provided annually, profits were shared annually and objectives set annually. 
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The final category of the Gomez-Mejia and Balldn (1992) Profile is the Administrative 
Framework. This covers the degree of centralisation of compensation systems, pay 
disclosure, employee participation in design, and system bureaucracy and flexibility. For 
these elements, the compensation practices across the Singaporean subsidiaries did not 
show any uniform patterns. 
The Degree of Discretion in Choice of Compensation 
If the external environment completely determined compensation design in a country, 
then arguably one would expect a set of identical pay systems in that nation. On the 
other hand, variation would imply that management had some discretion in choice of 
system. Very few of the occupations selected for analysis from either the Australian or 
Singaporean affiliates and companies had exactly the same Algorithmic or Experiential 
profiles as each other. One exception was the operating and clerical staff in the same 
collective agreement of Oilco Singapore. 
In examining the features of each of the occupational patterns shown in Appendices 12.1 
and 12.2, we can comment on the degree of discretion which management in the 
subsidiaries had. The starting point is that compensation design is assumed to have 
flowed from either the corporate MINE and/or subsidiary business strategies, and that 
design will be affected by other internal and external factors. Each of the Gomez-Mejia 
and Balkin (1992) compensation choices (see Appendix 4.3) is used as a guide for the 
comments. 
In either Australia or Singapore, a choice of skill or job as the basic unit for the 
compensation systems was possible, irrespective of whether this was in a collective 
agreement or not. The main constraint for the unionised staff in Australian affiliates was 
the recommendation of the AIRC that awards and agreements be based on skill and 
include career structures. The longevity of the job-based systems in all the MNEs could 
be due to a variety of reasons ranging from (1) reluctance to remove a long-standing and 
understood system, to (2) the Singaporean national culture which reinforces hierarchies. 
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The criteria for giving pay increases can include tenure or performance. Legally, there is 
no constraint on either criterion in Australia or Singapore, although the method for 
increasing pay will usually be included in collective agreements, which are legally binding. 
Payment for tenure is more common in Singapore, as discussed earlier, and is reflected in 
the pay systems of operating and clerical staff. This could be attributed to the national 
culture and status gained from seniority, the historic tradition of the family firm in 
rewarding loyalty (Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992) and/or earlier copying the practices of 
the British Civil Service. In the Australian affiliates and companies, this pay for tenure 
custom was not as strong for operating and clerical employees except for those who were 
working in areas covered by some former clerical awards. The emphasis on performance 
linked to pay rises can possibly be explained by the strategic importance of the 
management group irrespective of national location. 
The management choice with regard to individual or aggregate performance for rewards 
in the subsidiaries may have been affected by both internal and external environmental 
influences. Formal individual performance appraisal mechanisms varied across the 
affiliates in both countries. Comparing the two countries, apart from what is agreed and 
ratified in federal awards or enterprise agreements in Australia, the MNE has a choice of 
measurement tool or incentive. In the same way, apart from what is agreed and ratified in 
a collective agreement in Singapore and the payment of the AWS, the MNE affiliate has 
considerable discretion. The performance measurement systems may thus depend on the 
organisational culture that the MNE wants to foster, and the behaviour and performance 
it requires, particularly of managers. However, some factors may constrain the type of 
performance system. They include (1) the ease with which performance outcomes can be 
attributed to individuals, (2) national cultural constraints such as loss of face or dislike of 
the singling out of individuals through variable incentives, and (3) the HRM know-how of 
the affiliate. 
The Tables in Appendices 12.1 and 12.2 record that the time orientation for measuring 
performance and reviewing rewards was short for nearly all Australian and Singaporean 
affiliates and companies. The choice may be affected by internal variables like the 
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organisational culture of the corporate MNEs and subsidiaries, their long-term and short-
term planning processes and cycles, and the frequency of business plans and budgets. At 
the subsidiary level, the technology of the production process and the preferences of 
employees may determine the type of incentives. Apart from the business planning 
aspect, national cultures may encourage managerial and employee short-term orientation 
(Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992) as might institutional actions such as the annual 
recommendations of the Singaporean National Wages Council and the announcement of 
the annual Singaporean Civil Service salary rises. 
Risk sharing in the Gomez-Mejia and Balkin (1992) Compensation Profile refers to the 
proportion of employee earnings that are variable through being contingent on 
achievement of group or organisation performance goals. If the MNE subsidiary follows 
local practice, the area of discretion is possibly greater in Singapore than in Australia, as 
there is government encouragement for more flexible compensation. However, rather 
than being decided by management only, the degree of pay at risk for unionised industrial 
employees in both countries may be negotiable and in the collective agreement. For both 
unionised and non-unionised staff in Singapore, the custom and practice of the payment 
of AWS is a major variable component. This was reflected in the level of compensation 
at risk recorded in the case study data and was higher in Singapore than in Australia. 
There is no legislation that covers variable pay in Australia and, in the Australian case 
subsidiaries and companies, managers had more pay at risk than did clerical and industrial 
occupations. In both countries, the importance of the management performance to the 
effectiveness of the subsidiary may explain the pay—perfomance link, but employee 
attitudes towards risk sharing may also be attributed to a particular national culture. 
Internal structural factors and the head office orientation of a corporate MNE rather than 
external factors could possibly explain the Strategic Focus of the compensation of top 
management in the subsidiaries in both Australia and Singapore. The criteria to which 
executive pay in the subsidiaries were tied may have been laid down by the corporate 
MINE head office. Because of the complexity of systems, the allocation of an Algorithmic 
or Experiential label to each affiliate for using corporate or business unit performance for 
pay purposes is difficult here. 
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Gomez-Mejia and Balkin's (1992) concepts of internal and external equity are termed 
internal consistency and external competitiveness by Milkovich and Newman (1996) — 
two strategies that may often conflict with each other. Several factors may affect which 
dimension is given emphasis by management of an MNE subsidiary. Milkovich and 
Newman (1996) suggest that the major factors that influence internal structures of a 
domestic firm include: 
societal norms and customs; the economic conditions in which organizations operate; the culture, 
technology, strategy and objectives of a particular organization; and the particular characteristics 
of the work and the employees involved (p.53). 
Pay levels and external competitiveness can also be influenced by similar factors such as 
business strategies, kind of workforce, labour market competition, and product 
competition (Milkovich and Newman, 1996). As an MNE, the affiliate may be affected 
by head office IFIRM policy such as common international pay structures especially for 
expatriates and host country managers, but it has also to attract and retain employees 
from the various labour markets in the host nation. Local legislation and industrial 
systems may limit the subsidiary's pay choices as well. 
Historically, the job classifications of the award system set the basis for the internal 
structure for industrial and clerical staff in the Australian units, and pay rises were 
dependent on the recommendations of the NWC of the AIRC. The AIRC based the size 
of the general increases across the nation on what it considered the economy could bear. 
As we have noted, the affiliate could blur the relativities by exceeding the set rates by 
over-award payments according to labour market pressures and other factors. More 
recently, the AIRC has encouraged internal structures based on skills, particularly as a 
foundation for new enterprise agreements. Choices for internal structures for staff 
outside the scope of the award system are much wider. By contrast, there is no 
legislation in Singapore governing internal structures, but the NWC has suggested 
guidelines for the ratio of minimum to maximum salaries in grades and encouraged 
greater variable pay components. The similarity of the collective agreements in 
Singapore with the emphasis on job structures, grade ranges and defined annual 
increments for length of service appear to be the result of custom. For non-bargainable 
employees, the management has more scope. The choice for MNE managers in internal 
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consistency and external competitiveness is affected by internal and external factors, the 
latter including the state of the labour markets in which they function. 
While all the subsidiaries and companies were assessed as Algorithmic for Reward 
Distribution (Gomez-Mejia and Balkin, 1992), the degree of difference in hierarchies 
obviously varies from unit to unit. While internal factors such as size may determine this, 
external environmental factors such as unions and national culture (particularly 
Hofstede's [1980] Power Distance dimension) play a role because unions in Singapore 
and Australia preferred either a skill or job hierarchy for their members, and because 
compensation hierarchies were very tall in some of the industrial compensation systems in 
the Singaporean case studies — Singapore having a high Power Distance dimension. 
The final feature for the Basis for Pay of Gomez-Mejia and Ballcin's (1992) compensation 
profile is the Type of Control—namely whether the emphasis is on monitoring behaviour 
or outcomes. Research on managerial pay strongly suggests that 'more diversified firms 
do generally rely on output controls, while less diversified companies rely on behavioral 
and process controls' (Gomez-Mejia and Balldn, 1992:47). Whether this can be 
generalised to MNEs is open to question; it may depend on the type of MINE. But in the 
case companies, all managers were subject to output controls (Experiential). The picture 
for non-managerial staff was more varied. From an MINE head office viewpoint, prima 
facie, it would seem easier to review subsidiary managers against output criteria set 
across the MINE, but Gomez-Mejia and Balkin (1992) argue that business units at an 
early stage of development or aggressively pursuing new markets 'should rely on 
subjective performance measures' (p.48). The criteria will depend on the MINE head 
office orientation and the extent to which it wishes to replicate performance appraisal 
systems and manage career mobility. 
In addition to the state of the labour market, subsidiary managers' choice of pay levels 
will depend on MINE head orientation and company culture, labour costs, product 
markets, and the affiliate's ability to attract and retain either all staff or particular key 
occupations. The presence of unions and the stage of the subsidiary in its life cycle will 
also affect strategy for this feature. 
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In considering the significance of incentives in the pay mix, the definition of a 'significant' 
amount of pay 'at risk' in terms of percentage or dollars is clearly open to debate, and 
will be relative to occupation, industry or country standards, or all three. For the 
operating/industrial and clerical employees in the Australian subsidiaries and companies, 
incentives could not be judged to be significant by Singaporean standards. However, 
variable pay for managers in some Australian affiliates and companies could be judged as 
'significant'. Apart from Metalco Singapore whose financial performance kept bonuses 
at a moderate level, all other subsidiaries in Singapore applied a high degree of pay at risk 
across their workforces. Factors affecting managerial discretion on variable pay 
encompassed the corporate MINE 1HRM orientation, subsidiary business strategy, quality 
of performance management systems, and required behaviours for particular occupations. 
External factors included following local HRM practices, the influence of industrial 
bodies such as the Singaporean NWC, or national culture. National culture may not just 
affect the proportion of variable pay in total earnings, but also the type of incentive 
schemes as well (Hodgetts & Luthans, 1993b). 
While a national culture may affect reinforcement patterns (e.g. preference for short-term 
or long-term gains), subsidiary managements have a choice (and presumably local 
experience) in judging how close the incentive should be paid to the achieved target. 
However, Gomez-Mejia and Balkin (1992) argue that continuous and regular interval 
reinforcement such as Christmas bonuses encourage a short-term orientation, compared 
with, say, the issuing of shares as part of a package. The kind of business strategy 
pursued by the MINE subsidiary determines whether a particular frequency of incentives is 
appropriate (Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992). 
From the findings from each of the case companies in both countries, no major attempts 
appeared to be in progress to further the non-monetary rewards of the workforces in the 
areas of quality of work life and job enrichment, with the possible exception of Metalco 
Singapore. However, there are problems of definition of a non-monetary reward 
emphasis. In Australia, as mentioned already, the move to skill-based pay in awards 
offers more opportinity for career progression and team organisation, and the negotiation 
of enterprise agreements in Oilco (A), Buildo (A) and High Tech (A) would have 
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increased the amount of employee involvement in negotiations. The subsidiary 
management has therefore considerable choice in this area, although Gomez-Mejia and 
Balkin (1992) suggest that in a tight labour market (as was Singapore's), the monetary 
factor is very powerful in attracting and retaining key employees (p.52). 
In relation to subsidiary decision making, in Australia, the industrial staff schemes of all 
subsidiaries and companies were uniquely designed, with the degree of autonomy from 
the country head office varying. With clerical staff working in the Australian owned 
MNE head offices, it was to be expected that head office FIRM staff would exercise 
closer control of affiliate clerical systems. In the non-Australian MNEs, the clerical 
compensation was unique to the site, although monitored by the national head office 
HRM function. Managerial pay for all Australian subsidiaries and companies was 
administered centrally. The IHRM orientation of the MINE head office plus its corporate 
FIRM capacity to coordinate pay systems across the MINE determines the degree of 
centralisation and decentralisation of compensation in the subsidiary. Thus the degree of 
freedom of the Singaporean affiliates was higher for non-managerial levels than at 
managerial levels. 
The effectiveness of high levels of pay disclosure is dependent on an appropriate 
organisational culture; otherwise, disclosure can 'exacerbate hostilities and conflicts' 
(Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992: 55). In the Australian and Singaporean units, the 
presence of a registered collective agreement meant that grade levels and salaries were 
well publicised. For job evaluation schemes, the grade ranges may be known, if not 
actual individual salaries. In Australia, under corporations law for stock exchange listed 
companies, company officers' (i.e. directors') salaries have to be published in company 
annual reports for shareholders. Only in one subsidiary (Foodco Australia) did managers 
have to sign a salary confidentiality agreement, as it was their policy not to disclose grade 
ranges or the grade into which an employee was allocated. Apart from these several 
constraints, the affiliates and companies could adopt whatever disclosure policy they 
wished. 
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The presence of a union in subsidiaries in both countries had an impact on the 
Governance Structure and Nature of Pay Policies, the final dimensions of the Gomez-
Mejia & Balkin (1992) Compensation Profile. In both countries, union recognition 
resulted in high levels of participation in compensation design and more formal 
documentation. Job evaluation systems also require more formal procedures and can use 
a range of employees in judging panels. Another form of participation is permitting 
employee choice of benefits packages within a fixed cost, or, as happened in Oilco 
Australia, setting up a series of employee focus groups to generate proposals for 
improved salary incentive systems. Internal factors such as size, organisational culture 
and union recognition affect discretion of management in these policies. Certainly the 
smaller subsidiaries without pay structures had more freedom to handle compensation on 
a case-by-case basis. 
We conclude this chapter by considering one other aspect of the compensation package, 
namely employee benefits. 
Comparison of Benefits in the Case Study Subsidiaries 
The employee benefits of each MNE subsidiary and company considered in Chapters 7 to 
12 showed that the benefits profile for the Singaporean and Australian affiliates and 
companies of each MINE was different. Because the range of internal and external 
variables affecting pay systems also impacts on benefits, this was not an unexpected 
result. It was suggested in Chapter 2 that the employee benefits provided by a company 
may depend on government policies for social security, retirement and health; 
employment legislation covering leave such as sick, maternity and annual leave; 
economic, taxation and incomes policies; demographic changes; the state of the labour 
market; and national culture. Internally for the NINE, there are decisions to be made 
about the following factors: the type of head office benefits to be standardised in all 
subsidiaries; labour/operating cost ratios; the level at which to pitch benefits in relation to 
local host country employers; the presence of unions and collective agreements; fitting 
benefits to organisational culture; the preferences of employees; and the offering of 
benefits sufficient to attract and retain key employees. 
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While merely comparing the number of benefits provided in each affiliate (according to 
the benefits questionnaire profile used in the study) is not of great value without knowing 
their cost and rationale, the case comparisons did show that a Newly Industrialised 
Country such as Singapore does offer an equally-wide range of benefits as that of a 
mature economy like Australia. Table 12.5 compares the total benefits for each 
subsidiary and company as at 1995. 
Table 12.5 
Number of Employee Benefits for Each Australian and Singaporean Subsidiary 
and Company 
Industrial/ 
Blue-Collar 
Unskilled 
Skilled 
Clerical/ 
Achnin 
Sales/ 
Technical 
Professional/ 
Management 
Board 
Oilco Australia 25 25 23 21 23 21 
Foodco Australia 17 17 17 13 17 17 
Buildo Australia 16 16 16 19 21 
Metalc° Australia* 15 16 19 21 23 
High Tech Australia** 24 24 18 19 20 20 
Oilco Singapore 29 29 26 26 26 21 
Foodco Singapore 26 26 23 23 21 
Buildo Singapore 19 19 16 20 17 13 
Metalco Singapore* 15 15 12 13 12 
High Tech Singapore 21 23 21 
Notes: *This is the position as at 1993. For all other subsidiaries, the position is at 1995. These are 
the number of benefits as per the profile questionnaire used for the study. In some cases, additional 
benefits were given for certain occupations, especially under Australian awards. 
** High Tech Australia is a parent MNE rather than subsidiary. 
Table 12.5 indicates that Oilco Singapore offered more benefits than Oilco Australia for 
all occupations except for the Oilco Australia board members. A similar picture emerged 
for Foodco where the Singaporean affiliate was more generous. Up to the sales and 
technical level, Buildo Singapore's benefits exceeded those of its Australian counterpart, 
while the larger Metalco Australia provided more benefits across the organisation than 
did Metalco Singapore. Up to management level, High Tech Australia gave fewer 
benefits than High Tech Singapore. Table 12.5 also illustrates that the number of benefits 
can vary according to occupation irrespective of country. 
The Tables in Appendices 12.3 and 12.4 show separately the frequency of each type of 
employee benefit offered in all Australian and Singaporean subsidiaries and companies. 
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Comparing both Tables, no affiliate or company gave housing renovation (as opposed to 
house purchase) loans, and no Singaporean unit paid more retirement benefit than was 
required under the Central Provident Fund (CPF) laws. These profile headings are 
therefore omitted from the tables. The figures are for the position as at 1995 except that 
Metalco's figures were calculated for 1993. There are several benefits shown in 
Appendices 12.3 and 12.4 that all subsidiaries gave irrespective of occupation or location. 
They were: 
• Annual leave 
• Compassionate Leave 
• Maternity Leave 
• Sick Leave 
There were several other benefits that were common to almost all subsidiaries and 
companies either in Australia or Singapore. Free medical treatment and medicine, 
hospital ward, and specialist surgical fees benefits were widely provided in Singapore. 
In contrast, paternity leave and retrenchment benefits were almost universal in Australia 
whereas paternity leave was only provided in two affiliates in Singapore, and 
retrenchment benefits in just over half. Contributions to the CPF were compulsory in 
Singapore for retirement and other purposes, and superannuation was mandatory in 
Australia. Other relatively common benefits for the two countries were long service 
awards, long term illness protection, and study leave provision. Assistance with dental 
costs was given in about half the Singaporean affiliates, but rarely in Australia. The 
Festive Loan/Advance is unique to Singapore and usually given prior to the celebrations 
of Chinese New Year. It was a benefit in three subsidiaries up to technical and sales staff 
level. Acting allowances, shift allowances, company uniform, and time off for union 
duties in both countries were less frequent the higher the role. The provision of mobile 
phones, entertainment expenses, employee share schemes and motor vehicles 
provision/cost reimbursement rose with rank. 
In the MNEs studied, several reasons can be suggested for the number and kind of 
benefits paid by the subsidiaries studied. The role of legislation and national culture is 
discussed in more detail in the next chapter, but Singapore's Employment Act lays down 
national standards for annual leave, public holidays, sick leave, maternity leave, and a 
negotiable retrenchment benefit. Beyond these, the benefits are either negotiated in a 
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collective agreement or provided at the will of management. In Australia, many 
employee benefits are initially negotiated collectively and then included in industry, 
occupational, company or enterprise, state or federal awards, but several national 
standards for awards have been set as a result of test cases brought by unions before the 
Australian Industrial Relations Commission. These include maternity leave, family leave 
such as unpaid adoption and paternity leave, and notice and compensation for 
retrenchment (Creighton & Stewart, 1994). In addition, state governments (but not the 
federal government) have legislated for long service leave. 
Summing up, for the benefits provision in both countries there are statutory and/or 
industrial award minima that the MNE subsidiary has to observe. Beyond these, the 
management of the affiliate has considerable discretion in selecting which benefits to offer 
to support its business strategy. Some of these will be affected by the type of production 
process of the unit, its location and the type of employee. For unionised staff, the range 
of benefits may have to be negotiated with a union and, once in a collective agreement, 
may be difficult to remove. It is arguable that as an economy and society change, the 
range of benefits changes with them. Greater insecurity of employment has resulted in 
national retrenchment standards in Australia and the right to negotiate retrenchment 
compensation in Singapore. In both nations, there was an emerging range of family leave 
reflecting the greater and changing role of women in the workforce. The other national 
(and organisational) cultural aspect was that the hierarchical nature of compensation was 
reinforced by the different benefits for managerial employees in most affiliates. In 
Singapore, the lack of a welfare infra-structure appeared particularly instrumental in the 
degree of health and dental coverage. While the organisational culture and IHRM 
orientation of a company may colour the paternalism of an MINE affiliate, the local 
management still has to operate within or above the standards of the local labour market 
to attract, motivate and retain staff. It has also to devise benefits within the relevant 
taxation requirements. These requirements are particularly stringent in Australia. 
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Concluding Summary 
In this chapter we have drawn together some key findings of the thesis in the context of 
the main guiding question: 'How does the external environment of an MNE 
subsidiary influence the design of its compensation system?' We have argued that, in 
answering this question, complications arise because affiliates may have more than one 
compensation system, each of which may be affected in a different way by the external 
environment. Comparing the compensation systems in the subsidiaries of the same MNEs 
showed different Algorithmic and Experiential features within and between affiliates. 
Possible explanations for these differences were offered. Despite the external 
environmental influence, we suggested that there would still be a considerable degree of 
choice of design of compensation system by an MNE's management, but that this was 
possibly higher at managerial level than at industrial (blue-collar) levels. Finally, the 
employee benefits given in all subsidiaries in Australia and Singapore were compared, and 
some reasons offered for differences between them. 
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CHAPTER THIRTEEN 
RESEARCH PROPOSITIONS AND CONCLUSION 
Explanatory Framework of Subsidiary Compensation Design 
In Chapter 12, we noted that MNE subsidiaries usually had more than one 
compensation system, and that as there were variations in types of system within and 
between affiliates of the same MNE in different countries, the national external 
environment was arguably not a total determinant of compensation design. The 
management of affiliates therefore had a degree of discretion in design, but not total 
discretion, as the external environment of both Australia and Singapore presented 
some constraints. 
The relationships between elements of the external environment and the case study 
subsidiaries' compensation systems are now considered again using the explanatory 
framework shown in Figure 13.1. Some relationships are used to develop some 
propositions for further testing. Based on the replication of the case study findings 
and the literature, the direct compensation/external environment linkages are placed in 
the context of the interaction of the MNE corporate, regional, and national offices 
with their respective external environments, the inter-linkages with the affiliates and, 
finally, the influence of certain elements of the internal environment on pay design. 
From the cases, it is assumed that competitive strategy was a dominant factor in 
compensation design. However, the organisation and nature of work, affiliate size, 
and local subsidiary human resource policies and practices also appeared to be 
significant. 
Figure 13.1 incorporates the five levels needed for analysis of MNE compensation 
design (MNE corporate, regional, national, affiliate, and individual). With the 
assumption that any comprehensive SIHRM model has to start with the MINE 
corporate strategy (by definition), it follows that compensation systems should 
normally be designed top down. It is accepted that in some cases, corporate or 
business unit strategy may be formulated in response to management's preferred 
• Corporate MNE Competitive Strategy 
• International Orientation 	 4--*External Environment 
• Design /Approval/Advice/Control 
Regional/ National Offices 
Other Subsidiaries 
Figure 13.1 Explanatory Framework of MNE Subsidiary Compensation Design 
MNE Subsidiary External Environment 	 MNE Corporate Head Office 
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compensation system (Gomez-Mejia & Balldn, 1992), its desire to follow 'fads', or to 
maintain the status quo (Jackson & Schuler, 1995)--hence the bi-directional arrows 
between subsidiary competitive strategy and choice of compensation. Further, reverse 
arrows may reflect any negotiation that exists over competitive strategy, although this 
does not necessarily imply that the bottom of the MNE has as much power as the top 
(Frenkel & Royal, 1998). With the presence of regional offices (e.g. Buildo 
Singapore and Metalco Singapore) and national offices (e.g. Oilco Australia), there 
may be separate regional and national competitive strategies and IHRM policies. At 
the affiliate level, subsidiary business strategies and other internal factors affect 
subsidiary compensation as a whole, and also impact differently on various levels of 
employee. 
In Figure 13.1, the effect of the external environment is shown at international, 
regional, national and subsidiary levels. To maintain clarity in Figure 13.1, the 
external environment of 'other subsidiaries' is not included, although it is 
acknowledged. In this thesis, the national external environments of Australia and 
Singapore were analysed in detail, but it is the interactive effect that is the central 
concern. The arrows in Figure 13.1 are bi-directional to suggest that MNEs attempt 
to influence their environments (e.g. by appearing before industrial tribunals with 
unions) as well as reacting to them. In addition to the internal/external linkages, 
Schuler, Dowling and De Cieri (1993) emphasise interunit bi-directional linkages that 
might influence compensation design through sharing of FIRM policies and resources, 
and the degree of inter-subsidiary production dependence. 
The important elements of the external environment are judged to be industry 
characteristics facing the MNEs, and the influence of the host nation's government on 
employment and taxation legislation, the industrial relations system, economic 
management, and social security systems. The case study findings were generally 
inconclusive about the direct effect of national culture on compensation design, but it 
can be argued that facets of national culture are indirectly manifested through a 
country's legislation, industrial relations, economic management, social security, and 
employee pay preferences. 
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The case studies also showed the presence of several compensation systems in the 
affiliates. Figure 13.1 thus shows that the external and internal environmental features 
may influence each element of the compensation systems of the local board, 
expatriates, and host country staff. Some of the host country employees may, in turn, 
be represented by a union or be within its coverage. The effect of the environment 
may be tempered by the MNE's union recognition policies and the observance of 
awards and agreements. 
In summary, the underlying assumption of the framework is that the subsidiary 
management has a choice of compensation design to achieve its goal of maximising its 
competitiveness (Dowling, Welch & Schuler, 1999), but that some choices may be 
closed off to the MNE because of external environmental constraints. More choices 
may be available as a result of environmental changes resulting from pressure of 
subsidiary management to influence the external environment. 
Each of the variables of the framework is now considered in turn, some in sufficient 
detail to generate propositions. The propositions cover the effect on compensation 
systems of the MINE head office, host country legislation, industrial relations, 
economy and incomes policies, and national culture. The propositions are designed to 
'state the relations among constructs', and to operate on a more abstract level than 
hypotheses (Bacharach, 1989:500). During the discussion on the effect of national 
culture, a separate brief comment is made about the influence of national culture on 
the provision of employee benefits in Singapore and Australia in the light of recent 
research by Schuler and Rogovslcy (1998). 
Propositions for the MNE Head Office Involvement in Subsidiary 
Compensation Design 
A starting point for the explanatory framework of Figure 13.1 is the MINE 
competitive strategy. While not considered in detail in this research, it is accepted 
that HRM (including compensation design) is crucial to implementation of the 
corporate MNE's competitive strategy (Schuler & Huselid, 1997) and that 
components of any international strategy may include the scope of the MINE 
operations, its resource deployment, distinctive competence, and synergy (Griffin & 
Pustay, 1996). The matching of compensation practices to business strategy is not 
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just the preserve of the HR professional in the corporate head office, but is 'a 
dispersed activity throughout the organisation' (Sloman, 1997:172), including MNE 
affiliates. One indicator of the matching process in an NINE is its international HRM 
orientation. One of the initial research questions thus asked how an MNE's 
international orientation affected the choice of compensation design of a subsidiary. 
Based on the five cases, the corporate MINE head offices adopted different 
approaches in relation to affiliate compensation design. These approaches included 
the design and control of subsidiary compensation or giving advice and approval. 
Apart from MNE headquarters' international orientation, other variables may 
moderate the effect of the external environment on compensation. They include the 
structure of the MNE, its experience of the MINE in running international business, 
the amount of resources allocated to compensation design and operation 
internationally, and the location of the SIHRM function either at the MINE centre or 
at affiliate level or both (Schuler, Dowling & De Cieri, 1993). Furthermore, other 
variables may be the HRM philosophy and the specificity of HRM policies developed 
at the centre of the MINE (if any), and the potential of the subsidiaries' HRM practices 
to deviate from central policies to accommodate the needs of the competitive strategy, 
interunit linkages, local environments, and needed employee behaviours (Schuler, 
Dowling & De Cieri, 1993:732 & 751). For example, in the Foodco Singapore case, 
it was noted that all the Singaporean affiliate's production was exported to Australia 
for further processing and that the South—East Asia Regional office and Australian 
national head office monitored the Singaporean compensation systems. It could be 
argued that the stronger the production integration of subsidiaries, the greater the 
intervention in the compensation systems for all staff of the supplying affiliate by an 
MINE regional or national office (see, for example, Hamill, 1984; Andersson & 
Forsgren, 1996). 
From the literature, we note that the interdependent network features of an MINE 
(Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989), and the need for the head office to balance local 
responsiveness and global integration to be competitive (Nohria & Ghoshal, 1997), 
are crucial considerations for any study of head office—subsidiary relations. To 
achieve the local—global balance, an MINE head office uses a variety of informal and 
formal mechanisms to control its affiliates, some of which can be classified according 
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to the degree of centralisation of decision making, the formalisation of systems and 
rules for decision making, and 'normative integration' ('socialization of managers') 
(Ghoshal & Nohria, 1993:28). Extant research has suggested that head office—
subsidiary relations can be affected by the importance of the role assigned to the 
affiliate (Martinez & Janllo, 1991), its competencies and resources, MINE ownership 
structure (Martinez & Ricks, 1989), the national origin of the MINE (Ferner, 1997), 
the dependence of the affiliate on head office for resources (Hamill, 1984; Martinez & 
Ricks, 1989), subsidiary performance and production integration (Hamill, 1984), and 
the method of acquisition of the unit (Rosenzweig & Nohria, 1994). In addition to 
these, the involvement by head office in affiliate decision making may vary according 
to the subsidiary in question, the type of employee (HCN, PCN or TCN)(Kuwahara, 
1985; Kuhne & Toyne, 1985), the type of occupation (Atkinson, 1989), the particular 
aspect of compensation (such as compensation structures, collective agreements, base 
pay levels, financial incentives, or any of the employee fringe benefits), labour costs 
and productivity (Marginson et al., 1995), and the relationship of pay systems to the 
other HRM functions and to the MINE strategies generally. 
Previous work has attempted to assess the scale of intervention in compensation 
design by head office using a range from 'parent decision' to 'subsidiary decision' 
(Van Den Bulcke & Halsberghe, 1984; Hamill, 1984). However, an MINE head office 
decision about the compensation design to be followed in a subsidiary may not 
necessarily mean that the design mirrors the systems in the head office, although there 
is evidence (e.g. Oilco and Metalco) that MNEs will transfer HRM practices to 
subsidiaries to get consistency between the MINE head office and its affiliates. When 
an MINE headquarters does not transfer its practices, the MINE subsidiary practices 
tend to follow those of local firms, rather than those of other affiliates in the MINE 
(Taylor, Beechler & Napier, 1996). Thus the three choices for the MINE head office 
in relation to affiliate compensation include (1) resemblance of systems to those of the 
parent MINE (ethnocentric), (2) conforming to host country practices (polycentric), 
and/or (3) adherence to a world-wide standard (global) (Rosenzweig & Nohria, 
1994:229). Taylor, Beechler and Napier (1996: 966-7) have expanded the 
application of these three choices by using the terms `exportive SIHRM' (high internal 
consistency and low external consistency), 'adaptive' (low internal and high external 
542 
consistency), and 'integrative' (taking the 'best approach' — high internal consistency 
and moderate external consistency). 
As previous authors have suggested, Taylor, Beechler and Napier (1996) state that 
the choice which the MNE parent makes may depend on the strategy of the MINE, the 
level of interdependence and resource exchange between sub-units, and the perception 
of the HRM competence by the top management as a resource that can be used 
outside the home country to gain competitive advantage (pp. 967-9). The more a 
subsidiary is dependent on the MINE parent for resources, the more control over 
HRM would be exercised by head office (p.974). In setting up a greenfield site, an 
MINE affiliate is more likely to install HRM practices similar to those of the MINE 
parent than it would in an acquired established firm (p.9'76) (see also Rosenzweig and 
Nohria, 1994). Taylor, Beechler and Napier (1996) proceed to argue that HRM 
practices are easier to transfer overseas from head office to a subsidiary when there is 
a national cultural similarity, but, as mentioned earlier, Rosenzweig and Nohria (1994) 
found only weak support for a hypothesis that resemblance to local HRM practices is 
negatively related to the Culture Distance between the parent country and the host 
nation (p.237). Head office HRM practices may also be more evident for occupations 
in the affiliate that are crucial to the MNE's performance and when the host nation 
legislation does not constrain transfer of FIRM practices (Taylor, Beechler & Napier, 
1996: 978). 
Rosenzweig and Nohria's (1994) findings on 249 US affiliates of MNEs supported 
hypotheses that affiliate FIRM practices will more closely resemble those of local 
competitors than those of the parent MINE in its home country (p. 231), that 'time off' 
provisions and 'benefits' will tend to conform to local practices whereas this was less 
the case for executive bonuses because of equity issues across the MINE (pp. 232-3). 
Perhaps the most significant finding was the lack of support for the hypothesis that 
greater head office control of an affiliate is likely to result in less use of local practices 
(p.238). This was supported in a study by Putti, Singh and Stoever (1993) of the 
perceptions of managers of 78 US, European and Japanese MINE subsidiaries based in 
Singapore. The study concluded that allowing greater autonomy to an affiliate does 
not necessarily mean its HRM practices will be more localised (p.115). 
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In the context of the literature just discussed, we now turn to the findings about the 
head office role in compensation design in the case study MNEs. In Oilco Australia, 
the corporate MNE head office in Europe decided the compensation package for the 
chairman, and approved the conditions and any regrading of the top 'letter' category 
positions in the affiliate. The procedures for the payment of expatriates were 
administered from Europe. There was no corporate MNE head office involvement in 
non-managerial compensation designs, apart from receiving data on costs at the 
annual presentations. The managerial compensation system was decided mainly by 
the subsidiary. The key transfer of compensation design from the parent Oilco to the 
Australian affiliate was the use of the Hay salary structure, which was adapted locally. 
The salary rates were set locally and geared to the Australian labour market. All other 
payment and employee benefits systems conformed to local Australian practice, 
particularly the introduction of enterprise agreements. 
The relationship of Oilco Singapore to the European corporate MNE head office was 
similar to that of Oilco Australia. Expatriate packages were set according to the 
corporate MNE guidelines. The conditions for top management were agreed with 
head office, and communication took place over the use of the Hay system. Like 
Oilco Australia, the main corporate head office interest was in the cost of labour. 
There was no direct involvement in the structures for the non-managerial employees. 
While generous, the collective bargains and salary structure conformed to local 
practice. The two conclusions here are, first, that a common senior level salary 
structure existed across the MNE, irrespective of local national cultures, because this 
assisted in the mobility of staff between units. Second, the corporate head office was 
more concerned about the pay and conditions of employees at the top of the affiliate 
than the pay system of non-managerial staff. The negotiating and signing of collective 
agreements in both subsidiaries was done locally. 
With the European owned Foodco, the compensation system for the Foodco Australia 
manufacturing plant was determined locally. The salary structure of the managerial 
staff was administered from the Australian headquarters, and was a different system 
from that operating in the parent home country. The negotiations of the agreements 
with the unions for the non-managerial staff (resulting in letters of agreement with the 
unions) were done and signed off locally. There was no direct contact with the 
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corporate MINE head office about these agreements. There were no transfers of 
compensation or benefits systems from Europe for any occupational level, apart from 
the possibility of buying shares in the European parent. By contrast, Foodco 
Singapore was subject to more external intervention. While the local affiliate 
negotiated the collective agreement with the unions, the Regional Director approved 
the final design for non-managerial staff. The Foodco Australia HRM Director was 
consulted about the proposed salaries planned for the four managers on the site for 
the following year. There was no transfer of compensation or benefits design from 
the Australian parent company, or from the corporate European parent, as local 
practice was followed at all levels. 
Buildo was an Australian MINE of which Buildo Australia was a part. In the 
manufacturing affiliate, the management salary system was common across the steel 
division of the MINE in Australia, leaving the subsidiary little choice but to use this. 
Negotiations for the enterprise agreement were performed locally in conjunction with 
the Special Building Products Group head office. There was no intervention by the 
corporate MNE head office. By comparison, the involvement by the parent MINE 
Buildo into the Buildo Singapore compensation systems was greater. The Managing 
Director's (MD) conditions were set by the Australian corporate MINE and its South-
East Asian regional office in conjunction with the Buildo Singapore board. While the 
Australian corporate MINE monitored the managerial pay, the final approval of the 
management packages was by the Buildo Singapore board. The corporate MINE head 
office was not otherwise involved either in the transfer of compensation practice or 
controlling the systems. The compensation systems were essentially locally based. 
No Australian pay systems were thus transferred into the Singaporean affiliate from 
Australia, the main involvement being in the MD's compensation. 
Metalco Australia was a unit in one of the operating companies of the Australian-
owned Metalco MNE. The compensation in Metalco Australia was subject to some 
corporate head office control and a common company-wide compensation strata 
system. Although the strata system applied across the MINE in Australia, negotiation 
of collective agreements was done locally. In contrast, Metalco Singapore was a self-
contained affiliate within the Singaporean region. All compensation systems were 
devised locally and set to local conditions. The only link back to the Australian 
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corporate MNE was the setting of the salary and conditions of the Metalco Singapore 
General Manager within the strata system. The Managing Director of the Singapore 
holding company also approved the General Manager's benefits and local allowances, 
and the general pay levels for the company. Apart from the strata system, no 
Australian compensation systems were transferred into Singapore. 
High Tech was also an Australian-owned MINE. The MINE corporate head office 
centralised the compensation design for the High Tech Australia company. The 
packages for MDs in Australia, the Americas and Asia and their direct reports were 
determined at Board level, whereas other staff salaries were recommended by senior 
line management. The enterprise agreement was negotiated under local Australian 
legislation. Apart from the MD for Asia, the corporate MINE head office in 
Melbourne played little role in the compensation design for High Tech Singapore. 
The Singaporean regional office approved the compensation design for the High Tech 
Singapore CEO. Compensation systems for other staff in the affiliate were 
determined by the CEO to conform to local conditions. No compensation systems 
were imported from Australia. 
From the cases, except for the linkages between corporate, regional and national head 
offices and the affiliates, there was no significant evidence of other subsidiaries relying 
on each other for information or resources on compensation design. The only 
reference was by an Oilco Australia interviewee who referred to exchanges of 
information with other subsidiaries about managerial salaries and grade points. 
Specialist HR resources directed at the design and operation of compensation systems 
generally seemed to be a function of size of the MINE. Both subsidiaries of Oilco had 
large specialist HR teams. While Foodco Australia had a specialist HR function at 
subsidiary level and at the national Australian head office, human resource activities at 
Foodco Singapore were handled by line managers. Buildo Australia relied on advice 
by a Group head office HR professional, but like Buildo Singapore at the time of the 
first interviews, had no dedicated HR function. Metalco Australia had several HR 
professionals in the corporate Australian head office, a team of professionals at the 
processing company head office, and on site at Metalco Australia. By comparison, 
Metalco Singapore was too small to carry a HR specialist. A similar argument could 
be made for High Tech which only latterly appointed a HR professional. Prior to this, 
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the High Tech company and Singaporean affiliate divided the HR function between 
line management. For all case subsidiaries, the negotiation of local union collective 
agreements was not confined to those affiliates with specialist HR professionals, but 
the approval of senior managerial salaries did involve corporate, regional or national 
head offices and some input from Hit professionals, where appropriate. 
From the cases and the literature, we can now develop a series of propositions 
concerning the role of the head office and subsidiary compensation. Based on the 
Oilco Australia, Oilco Singapore, and Buildo Singapore cases and the work of 
Schuler, Dowling & De Cieri (1993), Taylor, Beechler and Napier (1996), Kuwahara 
(1985), and Kuhne and Toyne (1985), the following proposition is developed: 
Proposition 1 
Irrespective of a parent MNE's general international orientation, the more 
senior the managerial position in a subsidiary, and the more crucial it is to the 
performance of the subsidiary, the more likely that an MNE corporate head 
office will devote resources to deciding or approving the compensation design 
and/or level of this position. 
While the IHRM literature and research has concentrated on managerial and 
professional employees, it should not be concluded that head offices do not get 
involved in the management of non-managerial employees (Ferner, 1994). From the 
findings in Oilco, Buildo, Metalco, and High Tech (but not Foodco) cases, and 
Schuler, Dowling and De Cieri. (1993), we can formulate another proposition: 
Proposition 2 
The lower the level of a position in the organisational hierarchy of a subsidiary, 
the more the parent MNE will adopt a polycentric international orientation 
towards compensation design of this position. 
From the Oilco Australia and Singapore, and Metalco Australia and Singapore cases, 
and the research reported by Edwards, Ferner & Sisson (1996), Schuler, Dowling and 
De Cieri (1993), Taylor, Beechler and Napier (1996), and Walsh, Zappala and Brown 
(1995), we can postulate: 
Proposition 3 
The greater the mobility of professional and managerial staff between MNE 
units, the greater the likelihood of an ethnocentric approach by the MNE parent 
to the compensation of these staff, and the transfer and formalisation of the 
parent head office compensation system for these staff to all affiliates. 
If Proposition 3 was empirically supported, this would suggest a constraint on the 
MNE subsidiary to adapt its managerial and professional compensation systems to (1) 
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the needs of the affiliate's competitive strategy, (2) the differences in the local external 
environment, and (3) the shaping of employee behaviours needed to achieve the 
affiliate's competitive strategy. 
Industry Characteristics and MNE Subsidiary Compensation 
In their integrative framework of SIHRM, Schuler, Dowling and De Cieri (1993) 
include industrial characteristics as an exogenous variable. The characteristics are 
taken to include the type of business or industry, the nature of competitors, and the 
extent of change (p.738). In their analysis of the effect of organisational context on 
HRM practices, Jackson and Schuler (1995) also include industry characteristics as a 
major external variable, but this time referring to whether a company is private or 
public, the industrial sector it occupies, and its exposure to change. Because of the 
pervasiveness of industry characteristics, Dowling, Welch and Schuler (1999:289) 
argue that exogenous factors 'can exert a direct influence on endogenous factors, 
SHRM strategy and practices, and multinational concerns and goals'. Figure 13.1 
shows a two-way (rather than one-way) interaction between the internal and external 
factors affecting affiliate compensation, one argument being that while the extent of 
competition may affect the business strategy of an affiliate, the actions of a subsidiary 
may also influence the extent of competition faced by other MNEs in the industry. 
The intended joint venture between BP Amoco and Caltex Australia for the blending, 
packaging and warehousing of lubricants in Australia is one possible example (Caltex, 
1999). 
All case study MNEs were located in the private sector, so their compensation 
systems were less subject to host country government control than those for 
public/civil service employees (Hague, 1999). While the terms `multidomestic' and 
'global' oversimplify the complexity of MNE structures and strategies (Schuler, 
Dowling and De Cieri, 1993), Oilco appeared to have more global attributes than did 
the other four MNEs, with common managerial pay structures and centrally designed 
expatriate compensation to support high levels of expatriate mobility between units. 
All case MNEs operated in highly competitive product markets. It is difficult to draw 
direct links from this feature to specific pay system design here, but reduction in salary 
levels for higher paid employees in High Tech occurred during recessions. Oilco 
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Australia led the breakaway from centralised oil industry pay agreements to gain more 
control over labour costs, and incentive schemes in Foodco Singapore and Buildo 
Australia and Singapore arguably were attempts to improve subsidiary 
competitiveness (Rimmer et al., 1996). 
Space limitations do not allow a full discussion of all dimensions of change in the case 
MNEs, but the need to cope with technological change was arguably an impetus for 
the introduction of team-based structures, greater employee flexibility and 
competency-based pay in Oilco Australia and the Australian High Tech manufacturing 
site (Ledford, 1991). Strong arguments can therefore be made for the inclusion of 
industry characteristics in any explanatory framework of MINE compensation design. 
Proposition for Employment and Taxation Legislation and MINE Subsidiary 
Compensation Design 
From a compensation viewpoint, the discussion by Schuler, Dowling and De Cieri 
(1993) of the 'political' exogenous factor only in terms of political stability and 
SIHRM underplays the role of government in compensation design. This is apparent 
in Australia by the positions adopted by governments of different political persuasions 
while participating in National Wage Cases over wage levels and principles before the 
Australian Industrial Relations Commission. Furthermore, the government is a major 
employer in its own right and its policies may influence other employers, including 
MINE affiliates. Political colour has also affected the type of employment and 
industrial relations legislation passed, which in turn has affected the role of industrial 
tribunals, the rights of unions, and the type of collective and individual agreements 
that were possible. In Singapore, the government had adopted a clear position on the 
role and type of unions, and participates in the National Wages Council proceedings 
as well as receiving its recommendations. Similarly, the bonuses given to public 
servants signal the government's view of the country's capacity to pay. 
In Chapter 3 of the thesis, it was argued that the MINE subsidiary in a host country 
may face a legal environment that consists of home and host nation laws, regional and 
international legislation, treaties and conventions. While the laws of a host nation 
affecting compensation might be taken as 'given', the MINE may have some input, say 
through employer associations, in trying to influence local law (Masters, 1987). Host 
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country employment legislation may affect compensation by setting legal minimum 
wages and national conditions of employment, mandatory bonuses, equal pay, and the 
requirements for a wages-work bargain (Morgenstern, 1984; Creighton, Ford & 
Mitchell, 1993). 
When considering the Singaporean and Australian legal environments, we noted that 
the Singaporean Employment Act (1968 and subsequently amended) specified the 
minimum conditions of service. It was also stated that managers, civil (public) 
servants and certain other categories were excluded from coverage as were those 
earning more than the set limits. The Act did not set any minimum pay levels or equal 
pay requirements. Benefits paid in kind such as employer-provided housing or cars 
were taxable, and while not actually affecting compensation design, the mandatory 
employer contribution to the Central Provident Fund (CPF) markedly increased the 
cost of labour. 
In comparison, in Australia, minimum rates of pay and basic employee benefits are 
mainly set by the award system. Federal and state legislation covers annual leave, 
long service leave, parental leave, equal pay and various mechanisms for setting 
minimum entitlements in agreements (Creighton & Stewart, 1994). MINE affiliates 
must also pay any tax necessary under the Fringe Benefits Tax provisions. Other 
taxation legislation may affect income, benefits and capital gains (Gomez-Mejia & 
Balldn, 1992). Capital gains under employee share plans may be liable for tax under 
income tax laws. Other laws in some countries may prohibit forms of compensation 
such as stock option plans (Schuler, Dowling & De Cieri, 1993). 
In assessing the effect of legislation on compensation design in the case companies, in 
Oilco Australia, legislation had affected the way certain parts of compensation had 
been packaged. This particularly applied to top executive benefits because of the 
Fringe Benefits Tax (FBT), and new superannuation laws. The company had an equal 
opportunity policy and equal pay. The interviews in Oilco Singapore revealed that the 
S$1500 per month limit for the coverage of the Singaporean Employment Act applied 
only to the employees in the bottom half of the nine grade salary structure of Oilco 
Singapore's unionised employees. However, the MINE exceeded the Act's minima 
and gave the enhanced conditions to all employees on the salary structure. Oilco 
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Singapore observed equal pay despite the absence of legislation, and revised its 
retirement age according to the 1993 Act. 
In Foodco Australia, the interviewees stated that the subsidiary observed the 
Australian federal and state legislation relating to equal pay and leave. These, 
together with the minimum rates in awards, did not pose a major constraint for the 
company as it paid above award rates. The introduction of FBI and new 
superannuation laws had, however, caused a review of the managerial benefits and the 
affiliate's superannuation policy. In Foodco Singapore, the subsidiary was not 
unionised for the first interviews, but followed the industrial relations laws and 
procedures on recognising unions for bargaining at a later date. The unit applied 
equal pay principles and considered any minimum conditions legislation irrelevant, as 
it had paid above the market levels to remain non-unionised (without success). 
In Buildo Australia, the minimum rates of the Metal Industry Award provided the 
main constraint on pay systems for unionised staff. The FBT caused a redesign of the 
car policy, medical scheme and low interest housing loans, and the new 
superannuation laws had a similar effect. Like Oilco Australia, this subsidiary took 
advantage of new industrial relations legislation to negotiate an enterprise agreement. 
In Buildo Singapore, the managers interviewed took the line that the minimum 
conditions of the Employment Act had to be observed, and that contributions to the 
CPF had to be made according to the rules. Apart from this, the subsidiary was not 
unionised and designed its own systems, which included payment of the Annual Wage 
Supplement. 
Metalco Australia had a clear company policy to observe any laws which applied to 
the MNE; a stated policy on equal pay and opportunity; and paid sums above award 
minima even though these appeared to conflict with its paid rates agreements. FBT 
had an effect on salary packaging, and superannuation had undergone a similar 
review. Legislation in Singapore was not seen as a major constraint in compensation 
design by the General Manager of Metalco Singapore, as the Employment Act was 
observed and CPF was paid. 
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The state and federal awards were the constraining minima for High Tech Australia. 
Equal pay was not an issue as awards no longer have separate female and male rates, 
but FBT had a major effect on High Tech and allowances had to be reorganised. An 
interviewee outlined the arrangements for managers to minimise income tax by salary 
sacrificing arrangements for car leases. High Tech Singapore managers spoke of 
observing the Employment Act without problems and paying Annual Wage 
Supplements. As this Singaporean subsidiary was small, it had great flexibility in the 
design of individual compensation packages. 
During the case study interviews, no interviewee mentioned international MNE codes 
of practice, conventions or, where relevant, parent country legislation or transnational 
law, but it did appear that the Singaporean MNE subsidiaries had noted the minimum 
conditions of the Employment Act and incorporated them into pay and benefits 
provisions. This is understandable as employees can make complaints about breaches 
to the Ministry of Labour (Manpower) and have them investigated. In Australia, 
there are federal government inspectors who can seek access to company premises to 
check pay records for under-payment and award breaches. Further, employees can 
seek information from state and federal industrial relations/labour departments and 
trade unions about the appropriate conditions of service for particular industries. As 
Florkowsld and Nath (1993:311) argue, employment rights 'are meaningless if they 
not enforced'. 
The imposition of taxation such as the FBT can cause companies to restructure 
benefits. Even overseas expatriate staff working in Australia are subject to FBT 
under certain conditions. Minimum conditions affect all employees in the sense that 
their compensation has to be above these minima, but arguably, managers who were 
in receipt of more expensive fringe benefits in Australia may have been affected more 
by the FBT legislation. However, apart from the inclusion of the AWS in Singapore, 
there was no legislation in either country about pay structures and mix. Nevertheless, 
the MNE subsidiary has little choice but to comply with the legislative requirements of 
the host country that do exist, although it may try to maximise its discretion to 
achieve business goals and/or follow MINE IIHRM strategies and policies. 
Alternatively, it may assess legal monitoring systems and probability of prosecution 
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for violation of host nation laws, or even reject potential locations on the basis of their 
legal systems (Florkowski & Nath, 1993). 
The greater the range of employment and taxation legislation there is in the host 
country, the more this will impact on the MINE subsidiary. Levels of direct taxation 
may result in tax equalisation or tax protection for the PCN and the HCN (Dowling, 
Welch & Schuler, 1999) or 'very creative and innovative new compensation schemes' 
in attempts to get around strict tax laws (Bloom & Ivfilkovich, 1999:293). Indirect 
taxation may influence the host nation's cost of living and the allowances payable to 
an expatriate. As locally owned firms are subject to the same laws, MNE 
compensation practices are likely to be similar to those of locally owned firms for 
those elements subject to legislation. This will force the MINE to become more 
polycentric in international orientation (Schuler, Dowling & De Cieri, 1993). This 
appeared to be the case for all subsidiaries in Australia and Singapore for non-
managerial staff compensation. While research is limited on the way MNEs manage 
HRM in relation to host country legislation, using the Florkowski and Nath 
(1993:310) dimensions of the international legal environment, a fourth proposition 
can be postulated: 
Proposition 4 
The greater the range of regulatory complexity and regulatory relevance of the 
employment and taxation legislation affecting compensation design in a host 
nation, the more likely an MNE is to adopt a polycentric international 
orientation to IHRM and host nation compensation practices in its subsidiaries. 
Proposition for the Influence of Industrial Relations Systems on Subsidiary 
Compensation 
The fourth supplementary research question for the thesis related to the effect of the 
host country industrial relations systems on MINE affiliate compensation. Figure 13.1 
reveals the interaction of national government and, more indirectly, national culture 
with an industrial relations system. From the case studies, the most significant 
features were the role of industrial tribunals, dispute resolution systems, union rights, 
scope and strategies, the nature of collective agreements and awards, and the 
recommendations and principles of the AMC NWC and the Singaporean NWC. 
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There are some initial complications in studying the impact of an industrial relations 
system on MINE subsidiary compensation design. First, there is a shortage of research 
studies on MNE subsidiary industrial relations practices at the workplace level on 
which to ground a proposition (Dowling, Welch & Schuler, 1999). Second, there are 
problems in defining what an industrial relations system is, and in questioning the 
relevance of early definitions like Dunlop's (1958) in the 'process of 
internationalization' (Chaykowski & Giles, 1998:3). There is then the level at which 
the system operates, which may be at international, regional, national, industry, 
company, or enterprise levels. To reflect this, the locus of decision-making of MINE 
industrial relations (IR) policies may be at international corporate MINE head office, 
national head office, subsidiary and site levels (Gunnigle, Brewster & Morley, 1994), 
as well as at a regional MINE office level. Another complexity is that the degree of 
centralisation of decision-making may vary for each element of IR policy, as Hamill's 
(1984) work on British subsidiaries of 30 foreign MNEs shows. Because an MINE 
will be faced with a different industrial system (as well as union strategies) in every 
country in which it is located, no matter where its industrial policies are formulated, 
the MINE will inevitably have to take local requirements into account (Dowling, 
Welch & Schuler, 1999; Veersma, 1995). The outcomes of the subsidiary's industrial 
relations system in the form of pay and conditions have to be competitive in the local 
labour market (Bomers & Peterson, 1977). 
Hamill (1984) suggests five structural factors that may affect where IR policy is made 
in the MINE. They are the degree of integration of production, the home country of 
the MINE, the form of establishment of the affiliate, its profitability, and its 
dependence on the parent for investment and financing (pp. 33-4). In addition, MINE 
head office control of industrial relations may depend on the MNE's technology and 
organisation, its product, the strategic significance of the subsidiary in terms of 
component supply, sales or use of output, its age, its performance, and the differences 
in cultures between host and home country nations (Dowling, Welch & Schuler, 1999; 
Bean, 1994; Frenkel, 1993b). In Hamill's (1984) study of 30 British subsidiaries of 
foreign MNEs, 21 firms were unionised. Of these, 18 could negotiate and bargain 
without head office involvement, but only 14 of the 21 could decide the structure of 
bargaining autonomously (p.31). On the recognition of unions for all 30 companies 
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studied, 11 of the 30 had either to consult, seek advice, or act on a decision from head 
office (p.31). 
Understanding the role of government in industrial relations, the ideological leanings 
and structures of the relevant unions, the scope and processes of collective bargaining, 
and the legal and societal context in which industrial relations occur, are all important 
for the MNE (Dowling, Welch & Schuler, 1999). As mentioned earlier, industrial 
legislation usually reflects national government lit policy and ideology, and may cover 
the tribunal procedures for dispute resolution, the rights of unions, minimum 
conditions of work, and the legality of compulsory union membership, closed shops 
and the check-off system. Local laws may also indicate the MINE affiliate's discretion 
to minimise union intervention and collectivism, and 'opt out' of the formal industrial 
relations system. The discussion of the industrial relations systems of Singapore and 
Australia in Chapters 5 and 6 and in Foodco Australia clearly illustrates this. In 
Chapter 3, we noted that key decisions for the MINE are the extent to which it 
centralises industrial relations strategy, and adopts world-wide policies on union 
recognition, avoidance, and collective bargaining. 
In Chapter 5 (on Singaporean Compensation in its Local Context), it was suggested 
that once an MINE recognises unions and starts to negotiate a collective agreement, 
any breakdown in the process will end up with the Ministry of Labour, and, if 
necessary, with the Industrial Arbitration Court (IAC). The IAC will arbitrate using 
the National Wages Council recommendations and local legislation as the bases for its 
decisions. In Chapter 6 (on Australian Compensation), we argued that the larger the 
workplace, the more likely it was to be unionised and to have a high number of unions 
represented. However, apart from the constraints of awards, legislation, and union 
presence, the MINE has some choice of style of industrial relations it wishes to foster 
(Poole, 1986; Godard, 1997). Through recent legislation, companies in Australia now 
have more choice in negotiating a variety of pay practices at enterprise level. 
However, like Singapore, any formal agreement is subject to local legislation and the 
possible scrutiny and approval of an industrial tribunal. In 1995, under the 
(Australian) Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993, any new certified enterprise 
agreement had to be in a workplace covered by a federal or state award, pass a 'no 
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disadvantage' test (so that employees were not worse off), and not be contrary to the 
'public interest'. These constraints force some conformity of compensation practice. 
From the case studies, some obvious conclusions can be drawn. First, once an MINE 
agrees to recognise and bargain collectively, it will normally end up with at least two 
compensation systems in a subsidiary or company — one for unionised employees and 
one for non-unionised staff. This applied in Oilco Australia and Singapore, Foodco 
Singapore, Buildo Australia, Metalco Australia, and the company, High Tech 
Australia, all of which had collective agreements. By contrast, Foodco Australia had 
'letters of agreement' with the unions. Second, where unions have coverage of a 
particular set of occupations across an economy, and the industrial relations system 
encourages collectivism, to go 'outside' the formal system to design unique 
compensation for the subsidiary requires high levels of managerial commitment, and 
industrial relations technical skills and resources. This arguably applied to Foodco 
Australia. Third, entering into registered collective agreements will formalise the pay 
structures within the compensation system, making them harder to change quickly and 
more accessible to external parties. Examples here are Oilco Australia and Singapore, 
Foodco Singapore, Buildo Australia, Metalco Australia, and High Tech Australia. 
The recognition of unions in these subsidiaries may have been due to the custom and 
practice of the industry in which they were part, the degree of unionisation for that 
industry, the ease of member recruitment, the Australian award system, employment 
legislation, local union strategy, or the size and occupational structure of the unit. 
In the case study companies with collective agreements, the management negotiated 
their agreements with local, and not international unions, and had them certified by 
local industrial tribunals. It could perhaps be assumed that the provisions of the 
agreements were designed to facilitate the goals of MINE corporate and affiliate 
competitiveness, labour flexibility, cost efficiency, and the attraction, retention and 
motivation of the workforce from the local labour market. Nevertheless, most 
content of the MINE agreements was similar to many other local collective agreements 
examined by the author, and did not include any feature obviously transferred from an 
overseas MINE corporate head office (in the case of Oilco Australia and Singapore, 
and Foodco Singapore). 
556 
Even if the MNE head office had a centralised approach to industrial relations, or a 
union attempted multiple negotiations with an MNE 'in several countries 
simultaneously' (Bean, 1994: 204), any agreements would have to conform to the 
industrial and legal requirements of the country in which they operated. This is not to 
say that foreign owned firms never pursue industrial relations policies that are 
different from domestically owned firms (see, for example, Veersma, 1995 at pp.323— 
4). There is evidence that differences do occur, perhaps due to nationality or the 
amount of resources devoted to the HRM function by the MNE (see, for example, 
Enderwick & Buckley, 1983; ILO, 1976). However, where local and multinational 
companies are organised and practise collective bargaining, 'the pressures for parity in 
wage levels may be strong' (ILO, 1976:3), and they may both use host country 
national agreements for pay determination (Turner, Dart & (Iunnigle, 1997). There is 
also US empirical evidence that where employees in MINE affiliates are represented by 
unions, then there is a tendency for the local (rather than parent MNE) FIRM 
practices to be followed (Rosenzweig & Nohria, 1994:236). Thus MINE policies on 
'basic pay, holidays, retirement, participation and consultation are likely to be 
constrained by national conditions and institutions' (Ferner, 1994:94). From this 
discussion, propositions five and six are suggested: 
Proposition 5 
The extent to which the industrial relations system of a host country influences 
the compensation design of an MNE subsidiary depends on whether the 
subsidiary recognises and negotiates with host country trade unions. 
Proposition 6 
The more an MNE subsidiary engages in formal collective bargaining in a host 
nation, the more likely that its collective agreement/s will reflect the main 
compensation features of collective agreements for similar staff of locally owned 
host country organisations. 
Propositions for the Effect of Economic Management on Subsidiary 
Compensation 
Earlier in the thesis, it was acknowledged that the external economic environment 
could have a significant impact on compensation systems particularly through its 
effect on the product and labour market for the MINE. The posing of a supplementary 
research question reflected this. In relation to the labour market, the impact on 
compensation could be manifested through the effect of economic policies on a range 
of factors such as employee expectations about wage and salary increases, the 
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bargaining power of the unions, and the future of specific industrial sectors (Kochan 
& Barocci, 1985). The level of demand for, and supply of, qualified people in 
occupational labour affects the levels of earnings and unemployment, although 
governments may adopt education and immigration strategies to alleviate difficulties 
(Ministry of Information and the Arts, 1999). Employers may also adopt flexible 
employment or family-friendly arrangements to increase labour participation in 
particular markets (Ministry of Manpower, 1999). However, the discretion of 
employees, unions or employers to make compensation policy could possibly be 
constrained directly or indirectly by a national government's incomes and prices policy 
(as part of its economic management of inflation) which may limit the permissible pay 
increases by an MNE affiliate in a given period (Elvander, 1990). The variables of 
incomes policy, inflation, state of occupational labour markets, level of occupational 
earnings and unemployment are recorded as important variables in Figure 13.1. 
From the study of the Singaporean and Australian external environments, the roles of 
the National Wages Council (NWC) and the Australian Industrial Relations 
Commission (AIRC) were discussed, and the effect of the NWC in Singapore and the 
AJRC principles in Australia were raised with the case study subsidiaries. Taking the 
Singaporean affiliates first, Oilco Singapore followed the recommendations of the 
Singaporean NWC by incorporating more variable pay in its collective agreement 
after 1988, gave the recommended pay increases from 1972-85, and arguably 
observed three of the five flexible wage principles suggested in the 1986 NWC 
recommendations. The non-unionised staff had a different basis of pay which still 
included a major variable component. As the NWC has not recommended annual 
quantum rises for the economy since 1986 (only qualitative guidelines), the company 
set its pay levels in relation to the local market. In Foodco Singapore, prior to 
unionisation, the affiliate's policy was to use NATC recommendations as a guide, but 
not follow them to the letter. However, the union now used the NWC 
recommendations as a basis for bargaining and the MNE had proportions of variable 
pay in its systems. In Buildo Singapore, the MD spoke of taking the NWC guidelines 
into account in pay system levels and mix, but concluded that the labour market was 
the `mdm driving force in pay policy'. In the smaller Metalco Singapore, NWC 
decisions were noted as were the rises given to the Singaporean Civil Service, but the 
capacity to pay was a dominant influence on pay levels. Despite this, the company 
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still had a variable component in its systems. High Tech Singapore management did 
not consider that NWC recommendations had much impact on the affiliate as annual 
reviews were based on market movements as well as performance. 
In Australia, the AIRC through its National Wage Cases (NWC) awarded national 
wage adjustments based on movements in the consumer price index between 1975— 
81, at first quarterly and then six-monthly, and then again from 1983-87. Since that 
time the AIRC no longer grants 'across-the-board' increases, but only 'safety net' 
increases to minimum rates awards (Deery, Plowman & Walsh, 1997:8.32). This 
mainly benefits lower paid employees who cannot gain rises from negotiated 
enterprise agreements. In addition to this activity, from 1987-89 the ALRC issued 
principles for the reform of the award system. 
When interviewed, Oilco Australia managers argued that the economy affected pay 
levels rather than design, especially for non-unionised staff whose compensation was 
market driven, although economic indicators like inflation were also studied. By 
comparison, the AIRC NWC pay recommendations and principles had an immediate 
impact on award employees as the unions pursued the announced pay rises and then 
cooperated in the restructuring of their awards. In Foodco Australia, 'The Accord' 
had the effect of moderating wage increases, but had not affected compensation 
structures. In the past, AIRC NWC decisions had been noted, but the company had a 
policy of minimising the role of unions and tribunals through its own plant agreements 
which were reviewed separately. The AIRC had no impact on managerial systems. 
The distinction between unionised and non-unionised staff was reflected in the effect 
of the AERC NWC recommendations on Buildo Australia. In the past, the AERC 
increases through the Metal Industry Award immediately flowed on to the industrial 
staff irrespective of the subsidiary's capacity to pay. While 'The Accord' had the 
result of holding back industrial pay increases and forcing change in the award system, 
management rises continued to move ahead. Metalco Australia was another company 
that attempted to minimise the union's role and had seen 'The Accord' as an 
impediment to its strategy. Prior to the issuing of individual contracts after 1994, its 
unionised workforce received the indexed AIRC increases from 1983-86, and other 
rises from 1988-92 during the reform of work practices. The clerical award rates 
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were also increased as a result of AIRC principles and recommendations whereas non-
unionised staff received rises under the centralised Metalco strata (i.e. job evaluation) 
system. Finally, in High Tech Australia, national incomes policies had no major effect 
on non-award staff, according to the managers interviewed, but AMC NWC 
principles had been followed for clerical and industrial employees, and an enterprise 
agreement concluded for the manufacturing function. 
A number of general conclusions can be made about the effect of incomes policies on 
compensation design in the MNE subsidiaries and companies studied. First, all the 
units had more than one compensation system and the Singaporean NWC and the 
Australian AIRC recommendations affected each system in different ways. There was 
more discretion to fix pay levels and mix for non-unionised/non-award employees in 
unionised companies and all staff in non-unionised firms. Second, the existence of a 
collective agreement intensified the effect of the Singaporean NWC and AIRC 
recommendations on the subsidiary. This is because in the event of a dispute between 
the company and the union, the Industrial Arbitration Court in Singapore will use the 
NWC recommendations as a guide for arbitration without appeal. In Australia, the 
AIRC will obviously assess a dispute according to industrial legislation and its own 
NWC principles. Third, MINE affiliates could devise a pay strategy to minimise the 
effects of the NWC and AIRC by remaining non-union in both countries, negotiating 
informal collective agreements directly with the workforce or paying over the awards 
in Australia (like Foodco Australia), or operating with individual contracts only. The 
Singapore NWC recommendations are 'guidelines only' and 'are intended to serve as 
a general basis for negotiation' (NWC, 1992:ix), but have the backing of government 
and the participation of MNE employers in their formulation. In Australia, the 
subsidiaries could ignore the decisions of the AIRC, but if unionised and working with 
registered AIRC awards and agreements, would be unlikely to be allowed to do so. 
Fourth, observance of income policy principles may have social responsibility 
overtones, especially if the employer is large and high profile. Excessive pay increases 
when government and tribunals are advocating restraint may result in bad publicity, 
especially in a small country like Singapore. Finally, incomes policies rarely include 
guidelines on employee benefits. 
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The MINE subsidiary operates within the constraints of the labour markets and 
government and industrial policies of the host nation in which it is based, and, 
although national public policy is an important influence on compensation systems 
(Bloom & Milkovich, 1999), there may still be some discretion for compensation 
design for all occupations. For the affiliate, compensation is a cost to be minimised 
and a lever to influence behaviour, and it might be assumed that the MINE subsidiary 
will use any compensation strategy that will facilitate the business goals of the 
corporate MINE or the affiliates. While there is little research on the reaction of 
MNEs specifically to incomes policies and government intervention in the wage-
setting process, Milkovich and Newman (1996:499) argue that: 
Those companies that seem to suffer the least disruptions are the ones that have sound and 
flexible compensation systems in place, well-thought-out policies that demonstrably have been 
followed in the past. 
This leads to a seventh proposition: 
Proposition 7 
The propensity of an MNE subsidiary to follow the national incomes policy 
requirements of a host nation is dependent on the MNE's degree of discretion to 
set appropriate pay levels and pay mix to achieve its corporate and subsidiary 
MNE business goals and IHRM strategies. 
The Effect of Social Security Systems on MNE Compensation Design 
In the previous chapter, the differences in employee benefits provided by the 
Australian and Singaporean MINE subsidiaries were analysed. It was noted that both 
national governments had a substantial effect on the benefits offered through 
government policies on social security, retirement and health, and employment 
legislation covering sick, maternity, and annual leave. The most significant differences 
between the two countries affecting employee benefits, however, were in the 
respective governments' approaches to the provisions for retirement and public 
health. These variables are therefore included as contingency factors in Figure 13.1. 
The interlinking of national culture with government philosophy on retirement 
provision and public health is arguably most notable in Singapore. The 'thrift' of 
Hofstede and Bond's (1988:17) Confucian Dynamism is evident in the long-standing 
Central Provident Fund (CPF) to which workers and employers contribute in order to 
provide financial security on retirement. The Singaporean Government does not 
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contribute to this and so the cost is borne solely by employer and employee. The 
employer's contribution of up to 20 per cent is thus a significant labour overhead, and 
it was therefore not surprising that no Singaporean case study affiliate made additional 
contributions to private pension funds. Another interrelationship of external variables 
is also evident in that the amounts of employer and employee CPF contributions are 
changed by the Singaporean Government according to the state of the Singaporean 
economy, as was the case in the 1998 recession when the employer's contribution was 
reduced by 10 per cent (Foo Siang Luen & Kwok Toi Chi, 1999). 
Singapore's health care financing philosophy system is based on 'individual 
responsibility, coupled with help from the community and government for those 
unable to pay on their own' (Ministry of Information and the Arts, 1999:249). As 
noted earlier, Medisave is a compulsory savings scheme in which the employee 
contributes 6-8 per cent of earnings as part of CPF contributions. Funds can be 
withdrawn from these savings to pay for hospitalisation expenses for the employee or 
his/her family. The Singaporean case study subsidiaries shared the cost of the 
Medisave contributions as part of CPF, but all supplemented this with additional 
health insurance cover and direct medical services (Oilco Singapore). 
In the Australian subsidiaries and companies, retirement provision was made through 
a variety of superannuation schemes to which the employer and employee contributed. 
The Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act (1992) gives mandatory 
superannuation coverage using the same principle, although the introduction of the 
legislation led to the review of existing private superannuation arrangements in some 
case companies. According to their income from private sources and assets held, 
retired people in Australia may be eligible for a publicly provided pension and other 
benefits. While there is a Medicare public health scheme to which all employees 
contribute a fixed percentage according to income, some Australian MNE subsidiaries 
and companies only paid for additional private health insurance for the higher 
categories of employee. 
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Employee Compensation Preferences and MNE Subsidiary Compensation 
Design 
Only in the Oilco Australia case was it noted that employees were asked to cooperate 
in the redesign of the variable component of their compensation system. The staff 
were non-unionised and paid according to their place in the Hay administrative and 
managerial pay structure. In theory, it could be argued that other collective 
agreements in the Australian and Singaporean companies and subsidiaries were 
designed by management and unions, with the unions consulting their memberships. 
Arguably the preferences of employees may have been based on values on income 
equality, individualism versus collectivism, and acceptance of risks. Thus wide grade 
bands in Singaporean collective agreements are accepted compared with the more 
narrow salary ranges in Australia. Although small samples were used, Mamman, 
Sulaiman and Fadel (1996) found in a survey of three Asian countries and Australia, 
that there were significant differences between the Asians and Australians as to their 
preference for educational qualifications, length of service, and use of collective 
bargaining as the basis for the pay system (p.115). The acceptability of the pay 
system can thus be an important influence in its design and employee satisfaction 
(Heneman, 1985). 
However, Bloom and Milkovich (1999) argue that if the national culture of a nation is 
sufficiently diverse, two companies operating in the same national culture might 
develop very different organisational cultures through running distinct pay systems, 
and be able to attract different workforces who share the unique values and 
competencies necessary to support the MNE's strategic goals (p.293). Moreover, 
there are difficulties in distinguishing the effects of personality from those of national 
culture (such as attitudes toward materialism) (Cable & Judge, 1994). As Yuen Chi-
Ching, (1998:140) puts it, employee compensation preference in Singapore might be 
affected by the 'strong task orientation and materialistic values' of the country and 
concern for one's own interests. 
Proposition on the Effect of National Culture on Subsidiary Compensation 
From the case studies, it was mentioned earlier that no manager in the case study 
companies and affiliates stated specifically that national culture and religion were 
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taken into account when compensation was designed. Nevertheless, recent research 
has emphasised that national culture should be taken into account as a significant 
variable when designing the compensation in an MNE subsidiary (Newman & NoBen, 
1996). The role of national culture in compensation deign was therefore included as 
one of the initial research questions. 
Townsend, Scott and Markham (1990) in their study of pay practices in five cultural 
clusters concluded that culture 'is a predominant factor that influences certain 
compensatory patterns' and that 'phenomena beyond strictly local and national 
customs may impact on how employees are paid' (p.674). Newman and Nollen 
(1996), having used Hofstede's dimensions of culture to assess the managerial 
practices of 176 work units of an MNE across 18 countries, suggested that MNEs 
'would be well advised to take national culture as a given and adjust their practices 
accordingly' (p.774). Newman and Nollen's work was important in that it linked the 
'cultural fit' to subsidiary performance. Schuler and Rogovsky (1998) again using 
Hofstede's (1980) work in a study of compensation in 24 nations, concluded that 
'national culture provides an important explanation' for the differences in 
compensation patterns internationally (p.172). The apparent benefits for 
incorporating national cultural determinants into compensation design, according to 
Townsend, Scott and Markham (1990), were that if cultural factors were 
incorporated in pay design, then employee expectations would be met, that employee 
satisfaction would be higher, and that MNEs could 'optimize their compensation 
budget' (p.667). Going further, Schuler and Rogovsky (1998) saw linking 
compensation practice to the 'cultural expectations of host country employees' as the 
basis for 'competitive advantage' or, at least, a way 'to avoid possible failure' (p.161). 
We noted earlier in the thesis the problems of defining culture, the distinction between 
culture and national culture, the scarcity of measurable cultural dimensions, and the 
dangers of extrapolating from culture to 'appropriate' compensation systems for 
specific dimensions. Research is limited on how much discretion management has to 
move away from these recommended HRM practices before business performance 
declines, presuming that the recommendations are 'right' in any case. There is also 
the problem of (1) isolating the variable of national culture from the influence of the 
internal and other national external variables in compensation design for the MINE 
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affiliate, (2) deciding whether national culture is reflected in decisions of bodies like 
the Singapore NWC and AlRC, and (3) judging whether business exigencies might 
override cultural factors in decisions. In addition, there is the impact of national 
culture on the value system of the employee. Are employees more attracted to MNEs 
that offer compensation systems in line with their values determined by national 
culture, and what effect does each type of compensation system have on the 
behaviour of different categories of employees in different cultures? 
Figure 13.1 portrays some possible linkages between national culture and other 
elements of the external environment. It suggests that national culture may influence 
host government philosophy and policy in a number of areas and employee 
compensation preferences. One could argue that the Power Distance and Masculinity 
dimensions (Hofstede, 1980) might affect the type of minimum conditions, taxation 
policy, incomes policy, social security, and legislation relating to equal pay. In 
industrial relations, Yuen Chi-Ching (1998) refers to empirical research showing 
Singaporeans' preference for avoiding and compromising rather than collaborating 
and competing; the 'oriental paternalism' of the Govenunent (p.130); respect for 
authority (p.137); and the concern for 'face' (p.139). In contrast, Olekalns (1998) 
views Australian individualism as emphasising achievement and individual 
contribution, while at the same time, 'a horizontal orientation emphasizes fairness and 
an equal distribution of resources' (p.284). This might account for the longevity of 
the ALP/ACTU Accord, and retirement and public health provisions in Australia. 
Hofstede's (1980) four dimensions to represent national culture and Hodgetts and 
Luthans (1993b) recommendations for compensation design for each dimension were 
used in the analysis of the data from the case companies. It was acknowledged earlier 
that the Hodgetts and Luthans (1993b) guidelines are somewhat general in some 
cases, and that they were designed to apply to host country managers only. However, 
they have been used to apply to all occupations, a practice followed by Gomez-Mejia 
and Welbourne (1991). The Tables in Appendices 13.1 and 13.2 test how the 
compensation design of all case subsidiaries and companies in Australia and Singapore 
respectively conform with the Hodgetts and Luthans (1993b) recommendations for 
Hofstede's dimensions. As mentioned in Chapter 4, to add further specificity to some 
dimensions, there was some reliance on Gomez-Mejia and Welbourne's (1991) and 
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Schuler and Rogovsky's (1998) extrapolation of Hofstede's (1980) dimensions to 
compensation. As wage and salary dollar amounts were not sought, data on the 
differences in salary between the lowest and the top of the organisation were 
unknown except in the cases of Oileo Australia where the directors' salaries were 
published in the annual report, and operators' and clerical employees' compensation 
was available from published agreements of the AIRC. However, where collective 
agreements were published in each country, the range between the lowest and highest 
paid in that agreement is taken as an indication of Power Distance. As noted in 
Chapter 4, 'decentralised pay policies' was interpreted as the degree of centralisation 
of the compensation system in relation to the structures of the MINE affiliates, and not 
the whole corporate MNEs, of which three were Australian and two were non-
Australian. 
For the Australian MINE subsidiaries and companies, the Table in Appendix 13.1 
shows that in no occupation of any subsidiary was there a full conformity with the pay 
recommendations suggested for the Australian cultural dimensions. Of the 
compensation systems shown, the best result was the five occupations that met eight 
recommendations out of a possible thirteen. Looking at the Table in Appendix 13.1 
as a whole, the only pay recommendation that obtained full support by all Australian 
subsidiaries and companies for all occupations shown, was the absence of family-
friendly employee benefits over and above those that are mandatory. This would be 
expected with a moderately high Masculinity culture. More frequent was a complete, 
or almost complete, lack of support across the board for recommendations such as 
low benefit gaps, gain-sharing, and gender pay differences. Conformity with the 
Hodgetts and Luthans (1993b) recommendations was more common within 
occupational groups. For example, nearly all the managerial compensation systems in 
the Australian affiliates and companies used profit-sharing, individual performance-
based pay, and rewards for short-term achievement. In addition, all firms ensured that 
the managerial salaries paid were competitive with market levels. This led generally 
to a higher degree of support for the pay recommendations than for the 
operating/industrial and clerical systems. The compliance with the compensation 
recommendations by the operating/industrial and clerical employee schemes was more 
mixed across the MNEs. Individual performance-based compensation is not wide-
spread in Australia for these occupations, and in the past, general pay rates have been 
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partly dependent on AIRC decisions rather than being totally determined by external 
market levels. 
The fact that no Australian MNE affiliate or company followed all the Hodgetts and 
Luthans (1993b) recommendations completely might have been due to the small 
number of cases, the quality of Hofstsede's (1980) dimensions and findings, the 
inappropriateness of the compensation guidelines, the MNEs concerned judging 
factors other than national culture to be more important, or any combination of these 
four reasons. Bloom and Milkovich (1999) criticise models such as that of Hodgetts 
and Luthans (1993b) for their prescriptive nature and for predicting that national 
cultural factors will be more significant than organisational level factors as dominant 
determinants of compensation design (p.290). 
In interpreting the Table in Appendix 13.1, it is noteworthy that all the 
operator/industrial employees' wage systems were based on, or underpinned, by 
industrial awards. Gain-sharing is not practised widely in Australia, and, according to 
Morehead et al. (1997), profit-sharing was only practised by 15 per cent of 719 
workplaces surveyed in 1995 with more than 20 employees which run performance-
related pay systems. In the Australian affiliate and company cases, only managers had 
access to these schemes. Awards for industrial staff in Oilco, Foodco and High Tech 
Australia were skilled-based rather than performance-based as a result of the AIRC 
recommendations, thus going against the Hodgetts and Luthans recommendations. 
Furthermore, Schuler and Rogovsky's (1998) data supported a proposition that skill-
based compensation would be more prevalent in countries that had higher levels of 
Uncertainty Avoidance. Australia only has a moderately weak Uncertainty Avoidance 
score (Hofstsede, 1980). Nevertheless, management in all Australian subsidiaries and 
companies was rewarded on performance (possibly because there are a key strategic 
group), which is appropriate for a high Individualism and moderately weak High 
Uncertainty Avoidance national culture. 
This highlights one apparent contradiction in the Hodgetts and Luthans (1993b) and 
Gomez-Mejia and Welbourne (1991) recommendations for appropriate pay systems 
for particular national cultures. For a high Individualism national culture, 
performance-based pay is recommended. If the culture has a strong Uncertainty 
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Avoidance dimension, fixed rather than variable pay is judged more important. What 
then is the role of variable and fixed pay if a country has both high Individualism and 
strong Uncertainty Avoidance such as Belgium and France? Schuler and Rogovslcy's 
(1998) data did not support a proposition that pay-for-performance will be less 
prevalent in countries with higher levels of Uncertainty Avoidance. Thus they found 
pay-for-performance is present in countries with high Uncertainty Avoidance. In the 
Australian cases, the Australian MNE managers were all subject to pay-for-
performance, Australia having a moderately weak Uncertainty Avoidance, while the 
data on the Australian affiliates' and companies' industrial and clerical staff 
compensation was less clear cut. One could argue that managerial pay in the 
Australian affiliates conformed more closely to the Hodgetts and Luthans (1993b) 
recommendations in general because the intervention by the industrial relations 
institutions such as the AIRC, unions, and the award process was less. While an 
MNE's subsidiary management may wish to design all compensation to suit the local 
national culture, it may be constrained in doing so by the local institutional 
infrastructure. The ownership of the Australian subsidiaries (Australian and 
European) did not appear to affect the lack of complete conformity with the pay 
recommendations. Locally owned Australian MNEs were not more closely aligned 
with the Hodgetts and Luthans (1993b) recommendations for their national culture. 
Comparing the results for the Singaporean MNE subsidiaries in the Table in Appendix 
13.2 across all MNEs, there was an emphasis on performance and sharing of risks 
associated with the success of the business. This was built in through the payment of 
the Annual Wage Supplement and other bonuses, and conforms with the Hodgetts 
and Luthans (1993b) recommendations for weak Uncertainty Avoidance. The other 
feature in this category of paying competitive salaries was supported by all MNEs, but 
with a tight labour market in Singapore, the labour market factors in addition to (or 
instead of) cultural ones may be the reason for conforming here. The collective 
agreements and structures for the operators/industrial staff in Singapore were 
extremely hierarchical, with large salary ranges for grades. For the smaller numbers 
of clerical and managerial employees in the affiliates, individual negotiation was the 
main basis of compensation, so the hierarchies were not so clear. However, 
differences in benefits were tied to rank, in line with the Hodgetts and Luthans 
(1993b) recommendations. Compared with Australian practices, the gaps between 
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lowest and highest paid grades in the collective agreements and structures for which 
salaries were available were extremely wide (appropriate for a high Power Distance 
national culture). Wide use of bonuses based on affiliate performance, group 
compensation plans, pay rises based on length of service for operating and some 
clerical staff; and some benefits geared to family need, all supported the guidelines. 
The seniority-based systems in the Singaporean case studies conflict with Schuler and 
Rogovsky's (1998) findings which support a proposition that seniority-based 
compensation is more likely to be found in countries with higher levels of Uncertainty 
Avoidance. 
Pulling the strands together, by comparing the data for the Australian and 
Singaporean subsidiaries and companies in the Tables in Appendices 13.1 and 13.2, in 
general, the Singaporean units conformed more with the Hodgetts and Luthans 
(1993b) compensation guidelines. The non-Australian MNEs' Singaporean affiliates 
were more aligned to the recommendations than were the Australian MNEs' units. 
As the results were uneven across all units, an argument could be put that the 
relationship between culture and compensation varies according to the occupation in a 
subsidiary. In fact, Schuler and Rogovslcy's (1998) findings show that there were 
occupational differences in their alignment to national culture in the areas of individual 
bonuses, employee benefits and employee share ownership plans. An alternative view 
is that national culture may not be the correct level of analysis, and that the culture of 
subgroups may prove more fruitful as an explanatory factor in international 
compensation design (Bloom & Milkovich, 1999). 
The collective agreements for industrial employees in Oilco Singapore and Foodco 
Singapore, and the collective agreement for the clerical staff in Oilco Singapore, were 
the pay systems nearest to fulfilling all Hodgetts and Luthans (1993b) 
recommendations. Apart from these, the degree of support for the recommendations 
was different for each occupation in the same affiliate. This might be due to the 
extent to which compensation is designed to develop the appropriate behaviour 
required for business strategy, the replication of head office pay system (such as Hay 
job evaluation), the strategic importance of an occupation, or the influence of external 
regulation and principles such as the Singaporean NWC and the ARC. Alternatively, 
there may be internal factors and other economic, social, legal, labour market and 
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historical macro variables affecting the nexus between pay and national culture 
(Schuler & Rogovslcy, 1998; Gomez-Mejia & Welbourne, 1991). Such a conclusion 
might be drawn from the weak support for a hypothesis in the Rosenzweig & Nohria 
(1994) study of US subsidiaries which stated that the resemblance to local HRM 
practices was negatively related to the Culture Distance between the parent country 
and the host country (p.237), and from the comparison of managerial pay systems in 
London and Hong Kong banks by White, Luk, Druker and Chiu (1998). While 
recognising that the findings from a small number of cases cannot be generalised, two 
further propositions are therefore suggested for further analysis: 
Proposition 8 
While national culture may have an influence on management's choice of 
compensation design for an occupation in an MNE subsidiary, it will not be the 
main determining factor. 
Proposition 9 
The amount of influence that national culture has on management's choice of 
compensation design for an occupation in an MNE subsidiary will depend on 
the strategic importance of that occupational group in attaining business goals 
and IIIRM strategies either of the affiliate or the whole MNE. 
A Comment on Employee Benefits and National Culture 
In passing, the employee benefits of the Australian and Singaporean subsidiaries can 
also be compared with the Schuler and Rogovsky (1998) findings. The authors 
concluded that their evidence supported propositions that the higher the level of 
Masculinity in a national culture, the less prevalent would be flexible benefit plans, 
workplace child-care, career break schemes, and maternity leave programs (pp.13- 
14). Thus one would expect additional family-orientated benefits in the Singaporean 
affiliates studied, as Singapore has a moderately low Masculinity (Hofstede, 1980). 
Apart from Oilco Singapore and Foodco Singapore in the case companies, the level of 
extra family benefits was low. No data were collected on career break schemes by 
this researcher, but it was not a benefit mentioned in discussions with unions or 
companies. However, maternity leave is mandatory in Singapore (eight weeks with 
full pay under the Employment Act), although the provision of child-care and flexible 
benefit plans are not. The case data cannot be generalised, but a wider data base is 
available. Contrary to the Schuler and Rogovsky (1998) findings, a NPB/SELS 
(1993) survey of 300 Singaporean companies in the private sector in 1992 (already 
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referred to earlier) found that 70 per cent of companies did not intend to implement 
flexible benefit programmes (p.4), and only 2 per cent either provided or subsidised 
child-care facilities (p. 23). The 2 per cent was the same percentage for locally owned 
and MNEs operating in Singapore. There were no data on the incidence of career 
break schemes. The incidence of some benefits in Singapore may therefore affected 
by factors other than national culture such as the size of firm, ownership, the stage of 
economic development in the country, or government policy. 
By comparison, the benefits in the Australian case studies did appear to support the 
findings of Schuler and Rogovsky (1998) in relation to Australia's moderately high 
Masculinity dimension (Hofstede, 1980). There were few additional family benefits 
apart from those required by legislation or AlRC test cases. Again, one cannot 
generalise from the cases, but a study of 1,596 Australian federal enterprise 
agreements in March 1998 (AC1RTT, 1998:32) showed that only 0.2 enterprises had 
child-care facilities at the workplace, 0.1 per cent had career break schemes, and 3.2 
per cent had paid parental leave. There were no data on flexible benefit plans in the 
study. The 1995 AWIRS study (Morehead et al., 1997) of 1,967 workplaces with 
more than 20 employees gave a more favourable impression of work and family 
initiatives. Family or carer's leave was available in 29 per cent of workplaces, paid 
maternity leave in 34 per cent, and paid paternity leave in 18 percent of workplaces 
(pp. 114-16). Assistance with child-cue either through financial assistance or 
provision of workplace-based facilities was offered in only 7 per cent of workplaces 
(p.116). While Australia has a national standard of twelve months unpaid maternity 
leave, it was one of only six countries out of 152 surveyed by the ILO that did not 
require women to be paid during maternity leave (Age, 10 March, 1998:17). The 
most generously paid maternity leave was in the public sector with a norm of twelve 
weeks. In terms of the Masculinity dimension, therefore, one Singapore survey did 
not support the Schuler and Rogovsky (1998) findings whereas one Australian study 
did. Moreover, Schuler and Rogovsky found no links between family-orientated 
employee benefits and the levels of Uncertainty Avoidance in the 24 countries they 
studied, so it seems that non-cultural factors may be significant in employee benefit 
determination. 
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Effects of the Internal Environment on Subsidiary Compensation Design 
We have already argued that the design of MNE affiliate compensation is determined 
by a combination of internal and external environmental factors. From the case 
studies, it was assumed that the compensation systems would be arranged to facilitate 
the competitive strategy of the subsidiary within environmental constraints. In the 
case MNEs, apart from the competitive strategy, the organisation of the affiliate, the 
nature of the work, its size and local FIR policies and practices appeared to be the 
most significant internal influences. Again, it could be argued that some of these 
could be affected by external factors. An example is the pressure of increased 
competition leading to the restructuring of organisations (Morehead et al., 1997). 
The desirability of linking of HRM policies and practices to business strategy is a 
well-trodden path in FIRM (see, for example, Tyson, 1997). From the case studies, 
some links could arguably be identified. Foodco Australia attempted to increase 
employee flexibility and manufacturing efficiency, and apply technology better. It 
introduced its own site agreements and a multi-skilled approach to operator 
compensation. Flexibility of labour was also at the heart of the collective agreement 
for Foodco Singapore. In Buildo Australia, low cost production and distribution, and 
good customer service were competitive strategies. The affiliate's new Performance 
Improvement Payment Scheme had Variable Conversion Cost/Tonne produced and 
Customer Service as its two Key Performance Indicators that triggered incentive pay. 
Metalco Singapore's competitive advantage was in improved quality and reduced 
costs. ISO 9000 quality standards were introduced, and industrial staff were paid at 
'market rates' with the opportunity of a share of the profits according to sales. 
The need to cut costs in in Oilco Australia and High Tech Australia led to down-
sizing leading to reduced hierarchies. The flattening of the organisations did not lead 
to a formal salary broad-banding system, but was accompanied by the introduction of 
team structures on the shop-floor. Skill-based pay is often advocated for team 
rewards (Welbourne & Gomez-Mejia, 1991). However, no formal shopfloor teams 
were present in Foodco Singapore and Buildo Singapore even though the operators 
were paid for skill. 
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The NINE subsidiary's organisation design through its specialist fimctions, 
departments and teams influences the work to be done, and the skills needed to 
perform it (Milkovich & Newman, 1999). In Chapter 12, we noted the numbers of 
different pay systems in each subsidiary that were partly a function of the occupational 
structure of the affiliate. This was particularly apparent in Oilco Australia and High 
Tech Australia. However, Oilco Australia and Metalco Australia interviewees talked 
of the ultimate objective of putting all employees on to `staff/individual contract 
conditions. Skill-based pay existed in a number of affiliates as well in order to 
encourage further skill formation. The size of the unit was also arguably important as 
more formal compensation systems were found in larger units. However, where there 
were large numbers of a particular occupational group, the compensation was more 
formalised. Thus Oilco Australia, Foodco Australia, Buildo Australia and Metalco 
Australia, and Oilco Singapore had compensation structures (rather than individually 
set pay ranges) for most levels of staff. In the remaining subsidiaries, there was a 
greater use of individual contracts outside of a formal structure. 
Finally, Gomez-Mejia and Balldn (1992) suggested that strategic pay choices are 
seldom made in isolation and are more common in clusters or patterns (p.60). Indeed, 
recent research supports strong links between organisational effectiveness and BRM 
systems or 'bundles' (Bloom & Milkovich, 1999:285). It might be posited that pay 
choices are also be clustered with a set range of BR practices. For example, the 
desire of subsidiaries to link performance to pay for all managers in all units, to 
encourage skill-related career paths for operators (Oilco Australia and Foodco 
Singapore), to facilitate the mobility of staff and possibly career development through 
international transfers in four of the Singaporean affiliates, shows that local HR 
policies and practices should not be omitted in any explanatory framework of 
subsidiary compensation. Indicating the strength of each endogenous variable in 
determining discretion in compensation design is obviously problematical. A research 
need is to elicit whether MNE subsidiary managers match compensation systems with 
the internal environment such as affiliate goals and organisational cultures first before 
considering the implications of the external environment on 'strategic alignment' 
(Bloom & Milkovich, 1999:293). 
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A Theory of Compensation in MNEs 
In relation to the contribution of this study to explaining compensation in MNEs, the 
findings have suggested a number of factors that should be considered. While some 
elements of the external environment were separated for analysis, the inter-relation of 
each element was very evident particularly regarding the actions and philosophy of 
government, employment legislation, industrial relations system and unions' role. 
Nevertheless, the MNEs used a variety of methods to manipulate the environment 
particularly through use of industrial tribunals. 
The analysis of the case companies over time demonstrated the dynamism of the 
external environment which MNEs have to adjust to, such as the introduction of FBT. 
The degree of dynamism for each external environmental element varies, however, 
and subsidiaries reviewed pay rates regularly against labour market changes. In 
contrast, national cultural changes are much more gradual and did not appear to rank 
highly in the decision-making processes of managers in either Australia or Singapore. 
The complexity of an external environment facing an MINE differs from country to 
country. The range of employment law affecting compensation varies and has 
different degrees of application according to the level of the employee and element of 
the compensation system. This was particularly evident in Australia and Singapore in 
the authority of unions to seek collective bargaining rights, and in the compulsory 
provision of employee benefits. The influence of the external environment therefore 
appeared to differ according to the level of staff and the feature of the compensation 
systems under review. At one end, industrial employees in some MNEs were 
unionised and their structures subject to industrial tribunal approval; at the other, 
expatriates' allowances were adjusted to reflect the different cost of living in a nation 
without third party interference. Our two country examples demonstrated that the 
MNE will face significant differences in external environmental constraints in each 
nation in which it is located. 
How should the MNE handle these national differences in external environment in 
designing its compensation systems? The study findings indicated that each MINE 
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decided to vary its compensation systems according to the subsidiary. Apart from 
adaptation to a country, this may because: 
If the basic premise of a strategic perspective is to align the [subsidiary]compensation system 
to the [affiliate] business strategy, then different [subsidiary] business strategies will translate 
into different [affiliate] compensation approaches (adapted from Milkovich &Newman, 
1999:24) 
There were some similarities in the overall Algorithmic or Experiential patterns 
between pairs of affiliates in the same MINE for particular occupations, but there was 
no pair of Australian and Singaporean subsidiaries where the set of up to 19 individual 
Algorithmic and Experiential elements was completely identical. The MINE case 
companies therefore did not have overall common compensation systems across the 
world for all levels of staff. One could ask whether common world-wide systems 
might be possible and whether 'new pay' or 'high commitment' models would work 
effectively in any environment (Milkovich & Newman, 1999). 
In relation to cross-national compensation, there has been recent debate about the 
globalisation of labour markets, and the design of %orderless pay systems' and pay 
convergence (Milkovich & Newman, 1999:523). Caimcross (1999a: S17) writes of 
Unilever's expectation of regional pay convergence and a 'pan-European' rate in time. 
Global pay may be possible for software programmers who live in one country and 
work in another (Caimcross, 1999b). There is consultants' survey evidence on MNEs 
designing global pay structures, incentives and stock options for executives which 
usurp MINE subsidiary managers' decisions. The data also suggests that professional 
compensation systems are being designed at global, regional and local levels, whereas 
administrative, clerical and blue collar compensation was still a local decision (Gross 
& Wingerup, 1999). 
While pay differences for executives across countries may converge (particularly at 
senior executive levels), global pay-for-performance may encounter national cultural 
differences as well as various taxation and benefit systems (Caimcross, 1999a). Apart 
from national cultural differences, it is obvious that national economies, laws, 
governments, and unions vary and so, at the minimum, pay levels would have to be 
adjusted to the rates of the local labour markets to attract local employees. Any 
desire by the MINE to encourage extra performance, skill or flexibility through pay to 
achieve the business goals of a particular subsidiary (as opposed to the whole MNE) 
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would be difficult through a global system. Lack of uniformity in the case study 
affiliate compensation systems was due to the different ranges of exogenous and 
endogenous factors facing those affiliates. 
The MNEs studied handled the constraints of the external environment in different 
ways. Some took a passive approach for some years and maintained existing 
collective agreements for industrial staff while adjusting the levels of pay on a regular 
basis (e.g.Oilco Singapore) whereas others tried to overcome existing legislation and 
industrial awards to place industrial employees on to a completely different structure 
(e.g. Metalco Australia). The MNE may thus accept or attempt to overcome the 
constraints of the external environment. The MNE may be more prepared to try to 
avoid the external constraints of the environment in its home country rather than in a 
host country where it may be more unsure of the outcome for non-compliance with 
compensation legislation and local custom and practice. The findings suggested that 
the MNEs had considerable discretion in the compensation systems adopted 
particularly at higher levels of the unit, but that the MNE corporate, regional or 
national head offices could influence the final design and/or rates of pay—particularly 
at senior levels. A MINE head office may become involved in the process of 
compensation determination (e.g. through an international policy on union 
recognition) or in the system itself (e.g. Oilco's Hay structure). If a head office 
becomes involved, the degree of influence on subsidiary decision making may vary 
according to the particular element of compensation. The two dimensions of 
acceptance–avoidance of external environmental constraints and high–low 
involvement by the head office are shown as continua in Figure 13.2. 
While the process of compensation determination could be applied to Figure 13.2, for 
brevity, concentration will be on the system design only. The decision on the nature 
of each element of the compensation systems of the case study subsidiaries can be 
allocated to one of the quadrants in Figure 13.2, but a few examples for illustration 
will suffice. In Quadrant 1, near to the intersection of the two axes, can be located 
the decision about managerial compensation for host country managers in Foodco 
Singapore. The terms for the managers were negotiated individually, benchmarked by 
surveys against local rates, but with the Singaporean National Wages Council 
recommendations noted. Salary increases were based on performance using the 
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Figure 13.2 
1VINE Managerial Choices for Each Element of the Compensation System for 
Each Occupation in a MNE Subsidiary 
High Involvement by 
MINE Corporate, Regional, National Offices 
(1) 
Acceptance of External 	 
Environmental Constraints 
(3 ) 
(2) 
Avoidance of External 
Environmental Constraints 
(4) 
Low Involvement by 
MINE Corporate, Regional, National Offices 
Australian national office appraisal system. The package included the customary 
Singaporean 13 th month AWS as well as other merit pay and bonuses. 
Into the middle of Quadrant 2 can be placed the decision by the corporate MINE Oilco 
about the Hay evaluated compensation structure for middle and senior managerial 
staff in Oilco Singapore and Oilco Australia. The MINE Oilco European head office 
required the affiliates to install the Hay structure to facilitate inter-subsidiary transfers, 
and the structure was subject to no legislation or union constraints. The managerial 
employee benefits of the two Oilco subsidiaries, on the other hand, were less 
influenced by the corporate MINE Oilco European head office, but more subject to 
local influences such as coverage for health insurance. A position in Quadrant 3 is 
appropriate to reflect the greater influence of the host nation environment and the 
smaller involvement of the corporate head office in determining managerial benefits. 
By comparison, the decision about the compensation systems for the operators in 
Foodco Australia could be placed in the middle of Quadrant 4. There was no 
involvement by the corporate MINE European head office, but the national Australian 
office set the budget guidelines for the negotiations for manufacturing site collective 
agreements that were signed by union officials as 'letters of agreement'. These 
agreements set up a compensation structure for operators that only partly conformed 
with the award for the industry in which it was based, and were not sent to the AIRC 
for ratification. 
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The model in Figure 13.2 can partly reflect the amount of discretion that an affiliate 
has in decision-making on compensation systems. One key question is the basis on 
which the corporate, national and regional offices decide to intervene in affiliate 
compensation systems. Quadrants 1 and 2 denote a head office ethnocentric 
orientation, and 3 and 4 a polycentric approach. The degree of head office 
intervention may be to do with the cost of expatriates and senior staff, the need to 
maintain some internal equity for transfers across the MINE, and the importance of the 
affiliate. One could argue that that head office orientation may vary according to the 
head office BRM function, type of subsidiary staff and each element of affiliate 
compensation. Decisions about the acceptance and avoidance of external 
environmental constraints may be connected with the need to devise appropriate 
compensation systems to achieve business unit and corporate goals, and the HRM 
competence of the subsidiary and head offices. The model can certainly cope with the 
need to analyse the decision about each element of the compensation system for each 
level of employee, a necessary condition for any theory of MINE compensation. 
Implications of the Study for SIIIRM Theory 
With the difference between International HRM (IHRM) and Strategic IHRM being 
the link between IHRM and the strategy of the MINE, the current theoretical 
underpinning of S1HRM has been well summarised by Taylor, Beechler and Napier 
(1996). Past writers have linked the SIHRM systems of an MINE to its stage of 
internationalisation (Milliman, Von Glinow & Nathan, 1991) or its international 
strategy through a contingency approach, not necessarily seeking the best IHRM 
practices, but more the best 'fit' between external environment, overall strategy and 
BRM implemented policy (Taylor, Beechler & Napier, 1996: 961). This implies a 
need for 'flexibility' as the MINE becomes more internationalised. The Schuler, 
Dowling and De Cieri (1993) integrative framework of SIFIRM progresses these 
SIHRM theories further by placing the emphasis on interunit linkages (integration), 
the adaptation of the affiliate to its local external environment (differentiation), and 
the exogenous and endogenous factors which impact on the MNE's HRM 'in its 
effort to be locally responsive and adaptable and globally coordinated and controlled' 
(p.725). 
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Taylor, Beechler and Napier (1996) argue that the key contribution of previous 
THRM models has been the identification of 'critical variables' for SIHRM in addition 
to strategy, such as the industry of the MINE, its international experience, its 
organisational structure, the MINE head office orientation, the variability of the 
external environments facing the MINE (Milliman, Von Glinow & Nathan, 1991), and 
the performance implications of the balance between central integration and local 
responsiveness. Taylor, Beechler and Napier's (1996) model attempts to take 
SIHRM theory further by using resource-based and resource-dependency as well as 
contingency approaches. In addition, they stress four 'critical considerations' not 
previously developed in S1HR.M models: (1) the importance of the home HRM 
system for building the IHRM system, (2) using different SIHRM for various types of 
affiliates, (3) differentiating employees in SIHRM, and (4) 'being more explicit about 
how SIHRM systems vary over time' (pp.  962-3). 
These additional considerations suggested by Taylor, Beechler and Napier (1996) can 
be applied to the case studies in this thesis. In the Australian owned MNEs, Buildo 
had access to large body of HRM expertise and an international division, whereas 
High Tech had no HRM specialist until relatively recently. Neither MINE head office 
became involved in the non-managerial pay systems in Singapore, which, according to 
Taylor, Beechler and Napier's (1996) propositions, may have been because they were 
not global organisations (although Buildo could arguably justify this nomenclature), 
or because top management perceived the MNE's HRM competence as 'context 
specific' and not 'useful beyond national borders' (p.969). By contrast, the European 
owned Oilco had highly developed and resourced HR systems and some similarity of 
compensation practices (such as Hay job evaluation systems) across units. According 
to the Taylor, Beechler and Napier's (1996) propositions, this `exportive' or 
'integrative' SIHRM orientation might have been because Oilco was following a 
global strategy, and because Oilco's top management perceived the MNE's 
competence in FIRM to be 'context generalizable'. 
The Taylor, Beechler and Napier (1996) model also posits that the parent MINE 
SIHRM orientation may vary for each subsidiary which, in turn, affects the degree to 
which there is similarity between the FIRM of the parent MINE and the affiliates. This 
is because the affiliates' dependence on the parent may vary. Second, there are 
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differences in the strategic roles of the subsidiaries and the way they are established, 
and, third, there are differences in legal and national cultural environments. Under the 
resource-dependence approach, it could be argued that Foodco Australia was 
dependent on the skills and technology in Foodco Singapore to produce the raw 
confectionery sent to Australia. In turn, Foodco Singapore would be dependent on 
the technical know-how, initial capital and revenue of the Australian parent. As an 
'integrated player' (Taylor, Beechler & Napier, 1996:975), one might therefore have 
expected a high degree of similarity between the HRM systems of Foodco Australia 
and Foodco Singapore. This was not the case, and under Taylor, Beechler and 
Napier's model, may have been due to the purchase of an existing manufacturing 
company by Foodco Australia, rather than establishing a greenfield operation (p.976). 
We noted in all the cases that there were differences in the way compensation was 
designed for different occupations in the subsidiaries. Without further analysis, it 
would be difficult to assess how critical each group of employees was to the MNEs' 
performance, but the compensation packages for expatriates in Oilco had much MNE 
head office involvement and were based on standard principles. Only in Oileo 
Australia and Oilco Singapore was there a similarity in salary structure between both 
subsidiaries and the MINE corporate head office. Under the Taylor, Beechler and 
Napier (1996) model, this could be because employees paid via these structures were 
'critical' to the MNE's performance (p.978). However, the employee groups which 
are critical to performance may change over time and thus attract more interest by the 
parent company. 
While this thesis did not attempt to assess the 'fit' between the compensation design 
in the subsidiaries studied and the business strategies, further theoretical development 
of strategic IHRM along contingency lines could include the extra variables of the 
Taylor, Beechler and Napier (1996) model together with the other 'critical' variables 
already discussed, and the endogenous and exogenous factors of the Schuler, Dowling 
and De Cieri, (1993) framework. It is acknowledged that there are definitional and 
conceptual measurement problems in the concept of 'fit' (Gerhart & Milkovich, 1992: 
532), and that contingency models may also suffer from 'ambiguous levels of anlysis' 
and 'temporal vagaries' (Bloom & Milkovich, 1999:287). Moreover, placed in the 
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context of the parent MNE head office and regional/national offices, the number of 
these variables for any overriding SIHRM contingency framework is considerable. 
While contingency theory 'still remains a dominant paradigm' in management 
(Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992:116), other theoretical approaches can be suggested 
for useful development in relation to the thesis topic. This is especially so given that 
compensation design may be due to 'custom, imitation from other firms, 
administrative convenience, and ad hoc programs' (Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992: 
57). These approaches (discussed in detail by Wright & McMahan, 1992) include the 
resource-based view of the MNE and 'the relationships between strategy, HR 
practices, and the HR capital pool' (p.299). This is particularly relevant to the 
attempt by Australian companies to develop employee competencies through skill-
based pay to support business strategies for competitive advantage. However, 
competitive advantage through the pay system depends on whether competitors can 
imitate the 'synergies' of the compensation with other organisational factors such as 
company culture and business strategy (Gerhart, Trevor & Graham, 1996:147). 
Human capital theory (Jackson & Schuler, 1995) is also applicable here as the costs of 
building additional infrastructure to assess shop-floor competencies and design career 
structures arguably constitute 'human capital investments' (p.241). The behavioural 
approach of linking required role behaviours to support different business strategies 
(Jackson, Schuler & Rivero, 1989) might be another rationale for different 
compensation systems in subsidiaries, but there is little research as yet to support 
strong links of particular role behaviours with particular competitive strategies 
(Wright & McMahan, 1992:305). In such a line of research, it would be necessary to 
separate global strategy from affiliate strategy and their link to role behaviours. 
Furthermore, from a cross-cultural viewpoint, there are challenges in assessing 
whether similar HRM practices produce similar role behaviours internationally. For 
example, two types of incentive schemes were used on the shop-floor in Foodco 
Singapore and Buildo Singapore, while Buildo Australia used another type of 
incentive scheme. 
This thesis has concentrated on compensation in MNE subsidiaries, but as previously 
suggested, it is obvious that compensation would have to be linked to other FIRM 
practices to explain how MNEs link FIR practice to strategies. The use of a 
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cybernetic systems approach (Wright & McMahan, 1992) suggests that organisations 
might seek employee control through 'inputs' (selection and training), 'behaviours' 
(behaviour-based appraisal and reward systems), and 'outcomes' (outcome-based 
appraisal and reward systems) (p.307). We noted that the use of performance 
appraisal in conjunction with pay-for-performance was uneven across the affiliates, 
but more common at managerial level. The particular relevance to this thesis is the 
need for the cybernetic model to operate in a changing external context that has to be 
monitored by management. For a full systems model, Wright and McMahan (1992) 
note that feedback from the environment has to be interpreted and may then lead to 
adjustments in HR practice (p.308). 
Roth and O'Donnell's (1996) major study of 100 MNE subsidiaries in five countries 
showed the potential of applying agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1988) to affiliate 
compensation. Liking the headquarters-foreign subsidiary structure to the principal—
agency structure, the three agency problems for the head office-subsidiary relationship 
arose from the cultural distance between headquarters and subsidiary market, the 
strategic and operational role of the subsidiary, and the 'commitment and 
psychological alignment' at the individual level (p.682). Roth and O'Donnell's study 
included hypotheses about the links between (1) cultural distance, (2) role of the 
affiliate, and (3) senior management commitment to headquarters, and (1) the 
proportion of incentives in senior executive and other personnel compensation, and 
(2) market position of pay levels. They concluded that their findings provided 
'moderate support' for the application of agency theory to MINE subsidiary 
compensation and suggested that future studies integrating agency theory and 
institutional theory could be worthwhile (p.698). In relation to this thesis, with only 
European, Australian and Singaporean cultures studied (and the similarity of the 
British cultural dimensions [Hofstede, 1980] to those of Australia) and the lack of 
compensation figures for senior management, it was not possible to compare the case 
study findings with those of Roth and O'Donnell. 
According to Wright and McMahan (1992), other models of HRM could be termed 
'non-strategic' (p.310). They include 'resource dependence/power models', already 
referred to in the Taylor, Beechler and Napier (1996) model. With regard to SIHRM 
practices at parent and subsidiary levels, one issue is the extent to which 
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compensation design is the result of MINE political considerations as opposed to 
technical considerations (Wright & McMahan, 1992). The resource dependence 
approach can be used to show 'situations in which MNCs will exercise control over 
the SIHRM system of their affiliates' (Taylor, Beechler and Napier, 1996: 960). One 
final perspective (although currently not well developed) is institutionalism (Wright & 
McMahan, 1992: 313). Using this approach, some HRM practices can be imposed 
'coercively' through legislation or an MINE head office ordering changes in an affiliate 
(p.314). In relation to the thesis, this was obvious in the observance of the mandatory 
minima of conditions both in Singapore and Australia. 
An alternative way of viewing institutionalism is the modelling of compensation 
design on practice in other companies in order to appear 'legitimate' or 'up to date' 
(p.314). This has been seen as 'a lower-risk approach' than the resource-based model 
as a basis for choosing a compensation practice (Gerhart, Trevor & Graham, 
1996:149). However, an MINE might follow both institutional and resource-based 
approaches with, for example, the 'best practice' institutional approach for some part 
of compensation design, and a resource-based approach for its core pay system 
(p.153). Thus, the similarity of non-managerial and middle management pay systems 
to the host country's systems in the MINE case studies could be explained by 
institutional theory in that the MINE affiliates wish to appear 'respectable' and present 
a small target for tribunals, unions, and governments. Compensation for senior 
managers and expatriates might be better explained by agency or resource-based 
approaches (Roth & O'Donnell, 1996). 
HRM practices may continue to exist due to organisation inertia (as denoted in 
organisation structural inertia theory [Baum, 19961), rather than being modified to 
support a competitive strategy. The collective agreement of Oilco Singapore is 
possibly an example of this inertia, as it has persisted for over thirty years in a similar 
form. By comparison, change in employment legislation led to changes in 
compensation design at lower levels through enterprise agreements in Oilco Australia, 
Buildo Australia, and High Tech Australia. Further research would be needed to 
determine to what extent the proliferation of enterprise agreements in Australia is due 
to imitation, a genuine desire to obtain a better link between compensation practice 
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and business strategy, or the pressures of the 'institutionalized environments to 
become similar' (Jackson & Schuler, 1995). 
According to Jackson and Schuler (1995), institutional theory and resource 
dependence theory appear to be 'particularly useful guides' for research on how the 
legal, social, and political external environments affect BRM practice (p.248). But 
going beyond the determinism of contingency factors for MNE compensation design, 
the 'strategic choice' model of Child (1972; 1997) could also provide some 
theoretical scope for further understanding of how much discretion MNE managers 
have in the choice of affiliate pay systems in the context of their internal and external 
environments. The British contextual position, for example, argues that organisations 
do at times deviate from their socio-cultural context (Whittington, 1990). More 
recently, however, De Cieri and Fenwick (1998: 5-6) have suggested that network 
theory should supplement institutional, resource dependence and resource-based 
theories to allow a 'multi-level analysis of the variables related to compensation in 
networked organization'. While each of the theoretical approaches offers a 
contribution towards the understanding of MNE affiliate compensation design, it is 
likely that more could be gained from multi-disciplinary and multiple theoretical 
approaches (Dowling, Welch & Schuler, 1999) and viewing the term 'Strategic 
International BRM' as more simply 'Strategic HRM of an MNE'. 
Implications for IHRM Practice 
The implications of the study's findings for IFIRM practice and, in particular, 
compensation design in MNE subsidiaries, are the greater knowledge needed by ARVE 
managers about subsidiary external environments in each country of operation, and 
the recognition of the choices of compensation system available at affiliate level. 
The background knowledge needed to analyse the external environmental factors in 
the affiliates studied in the thesis would be similar to that needed by expatriate MNE 
managers setting up 1HRM systems for all staff in a new overseas unit. The key 
practical question concerns the basis on which the MNE management should design 
the compensation system. Starting from the lower levels of a subsidiary, non-
expatriate staff would be selected from the local labour markets. Intimate knowledge 
of these markets would thus be essential, gained either from consultants, government 
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officials or locally recruited host country managers. Compensation levels and mix and 
benefits would have to be adequate to attract good quality employees. The 
compensation mix and benefits may be affected by any relevant employment 
legislation, although the MINE may attempt to influence this through political or 
employers' pressure groups. The legislation may set minimum standards which have 
to be observed, and may vary according to the occupation. 
The MINE subsidiary may have a choice as to which compensation design it installs, 
but this may depend on whether the MINE decides to (1) recognise unions for the 
grades of employees capable of being unionised, (2) take host country culture into 
account, (3) follow any guidelines from host country industrial institutions, and (4) 
transfer any pay designs from the parent. If the MINE subsidiary decides to recognise 
unions, then it may be forced to negotiate conditions which more closely reflect the 
local labour market practices. The power and status of host country institutions like 
unions and government may affect the discretion of the affiliate to adopt 'high 
standard' HRM practices (Kochan, Batt & Dyer, 1992:331). Transferring parent 
head office salary structures is likely to generate more than one compensation system 
in the subsidiary, but even with the head office structure, the level of pay would have 
to be attuned to the host country labour market. 
Compensation for host country managers can be formulated with more freedom, as it 
is less likely that laws setting minimum standards and unions would have much 
impact. However, the final design would usually have to be agreed with the parent 
MINE head office, which may impose its own design, or, at least, its preferred mix, on 
the subsidiary in order to facilitate a standard structure or have more control over 
management performance according to the strategic role of the subsidiary. Each of 
the variables listed earlier in Figure 13.1 would have to be considered. If a head office 
compensation design is replicated in the subsidiary, the MINE would have to assess 
how much this should be adapted to fit local national culture and mandatory 
requirements. Host country environments may vary in their acceptance of new 
compensation practices introduced by an MINE subsidiary (Rosenzweig & Singh, 
1991). However, without further empirical evidence, the linkage of national culture 
with compensation design is problematical (Gomez-Mejia & Welbourne, 1991). This 
study has also shown that MINE affiliates do not operate with one compensation 
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system, but may function successfully with several systems. In short, the better the 
understanding of the host country external environment, the better the 'fit' of the 
affiliate's IHRM with its environment (Katz & Elsea, 1997; De Cieri & Dowling, 
1997). 
Limitations of the Research 
As with all research projects, the findings of the research have to be assessed in 
relation to some limitations of the research methodology. In Chapter 4, a number of 
these were referred to, including the selection of comparative cases and the difficulty 
in finding pairs of similar case subsidiaries in Australia and Singapore that were 
prepared to provide access. Ideally, the pairs of affiliates would have had highly 
similar endogenous factors. While the technology and products were similar in Oilco 
and Buildo, the comparison in High Tech was of a company (including head office) in 
Australia, with a sales office in Singapore. The subsidiaries studied in the Metalco 
and Foodco MNEs were of markedly different sizes and technologies and their 
products were not identical. 
In choosing a case methodology rather a survey methodology, the advantage of the 
potential to record and analyse changes in HRM practices over time in a company was 
apparent. However, one problem is that the company owners may change during the 
research period as was the situation with Metalco Singapore, and so this case analysis 
was for the position up to April 1993 rather than 31 August 1995 as for the other four 
MNEs. Another limitation was the range of personnel interviewed. The size of an 
international study is always constrained by budget limitations. It would have been 
useful to have spent some time at the MINE corporate head offices of Oilco and 
Foodco in Europe to compare their perceptions of headquarters' control, but the 
financial resources available did not permit this. To add another comparative 
dimension to the project, a study of the compensation of a major Singaporean owned 
firm was undertaken by the author at the same time as the MINE cases, and while a 
further comparison with the MINE affiliates in Singapore would have been valuable, it 
was not included because of the scale of the research. 
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The Summary Profile of Experiential and Algorithmic Compensation Patterns of 
Gomez-Mejia and Ballcin (1992) was used to provide a standard basis for comparison 
of the compensation systems in the case subsidiaries, but the multiple bases for pay in 
some affiliates were sometimes difficult to fit into the single criteria of the patterns. 
Allocations to the Algorithmic or Experiential categories have been made in a 
consistent way, even if they not a perfect fit. A similar classification problem arose in 
relation to national culture and compensation. We noted earlier some of the 
challenges in linking compensation features to the Hofstede (1980) cultural 
dimensions. Although Hofstede's work has the advantage of rank orders and indices, 
there is the problem of drawing a line between a strong and weak finding on the 
dimensions. Australia and Singapore were judged either moderately high or low on 
some of the dimensions, but the pay recommendations of Hodgetts and Luthans 
(1993b) and Gomez-Mejia and Welbourne (1991) did not allow for this. The 
dimensions were either strong or weak, or high or low and this research classified the 
dimensions in the same way. It was also noted that the Hodgetts and Luthans 
(1993b) guidelines for compensation design were aimed at host country managers 
only, but have been taken to apply to all subsidiary employees in this study. These 
compensation and national cultural issues suggest a need for more robust techniques 
for measuring IHRM concepts and constructs in future research (De Cieri & Dowling, 
1999). 
Other limitations of the project were the lack of pay data from the MNEs where these 
were not publicly available. This information was not sought in order to increase the 
possibility of access to MNEs, but would have been useful in analysing pay ranges in 
subsidiaries. It was not possible to consider the effect on compensation of sub-
cultures in Australia and Singapore (Bloom & Milkovich, 1999) because there is little 
empirical research on sub-cultures within both countries; the work of Hofstede (1980) 
and Trompenaars (1994) is targeted to national cultural levels only. Another 
limitation of the study was its restriction to two countries only. This decision was 
made on the grounds on the appropriate scale needed for a thesis of this nature after 
work on the external environment and compensation systems of a third country had 
been commenced. 
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Against these limitations, the research has attempted to avoid some of the major 
pitfalls of comparative management studies as listed by Peterson (1993), in that it has 
developed an explanatory framework based on the literature and the case findings, has 
examined national culture as one of several other external variables that may cause 
differences in compensation design, has not assumed that the external environmental 
elements have equal value in both Singapore and Australia, has studied more than one 
category of employee, and has used a variety of affiliate sizes. The writer is also 
mindful that it is not prudent to attempt to generalise findings of case study research 
Suggestions for Further Research 
With international compensation research at an early stage of development, there is 
much potential for further research on MNE compensation policy and practice as the 
conclusion to Chapter 3 indicated. This section thus highlights a possible sample 
only. 
Following the lead of Jackson and Schuler (1995), the external context of THRM is in 
need of further research. In relation to this thesis, more work could usefully be done 
on the effect of the industrial relations institutions faced by MNEs that recognise 
unions. For example, one could question the role of national culture in the setting up 
and decisions of bodies such the Australian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC) 
and the Singaporean National Wages Council (NWC)(Tayeb, 1995). Decisions and 
recommendations of the AIRC and NWC could be analysed from a cultural 
perspective, such as their effect on wage differentials and income inequality, as might 
the presence of 'strong national or sectoral bargaining arrangements' (Locke, Kochan 
& Piore, 1995:151). We know little about the extent to which MNEs follow those 
recommendations for different levels of employee compared with local firms, 
especially if by doing so, the MNE is not able to design its preferred compensation 
systems in line with subsidiary and global business goals. In this regard, what 
processes, if any, do MNEs use to try to influence the host country governments and 
industrial tribunals over conditions of work? 
MNEs may be faced with demands for union recognition at the affiliate level. The 
changing density of unionism across the world may have an effect on pay strategies. 
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It would be useful to compare the features of the collective agreements of one MNE's 
subsidiaries in different countries to determine how much similarity there is between 
affiliates. We have noted that employment legislation can have a significant effect on 
setting minima for the compensation system, although not necessarily on the 
compensation structure. If a suitable measure of national culture could be developed, 
one could attempt to establish a link between national culture and employment 
legislation that sets the context for compensation, especially benefits. 
On a more basic level, there is a need for data on compensation systems generally 
across the world so that studies like that of Schuler and Rogovsky's (1998), which 
show a link of national cultures to pay practices, could be extended to other countries. 
On a practical level, we do not know to what extent the MINE should take cultural 
factors into account when designing pay (Milkovich & Bloom, 1998). The matter is 
complicated by the absence of research on national sub-cultures and compensation, 
and by recent work which suggests that decisions to transfer pay practices by the 
parent MINE may not be totally based on national cultural grounds, but more for 
economic reasons (Dedoussis, 1995). There is little empirical work on which 
compensation designs are the most effective in different cultural settings. We do not 
know the extent to which job evaluation factors and processes of international job 
evaluation systems are adjusted to fit local national cultures and variables. 
Figure 13.1 illustrated a contingency framework for a number of variables that might 
affect an MNE's subsidiary compensation design. At the present state of IHRM 
knowledge, each of these variables could form the basis for future research (Ferner, 
1994). With the emphasis on SIHRM as opposed to IHRM, as defined earlier, the 
links between global and affiliate business strategies and compensation design are 
particularly crucial. The integration of compensation in 'bundles' of IHRM policies 
and practices is also an area that could be beneficially studied (Kochan, Batt & Dyer, 
1992; Dyer & Reeves, 1995). Sparrow, Schuler and Jackson (1994) found evidence 
of a convergence in the use of HRM for competitive advantage and the role of MNEs 
in this convergence would be of interest. If MINE affiliates copy the pay practices of 
other MNEs in a host country (institutional theory), how might local employees react 
to this development (Gerhart & Milkovich, 1992)? There is some evidence of 
convergence of MNE subsidiary pay practices in some countries, although small 
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Chinese-owned firms operating alongside MNEs tend to retain local host country 
characteristics (Amante, 1995). 
Turning to the MNE itself, there is potential for further research on the effect of 
different MINE structures on compensation design (perhaps on the lines of work by 
Roth and O'Donell, 1996), along with more studies on the effect of nationality, stage 
of maturity, size, nature of ownership, number of country locations, and the resource 
dependency of subsidiaries. The effect of MINE company culture on compensation 
design is another area currently under-researched as are the links of expatriate 
rewards with MINE strategic goals (Bonache & Fernandez, 1997). The role of the 
regional office in compensation design has not been considered in depth, and might 
play an increasingly important role for many MNEs as they move into Asia. 
Schuler, Dowling and De Cieri (1993) stressed the need for multi-disciplinary studies 
in future HIRM research. In relation to pay, we have concentrated on the design of 
systems by the MNEs, but have neglected the effect of different compensation designs 
on the attraction, motivation and retention of Australian and Singaporean employees. 
MNEs that replicate compensation designs (including incentive systems) in all their 
operating countries presumably assume that all employees will be attracted, motivated 
and retained in a similar way to that of the home country. Further research across 
cultures similar to that of Manunan, Sulaiman and Fade! (1996) would seem 
promising. More data are needed about the effect of age, gender, merit, performance, 
and loyalty in different cultures (Arvey, Bhagat & Salas, 1991). For example, it may 
be imprudent to assume that there are no differences between Chinese-based nations 
(Paik, Vance & Stage, 1996). Moreover, national cultures may change, which may 
affect the values of the employee towards compensation. 
Finally, further research on the process by which compensation decisions are made 
across an MINE would inevitably have to draw on a range of disciplines. For example, 
what is the process by which the MINE head office decides to replicate a 
compensation system in an affiliate? All this suggests that we are some way from 
advocating how far an MNE can have common compensation designs across all its 
affiliates. 
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Conclusion 
The main guiding question for this thesis was how the external environment of an 
NINE subsidiary influences the design of its compensation system. The thesis 
addressed the question by comparing the compensation design of five pairs of MINE 
subsidiaries and companies operating in Singapore and Australia. These cross-
national comparisons of case studies were used as the basis for developing an 
explanatory framework, some propositions for further study and directions for further 
research. While there is an emerging literature on MINE compensation, few studies 
have examined the design of pay in MINE subsidiaries at all levels of employee, and 
assessed the effect of the external environment on design. Studies of affiliate 
compensation design of MNEs in relation to the local environment have tended to 
focus on MINE subsidiaries located in one country — usually the United States. 
Through the use of cases on five pairs of MINE affiliates and companies, changes in 
compensation design over time have been examined. We have noted that assessing 
the influence of exogenous factors on affiliate compensation is complicated by 
definitional problems and by the close inter-relationship of these macro external 
variables such as the economy, legislation and rules, industrial relations system, role of 
government, and national culture. In addition, an affiliate may fimction with more 
than one compensation system across its various occupations. While the 
compensation design for every occupation in an MINE affiliate may not be directly 
attributable to elements of the external environment, the thesis has shown that some 
choices of compensation, particularly for lower level occupations, may have been 
constrained or expanded by the external environment, particularly legislation. The 
local economy and labour market affected the level of pay in the subsidiary; 
employment laws and industrial tribunals set national pay or conditions minima; union 
presence caused the formalisation of collective agreements; and national wage case 
principles and recommendations encouraged certain forms of pay mix and basis for 
pay. The study also found that there was an uneven conformity between the 
subsidiaries and companies with the compensation recommendations of Hodgetts and 
Luthans (1993b) for particular national cultures. This suggested that that other 
variables were more dominant in the choice of system, presuming that the 
recommendations were appropriate for Australian and Singaporean cultures. 
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The implications of the findings for IHRM theory and practice were also considered. 
While the findings from the cases cannot be generalised, the variety of cases 
highlighted the complicated nature of small and large international organisations, and 
the unique managerial challenges which they face. The emphasis of the thesis has 
been on the influence of the external environment on MNE subsidiary compensation, 
though we have shown that management still has considerable discretion in choice of 
pay system design. Using the Gomez-Mejia and Balkin (1992) compensation 
patterns, the research methodology has also demonstrated ways in which differences 
between the compensation of MNE affiliates can be expressed. One key finding from 
the five cases was that in only one MNE pair of subsidiaries and companies operating 
in Australia and Singapore were the compensation systems the same (using a single 
overall Algorithmic and Experiential classification) for all the selected occupations for 
study. Separating the reasons for differences in compensation systems for every 
occupational level in the subsidiaries of an MINE with precision is an opportunity for 
future IHRM research. 
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APPENDIX 4.1 
Questionnaire Check-list 
for Case Study Company Interviews 
Date, time and location of interview 
Stress Confidentiality 	 Name of Company (Aust/Sing) 
Use of Pseudonyms Name of interviewee/Position 
Company Background 
A. Background 
1. Nature of industry 
2. Main Technology 
3. Main products (any brochures? Annual Reports?) 
4. Range and nature of products markets 
5. Competition - domestic/overseas 
6. Customers 
- other firms 
- public 
-overseas 
7. Size of Market (increasing/decreasing) 
B. History/Ownership/Goals.  
1. Ownership (any change over 25 years) 
2. Organisation Structure (plus changes) Charts? 
- Levels in Hierarchy/Structure 
- Technology 
- Work Organisation 
- Skill Levels 
3. Works Sites 
4. Different Products 
5. Corporate Philosophy 
6. Culture of Organisation 
- social responsibilities 
- employees 
- customers 
- suppliers 
-government 
- distribution 
- stockholders 
7. Major Objectives e.g. 
- growth 
- cost cutting 
- innovation 
- turnaround 
8. Trend with investment/capitalisation 
9. Market (Share of overall market) 
How do they compete? 
-price 
- quality 
- service 
- reliability 
- technical excellence of products 
- special characteristics 
-other? 
10. How have these changed? 
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C.  Business Plan/HRM Plans/Unions 
1. Formal strategic and business plans 
2. Formal stated policy/philosophy towards employees 
3. Extent to which owners influence this. 
4. Formal HRM objectives? 
5. Are HRM (Objectives/issues) part of business plan? 
e.g., 	- cost cutting 
- flexibility 
- job design 
6. Formal/Informal/Ad Hoc HRM Procedures? 
7. Formal/Informal/Ad Hoc HRM Policies? 
8. Presence of HRM Department/Specialist? 
9. Is IMM strategy clear? 
10. Industrial relations set-up 
- Unions/Shop Stewards 
- Density of membership 
- Negotiating set-up/Committees 
- Multiple unions and awards 
11. How have these changed over time? 
Compensation Systems 
D. Reward (Salary/Wage) Structures (plus changes over e.g. 5 years) 
Categories/Employee Numbers/Male/Female/Age Distribution 
1. Industrial/Blue collar 
- Unskilled 
- Skilled 
2. Clerical/Administrative (Award/Non Award) 
3. Sales/Technical 
4. Professional/Management 
5. Board of Directors 
1. Industrial/Blue Collar/Award (+History) 
1.1 General  
(a) Major awards or collective agreements in the industry. 
(b) Major award or collective agreements for the company. 
(c) No. of people on each of the awards/collective agreement. 
(d) Character - industry/occupation awards/agreements - 
-Federal/State 
(e) Over-award policy. 
(f) Negotiations and process of setting up new awards. 
(8) 	Role of Industrial Tribunals. 
(h) 	Enterprise Agreements. 
(I) 	Impact of industry-wide negotiations. 
(0 	Base pay/Over-awards proportions. 
(k) 	Incentives/Fixed/Individm1/Group - 
-types. 
(1) 	Job Evaluation/Work Value Schemes. 
(m) Total wage. 
(n) Allowances 
(o) Hours of work 
(13) 	Shift Work 
(q) Overtime 
(r) Method of pay - 
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-weekly 
-hourly 
-casual 
(s) Labour Market 
(t) Penalty Rates 
(n) 	Piece Rates 
(v) Leave 
(w) Singapore Bonus/AWS/Co. bonus 
(x) Gain Sharing 
(y) Employee/Fringe Benefits 
1.2 Basis for Pay 
(a) Job -v- skills 
(b) Performance -v- seniority 
(c) Short-term -v- Long-term 
(d) Hierarchy -v- Egalitarian 
(e) Internal -v- External 
(f) Measured performance 
(g) Pay for age 
(h) Education qualifications bonus 
(i) Pay level in line with Market 
(j) Open/Secret philosophy 
(k) Participation in design 
D2. 	Clerical/Administrative  
1.1 General 
(a) Philosophy 
(b) Policy 
(c) Major awards 
(d) No. of people on each 
(e) Character 
-Industry/Occupational 
-State/Federal/awards/agreements 
(f) Over-award 
(g) Negotiations/Determination 
(h) Role of industrial tribunals 
(i) Enterprise agreements 
(j) Industry wide negotiations 
(k) Job evaluation? 
-type/range? 
(1) 	Performance bonuses 
(m) Classifications? 
(n) Base pay/over-award/range 
(o) Incentives - type 
(p) Bonus? 
(q) Allowances 
(s) Shift work 
(t) Overtime 
(u) Method of Pay 
- Weekly 
- Hourly 
- Casual 
(v) Labour Market 
(w) Penalty Rates 
(x) Leave 
(y) Gainsharing 
(2) 	Employee Benefits 
1.2 	Basis for Pay 
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(a) Job v. *ills 
(b) Performance v. seniority 
(c) Short-term v. Long-term 
(d) Hierarchy v. Egalitarian 
(e) Internal v. External 
(f) Measured performance 
(g) Pay for age 
(h) Education qualification bonus 
(i) Pay level in line with Market 
(j) Open/Secret philosophy 
(k) Participation in Design 
D.3 	Sales/Technical  
1.1 General  
(a) Philosophy 
(b) Policy 
(c) Major awards 
(d) No. of people on each 
(e) Character 
	
	 - Industry/Occupational 
- State/Federal 
(f) Over-award 
(g) Negotiations/Determination 
(h) Role of industrial tribunals 
(I) 	Enterprise agreements 
Industry wide negotiations 
(k) 	Job evaluations? 
- type/range? 
(1) 	Performance bonuses 
(m) Classifications? 
(n) Base/pay/over-award/range 
(o) Incentives - type 
(p) Bonus? 
(q) Allowances 
(r) Hours of Work 
(s) Shift work 
(t) Overtime 
(u) Method of Pay 	- Weekly 
- Hourly 
- Casual 
(v) Labour Market 
(w) Penalty Rates 
(x) Leave 
(y) Gainsharing 
(z) Employee Benefits 
1.2 	Basis for Pay 
(a) Job v. skills 
(b) Performance v. seniority 
(c) SIT v. L/T' 
(d) Hierarchy v. Egalitarian 
(e) Internal v. External 
(f) Measured performance 
(g) Pay for age 
(h) Education qualifications bonus 
(i) Pay level in line with market 
(j) Open/Secret philosophy 
(k) Participation in design 
D4. 	Professional/Managerial 
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1.1 General  
(a) Philosophy 
(b) Policy 
(c) Award free? 
(d) Base Pay 
(e) Incentives/Bonuses 
(f) Allowances 
(g) Profit sharing 
(h) Determination 
(i) Performance Appraisal Systems 
(j) Job Evaluation Method 
(k) Flexibility 
(1) 	Bonus 
(m) Hierarchy 
(n) Fringe Benefits - choice 
(o) Performance standards 
(p) Gainsharing 
(q) Employee Benefits 
1.2 	Basis for Pay 
(a) Job v. skills 
(b) Performance v. seniority 
(c) Short-term v. Long-term 
(d) Hierarchy v. Egalitarian 
(e) Internal v. External focus 
(f) Measured performance 
(g) Educational qualifications and pay 
(h) Pay level in line with market 
(i) Open/Secret philosophy 
(j) Participation in design 
D5. Board of Directors 
(a) Determination 
(b) Salaries/job evaluation 
(c) Profits/Shares 
(d) Fringe Benefits 
(e) Bonuses 
(f) Approval mechanism 
D6. 	Expatriates 
- Numbers 
- Home Country 
- Basis of expatriate pay and conditions 
- Location of determination of pay 
External Factors 
E. How do you perceive the following as an influence or constraint on the nature of the pay systems 
chosen in your company? 
1. 	Law 
(a) Common Law 
(b) Minimum Wage 
(c) Equal Pay 
(d) Fringe Benefits Tax (1986) (Australia) 
(e) Income Tax 
(f) Affecting Profits 
(g) Affecting share ownership/distribution 
(h) Social Security 
(i) CPF/Superannuation legislation 
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(j) Industrial Relations legislation 
(k) Employment Act (Singapore) 
2. 	Economic 
(a) Rate of economic growth 
(b) Inflation 
(c) Globalisation and competition 
(d) Levels of Employment/Unemployment 
(e) Demand and Supply for labour 
3. 	Government Policies  
(a) Government policies 
(b) Incomes Policies 
(c) Interventionist/Laisse7 Faire Approaches to Pay Systems/Levels 
(d) Role of Public Sector Pay Systems 
4. 	Societal 
(a) Status systems 
(b) Society Trends/values 
(c) National Culture 
(d) Work Ethic - attitude to achievement 
(e) Motivators - pay/effort 
(f) Attitude to wealth/material gain 
(g) Independence/team culture 
(h) Concepts of effort/commitment 
(i) Comparable Worth 
S. 	Trade Unions/Industrial Relations 
(a) TU's views on pay structure 
(b) Industrial tribunals 
(c) Pay determination systems 
(d) TU structure/density 
(e) The Accord (Australia) 
(f) AIRC National Wage Principles/Cases (Australia) 
(g) AIRC Structural Efficiency Principles 1988 (Australia) 
(h) National Wages Council Decisions (Singapore) 
6. 	Local Labour Market 
(a) Trends in Compensation (including benefits) 
(b) Levels of Pay 
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APPENDIX 4.2 
Employee Benefits Profile 
Industrial/ 
Blue Collar 
Unskilled 	Skilled 
Clerical/ 
Admin 
Sales/ 
Technical 
Professional/ 
Management 
Board 
Acting allowance 
Annual leave 
Attendance allowance 
Business entertainment expenses 
Cellular phones 
Co-operative shares 
Compassionate leave 
Death benefit 
Dental treatment 
Early retirement schemes 
External/social recreational club 
membership 
Festive loan/advance 
Fixed monthly transport allowance 
Free medical treatment/medicine 
Funeral leave benefit 
Hospital ward benefit 
Housing loan 
Housing renovation loan 
Laundry benefit 
Life insurance 
Long service award 
Long-term illness . 
Machine allowance 
Marriage leave 
Maternity leave 
Meal allowance 
Medically board-out benefit 
Other loans 
Paternity leave 
Personal insurance 
Provision of car 
Reimbursement for use of own car 
on company business 
Retirement benefit (>CPF) 
[Singapore] 
Retrenchment benefit 
Service benefit 
Shift allowance . 
Sick leave 
Specialist surgical fee 
Study leave benefit 
Superannuation (Australia) 
Transport benefit/allowance/ 
reimbursement 
Uniform 
Union day leave 
Union education leave 
Unpaid leave 
Voluntary resignation benefit 
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APPENDIX 4.3 
TABLE 3-1 
Summary Profile of Experiential and Algorithmic Compensation Patterns 
Compensation Strategy* 
Basis for Pay 
Unit of analysis 
Criteria for pay increases 
Level of performance 
measurement 
Time orientation 
Risk sharing 
Strategic focus 
Equity concern 
Reward distribution 
Type of control 
Design Issues 
Salary market policy 
Benefits market policy 
Incentives in pay mix 
Total compensation 
Reinforcement schedule 
Reward emphasis 
Administrative Framework 
Decision making 
Pay disclosure 
Governance structure 
Nature of pay policies 
Superior dependency 
Algorithmic 
Job 
Tenure 
Individual 
Short-term 
Low 
Corporate 
Internal consistency 
Hierarchical 
Monitor of behaviors 
Above market pay 
Above market benefits 
Low 
Low future potential with 
higher immediate payoffs 
Fewer rewards with 
low frequency 
Nonmonetary 
Centralized pay 
Low 
Authoritarian 
Bureaucratic 
High 
Experiential 
Skills 
Performance 
Individual and aggregate 
Long-term 
High 
Division and business unit 
Market driven 
Egalitarian 
Monitor of outcomes 
Below market pay 
Below market benefits 
High 
High future potential with 
lower immediate payoff 
Multiple rewards with 
high frequency 
Pecuniary 
Decentralized pay 
High 
Participative 
Flexible 
Low 
*Based on the research of Gomez-Mejia (1992). 
Source: Gomez-Mejia and Ballcin, D.B. (1992) Compensation, Organizational 
Strategy. and Firm Performance,  Cincinnati, Ohio, South-Western Publishing, 
Tables 3.1 and 3.2, pp.61-65 
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Part 1 General System 
   
TABLE 3-2 
Compensation Elements Associated with the 
Algorithmic and Experiential Pay Patterns* 
Basis for Pay 
Strategic 
Compensation 
Pattern 
     
     
Jobs vs. Skills 
Firm uses a job-based pay system. That is, factors within the job are key 	 Algorithmic 
determinants of the amount of pay. 
Company relies on a skill-based pay system. That is, individuals are rewarded 	Experiential 
in part on their mastery of job skills. 
The job is a more important factor than an incumbent's ability or performance in 	Algorithmic 
the determination of pay rates. Heavy emphasis is placed on job evaluation 
procedures to determine pay levels. 
Performance Emphasis 
Firm has a strong commitment to distribute rewards based upon contributions to 	Experiential 
organization. 
There is a large pay spread between low performers and high performers in a given job. Experiential 
An employee's seniority plays an important role in pay decisions. 	 Algorithmic 
Individual vs. Aggregate Performance 
Individual appraisals are used almost exclusively with little variance in 	 Algorithmic 
performance ratings. 
Interdependencies are seldom taken into account when making decisions about 	Algorithmic 
an individual's pay. 
Short- vs. Long-Term Orientation 
The pay system has a futuristic orientation. It focuses employee's attention on 	Experiential 
long-term (two or more years) goals. 
The pay system rewards employees for short-term accomplishments during a 	Algorithmic 
fixed time period. 
Risk Sharing 
A portion of an employee's earnings is contingent on achievement of group or 	Experiential 
organization performance goals. 
Compensation system is designed so that a significant proportion of total labor 	Experiential 
costs is variable in nature. 
Firm strongly believes that employees should be risk takers with some of their pay. 	Experiential 
Corporate vs. Business Unit Performance 
Corporate performance is used as criteria for pay decisions concerning top 	 Algorithmic 
marfagement and aggregate incentive programs (e.g. gainsharing, profit sharing) 
for employees. 
Division or business unit performance is used as criterion to reward executives 	Experiential 
and determine aggregate incentive dollars for employers. 
*Based on the research of Gomez-Mejia (1992). 
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TABLE 3-2 (Continued) 
Compensation Elements Associated with the 
Algorithmic and Experiential Pay Patterns 
Internal Consistency in Pay Relationships vs. Market Forces 
Internal pay equity is an important goal of the pay system. 	 Algorithmic 
The firm tries hard to achieve comparable pay relationships across different 	 Algorithmic 
parts of the organization. 
The firm gives a higher priority to internal pay equity than to external market factors. 	Algorithmic 
Emphasis on Hierarchy and Status Differentials 
The compensation system reflects a low degree of hierarchy. In other words, 	Experiential 
firm offers a minimum of perks (reserved parking spots, first-class air travel, etc.) 
to top executives. 
Firm offers special pay packages and privileges as status symbols to the higher 	Algorithmic 
echelons in the organization. 
Firm tries to make pay system as egalitarian as possible. There are very few 	 Experiential 
special rewards available to any "elite* groups of employees. 
Quantitative vs. Qualitative Performance Resources 
Firm relies heavily on objective performance measures (e.g. earnings per share, 	Experiential 
reti-n on investment) as a basis for top executive pay and aggregate incentive 
, r,grams (e.g. gainsharing, profit sharing). 
r'irm relies on subjective evaluations to monitor subordinates. 	 Experiential 
Design Issues 
Pay Policy Relative to Market 
Preferred position of organization's salary levels with respect to competitors is 	Algorithmic 
clearly above market. 
Preferred position of organization's benefits level with respect to competitors is 	Algorithmic 
clearly above market. 
Role of Salary and Benefits in Total Pay Mix 
Base salary is an important part of the total compensation package. 	 Algorithmic 
Base salary is high relative to other forms of pay that an employee may receive 	Algorithmic 
in the organization. 
Benefits are an important part of total package. 	 Algorithmic 
Employees' benefits package is very generous compared to what it could be. 	 Algorithmic 
Role of Pay Incentives in Total Pay Mix 
Pay incentives such as a bonus or profit sharing are an important part of the 	 Experiential 
compensation strategy in this organization. 
Pay incentives are designed to provide a significant amount of an employee's 	 Experiential 
total earnings in this organization. 
Part 1 General System 
TABLE 3-2 (Continued) 
Compensation Elements Associated with the 
Algorithmic and Experiential Pay Patterns 
Design Issues 
Strategic 
Compensation 
Pattern 
     
Frequency of Rewards 
Bonuses are provided often; frequency of bonuses is viewed at least as 	 Experiential 
important as their magnitude. 
Organization provides a variety of deferred compensation plans in addition to 	 Experiential 
bonuses. 
Firm relies on annual pay raises, which may include both a merit and a 	 Algorithmic 
cost-of-living component. 
Reliance on Pecuniary vs. NonMonetary Rewards 
Firm tries hard to meet the psychological needs of employees by offering 
intrinsic rewards through such means as job enrichment and quality of work 
life programs. Monetary rewards are underemphasized. 
While intrinsic aspects of the job are not ignored, firm clearly uses pecuniary 
rewards as a crucial part of its human rewards strategy. 
Algorithmic 
Experiential 
 
Administrative Framework 
 
    
Autonomy vs. Centralization 
Pay policy is applied uniformly across all organizational units. 	 Algorithmic 
The personnel staff in each business unit has freedom to develop its own 	 Experiential 
compensation programs. 
There is a minimum of interference from corporate headquarters with respect to 	Experiential 
pay deciSions made by line managers. 
Pay Disclosure vs. Secrecy 
Firm keeps pay information secret from employees. 	 Algorithmic 
Firm has formal policies that discourage employees from divulging their pay to 	Algorithmic 
co-workers. 
Firm does not openly disclose the administrative procedures on how pay levels 	Algorithmic 
and radii raises are established. 
Participative vs. Authoritarian Pay System Design 
Employees' feelings and preferences for various pay forms (e.g. bonus vs. profit 	Experiential 
sharing) are taken very seriously by top management. 
Many different kinds of employees (individual contributors, managers, personnel 	Experiential 
staff, executives) have a say in pay policies. 
Pay decisions are made on an autocratic basis. Firms tend to `follow the book' 	Algorithmic 
very closely. Very few employees have any input to pay decisions. 
Bureaucratic vs. Flexible Policies 
Pay system is highly regimented with procedures carefully defined. 	 Algorithmic 
Compensation structure is very complex yet changes very slowly. Algorithmic 
While general rules exist, many pay decisions are one of a kind with considerable 	Experiential 
discretion on a case by case basis. 
651 
64 
Private Sector 
6 per cent (without offsetting of annual 
increment) 
9 per cent (with varying rates of offsetting 
depending on salary) 
$40 + 6 per cent (without offsetting of annual 
increments) 
$40 + 10 per cent (for employees who have 
not received an annual increment) 
6 per cent (with full offsetting of annual 
increments provided that those employees 
who are on incremental scales received a 
minimum increase after offsetting of 3 per 
cent; for those of the maximum of their pay 
scales, the wage increase was 3 per cent) 
7 per cent (with full offsetting of annual 
increments on a group basis) 
6 per cent (with full offsetting of all forms of 
increases in remuneration on a group basis) 
$12 + 6 per cent (with full offsetting of all 
forms of increases in remuneration on a 
group basis) 
$32 + 7 per cent (with full offsetting of all 
forms of increases in remuneration on a 
group basis) 
$33 + 7.5 per cent (with full offsetting of all 
forms of increases on a group basis) AND an 
additional 3 per cent of the group monthly 
wage bill of June 1980, to be distributed only 
among above average employees 
$32 + 6 per cent to $32 + 10 per cent (with 
full offsetting of all forms of increases on a 
group basis) AND an additional 2 per cent 
of the group monthly wage bill of June 1981, 
to be distributed only among meritorious 
performers 
$18.50 + 2.5 per cent to $18.50 + 6.5 per cent 
(with full offsetting of all forms of increases 
on a group basis) 
$10 + 2 per cent to $10 + 6 per cent (with full 
offsetting of all forms of increases on a group 
basis) 
Public Sector' 
9 per cent (without offsetting) 
$40 + 6 per cent (without offsetting for 
employees earning less than $1,000 per 
month) 
10 per cent (without offsetting for employees 
earning at least $1,000 per month) 
6 per cent (with full offsetting of annual 
increments provided that those on incremental 
scales received a minimum increase after 
offsetting of 3 per cent; for those at the 
maximum of their pay scales, the wage 
increase was a full 6 per cent) 
7 per cent (with full offsetting of annual 
increments on a group basis) 
6 per cent (with full offsetting of all forms of 
increases in remuneration on a group basis) 
$12 + 6 per cent (with full offsetting of all 
forms of increases in remuneration on a 
group basis) 
$32 + 2.5 per cent (subject to a minimum of 
7 per cent) 
$33 + 7.5 per cent (with full offsetting of all 
forms of increases on a group basis) AND an 
additional 4 per cent for above average 
employees 
$32 + 5 per cent (subject to a minimum of 
11 per cent) AND an additional 5 per cent 
of the group monthly wage bill of June 1981, 
to be distributed only among meritorious 
performers 
$18.50 for employees earning $568 per month 
or less 
3.25 per cent for those earning more than 
$568 per month 
$10 + 1.3 per cent for employees earnings 
$604 per month or less 
3 per cent for those earning more than $604 
per month 
NWC 
Year 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
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	 APPENDIX 5.1 
SINGAPORE NWC WAGE INCREASES/GUIDELINES, 1972-95 
1 The NWC wage increases for the public sector were for employees who were not in the superscale or equivalent grades of officers. 
The latter were considered on a different basis. 
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NWC 
Year  
1984 
1985 
Private Sector 
$27 + 4 per cent to $27 + 8 per cent 
(with full offsetting of all forms of 
increases on a group basis) 
3 to 7 per cent (with full off-setting 
of all forms of increases on a group 
basis. 
Public Sector 
$27 + 4.2 per cent for employees earning 
$680 per month or less. 8.2 per cent for those 
earning more $680 per month. 
Zero per cent after off-setting 
BOTH SECTORS COMBINED 
1986 
Wage restraint. Wages standstill except for contractual increments. 
Total wage increase should be given in two parts - a moderate basic 
wage increase and a variable payment/bonus linked to company/ 
individual performance or productivity. Total wage increase should 
lag behind productivity growth. 
Built-in wage increase (annual increments plus wage adjustments) 
should lag behind productivity growth. Companies performing well 
should however reward employees with higher variable bonus. 
Total wage increase for 1991 should be lower than that of last year, 
in line with the expected slower economic growth. Built-in-wage 
increase (annual increments plus wage adjustments) should lag behind 
productivity growth. Companies performing well should however 
reward employees with higher variable bonus. 
Total wage increases should be moderated in line with slower economic growth. Built-in wage 
increases should lag behind productivity growth rates. Wage increases should, as far as 
possible, be in the form of variable components. Total wage increases should be based on the 
individual company's performance. Employers encouraged to allow people to retire at 60 years 
or above. Part-time employment to be encouraged. Companies should set aside at least 4 per 
cent of payroll for training. NWC guides to apply to all levels of staff. 
Built-in pay rises should lag behind productivity growth. Total wage increases should, as far a: 
possible, be in the form of a variable payment. Successful companies should consider special 
bonuses. Companies with flexi-wage systems should pay according to their agreed formula. 
Adjustments should be in the form of variable pay. Employers to be encouraged to employ 
people until 60 years of age, and use part-time staff. Employers recommended to set aside 4 per 
cent of payroll for training. 
Built-in wage increases should lag behind productivity growth rates. Total wage increases 
should reflect the favourable performance of the economy. Variable payments should reflect 
company performance. One-off special bonuses for exceptionally performing companies. 
Total wage increases should reflect the performance of the economy. Built-in wage increases 
should lag behind productivity growth. Companies should pay as much as possible of their 
wage increase in the form of a variable component. The variable component should reflect the 
performance of the company. The variable component should be 20 per cent of total annual 
wages. Companies should consider paying in advance part of the total annual variable paymen 
based on their performance Successful companies should consider paying a one-off special 
bonus to reward their employees. Recommended a maximum/minimum salary rates of 
1.5 to 2 times in a sntary range for workers doing the same job. 
Source Extracted from National Wages Council (1992) 21 Years of the National Wages Counci l  
Singapore, SNP Publishers and copies of pp.xv-xvi. 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
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Summary of National Wage Case Decisions by the Full Bench of the 
Australian Industrial Relations Commission 1975-95 
Dale CPI Date Increase Amount 
March '75 3.6% 15 May 1975 3.6% 
June '75 3.5% 18 September 1975 3.5% 
October '75 0.8% 
December '75 5.6% 15 February 1976 6.4% 
March '76 	, 3.0% 15 May 1976 3.0% to $125 p/week 
thereafter $3.80/week 
June '76 2.5% 15 August 1976 2.5% to $98 p/w, flat 
$2.50 to $166 p/w, 
then 1.5% 
October '76 2.2% 15 November 1976 2.2% 
December '76 6.0% 31 March 1977 $5.70 p/w to all adults 
March '77 2.3% 24 May 1977 1.9% to $200 p/week 
thereafter $3.80 p/week 
June '77 2.4% 22 August 1977 2.0% 
September '77 2.0% 12 December 1977 1.5% 
December '77 2.3% 28 February 1978 1.5% to $170 p/w 
thereafter $2.60 p/w 
March '78 1.3% 7 June '1978 1.3% 
June '78 and 2.1%) 
September '78 1.9%) 12 December 1978 4% 
December '78 2.3%) 
and March '79 1.7%) 27 June 1979 31% 
June '79 and 2.7%) 
September '79 2.3%) 4 January 1980 4.5% 
December '79 3.0%) 
and March '80 2.2% 1 14 July 1980 4.2% 
June '80 and 2.8% ) 
September '80 1.9%) 9 January 1981 3.7% 
December '80 2.1%) 7 May 1981 3.6% 
and March '81 2.4%)  14 May 1982 No increase 
On 23 December 1982 the Commission announced a "freeze" on all Federal Award 
wages to apply from then until 30 June 1983. 
Match '83 	2.2% } 	 4.3% (made under new 
June '83 2.1% ) 	6 October 1983 	principles) 
September '83 	1.6%) 
December '83 4%) 	6 April 1984 	4.1% 
No increase was granted to cover the March 1984 and June 1984 quarters, as the CPI 
decreased during this period. 
September '84 	1.4% ) 	 2.6% (discounted for 
December '84 1.4%) 	6 April 1985 	previous negative 
movement) 
March '85 	1.4%) 
June '85 2.4%} 	4 November 1985 	3.8% 
September '85 	2.2%) 
December '85 2.0%1 	1 July 1986 	 2.3% 
March '86 	2.3%) First tier increase of 
June '86 1.7%) 	 $10 across-the-board 
September '86 	2.6%) p/week plus second tier 
December '86 2.9%) 10 March 1987 increase of up to 4% to 
be negotiated between 
parties. 
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Date 	CPI 	Date Increase 	Amount 
March '87 	2.0%) 
June '87 1.5%) 
September '87 	1.7% 	5 February 1988 	$6 across-the-board per 
December '87 	1.704 week 
3% increase to apply 
March '88 	1.8%) 	 no earlier than 1 
June '88 13% 1 1 September 1988 September 1988, plus 
flat $10 p/w increase to 
apply no earlier than 6 
months after the 
effective date of the 3% 
increase. 
September '88 	1.9% 	 Subject to ratification 
December '88 2.1%) of Commission and 
March '89 	1.0% 	7 August 1989 	completion of 
June '89 2.4% 1 successful exercises 
under Structural 
Efficiency Principle: 
$10 p/week for basic 
skilk/trainee workers; 
$12.50 p/w for semi-
skilled; $15 p/w or 3%, 
whichever is higher, 
for trades level and 
above; to apply no 
earlier than 7 August 
1989; plus second 
increase of same order 
payable not less than 6 
months after first 
increase. Second 
increase also subject to 
ratification. 
September '89 	2.3% 
December '89 1.9%) 
March '90 	1.7% 
June '90 1.6%) 
September '90 	0.704 } 
December '90 	2.7% 
16 April 1991 
2.5% increase in award 
rates upon application 
to Commission. 
Applies from date of 
variation of relevant 
award. 
October '93 	2.2% 
September '94 	1.7% 
October '95 
1 December 1993 	$8 per week to 
minimum rate awards. 
22 September 1994 	$8 per week - replaces 
the October 1993 
adjustment. 
$8 p/w - at enterprise 
level. 
22 March 1995 	$8 -p/w at award level 
22 September 1995 	$8 - p/w at enterprise 
22 March 1996 	level 
$8 - p/w at award level 
Notes: CPI = Consumer Price Index P/W= per week Note that the link between 
wage cases and the CPI was broken from 1987 onwards. The CPI figures since then 
are inserted here as a guide only. 
Source: CCH (1997) Australian Resource Management, Sydney, CCH Australia, 
pp5671-5673 
APPENDIX 12.1 
Summary Profiles of Algorithmic (A) and Experiential (E) Compensation Patterns for 
Three Occupational Groups in Australian Subsidiaries and Companies as at 1995. 
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(a) Basis for Pay 
E E E E E A A/E A A E A A A A A Unit of Analysis 
Criteria for pay increases A A A/E A/E A A A E A/E E A/E E A/E NE E 
Level of Performance Measure N/A N/A E A N/A N/A A B A A E E E A E 
Time Orientation A A A A N/A A A A A A A A A A/E A 
Risk Sharing A A A A A A A A A A E E E A E 
Strategic Focus N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A ! N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A A A E E E 
Equity Concern NE A/E A/E A A A/E A/E A/E A E A/E A/E A A 
Reward Distribution A A A A A i A A A A A A A A A A 
Type of Control N/A N/A E A A N/A E E .. A A E E E E E 
(b) Design Issues 
U/K U/K U/K U/K U/K U/K A A U/K U/K A A A U/IC U/K Salary market policy 
Benefits market policy U/K U/K U/K U/K U/K U/IC A U/K U/K U/K A A U/K U/K U/K 
Incentives in pay mix A A A A A A A A A A E A E A E 
Total compensation A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A 
Reinforcement Schedule A A E A A A A A A A A A A A A 
Reward Emphasis E E E E E E E E E E E E E E , E 
(c ) Administrative Framework 
E E E E E E E E A A A A A A A Decision Making 
Pay Disclosure E E E E E E E A E A A A A AlE A 
Governance Structure E E E E E E E A E A E A A A E 
Nature of pay policies A A E A A ; A A A A E A A/E A A E 
OVERALL A or E*** A A E A A IA A A A A A A A A A/E 
Notes : N/A = *Metalco as at 1993. ** High Tech Australia is defined as a company. *** The stated general comnensation Pattern for each subsidiary's occupation is based 
on those common compensation elements in each pair of subsidiaries for which data were available in both. A/E=Balance of A and E. N/A= Not applicable. U/K = Unknown. 
Summary Profiles of Algorithmic (A) and Experiential (E) Compensation Patterns for 
	APPENDIX 12.2 
Three Occupational Groups in Singaporean Subsidiaries as at 1995. 
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fa) Basis for Pay 
A E E A ** A A/EA AEA A A A A Unit of Analysis 
Criteria for pay increases A A NE A A NE A A E A/E E E E E 
Level of Performance Measure N/A E E N/A - N/A E E N/A E E E A A A 
Time Orientation A A A A -A A A A AA A A A A 
Risk Sharing EEEE -EE B 	EEEE E E E 
Strategic Focus N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 	N/A N/A AE E E E 
Equity Concern NE NE A A/E - NE E E 	E E A/E E E E E 
Reward Distribution A A A A -A A A 	A AA A A A E 
Type of Control N/AEEN/A-N/AEN/AN/AAEE E E E 
(b) Design Issues 
A A A U/K - A A A 	A U/K A A A U/K U/K Salary market policy 
Benefits market policy A A U/K U/K - A A U/K 	U/K U/K A A U/K U/K U/K 
Incentives in pay mix EEE A -EEE A A/EEE E A E 
Total compensation A A A A -A A A 	A AA A A A A 
Reinforcement Schedule ABE A -A E A 	A AA A A A A 
Reward Emphasis EEEE -EEE E EEE E E E 
(C ) Administrative Framework 
A E E E -AEE EEA A A EE Decision Making 
Pay Disclosure E E E A -E A A 	A AAA A A A 
Governance Structure EEE A -E A A 	A AA A A A A 
Nature of pay policies A A AE -A AE EEANEE E E 
OVERALL A or E*** A E E A - A A/E M/A 	A A M/A M/A NE E 
Notes :* Metalco as at 1993. ** No operators or industrial staff in this subsidiary. ***The stated general compensation pattern for each subsidiary's occupation 
is based on those common compensation elements in each pair of MNE subsidiaries for which data were available and applicable in both. N/A = Not applicable. 
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APPENDIX 12.3 
Frequency of Employee Benefits in CaseStudy Subsidiaries and Companies*  in Australia 
Industrial/ 
Blue Collar 
Unskilled 	Skilled 
ClericaU 
Admin 
Sales/ 
Technical 
Professional/ 
Management 
Board 
Total 
out of 5 
Total 
out of 5 
Total 
out of 5 
Total 
out of 5 
Total 
out of 5 
Total 
out of 
3** 
Acting allowance 2 2 2 
Annual leave 5 5 5 5 5 3 
Attendance allowance 1 1 
Business entertainment expenses 1 1 1 3 4 2 
Cellular phones 2 2 3 3 3 3 
Co-operative shares 2 2 3 3 4 3 
Compassionate leave 5 5 5 5 5 3 
Death benefit 3 3 3 3 3 2 
Dental treatment 1 1 2 1 
Early retirement schemes 2 2 2 2 2 1 
External/social recreational club 
membership 
1 1 1 2 4 3 
Festive loan/advance 
Fixed monthly transport allowance 
Free medical treatment/medicine 1 1 2 2 2 1 
Funeral leave benefit 2 2 2 2 2 1 
Hospiral ward benefit 1 1 3 2 
Housinj loan 1 2 
Housing renovation loan 
Laundry benefit 2 2 
Life insurance 1 1 1 
Long service award 4 4 5 5 5 3 
Long-term illness 3 3 s 4 4 3 
Machine allowance 1 1 
Marriage leave 
Maternity leave 5 5 5 s 5 3 
Meal allowance 5 5 2 
Medically board-out benefit 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Other loans 2 1 
Paternity leave 5 5 s 4 4 2 
Personal insurance 1 1 1 
Provision of car 1 5 5 3 
Reimbursement for use of own car 
on company business 
2 3 3 3 3 2 
Retirement benefit (>CPF) 
[Singapore] 
Retrenchment benefit 5 5 5 s 5 3 
Service benefit 1 1 
Shift allowance s 5 2 1 
Sick leave 5 5 5 5 5 3 
Specialist surgical fee 1 1 1 
Study leave benefit 4 4 4 4 5 1 
Superannuation (Australia) 5 5 5 5 5 3 
Transport benefit/allowance/ 
reimbursement 
3 3 3 3 3 2 
Uniform s 5 2 2 1 
Union day leave 
Union education leave 4 4 2 1 1 
Unpaid leave 3 3 4 4 4 2 
VobintAty resignation benefit 2 2 2 2 2 1 
Note: * High Tech Australia is interpreted as a company in the thesis. Only three subsidiaries and companies had 
boards of directors. 
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APPENDIX 12.4 
Frequency of Employee Benefits in Case Study Subsidiaries in Singapore 
Industrial/Blue Collar 
Unskilled 	Skilled 
Clerical/ 
Admin 
Sales/ 
Technical 
Professional/ 
Management 
Board 
Total out 
of 4* 
Total out 
of 4* 
Total out 
of 5 
Total out 
of 5 
Total out 
of 5 
Total 
out of 
2** 
Acting allowance 3 3 1 1 1 
Annual leave 4 4 5 5 5 2 
Attendance allowance 
Business entertainment expenses 1 4 4 2 
Cellular phones 1 1 1 3 2 2 
Co-operative shares 1 1 1 1 1 
Compassionate leave 4 4 5 5 5 2 
Death benefit 3 3 4 4 3 1 
Dental treatment 2 2 3 3 3 1 
Early retirement schemes 1 1 1 1 1 1 
External/social/club membership 1 2 
Festive loan/advance 3 3 3 3 2 
Fixed monthly transport allowance 1 1 2 3 2 1 
Free medical treatment/medicine 4 4 5 5 5 1 
Funeral leave benefit 3 3 3 3 3 1 
Hospital ward benefit 4 4 5 5 5 2 
Housing loan 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Housing renovation loan 
Laundry benefit 2 2 
Life insurance 1 1 3 3 2 1 
Long service award 3 3 4 4 4 1 
Long-term illness 3 3 4 4 4 1 
Machine allowance 
Marriage leave 2 2 3 3 3 1 
Maternity leave 4 4 5 5 5 2 
Meal allowance 3 3 1 1 1 
Medically board-out benefit 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Other loans 1 
Paternity leave 2 2 2 2 2 1 
Personal insurance 1 1 1 1 1 
Provision of car 1 3 2 
Reimbursement for use of own car 1 1 3 5 4 1 
Retirement benefit (>CPF) 
Retrenchment benefit 3 3 3 3 3 
Service benefit 2 2 2 2 1 
Shift allowance 4 4 1 
Sick leave 4 4 5 5 5 2 
Specialist surgical fee 4 4 5 5 5 2 
Study leave benefit 3 3 4 4 4 
Transport benefit/allowance/ 
reimbursement 
4 4 5 4 3 
Uniform 4 4 1 2 
Union day leave 1 1 
Union education leave 2 2 1 
Unpaid leave 1 1 2 2 2 
Voluntary resignation benefit 
Notes: *Some subsidiaries did not have industrial staff. ** Only two subsidiaries had board of directors in Singapore. 
APPENDIX 13.1 
The Hodgetts and Luthans Recommendations for 
Compensation in Australia as reflected by Australian Subsidiaries and Companies as at 1995 
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Notes: N = Not supported. Y = supported. P = Partly supported. U/IC = Unknown. *Position as at 1993. **High Tech Austral a is defined as a company. ***Interpreted 
as meaning within the Australian subsidiary (or company in High Tech Australia), and not the whole 'ANTE where the owner is European. 
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	 APPENDIX 13.2 
Compensation in Singapore as reflected in Singaporean Subsidiaries as at 1995 
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